Carranza-Arana v. Mullin et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
NERY RODOLFO CARRANZA-
ARANA,
Petitioner,
§
§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-441
§
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his/her
official capacity, Secretary of U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, et
al.,
Respondents.
§
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Nery Rodolfo Carranza-Arana’s “28 U.S.C. Section
2241 Habeas Corpus Petition” (“§ 2241 Petition”) and “Petitioner’s Brief Regarding
Habeas Relief After Buenrostro” (“Habeas Brief”). 	Dkt. Nos. 1, 7. 	For the reasons
discussed below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Carranza-Arana’s § 2241
Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Carranza-Arana, a citizen of Guatemala, is in immigration custody at the Port
Isabel Detention Center (“PIDC”) located in Los Fresnos, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No.
7 at 1. In his § 2241 Petition, Carranza-Arana states that he has been detained at PIDC
since January 20, 2026. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
1 Information obtained from Carranza-Arana’s § 2241 Petition and Habeas Brief. 	See Dkt. Nos. 1, 7.
Carranza-Arana’s A-number is A-221438694, and his country of origin is Guatemala. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2; Dkt.
No. 7 at 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 23, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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subsequently placed Carranza-Arana into removal proceedings, detaining him under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (hereinafter, “§ 1225(b)(2)(A)”). See Dkt. No. 7 at 4–5. On March
27, 2026, an immigration judge (“IJ”) issued an order of removal for Carranza-Arana,
who subsequently filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)2. Dkt. No.
7 at 2. Carranza-Arana remains in detention pending his removal proceedings.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized district courts to resolve habeas
petitions, including immigration-detention cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3); see
also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001). 	Habeas exists solely to “grant
relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody.” 	Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933,
935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, for the writ to issue, the petitioner must be “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). A court considering a habeas petition must “determine the facts, and dispose
of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
B. 	28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,
“if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under § 1229a[.]” When an alien is held under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the statute
2 Carranza-Arana’s appeal to the BIA remains pending. See EOIR Automated Case Information, Executive
Office of Immigration Review, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (search “A-Number” field as “221438694”
and “Nationality” field as “Guatemala”).
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mandates detention pending the resolution of the alien’s removal proceedings, subject to
certain narrow exceptions3. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (hereinafter, “§ 1226(a)”), “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 	Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a)
allows, but does not require, the Attorney General to release detained aliens on bond. 28
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Buenrostro-Mendez held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that DHS properly classified and detained noncitizens who are not
admitted to the United States under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at
502. 	The Fifth Circuit held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be
applicants for admission.” Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit held that “seeking admission” is
equivalent to being an “applicant for admission” by operation of law. 	Id. 	As a result,
aliens who do not show “clearly and beyond a doubt that” they are entitled to be admitted
to the United States “shall be detained.” See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
However, while Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any statutory claim that might be
raised with respect to an alien’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), it does not address any
constitutional claims relating to the alien’s detention under the statute. 	Accordingly, a
3 The Secretary of Homeland Security may temporarily parole into the United States “any alien applying for
admission” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A); see Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022). However, once the purposes of the parole
have been served, the alien must immediately be returned to custody, and his case “shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(A).
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court considering a habeas petition seeking relief with respect to § 1225(b)(2)(A) must
still review any constitutional claims raised by a petitioner.
C. 	Demore v. Kim
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that detention during deportation proceedings is a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. 	Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
523 (2003); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
The 	Supreme 	Court 	reasoned 	that 	detention 	pending 	an 	alien’s 	removal
proceedings “serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing
prior to or during their removal proceedings.” 	Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. 	Further, the
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that mandatory detention was
unnecessary to prevent aliens from absconding during removal proceedings, stating that
“the Due Process Clause does not require [the Government] to employ the least
burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
In his § 2241 Petition, Carranza-Arana challenges the Government’s ability to
detain him without an individualized bond hearing under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Dkt. No. 7 at 5–7.
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A. 	Buenrostro-Mendez foreclosed any relief with respect to Carranza-
Arana’s claim that his continued detention violates the INA.
In his § 2241 Petition, Carranza-Arana states that he is misclassified as an
“applicant for admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he “is a noncitizen that is within
the United States without lawful status who entered without inspection and was
apprehended.” 	Id. at 5. 	However, in light of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-
Mendez, the Court finds that Carranza-Arana is properly classified under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Carranza-Arana states that he initially entered the United States in 2009. Dkt. No.
1 at 3. 	Critically, Carranza-Arana admits that he entered the country without being
admitted or paroled. Dkt. No. 7 at 5. Carranza-Arana relies on his prolonged presence in
the United States to justify his eligibility for bond. 	As previously discussed, the Fifth
Circuit in Buenrostro-Mendez held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens]
to be applicants for admission.” 	166 F.4th at 502. 	Further, “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States […] shall be
deemed for the purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 	8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1).
Carranza-Arana, then, appears to be properly classified as “an applicant for
admission” who is “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A); DHS “shall detain”
Carranza-Arana pending his removal proceedings.
B. 	Carranza-Arana’s 	continued 	detention 	does 	not 	violate 	the 	Fifth
Amendment’s 	Due 	Process 	Clause, 	as 	detention 	during 	removal
proceedings is constitutionally permissible
Carranza-Arana asserts that this § 2241 Petition should not be denied because he
“has been in custody for a significant period and the likelihood of his case advancing
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through the BIA review process within any reasonable period of detention is substantially
unlikely.” Dkt. No. 7 at 8.
As discussed above, Carranza-Arana is proper under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court
must then evaluate whether Carranza-Arana’s detention pending his removal proceedings
violates his Due Process rights. 	The Court finds the Supreme Court’s Demore decision
controlling in this instance. While the Demore decision focused on § 1226(c), requiring
mandatory detention for aliens convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, the Supreme
Court did not rely on a prior criminal conviction in reaching its decision. 	Instead, the
Supreme Court focused on the Government’s interest in ensuring that aliens did not
abscond prior to or during their removal proceedings. Id. at 528. Further, it explicitly
addressed 	the 	constitutional 	validity 	of 	mandatory 	detention 	during 	removal
proceedings. Id. at 531. The Court, then, finds that same reasoning applies to Carranza-
Arana’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court finds that Carranza-Arana’s continued detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)
without a bond hearing does not violate his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. Accordingly, Carranza-Arana’s § 2241 Petition should be denied.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Carranza-
Arana’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
V. 	NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
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days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
F ED. R. CIV . P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 23rd day of July, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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