Vazquez-Andrade v. Vergara et al

1/6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
JORGE VAZQUEZ-ANDRADE,
Petitioner,
§
§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-313
§
WARDEN, OF EL VALLE
DETENTION CENTER, in their
official capacity, et al.,
Respondents.
§
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Jorge Vazquez-Andrade’s “Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus” (Vazquez-Andrade’s “§ 2241 Petition”). 	Dkt. No. 1. 	For the reasons
discussed below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Vazquez-Andrade’s § 2241
Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Vazquez-Andrade, a citizen of Mexico, is in immigration custody at El Valle
Detention Facility (“El Valle”) located in Raymondville, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. In his §
2241 Petition, Vazquez-Andrade states that he has been detained at El Valle since
February 6, 2026. Id. at 6. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently
placed Vazquez-Andrade into removal proceedings, detaining him under 8 U.S.C. §
1 Information obtained from Vazquez-Andrade’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1. Vazquez-Andrade’s A-
number is A-221060429, and his country of origin is Mexico. Dkt. No. 1 at 2.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 1:26-cv-00313 Document 4 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6

2/6
1225(b)(2)(A) (hereinafter, “§ 1225(b)(2)(A)”). Id. at 2, 10. As a result, Vazquez-Andrade
remains in detention pending his removal proceedings.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized district courts to resolve habeas
petitions, including immigration-detention cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3); see
also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001). 	Habeas exists solely to “grant
relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody.” 	Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933,
935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, for the writ to issue, the petitioner must be “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). A court considering a habeas petition must “determine the facts, and dispose
of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
B. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,
“if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under § 1229a[.]” When an alien is held under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the statute
mandates detention pending the resolution of the alien’s removal proceedings, subject to
certain narrow exceptions2. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
2 The Secretary of Homeland Security may temporarily parole into the United States “any alien applying
for admission” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022). However, once the purposes of the
parole have been served, the alien must immediately be returned to custody, and his case “shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
Case 1:26-cv-00313 Document 4 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6

3/6
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (hereinafter, “§ 1226(a)”), “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 	Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a)
allows, but does not require, the Attorney General to release detained aliens on bond. 28
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Buenrostro-Mendez held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that DHS properly classified and detained noncitizens who are not
admitted to the United States under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at
502. 	The Fifth Circuit held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be
applicants for admission.” Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit held that “seeking admission” is
equivalent to being an “applicant for admission” by operation of law. 	Id. 	As a result,
aliens who do not show “clearly and beyond a doubt that” they are entitled to be admitted
to the United States “shall be detained.” See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
However, while Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any statutory claim that might be
raised with respect to an alien’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), it does not address any
constitutional claims relating to the alien’s detention under the statute. 	Accordingly, a
court considering a habeas petition seeking relief with respect to § 1225(b)(2)(A) must
still review any constitutional claims raised by a petitioner.
C. 	Demore v. Kim
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that detention during deportation proceedings is a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. 	Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
Case 1:26-cv-00313 Document 4 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6

4/6
523 (2003); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
The 	Supreme 	Court 	reasoned 	that 	detention 	pending 	an 	alien’s 	removal
proceedings “serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing
prior to or during their removal proceedings.” 	Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. 	Further, the
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that mandatory detention was
unnecessary to prevent aliens from absconding during removal proceedings, stating that
“the Due Process Clause does not require [the Government] to employ the least
burdensome means to accomplish its goal.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
In his § 2241 Petition, Vazquez-Andrade claims his continued detention by the
Government, without an individualized bond hearing, violates the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Dkt. No. 1 at 10–11. Vazquez-Andrade states that he is not challenging
the statutory authority for his detention under § 1225(b)(2), but only “the constitutional
limits of prolonged civil detention.” Id. at 2.
Here, Vazquez-Andrade is being detained pending his removal proceedings. Dkt.
No. 1 at 4. However, Vazquez-Andrade asserts that his § 2241 Petition should not be
denied because he raises an independent constitutional challenge that “the Constitution
independently limits prolonged civil detention.” 	Dkt. No. 1 at 10. 	Vazquez-Andrade
claims his detention is unwarranted, stating “Respondents have not found that [Vazquez-
Andrade] poses a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Id.
As discussed above, Vazquez-Andrade’s detention is proper under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court must then evaluate whether Vazquez-Andrade’s detention pending his removal
Case 1:26-cv-00313 Document 4 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6

5/6
proceedings violates his Due Process rights. The Court finds the Supreme Court’s Demore
decision controlling in this instance. 	While the Demore decision focused on § 1226(c),
requiring mandatory detention for aliens convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, the
Supreme Court did not rely on a prior criminal conviction in reaching its decision.
Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the Government’s interest in ensuring that aliens
did not abscond prior to or during their removal proceedings. 	Id. at 528. 	Further, it
explicitly addressed the constitutional validity of mandatory detention during removal
proceedings. Id. at 531. The Court, then, finds that same reasoning applies to Vazquez-
Andrade’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	Vazquez-Andrade’s 	continued 	detention 	under 	§
1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing does not violate his due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Vazquez-Andrade’s § 2241 Petition should be denied.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Vazquez-
Andrade’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
Case 1:26-cv-00313 Document 4 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6

6/6
V. 	NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
F ED. R. CIV . P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 24th day of June, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:26-cv-00313 Document 4 Filed 06/24/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6