Ulanov v. The Warden of El Valle Detention Center

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
BAIEL ULANOV, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§
§ 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-246
WARDEN OF EL VALLE
DETENTION FACILITY, in his
official capacity, et al.,
§
§
§
Respondents. 	§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Baiel Ulanov’s “Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Ulanov’s “§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons
discussed 	below, 	it 	is 	recommended 	that 	the 	Court: 	(1) 	DISMISS 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Ulanov’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE
this case.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Ulanov, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, is in immigration custody at El Valle Detention
Facility (“El Valle”) located in Raymondville, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2. On June 28, 2024,
Ulanov entered the United States at a port of entry. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1. Subsequently, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) detained Ulanov, where he remains in
custody. Id. On February 5, 2025, Ulanov applied for asylum and withholding of removal
1 Information obtained from Ulanov’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1. Ulanov’s A-number is A-241380682,
and his country of origin is Kyrgyzstan. Dkt No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 21, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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to Kyrgyzstan. Id. On February 10, 2025, the immigration judge (“IJ”) issued an order
of removal to Kyrgyzstan. Id. at 40.
Ulanov 	subsequently filed an 	appeal 	of 	the 	IJ’s 	decision 	to 	the 	Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. On September 22, 2025, the BIA granted
Ulanov’s appeal on the grounds that the IJ’s decision did not provide a credibility finding,
nor did the IJ consider Ulanov’s status as a member of a “delineated particular social
group”. 	Id. at 73–74. 	On December 5, 2025, the IJ issued an order of removal to
Kyrgyzstan. Id. at 2. Ulanov filed an appeal for the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which remains
pending. Id.; see EOIR Automated Case Information, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (search “A-Number” field as “241380682” and
“Nationality” field as “Kyrgyzstan”).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Standing and Ripeness
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 	They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts presume that any given case lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of showing
otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770,
775 (5th Cir. 1986). 	Accordingly, federal courts have an independent obligation to
examine their own subject matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte. Rivero v. Fid. Invs., Inc.,
1 F.4th 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1670 (2022) (quoting Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
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The United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of
“cases” and “controversies.” 	Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 	Standing is an “essential and unchanging part” of the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. 	Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. 	Standing
requires, in part, an “actual or imminent” injury, i.e., one that is “ripe for decision.” Id. at
560; Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Schuehle
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002). For a claim to be ripe, it must have “matured sufficiently
to warrant judicial intervention.” 	Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 779
F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A premature claim for relief
is not judicially ripe and falls outside the federal courts’ limited jurisdiction. Shields, 289
F.3d at 835; see also Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(noting that standing and ripeness are “essential components of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.”).
Without subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have no authority to adjudicate
a case and must dismiss it. Goodrich v. United States, 3 F.4th 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2021);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 	Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without
prejudice. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021).
B. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241: Habeas Review of Final Orders of Removal
The district courts may grant writs of habeas corpus to persons in federal custody
in violation of federal law. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3). 	This power extends to
immigrant detainees in custody beyond the statutorily mandated removal period. 	8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001). Habeas review of
removal orders, however, is conditioned on the detainee first exhausting all available
administrative remedies. 	8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 	Failure to exhaust administrative
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remedies should result in dismissal without prejudice. 	Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm
Serv. Agency, 504 F.3d 592, 607 (5th Cir. 2007).
C. 	Zadvydas v. Davis
Immigration judges are authorized to issue orders of removal, which become final
once the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has acted or the time to seek review of a
removal order expires. 	See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; Texas v. United States, 524 F.
Supp. 3d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (Tipton, J.). Generally, the Government has 90 days
to execute a final removal order and remove the unauthorized immigrant from the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
Though § 2241 proceedings “remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention,” the detainee’s ability to seek
habeas relief is subject to certain time constraints. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. When the
Government fails to execute a removal order within the 90-day period, post-removal
detention must be limited to a period “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal;
indefinite detention is impermissible. Id. at 689.
This does not mean that any amount of post-removal-period of confinement is
unlawful; rather, the Government’s obligation to rebut a presumption of indefinite
detention does not activate until after detention has been ongoing longer than six months,
and only after the immigrant detainee first makes a showing that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Up to six months
of immigration detention after entry of a final removal order is, therefore, “presumptively
reasonable.” 	Id.; Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F.Appx. 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
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In arriving at the six-month presumption, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the sensitive interplay of separation of powers concerns and national
interests in the immigration context. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. 	The six-month
presumption, then, reflected a reasoned judgment that earlier review of post-removal-
period detention posed too great a risk to institutional interests to properly warrant
judicial scrutiny.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Critically, as his BIA appeal remains pending, Ulanov has not received a final order
of removal; his petition, then, is unripe. Dkt. No. 1 at 5; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(i)(B)(i) (“The
removal period begins … [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively
final.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (stating that the post-removal-period detention
statute applies only after a noncitizen has been ordered removed); Castillo-Rodriguez v.
I.N.S., 929 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding “the order of the immigration judge,
then, is not final when a timely appeal is taken to the Board [of Immigration Appeals]”);
Rendon-Valdes v. Noem et al., No. 4:26-cv-01278, 2026 WL 969964, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
13, 2026) (J. Ellison) (“the removal order does not become final until the BIA issues a
decision.”).
Therefore, judicial intervention at this stage is premature and, for the reasons
explained in Zadvydas, would be imprudent considering the Executive branch’s primary
prerogative over the administration of immigrant removal. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
700. The Court interprets Ulanov’s remaining arguments to derive from his claim that
his detention could be unreasonably prolonged due to his pending BIA appeal. See Dkt.
No. 1 at 6–7; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3–7. However, as discussed above, the removal period begins
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only on the date that the order of removal becomes administratively final. 	8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(i)(B)(i). 	Accordingly, Ulanov’s claim is not ripe and is subject to dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ulanov’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court
to CLOSE this case.
V. 	NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
F ED. R. CIV . P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 21st day of May, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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