Faroukou v. Warden of Port Isabel Detention Center

1/6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
FAROUKOU BODE, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-215
§
WARDEN OF PORT ISABEL
DETENTION CENTER, in his official
capacity,
Respondent.
§
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Faroukou Bode’s “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (Bode’s
“§ 2241 Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that
the Court: (1) DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Bode’s § 2241 Petition; and (2)
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Bode, a citizen of Togo proceeding pro se, is in immigration custody at the Port
Isabel Detention Center (“PIDC”) located in Los Fresnos, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 6. On
June 18, 2025, the immigration judge (“IJ”) issued an order of removal to Togo. Id. at 6.
Bode subsequently appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”). Id. On December 15, 2025, Bode’s appeal to the BIA was denied. Id.
1 Information obtained from Bode’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1. Bode’s A-number is A-221042301, and
his country of origin is Togo. Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 17, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 1:26-cv-00215 Document 13 Filed 04/17/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6

2/6
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Standing and Ripeness
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 	They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts presume that any given case lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of showing
otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770,
775 (5th Cir. 1986). 	Accordingly, federal courts have an independent obligation to
examine their own subject matter jurisdiction, even sua sponte. Rivero v. Fid. Invs., Inc.,
1 F.4th 340, 344 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1670 (2022) (quoting Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
The United States Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to the resolution of
“cases” and “controversies.” 	Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992); U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 	Standing is an “essential and unchanging part” of the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. 	Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. 	Standing
requires, in part, an “actual or imminent” injury, i.e., one that is “ripe for decision.” Id. at
560; Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Schuehle
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002). For a claim to be ripe, it must have “matured sufficiently
to warrant judicial intervention.” 	Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 779
F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). A premature claim for relief
is not judicially ripe and falls outside the federal courts’ limited jurisdiction. Shields, 289
F.3d at 835; see also Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(noting that standing and ripeness are “essential components of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.”).
Case 1:26-cv-00215 Document 13 Filed 04/17/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6

3/6
Without subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have no authority to adjudicate
a case and must dismiss it. Goodrich v. United States, 3 F.4th 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2021);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 	Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without
prejudice. Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021).
B. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241: Habeas Review of Final Orders of Removal
The district courts may grant writs of habeas corpus to persons in federal custody
in violation of federal law. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3). 	This power extends to
immigrant detainees in custody beyond the statutorily mandated removal period. 	8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001). Habeas review of
removal orders, however, is conditioned on the detainee first exhausting all available
administrative remedies. 	8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 	Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should result in dismissal without prejudice. 	Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm
Serv. Agency, 504 F.3d 592, 607 (5th Cir. 2007).
C. 	Zadvydas v. Davis
Immigration judges are authorized to issue orders of removal, which become final
once the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has acted or the time to seek review of a
removal order expires. 	See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1; Texas v. United States, 524 F.
Supp. 3d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (Tipton, J.). Generally, the Government has 90 days
to execute a final removal order and remove the unauthorized immigrant from the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
Though § 2241 proceedings “remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention,” the detainee’s ability to seek
habeas relief is subject to certain time constraints. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. When the
Government fails to execute a removal order within the 90-day period, post-removal
Case 1:26-cv-00215 Document 13 Filed 04/17/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6

4/6
detention must be limited to a period “reasonably necessary” to effectuate removal;
indefinite detention is impermissible. Id. at 689.
This does not mean that any amount of post-removal-period of confinement is
unlawful; rather, the Government’s obligation to rebut a presumption of indefinite
detention does not activate until after detention has been ongoing longer than six months,
and only after the immigrant detainee first makes a showing that “there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. Up to six months
of immigration detention after entry of a final removal order is, therefore, “presumptively
reasonable.” 	Id.; Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App'x 535, 536 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
In arriving at the six-month presumption, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the sensitive interplay of separation of powers concerns and national
interests in the immigration context. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. 	The six-month
presumption, then, reflected a reasoned judgment that earlier review of post-removal-
period detention posed too great a risk to institutional interests to properly warrant
judicial scrutiny.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Here, Bode’s appeal to the BIA of the IJ’s order of removal was dismissed on
December 15, 2025. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Therefore, it has only been four months since he was
issued a final order or removal, so his petition is unripe.2 	Dkt. No. 1 at 6; 8 U.S.C. §
2 Further, Bode claims that he has another immigration case “currently pending a review in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal[s]”, although Bode does not provide any identifying information for the Court to
locate his case. Dkt. No. 1 at 10. Regardless, a pending appeal could only shorten Bode’s window in
which he has been detained under a final order of removal.
Case 1:26-cv-00215 Document 13 Filed 04/17/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6

5/6
1231(a)(i)(B)(i) (“The removal period begins … [t]he date the order of removal becomes
administratively final.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (stating that the post-removal-period
detention statute applies only after a noncitizen has been ordered removed). This is fatal
to Bode’s § 2241 Petition because it falls short of six months; it falls within the window of
presumptive reasonableness. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; see also Chance, 453 F.
App’x at 536.
As a result, judicial intervention at this stage is premature and, for the reasons
explained in Zadvydas, would be imprudent considering the Executive branch’s primary
prerogative over the administration of immigrant removal. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
700. The Court interprets Bode’s remaining arguments to be derivative of his claim that
his detention is unreasonably prolonged and there is no significant likelihood of removal.
Dkt. No. 1 at 10–14. Accordingly, Bode’s claim is not ripe and is subject to dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Bode’s § 2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court
to CLOSE this case.
V. 	NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
Case 1:26-cv-00215 Document 13 Filed 04/17/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6

6/6
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 17th day of April, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:26-cv-00215 Document 13 Filed 04/17/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6