Cervantes Zuniga v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
JAIME CERVANTES ZUNIGA,
Petitioner,
§
§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-175
§
WARDEN, PORT ISABEL
SERVICE DETENTION CENTER,
in their official capacity, et al.,
Respondents.
§
§
§
§
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Jaime Cervantes Zuniga’s “Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (Zuniga’s “§ 2241 Petition”) and “Statement in
Response to the Court’s Order” (“Statement”). Dkt. Nos. 1, 6. For the reasons discussed
below, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Zuniga’s § 2241 Petition; and (2)
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Zuniga, a citizen of Mexico, is in immigration custody at the Port Isabel Service
Detention Center (“PISDC”) located in Los Fresnos, Texas. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. In his § 2241
Petition, Zuniga states that he has lived in the United States since 2001. 	Id. at 6. 	On
December 8, 2025, Zuniga was arrested by the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). 	Id. 	Subsequently, ICE transferred Zuniga to PISDC, where he
remains detained. Id.
1 Information obtained from Zuniga’s § 2241 Petition. See Dkt. No. 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged Zuniga as inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for entry to the United States without inspection. Dkt.
No. 1-1 at 6. DHS subsequently placed Zuniga into removal proceedings, detaining him
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (hereinafter, “§ 1225(b)(2)(A)”). Id. As a result, Zuniga is
subject to mandatory detention pending his removal proceedings.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241: Habeas Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized district courts to resolve habeas
petitions, including immigration-detention cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1), (c)(3); see
also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001). 	Habeas exists solely to “grant
relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody.” 	Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933,
935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, for the writ to issue, the petitioner must be “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). A court considering a habeas petition must “determine the facts, and dispose
of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
B. 	The Immigration & Nationality Act: § 1225(b)(2)(A)
Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,
“if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under § 1229a[.]” When an alien is held under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the statute
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mandates detention pending the resolution of the alien’s removal proceedings, subject to
certain narrow exceptions2. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (hereinafter, “§ 1226(a)”), “[o]n a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 	Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a)
allows, but does not require, the Attorney General to release detained aliens on bond. 28
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B).
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Buenrostro-Mendez held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that DHS properly classified and detained noncitizens who are not
admitted to the United States under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at
502. 	The Fifth Circuit held that “presence without admission deems the [aliens] to be
applicants for admission.” Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit held that “seeking admission” is
equivalent to being an “applicant for admission” by operation of law. 	Id. 	As a result,
aliens who do not show “clearly and beyond a doubt that” they are entitled to be admitted
to the United States “shall be detained.” See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).
However, while Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any statutory claim that might be
raised with respect to an alien’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), it does not address any
constitutional claims relating to the alien’s detention under the statute. 	Accordingly, a
2 The Secretary of Homeland Security may temporarily parole into the United States “any alien applying
for admission” on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806 (2022). However, once the purposes of the
parole have been served, the alien must immediately be returned to custody, and his case “shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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court considering a habeas petition seeking relief with respect to § 1225(b)(2)(A) must
still review any constitutional claims raised by a petitioner.
C. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause: Demore v. Kim
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of
law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that detention during deportation proceedings is a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. 	Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
523 (2003); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); see also
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001).
The 	Supreme 	Court 	reasoned 	that 	detention 	pending 	an 	alien’s 	removal
proceedings “serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing
prior to or during their removal proceedings.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 528. The Supreme
Court rejected Zadvydas’s arguments that mandatory detention was unnecessary to
prevent aliens from absconding during removal proceedings, stating that “the Due
Process Clause does not require [the Government] to employ the least burdensome means
to accomplish its goal.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
In his § 2241 Petition, Zuniga challenges the Governments’ ability to detain him
without an individualized bond hearing under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Dkt. No. 1 at 9–12.
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A. 	Buenrostro-Mendez forecloses any relief with respect to Zuniga’s
claim that his continued detention violates the INA.
In his § 2241 Petition, Zuniga argues that the mandatory detention provision under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to all inadmissible noncitizens residing in the United
States. 	Dkt. No. 1 at 9. 	Zuniga states that he is misclassified as an “applicant for
admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) due to his substantial ties and presence in the United
States. Id.
In light of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez, Zuniga’s argument that
he is misclassified as an “applicant for admission” fails. Critically, Zuniga admits that he
entered the country without being admitted or paroled. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. As a result, Zuniga
is properly classified as “an applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” under §
1225(b)(2)(A); DHS “shall detain” Zuniga pending his removal proceedings.
Further, 	in 	Zuniga’s 	Statement, 	he 	acknowledges 	that 	Buenrostro-Mendez
forecloses his statutory claim, conceding that his detention must be governed by §
1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. No. 6 at 1. Accordingly, Petitioner’s statutory claim that his detention
under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is improper and should be denied.
B. 	Zuniga’s continued detention is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment
Due 	Process 	Clause, 	as 	detention 	during 	removal 	proceedings 	is
constitutionally permissible
However, Zuniga asserts that his § 2241 Petition should not be denied because he
raises an independent constitutional challenge that “his continued civil detention without
any neutral, individualized determination of whether his continued confinement is
necessary to serve the Government’s legitimate interest.” Dkt. No. 6 at 2. Zuniga rejects
his detention, stating “[d]etention for non-criminal purposes is only allowed [‘]in narrow
nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification… outweighs the individual’s
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constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical constraint[‘].” 	Dkt. No. 1 at 10
(citing Zadvydas, 533 at 690).
As 	established 	above, 	Zuniga 	is 	properly 	detained 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A).
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	must 	evaluate 	whether 	his 	detention 	pending 	his 	removal
proceedings is a violation of his Due Process rights. The Court finds the Supreme Court’s
decision in Demore controlling in this instance. While the Demore decision focused on
§ 1226(c), which required mandatory detention for aliens who were convicted of one of a
specified set of crimes, the Supreme Court did not rely on a prior criminal conviction as a
prerequisite to its holding. 	Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the Government’s
interest in ensuring that aliens did not abscond prior to or during their removal
proceedings. 	Id. at 528. 	Further, it explicitly addressed the constitutional validity of
mandatory detention during removal proceedings, in general. Id. at 531. The Court, then,
finds that same reasoning applies to Zuniga’s detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court finds that Zuniga’s continued detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without
a bond hearing does not violate his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Accordingly, Zuniga’s constitutional claim should be denied.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court: (1) DENY Zuniga’s §
2241 Petition; and (2) DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
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V. 	NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen
days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
F ED. R. CIV . P. 72(b).
SIGNED on this 2nd day of June, 2026 at Brownsville, Texas.
____________________________
Ignacio Torteya, III
United States Magistrate Judge
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