Makhmudov v. Lyons et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
AZIZJON MAKHMUDOV,
Petitioner,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-CV-024
TODD M. LYONS, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner Azizjon Makhmudov is currently detained by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement at the El Valle Detention Facility in Willacy County, Texas. In this habeas action,
Petitioner contests Respondents’ ability to detain him without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner also challenges Respondents’ ability to detain him without revoking
or otherwise setting aside the conditions of his previous release. Petitioner bases his habeas action
on statutory arguments under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226, and on the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
On February 6, the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which foreclosed Petitioner’s statutory arguments.
Petitioner contends that Buenrostro did not address whether the law permits
Respondents to detain an individual under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without notice or other procedural
protections, when the individual had previously been released under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
(Statement, Doc. 10) He also argues that Buenrostro did not address whether the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits Respondents to detain an individual under Section
1225(b)(2)(A) without an opportunity to seek bond.
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s remaining claims lack
merit.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I.
In 2022, the United States detained Petitioner, but then released him under Section
1226(a), enabling him to live within the United States. In 2025, Petitioner was arrested without
notice and detained based on Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
Petitioner contends that having initially detained him under Section 1226, and through
which he obtained release, Respondents cannot reclassify and detain him under Section
1225(b)(2)(A) without notice or other procedural protections, including a bond hearing.
(Statement, Doc. 10)
As Buenrostro explained, Sections 1225 and 1226 “overlap[,]” rendering some aliens
potentially covered by both statutes. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 505. The Fifth Circuit
recognized that “[i]n contrast to past administrations, the current Administration has chosen to
exercise a greater portion of its authority by treating applicants for admission under the provision
designed to apply to them”–i.e., Section 1225. Id. at 507. Here, while the United States initially
detained Petitioner under Section 1226, Petitioner identifies no statutory or regulatory provision
preventing Respondents from now exercising its authority under Section 1225, which, under
Buenrostro, has applied to Petitioner since he entered the country without being admitted or
paroled.
Ultimately, Petitioner enjoyed liberty within the United States for some years when past
administrations exercised their discretion to forego applying Section 1225 to him. But no
statutory or regulatory provision, and no Constitutional principle, requires Respondents to follow
specific procedural steps before exercising their authority to the fullest under Section 1225.
In addition, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) contains a material procedural protection by requiring
detention only if a USCIS officer determines that an alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted.” Thus, any alien has the opportunity to demonstrate clear entitlement to
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admission, thus avoiding the statute’s mandatory detention provision. Here, Petitioner does not
assert that he could make such a showing or that he was prevented from attempting to do so.
II.
In his Petition (Doc. 1) and subsequent Statement (Doc. 10), Petitioner contends that his
detention violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Other courts have considered arguments substantively similar to those that Petitioner
advances. See, e.g., Zuniga v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-221-H, 2025 WL 3755126, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
29, 2025); Guzman-Diaz v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-3008-X-BN, 2026 WL 309938, at *8 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 5, 2026); Giron v. Noem, No. 4:26-CV-00086, 2026 WL 252370, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28,
2026); see also Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2024). These decisions applied
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence recognizing that for aliens seeking admission, due process is
satisfied through the procedures and rights that Congress elects to enact through legislation. See,
e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 138 (2020); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
The Court finds the reasoning of Zuniga, Guzman-Diaz, Giron, and Banyee to be
persuasive.1 For the reasons expressed in those decisions, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s
continued detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing does not violate his due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
1 While recognizing that other district courts have reached a contrary conclusion on this issue–see, e.g., Ochoa v.
Vergara, No. 1:26-CV-266-RP, 2026 WL 482211 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); Hassen v. Noem, No. EP-26-CV-00048-
DB, 2026 WL 446506, at *2 & n.1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026); Marceau v. Noem, No. EP-26-CV-237-KC, 2026 WL 368953
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026)–the Court respectfully disagrees with these decisions.
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III.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Accordingly,
it is:
ORDERED that Petitioner Azizjon Makhmudov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(Doc. 1) is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
Signed on March 31, 2026.
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Fernando Rodriguez, Jr.
United States District Judge
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