Gonzales v. Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
JESUS G. 1, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-215
§
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	§
Commissioner of Social Security, 	§
Defendant. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
ALJ TO DENY SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Plaintiff Jesus G. filed a Complaint in this Court after the Defendant Commissioner
of Social Security denied his application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI
of the Social Security Act. 	Dkt. No. 1. Before the Court are Plaintiff Jesus G.’s
“Memorandum Brief in Support of Reversal or Remand of Administrative Agency Action”
(Dkt. No. 14) and Defendant Commissioner’s “Defendant’s Brief” (Dkt. No. 17). Because
the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole, the Court recommends that the final decision denying benefits to Plaintiff
Jesus G. be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income benefits on September
29, 2023, alleging disability beginning February 20, 2023. Dkt. No. 7-6 at 2-32. Plaintiff also
filed an application for disability benefits on October 2, 2023, alleging disability beginning
on February 20, 2023. Dkt. No. 7-6 at 17. On May 20, 2025, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) held a hearing. Dkt. No. 7-3 at 38-54. On June 10, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision
1 Due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases and noting that judicial opinions are not subject
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in this case will
refer to the claimant only by first name and last initial.
2 The citation to the record refers to the Bates-stamped number on each record page.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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finding that Plaintiff has not been under a disability. Dkt. No. 7-3 at 15-27. The Appeals
Council denied review. Dkt. No. 7-3 at 2. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is final and ripe
for judicial review.3
APPLICABLE LAW
The Social Security statute provides the standard of judicial review of this Court for
any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In particular,
federal courts limit their analysis of the Commissioner’s decision to deny an application for
social security disability applications to two questions: “(1) whether the Commissioner
applied the proper legal standards; and (2) whether the Commissioner's decision is supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Est. of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d 744,
745 (5th Cir. 2000).
Regarding the evidentiary standard, substantial evidence is that which is relevant and
sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Spellman v.
Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.
Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1990). When applying the substantial
evidence standard, a court does not “reweigh the evidence in the record, not try the issues
de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner’s].” Johnson v. Bowen,
864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988). “Conflicts within the evidence are not for the court to
resolve.” Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990). The ALJ’s decision must
stand or fall on the rationale set forth in the ALJ’s opinion. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 455,
458 (5th Cir. 2000). If the Commissioner’s findings use the relevant legal standards and
are supported by substantial evidence, the findings are conclusive and so must be affirmed.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999).
The Social Security Act defines disability as “the inability to engage in any
3 When the Appeals Council declines review of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, the decision of
the ALJ constitutes the final decision of the Commissioner, and the ALJ’s factual findings and legal
conclusions are imputed to the Commissioner. See Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir.
2005).
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substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has summarized the Commissioner’s approach
to determine whether a claimant is disabled as the following:
the Commissioner uses a sequential, five-step approach [:] (1) whether the
claimant is presently performing substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the
claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant
from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the
claimant 	from 	performing 	any 	other 	substantial 	gainful 	activity.
Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Kneeland v. Berryhill, 850
F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The initial burden of proof lies with the claimant in the first four steps and the burden
shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3rd 431, 435 (5 th Cir.
1994). See id. “Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ considers the claimant's residual functional
capacity (‘RFC’), which serves as an indicator of the claimant's maximum capabilities
given 	the 	physical 	and 	mental 	limitations 	detailed 	in 	the 	administrative 	record.”
Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:23-CV-01953, 2024 WL 922783, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
4, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:23-CV-01953, 2024 WL 1201626
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2024) (citing Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754). The ALJ also uses the RFC
to “in both step four and step five to determine whether the claimant is able to do her past
work or other available work.” Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 754.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
At Step 1, the ALJ found that “since the alleged onset date” Plaintiff “has not had
earnings that rise to the specific levels set out in the regulations to constitute substantial
gainful activity.” Dkt. No. 7-3 at 17.
At Step 2, the ALJ found that Platiniff suffered “has the following severe
impairments: major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; panic disorder; and
substance use disorder[.]” Dkt. No. 7-3 at 18.
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At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination
of 	impairments 	that 	meets 	or 	medically 	equals 	the 	severity 	of 	one 	of 	the 	listed
impairments.” Id.
Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC as follows:
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work
at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: he
can 	understand, 	remember, 	and 	carry 	out 	detailed 	but 	not 	complex
instructions; he can occasionally interact with supervisors, coworkers, and
the public; and he can deal with occasional changes in a routine work setting.
Id. at 20.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has no past relevant work.” Id. at 25.
Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “has at least a high school education.” Id.
The ALJ took testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”), asking “whether jobs
exist in the national economy for an individual with the [Plaintiff]’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity.” Id. at 26. The VE testified that such an
individual “would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such
as:” Motor Vehicle Assembler, Floor Waxer, and Hand Packager. Id. Based on this
testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment to
other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Id. Accordingly,
the ALJ found that based on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, Plaintiff “not disabled”
from the alleged onset date to the date of the decision. Id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises the following issue for review: the “ALJ’s symptom assessment
violated the regulations and SSR 16-3p and is not supported by substantial evidence.” Dkt.
No. 14 at 2, 10. In particular, Plaintiff contests that the ALJ erred by “(A) relying on
minimal daily activities to infer the ability to perform full-time work, (B) failing to
adequately consider Mr. Gonzales’s medication side effects, and (C) failing to consider
steady changes or increases in medications, all of which demonstrated the severity of Mr.
Gonzales’s symptoms[.]” Id. at 2.
While the Court is certainly sympathetic to Plaintiff’s situation, the Court may only
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reverse the Commissioner’s decision if there is a legal error or a lack of substantial
evidence. In this case, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision does stand on the rationale
set forth in the ALJ’s opinion, Newton, 209 F.3d at 458, so the ALJ’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff contests that the ALJ relied on his minimal daily activities to infer
Plaintiff’s ability to perform full-time work. Dkt. No. 2 at 11-13. Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ considered “minimal daily activities” in his decision such as the following: “preparing
meals, buying groceries and personal necessities, dressing, bathing, taking medications,
[and] performing other personal care tasks daily and independently[.]” Dkt. No. 14 at 11.
Even if characterized as “minimal daily activities,” the Court notes that the ALJ considered
more than evidence than this in reaching the final decision. For instance, the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s “mental status/psychiatric screenings” but concluded that “they do
not reflect worse than mild difficulties with memory, understanding or applying[.]” Dkt.
No. 7-3 at 19. In addition, the ALJ still acknowledges that Plaintiff “‘has a moderate
limitation’ 	in 	several 	matters 	such 	as 	in 	understanding, 	remembering 	or 	applying
formation; in interacting with others; and with concentrating, persisting or maintaining
pace.” Dkt. No. 7-3 at 19. With these considerations, the ALJ finds that Plaintiff does
indeed face limitations “to work involving non-complex instructions, limited social
interaction and limited changes in work routine/setting[.]” However, the ALJ finds that
those limitations will “adequately 	account[] for any restrictions imposed by 	these
impairments.” Dkt. No. 7-3 at 23. Given this reasoning from the ALJ, the Court finds the
ALJ did not rely only upon Plaintiff’s daily activities when reaching his conclusions.
Plaintiff also contests the ALJ did not adequately consider the side effects of his
medication. Dkt. No. 14 at 2. However, the ALJ reasons that the side effects Plaintiff stated
in his testimony “are not reflected in the treatment/visit notes[,]” because no tremors or
other abnormal movements were noted. Dkt. No. 7-3 at 23. Further, the ALJ notes that
Plaintiff “often denied any side effects to his treating providers.” Dkt. No. 7-3 at 23. Given
these considerations, the Court finds that the ALJ did consider Plaintiff’s side effects
adequately even though the ALJ found the side effects did not limit Plaintiff as Plaintiff
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claimed.
Lastly, Plaintiff contests the ALJ also failed to consider the steady changes or
increases in his medications, arguing that these factors demonstrated the severity of his
symptoms. Dkt. No. 14 at 2. However, the ALJ did consider Plaintiff’s treatment routine.
Dkt. No. 7-3 at 23. The ALJ reasoned that “although [Plaintiff] has received treatment for
the allegedly disabling impairments, that treatment has been essentially routine and/or
conservative in nature[.]” The ALJ then relied on this reasoning to state that Plaintiff’s
treatment routine “demonstrates that the impairments are not as limiting as has been
alleged.” Dkt. No. 7-3 at 23. The ALJ specifically noted that
most of the claimant’s treatment since the alleged onset date has consisted of
recently-started medication management and counseling (Exhibits 18E; 6F,
9F generally), and the evidence as referenced above shows that this relatively
conservative therapy provides adequate relief of the alleged symptoms (e.g.,
noted to have improved memory, concentration, energy and/or appetite;
residual 	depressive 	and 	anxiety 	symptoms 	but 	some 	improvement;
depression 	“milder,” 	improved; 	denies 	any 	acute 	depression, 	denies
hallucinations, mood overall “getting there” and “balancing out”) (Exhibits
6F/59, 66, 95; 9F/13, 50).
Given this consideration paid to Plaintiff’s treatment, the Court is able to build a logic
bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s finding.
Ultimately, the Court finds the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments” is supported by substantial evidence. Dkt. No. 7-3 at 18.
Because of this finding and the Court’s limited ability to review the Commissioner’s denial
of an application of social security benefits, the Court recommends affirming the decision
of the Commissioner.
RECOMMENDATION
It is RECOMMENDED that the Court AFFIRM the decision of the Social Security
Commissioner and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to close this case.
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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United
States District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party filing objection must specifically
identify the factual or legal findings to which objections are being made. The District Judge
is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battle v. United
States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the
record before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings
without conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings
on appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs.,
L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on July 16, 2026.
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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