Sadat v. Venegas

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BROWNSVILLE DIVISION
SAYED S.1, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-cv-179
§
FRANCISCO VENEGAS, 	§
Respondents. 	§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO GRANT PETITIONER’S WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
RECOMMENDING PETITIONER’S RELEASE FROM DETENTION
I. 	Synopsis
Petitioner argues his detention is unlawful because it (1) exceeds the presumptively
reasonable period set out in Zadvydas and (2) there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Court agrees. 	The Government detained
Petitioner for over one year without deportation after securing a final order of removal; this
violates Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Thus, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court (1)
grant the Petition for 	Writ of Habeas Corpus; (2) order Petitioner’s release from
Respondents’ custody; and (3) deny Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. 	Jurisdiction
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his post-removal-period detention by
arguing that the Government has not shown there is a significant likelihood of his removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001)
(concluding that Ҥ 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for
statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.”); 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
1 Due to significant privacy concerns in immigration cases and noting that judicial opinions are not subject
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition in this case will
refer to the petitioner only by first name and last initial.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 30, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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the Constitution.”). Given Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to post-removal-period
detention2, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this claim.
III. 	Venue
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by . . .
the district courts . . . within their respective jurisdictions.” See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir.
Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973). Petitioner is currently detained in El Valle
Detention Facility. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. The Facility lies within Willacy County, a county served
by the Brownsville Division of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. Accordingly, venue is proper in this Court and division.
IV. 	Factual History
Petitioner is a national of Afghanistan. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7. On January 13, 2025,
Petitioner entered the United States and orally requested asylum. Id.; Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2.
Petitioner was interviewed by the Tactical Terrorism Response Team (TTRT), where he
claimed to have worked for the US military for two years and presented a letter from the
Department of Defense (DOD) to support his claim. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2. According to
government files, however, evidence contradicts this assertion and suggests that the letter
was possibly fraudulent. Id. Further, the government alleges that Petitioner has French
refugee status. Id.
On February 6, 2025, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
conducted a credible fear interview and subsequently issued a negative credible fear
determination.3 Id. Petitioner requested review by an Immigration Judge (IJ). Id. The next
day, on February 7, 2025, an Immigration Judge affirmed the negative credible fear finding.
On March 5, 2025, Petitioner submitted a request for reconsideration of his negative
credible fear finding to USCIS. Id. USCIS accepted Petitioner’s request for reconsideration
2 Petitioner stated that his asylum application is currently pending, but the Government alleges it was
denied. Dkt No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No. 18-1 at 3.
3 Petitioner’s credible fear interview occurred on February 6, 2025, the same day the negative credible fear
determination was issued. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2.
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of fear decision on May 6, 2025. Id. at 3. On May 20, 2025, the Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO) requested an update on Petitioner’s reconsideration request to the
USCIS Asylum office. Id. Then, on June 9, 2025, USCIS updated ERO that the request
was 	denied. 	Id. 	At 	this 	point, 	the 	ERO 	concluded 	that 	the 	removal 	order 	was
administratively final. Id. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.1, 1241.1(e). The 90-day removal period
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) ended on September 7, 2025. The 180-days of detention
mark passed on December 6, 2025.
The Government represents that, from April 2025 to January 2026, it engaged in
several efforts to effectuate Petitioner’s removal. Beginning in early April 2025, a photo
of the Petitioner was requested for a travel document. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2. By late April
2025, an electronic travel document for Petitioner was completed. Id. at 3. In July 2025, a
Detention and Deportation Officer (DDO) received a certificate of identity for Petitioner.
Id. However, Petitioner did not provide the requested information to complete his travel
document request process or his Afghanistan passport application on July 21, August 26,
October 31, and November 5 of 2025. Id. at 3-4. Due to not having a travel document,
Petitioner was denied a commercial removal in late July 2025. Id. at 3. In late October 2025,
Petitioner applied to the Incentivized Voluntary Departure (IVD) program but was denied
because he had a final order of removal. Id. A spreadsheet letter was sent to a DDO to
obtain a letter of removal on November 5, 2025, and on November 7, 2025, the spreadsheet
along with an I-269 was resent to Removal and International Operations (RIO) to obtain a
travel document. Id. at 4. An Afghanistan Transportation Letter is required for Petitioner’s
removal, and requests were sent to the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar for delivery to the
Afghanistan Embassy on September 12, December 15, and December 24, 2025; and
January 12 and January 22, 2026. Id. at 3-4.
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V. 	Procedural History
This case presents a unique procedural history due to the various habeas petitions
filed by the Petitioner. Petitioner filed “Declarations” on August 11, 2025, in two separate
civil actions initiated in different divisions within the Southern District of Texas. The first
civil action began in the Corpus Christi Division, was transferred to the Brownsville
Division, and then referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Ignacio Torteya. See Dkt. Nos. 2, 7,
8. The second civil action began in the McAllen Division before being transferred to the
Brownsville Division and ultimately referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Ignacio Torteya.
See Dkt. Nos. 1, 3, 4. On August 20, 2025, the Court ordered the consolidation of both civil
actions into Civil Action No. 25-cv-179. Dkt. No. 15.
On November 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus
(originally, Civil Action No. 25-cv-265) in the Southern District of Texas Brownsville
Division, which was subsequently referred to the undersigned. In this case, the Court
ordered the Government to respond to the Petitioner’s petition on February 3, 2026.
On January 7, 2026, in Civil Action No. 25-cv-179, Petitioner filed an amended
petition for writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”). Dkt. No. 30. In this case, the Court ordered
the Government to respond to the Petitioner’s amended petition on January 13, 2026. Dkt.
No. 33.
On July 29, 2026, the Court ordered for Civil Action No. 25-265 to be consolidated
into Civil Action No. 25-cv-179. Dkt. No. 41. In both cases, Petitioner asserts identical
claims and requests for relief. Accordingly, for ease of understanding, the Court will
consider Petitioner’s most recent petition (Dkt. No. 30) as the operative Petition.
In the Petition, Petitioner argues his detention violates the statutory limitations of 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) and his constitutional due process rights because there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Dkt. No. 30 at 19. Petitioner
requests his immediate release from Respondent’s custody. Id. at 28.
In Civil Action No. 25-cv-265, the Court ordered the Government to Show Cause
as to why the Writ should not be granted, Dkt. No. 12, and the Government responded with
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a Response to the Petition and a Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 18.4 Regarding
Petitioner’s indefinite detention claims, the Government maintained ERO is “actively
working to obtain a travel document for Petitioner and remove him from the United States
as quickly as possible.” Id. at 5. The Government also argues the Court should toll the
removal period to “account for Petitioner’s fraudulent conduct and unwillingness to assist
ICE with his removal.” Id.
VI. 	Applicable Law
a. 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
The District Court may grant the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when
Petitioner’s custody violates “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner must show that his or her custody violates federal law. See
Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that habeas relief
cannot be issued unless Petitioner alleges “that he or she has been deprived of some right
secured to him or her by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.”
(quoting Hilliard v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 759 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam)).
b. 	INA 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Zadvydas
The Immigration and Nationality Act denotes a “removal period” in which the
Attorney General “shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days”
when an alien is ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that 90-day-removal-
period, an alien must be detained per the statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A).
The statute is implicitly limited by the “Constitution’s demands.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 689. The “Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the Government to
‘depriv[e]’ any ‘person ... of ... liberty ... without due process of law.’” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 690. This constitutional concern becomes increasingly acute when detention lasts for
4 The Court notes there was a “Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” filed by the Government
in the operative case, Civil Action No. 25-cv-179. Dkt. 34. However, the Court is considering the
Government’s most recent substantive filings (Civil Action No. 25-cv-265, Dkt. 19 and 25) as the
operative responses for the remainder of this report.
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more than six months. Id. at 701. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court created
a framework in Zadvydas v. Davis for a Petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of his
or his continued detention after a six-month period. Id. See also Andrade v. Gonzales, 459
F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Zadvydas thus created a ‘6–month presumption’ of the
validity of detention under § 1231, after which an alien could attack the reasonableness of
his continued detention.”). “The alien bears the initial burden of proof in showing that no
such likelihood of removal exists.” Id. It is not the case that if an alien is not removed, then
they must be released after six months. Id. at 701 (“[A]n alien may be held in confinement
until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.”). If the court determines “removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer
authorized by statute.” Id. at 699-700.
c. 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13
Federal regulations “establish special review procedures for those aliens who are
subject to a final order of removal and are detained[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a). Notably, “[a]n
eligible alien may submit a written request for release to the [Headquarters Post-order
Detention Unit] asserting the basis for the alien's belief that this is no significant likelihood
that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(d)(1)
(emphasis added). After receiving the initial written request, the Headquarters Post-order
Detention Unit (HQPDU) conducts a review, which includes, among other procedures,
permitting the alien an opportunity to respond and possibly granting an interview with the
alien. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(e)(1-6). HQPDU must issue a written decision regarding “whether
there is a significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future under the circumstances” and provide the decision to the alien. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g).
A determination that “there is no significant likelihood that the alien will be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, despite the Service's and the alien's efforts
to effect removal,” absent special circumstances defined in the regulation, requires
arrangements be made promptly to release the alien subject to “appropriate conditions.” 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(g)(1). The regulations spell out the conditions of release. 8 C.F.R. §
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241.13(h). A determination that there is a significant likelihood that the alien will be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future results in a denial of the alien’s request. 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(g)(2). There is no avenue to pursue an administrative appeal of this denial.
Id.
d. 	Standard of Review: Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party (the Government)
establishes there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). 	The movant “can show
there’s no material dispute if he demonstrates that the [non-movant] could not prevail even
if each factual question were resolved in their favor.” Freedom From Religion Found., Inc.
v. Mack, 49 F.4th 941, 950 (5th Cir. 2022). A “genuine issue of material fact exists where
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant.” Piazza’s
Seafood World, L.L.C. v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 752 (5th Cir. 2006).
If the non-movant (Petitioner) would bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving
party may satisfy its summary judgment burden “by merely pointing out that the evidence
in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s claim.” Ortega Garcia v. U.S., 986 F.3d 513, 533 (5th Cir. 2021). The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out
specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. Id.
“All facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and all
justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor.” Crane v. City of Arlington, Texas, 50
F.4th 453, 461 (5th Cir. 2022). Thus, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the non-
movant, “but only when the there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Lexon Ins. Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
7 F.4th 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021). In the “absence of any proof,” the court cannot and will
not assume that the non-moving party could or would prove the necessary facts. McCarty
v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).
Finally, “a court should not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Chacon v. Copeland, 577 Fed. App’x. 355,
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360 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpubl.) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 150 (2000)) (internal quotations omitted). “Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputed
fact issues which are “irrelevant and unnecessary” will not be considered by a court in
ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id.
VII. 	Analysis
The facts material to Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim relate to the length of Petitioner’s
detention following the day his order of removal became administratively final and the
Government’s efforts to remove Petitioner to his home country of Afghanistan. The order
of removal became administratively final on June 9, 2025. No. 18-1 at 3. Because the facts
material to this case are undisputed, the issue in this case centers around whether there is a
significant likelihood Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.5
Petitioner’s current detention has surpassed six months. While the presumptively
reasonable period under Zadvydas is over, Petitioner “bears the initial burden of proof in
showing that no such likelihood of removal exists” Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538,
543 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
In the present case, Petitioner argues his prolonged detention indicates there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Dkt. No. 30 at 19.
The undisputed facts in the record show that Petitioner is a citizen of Afghanistan. Civil
Action No. 25-cv-265, Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2. Even one year after Petitioner’s order of removal
became final, Respondents still have not received a travel letter for Petitioner from the U.S.
Mission to Afghanistan in Doha, Qatar, which is required for his removal to Afghanistan.
Id. at 4. For these reasons, the Court finds Petitioner carried his initial burden to show that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. As a result,
5 The Court notes that whether Petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies is not contested. Still,
the Court highlights that Petitioner asserts he requested review of his negative credible fear finding by an
Immigration Judge on February 6, 2025, and then by USCIS on March 5, 2025. Dkt. No. 18-1 at 2-3. At
both times, the Petitioner was granted review and received a determination. Id.
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the Government must now “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut” this showing.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
The Government maintains that there is a significant likelihood Petitioner’s removal
will be effectuated in the near future. See generally Civil Action No. 25-cv-265, Dkt. No.
18. The Government points out that the ERO has submitted numerous requests to the US
Mission to Afghanistan for a travel letter to effectuate Petitioner’s removal. Id. at 5. The
Government also argues that difficulties in obtaining a travel document is due to
Petitioner’s lack of cooperation in completing his Afghanistan passport application. Id.
Further, the Government argues that this is cause for tolling the detention period. Id. To
support the tolling argument, the Government cites the statutory provision which allows
the removal period to extend beyond 90 days if the alien “fails or refuses to make timely
application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's departure or
conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal subject to an order of removal.” 8 U.S.C.
§1231(a)(1)(C). However, even if the removal period is or was extended6, the Court relies
on Supreme Court jurisprudence, which allows Petitioner to attack the constitutionality of
his mandatory detention under §1231 after a six-month period. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701;
see also Andrade, 459 F.3d at 543.
The Court turns to the Government’s updates concerning its attempts to return
Petitioner to Afghanistan. As of yet, the Government has not progressed beyond requesting
a transportation letter from the US Mission to Afghanistan. The Government requested
transportation letters five times with no timeline for receipt. Civil Action No. 25-cv-265,
Dkt. No. 18-1 at 3-4. The Court considers these facts insufficient to demonstrate that there
is a significant likelihood the Government will remove Petitioner in the reasonably
foreseeable future. See Mogos v. Thompson, 2026 WL 475079, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13,
2026) (finding a Government declaration representing that ICE is actively working to
6 The Court does not reach a conclusion on whether Petitioner’s conduct can or does constitute failing or
refusing to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure,
or whether his conduct can or does constitute conspiring or acting to prevent his removal subject to an order
of removal.
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secure removal to a third country did not carry the Government’s burden under the facts of
the case). The Government’s mere request for acceptance, even if made to numerous
countries, does not show Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
See Trejo v. Warden of ERO El Paso E. Montana, 807 F. Supp. 3d 697, 705 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 24, 2025) (finding that “Respondents cannot carry their burden [under Zadvydas] with
the outstanding requests, alone.”).
Under these circumstances, the Court finds the Government did not carry its burden
under Zadvydas. Moreover, the Court finds there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future in Petitioner’s case. Consequently, Petitioner’s detention
is unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700. This
action is also a violation of the due process clause. Villanova v. Tate, 801 F. Supp.3d 694,
704 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 2025) (Hittner, J.). Because of this finding, the Court finds
Respondents are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court is mindful that the government has the right to enforce Petitioner’s Order
of Removal. Id. However, when there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, it is impermissible for the Government to continue to detain
Petitioner indefinitely. Id. Furthermore, the Court notes that the choice at issue here “is
between imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be violated.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 698. Considering this, release from detention under the proper
release conditions is recommended.7
Because the Court recommends granting habeas relief under Petitioner’s challenge
to his post-removal-period detention, the Court finds no need to address any claim or
challenge not addressed in this report and recommendation. Id.
VIII. 	Recommendation
It is RECOMMENDED that the Court:
(1) GRANT Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus;
7 See Mogos v. Thompson, 2026 WL 475079, at *6 (“Zadvydas requires Petitioner’s release from [his]
unlawful detention.”).
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(2) RELEASE Petitioner from detention subject to supervision in accordance with
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.5;
(3) DENY the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgement (Dkt. No. 18 in 1:25-
cv-265); and
(3) DENY as MOOT Petitioner’s Motion to Consolidate (Dkt. No. 39).
IX. 	Notice to the Parties
The parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of
this Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections, if any, with the United
States District Judge assigned to this case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When filing an objection,
a party must object to specific facts or legal findings in this Report and Recommendation.
The District Judge is not required to consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections.
Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
If any party fails to timely object to any factual or legal findings in this Report and
Recommendation, the District Judge is not required to conduct a de novo review of the
record before adopting these findings. If the District Judge chooses to adopt such findings
without conducting a de novo review of the record, the parties may not attack those findings
on appeal, except on the grounds of plain error. Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs.,
L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed on July 30, 2026.
____________________________
Karen Betancourt
United States Magistrate Judge
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