Clem v. Martinez et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTR]CT OF TEXAS
SAN ANGELO DIVISION
JOSHUA COBY CLEM,
Plaintiff,
No. 6:25-CV-061-H
CARLOS MARTINEZ, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE
GE AND VERRULING
Before the Court are the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (FCR) of
United States Magistrate Judge John R. Parker (Dkt. No. 23). Judge Parker concludes that
the plaintiffs suit is frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
He recommends the Court dismiss the suit with prejudice and likewise deny the pending
motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 6). The plaintifftimely filed objections to the
FCR (Dkt. No. 24).
The Court overrules the objections and adopts the FCR in full. The Court agrees
that, after multiple attempts, the plaintiffhas failed to state a viable claim and asserts on.ly
frivolous, sovereign-citizen theories. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the action with
prejudice and terminates the pending motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 6).
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l. Background
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
The plaintiff, Joshua Coby Clem, filed suit, pro se, on July 17,2025, against Carlos
Marinez, Crockett County Constable,r for alleged constitutional violations that occurred
when he was anested and detained for driving without a valid driver's license in violation of
Texas law. Saa Dkt. No. l. Per the Court's standing order, the case was referred to Judge
Parker for pretrial management. Dkt. No. 2. Clem has since filed a request to proceed iz
forma pauperis (IFP) (Dkt. No. 4); a motion for preliminary injunction asking the Court to
enjoin govemment officials from anesting, detaining, or citing him for continuing to drive
without a license (Dkt. No. 6); multiple amendments, supplements, and requests to amend
his original complaint (Dkt. Nos. 5; 10; 11; 14;16: 17;18; 19; 21); and answers to Judge
Parker's questionnate (Dkt. No. 15).
Judge Parker granted the plaintifls request to proceed IFP and screened the case
pursuantto28U.S.C.$0 1915(eX2)(B)and1915A.,SeeDkt.Nos.7; 8. JudgeParkeralso
granted the plaintiffs request to amend his complaint and allowed the plaintiffto frle his
most recent amended complaint and "supplemental document" together as his second
amended compiaint. See Dkt. No.20; see alsoDkt. Nos. l8-1; 19;22.
In his live pleading, the plaintiff asserts violations of his First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, arising from his arrest and detention for driving without a
Texas driver's license. Dkt. No. 22 at 2. Although the plaintiff admits he did not have a
license at the time of his arrest and detention, he claims such arrest violated his
1 Clem hrst sued Martinez and later amendcd his complaint to add Susan Wemer, Justice of the
Peace, Precinct I, Tom Green County, Texas, and Chris Taylor, County Attorney for Tom Grcen
County, Texas. See Dkt. No.22.
I
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constitutional rights because he "do[es] not believe [he] was required to possess one because
[he] was not engaged in any commercial activity" and instead was "exercising [his]
constirutional right to travel privately." Dkt. No. 15 at 3. He also contends that Martinez
has taken multiple retaliatory actions against him that have chilled his freedom of
expression, association, and movement, inciuding: citing his wife for traffic violations;
causing three police officers to conduct an "aggressive" traftic stop; standing outside his car
window while the other officers issued citations; parking "near or outside" his home and
conducting traffic stops ofother citizens; instructing other officers to warn him that he
would be arrested or his vehicle impounded if he continued to drive without a license; and,
approaching his son at a public pool to question him about the plaintiffs beliefs. Id. at7.
B. Judge Parker's FCR
Judge Parker evaluated thoroughly each ofthe plaintiffs claims, taking as true the
factual allegations made in the plaintiffs pleadings and response to his questionnaire, and
concluded that, even viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, his
claims were frivolous and stated no grounds for relief. See Dkt. No. 23. Judge Parker fust
concluded that the premise of Clem's claims-that he "is not required to have the State of
Texas's permission to operate a motor vehicle on public roads-is 'blatantly incorrect."' Id.
at 9-10 (quoting Perkins v. Brewste/, No. 1:17-CV- I 173, 2018 WL 4323948, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 7, 2018)). As for the alleged constitutional violations, Judge Parker concluded that:
(1) Clem cannot assert a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure claim because
he does not dispute the facts that Martinez relied on that gave him probable
cause to arrest Clem but, rather, disputes the validiry of the starute that made
his conduct unlawful, id. at 11
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(2) Clem cannot assert a Fourteenth Amendment due-process violation for
restricting his liberty interest in travel because the licensing requirement does
not prevent Clem from traveling but, instead, from doing so on public roads
without a proper license, rd at 72-14: and
(3) Clem cannot assert a First Amendment retaliation claim because he cannot
show that Martinez's only motive for his actions was retaliation against Clem
for activity protected by the First Amendment, id. at 14-76.
Considering the frivolity of the plailtiffs claims, Judge Parker also recommended denying
the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 17 .
The plaintiffs objections reiterate his contention that the state's enforcement of its
driver's license requtement through his anest and detainment violated his constitutionally
protected right to travel because the license requirement is inapplicable to a private citizen
who is not traveling for the purpose of commerce. Dkt. No. 24 at2. He also alleges for the
fust time that the defendants acted in concert to "oppress or injure" him for the "free
exercise of [his] constitutional rights" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 5241. Id. at 3. In suppon of
these objections, the plaintiffcites cases from the Supreme Court and state courts in Illinois,
Califomia, and Virginia. See id. at34,7-8.
2. Legal Standard
A parry who seeks to object to any part of a Magistrate Judge's FCR must file
specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. 28 U.S.C.
$ 636(bXl); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). As for portions where no specific objections are filed
within the 14-day period, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge's findings, conclusions,
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and recommendations only for plain enor. Senano v. Customs & Border Patrol, U.S. Custofis &
Border Prot.,975 F.3d 488, 502 (5th Ct. 2020).
When a party files objections, the Coun must review those objected-to portions de
novo. 28 U.S.C. 0 636OXl); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V.,22 F.3d 634, 646
(5th Cir. 1994). The district court may then accept, reject, or modifu the recommendatrons
or findings, in whole or in part. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Objections to the FCR must be
"specific"; they must "put the disfrict court on notice of the urged enor." .llilliams y. K&B
Equip, Co.,724F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 1984). "[A]n objection must identiry the specific
finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specifu the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed
determination is found." Thompson v. Bumpas, No. 4:22-CV-640,2022WL 17585271, at*1,
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2022) (citng United States y. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 3d 559, 564 (E.D.
Tex. 2020)).
The district court need not consider "[flrivolous, conclusive[,] or general objections."
See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834F .2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted).
Moreover, "[i]t is well settled that issues raised for the first time in objections to a magisrrare
judge's report are deemed not properly before the district court." K lnvs.,Inc. v. B-Gas Ltd.,
No. 2i-40642, 2022WL964210, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 30,2022) (tust citing Cupit r,. Witley,
28 F.3d 532, 535-36 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994); then citing United States v. Armstrong,95l F.2d 626,
630 (5th Cn.1992); and then citingHarrisonv. Smith,83 F. App'x 630,632 (sth Ck.2003)).
3. Analysis
The Court ovemrles the plaintiffs objections and affums the FCR in full.
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Foremost, the plaintiffdoes not make specific objections to identified portions of the
FCR or Judge Parker's well-reasoned conclusions about each claim, but rather generally
objects to Judge Parker's recommendation of dismissal with prejudice. SeeDkl No. 24 at
2-3. The Court has reviewed these unobjected-to portions of,the FCR for plain error.
Finding none, the Court accepts and adopts those portions of the FCR.
In short, the plaintifPs objections are merely reiterations ofthe conclusory allegations
made in his live pleading. And his citations to legal authority are either trelevant,
non-bindilg, or both. As the Court need not consider "[flrivolous, conclusive[,] or general
objections," Battle,834F.2dat421, the plaintiff s objections are overruled. Furthermore,
the assertion of a conspiracy befween the defendants, made for the first rime in the plaintiffs
objections, is not properly before the Court. Klnvs.,2022WL964210, at *5. Evenso, the
plarntiffhas made no factual aliegations to support such a theory.
4. Conclusion
In sum, the Court overrules the plaintiffs objections (Dkt. No. 24) and adopts the
FCR (Dkt. No. 23) as this Court's findings. Accordingly, the Court denies the plaintiffs
motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 6) and dismisses the action with prejudrce.
So ordered on February 11 zozo
JAMES SLEY HENDRIX
UNIT STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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