Service v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANGELO DIVISION
SIERRA S., 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 6:24-CV-092-H-BW
§
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL 	§
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 	§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Sierra S. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to the Social Security
Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner”) that denied her application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The Court has
jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The case was
referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to issue findings and
recommendations to the United States District Judge under Special Order No. 3-350.
(See Dkt. No. 12.) Plaintiff filed a brief on appeal (Dkt. No. 21 (“Pl. Br.”)), to which
the Commissioner filed a brief in response (Dkt. No. 28 (“Def. Br.”)). Plaintiff filed
a reply (Dkt. No. 29 (“Reply”)). After considering the pleadings, briefs, and
administrative record, the Commissioner’s decision should be AFFIRMED.
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I. BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability
beginning on June 16, 2021. (Dkt. No. 15-1 (“Transcript”) (“Tr.”) at 121.) Plaintiff
alleges a disability due to depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder
(“OCD”). (Id.) The claim was initially denied on September 19, 2022, (id. at 144),
and again upon reconsideration on July 28, 2023, (id. at 155), after which Plaintiff
timely requested an administrative hearing, (id. at 19).
On January 23, 2024, Administrative Law Judge Laura Roberts (the “ALJ”)
held a telephone hearing, at which Plaintiff appeared and testified. (Tr. at 63–102.)
Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Merce Lara, an attorney. (Id.) Shelly
Eike, an impartial vocational expert (“VE”), appeared and testified telephonically.
(Id.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on May 1, 2024, finding Plaintiff not
disabled. (Id. at 19–32.) On October 24, 2024, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for further review. (Id. at 1.) The ALJ’s May 1, 2024, decision
thus became the “final decision” of the Commissioner subject to judicial review
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	District Court Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is limited to whether
the Commissioner’s position is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. See 42
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U.S.C. § 405(g); Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014); Ripley v. Chater,
67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); accord
Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923. To determine whether substantial evidence of disability
exists, four elements of proof must be weighted: (1) objective medical facts;
(2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) claimant’s
subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) claimant’s age, education, and
work history. See Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing DePaepe
v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1972)).
The Commissioner, rather than the Court, must resolve conflicts in the
evidence, including weighing conflicting testimony and determining witnesses’
credibility, and the Court does not try the issues de novo. See Martinez v. Chater, 64
F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994).
Thus, the Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the
Commissioner’s but must scrutinize the entire record to ascertain whether substantial
evidence supports the hearing decision. See Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923; Hollis v.
Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court “may affirm only on the
grounds that the Commissioner stated for [the] decision.” Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923.
“Absent an error that affects the substantial rights of a party, administrative
proceedings do not require ‘procedural perfection.’” Wilder v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-
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3014-P, 2014 WL 2931884, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2014) (quoting Taylor v. Astrue,
706 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2012)). “The ALJ is not required to discuss every piece
of evidence in the record nor must the ALJ follow formalistic rules of articulation.”
Hunt v. Astrue, No. 4:12-CV-244-Y, 2013 WL 2392880, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 3,
2013) (citing Castillo v. Barnhart, 151 F. App’x 334, 335 (5th Cir. 2005)). “Procedural
errors affect the substantial rights of a claimant only when they ‘cast into doubt the
existence of substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.’” Wilder, 2014 WL
2931884, at *5 (quoting Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988)).
“Remand is required only when there is a realistic possibility that the ALJ would
have reached a different conclusion absent the procedural error.” Id. (citing January
v. Astrue, 400 F. App’x 929, 933 (5th Cir. 2010)).
B. 	The Sequential Evaluation Process
“In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits or [supplemental security
income], a claimant must suffer from a disability.” Copeland. 771 F.3d at 923 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The Act defines “disability” as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or last for a continued
period of 12 months. See id. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923; Cook v.
Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985).
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a
claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Wren, 925 F.2d at 125
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(summarizing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)). On the first four steps of the analysis, the
claimant has the initial burden of proving that she is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The burden shifts to the Commissioner on the fifth step to
show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy and is
therefore not disabled. Id. “A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at
any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis.” Lovelace
v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1987).
At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is
not disabled. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful work activity, the
ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment,
or combination of impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning of the Act,
meaning that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant’s ability to perform
basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of
“not disabled.” If the claimant does, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of
Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or
medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement, the
claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1509. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant’s
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residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the ability to perform physical or
mental work activities on a sustained basis notwithstanding limitations for the
collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant’s
RFC permits her to perform the requirements of her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then she is not
disabled. Id. If an individual’s impairment precludes her from performing past
work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to show that there is other gainful employment available in the
national economy that the claimant is capable of performing. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at
236. This burden may be satisfied either by reference to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines of the regulations or by expert vocational testimony or other similar
evidence. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987).
III. ALJ’s FINDINGS
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the process described
above and made the following findings in her May 1, 2024, decision:
1. 	The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
on December 31, 2023.
2. 	The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period
from her alleged onset date of June 16, 2021 through her date last insured of
December 31, 2023 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. 	Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe
impairments: major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder
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(“GAD”), OCD, trichotillomania, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),
and obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. 	Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one
of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).
5. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that,
through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except with the
following limitations: She can have no interaction with the general public,
although contact is ok. She can have occasional interaction with coworkers
and supervisors. She can perform no tandem or team work or fast-paced
assembly line type work with strict production quotas. She can understand,
remember, and carry out simple tasks with simple instructions in a routine
work setting. She can perform no climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds;
crouching or crawling. She can perform occasional climbing of ramps and
stairs; stooping; kneeling and balancing on uneven, moving, or narrow
surfaces. She will be off task 10% of the workday.
6. 	Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform any past
relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. 	The claimant was born on July 3, 1991, and was 32 years old, which is defined
as a younger individual age 18–49, on the date last insured (20 CFR
404.1563).
8. 	The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564).
9. 	Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because the claimant is limited to performing unskilled work.
10. 	Through the date last insured, considering the claimant’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have
performed (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569a).
11. 	The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
at any time from June 16, 2021, the alleged onset date, through December 31,
2023, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
(Tr. at 19–32.)
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Accordingly, the ALJ determined that, for the application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits filed on December 6, 2021, the claimant
was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act. (Id. at 32.)
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts two points of error in this appeal: (1) that the ALJ’s step-three
determination that Plaintiff’s impairments neither meet nor medically equal the
criteria of a Listing is not supported by substantial evidence, (Pl. Br. at 12–14), and
(2) that the ALJ’s finding at step five that Plaintiff could perform the jobs of retail
marker, routing clerk, and mail clerk is likewise not supported by substantial
evidence, (id. at 9–12).
A. 	The ALJ’s step-three finding is supported by substantial evidence.
At step three of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant’s impairments are of a severity to meet or medically
equal the criteria of an impairment found in the Listings. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The Listings describe impairments that the Administration
considers severe enough to prevent a claimant from doing any gainful activity,
regardless of her age, education, or work experience. Id. § 404.1525(a). A claimant
whose impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment “will be considered
disabled without the need to consider vocational factors.” Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d
431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
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For this reason, the criteria in the Listings are “demanding and stringent.”
Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994). The medical criteria defining the
listed impairments have been deliberately set at a higher level of severity than the
statutory standard for receiving benefits because the Listings “were designed to
operate as a presumption of disability that makes further inquiry unnecessary.”
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990).
Each Listing specifies the objective medical and other findings needed to
satisfy the criteria of that particular Listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(c)(3). A
diagnosis alone is not enough to establish that a claimant’s impairment (or
combination of impairments) meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing. Id.
§ 404.1525(d). Rather, a Listing’s criteria are only satisfied when the claimant’s
impairments meet every requirement, “including any relevant criteria in the
introduction, and meet[ ] the duration requirement” of lasting or being expected to
last for either “a specific period of time” stated in the Listing or a “continuous period
of at least 12 months.” Id. § 404.1525(c)(3)–(4). An impairment or combination of
impairments that manifests only some of a Listing’s criteria, no matter how severely,
does not qualify; if a claimant’s impairment (or combination of impairments) does
not satisfy every component, it does not meet the Listing. See id. § 404.1525(c)(3).
At this stage, the burden of establishing that an impairment or combination of
impairments is of Listing-level severity rests with the claimant. See Selders v. Sullivan,
914 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1990).
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The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe mental impairments:
major depressive disorder, GAD, OCD, trichotillomania, and PTSD. (Tr. at 21–22.)
The relevant mental disorder Listings were thus Listings 12.04 (depressive, bipolar,
and related disorders), 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), and 12.15
(trauma- and stressor-related disorders). See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.00(A)(1). For listed mental disorders, the ALJ looks to “the paragraph B
criteria” to determine the claimant’s ability to (1) understand, remember, or apply
information; (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and
(4) adapt or manage oneself. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(E). The ALJ
evaluates the effects of the claimant’s mental impairments on each of the four areas
of mental functioning using a five-point scale—no limitation, mild limitation,
moderate limitation, marked limitation, or extreme limitation. See id. pt. 404, subpt.
P, app. 1, § 12.00(F)(1)–(2). To satisfy the paragraph B criteria, a mental disorder
must result in either an extreme limitation of one or a marked limitation of two of
the four areas of mental functioning. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b).
After reviewing the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had a marked
limitation in concentrating, persisting, or managing pace and moderate limitations in
the other three paragraph B criteria. (Tr. at 22–23.) Because Plaintiff’s mental
impairments did not satisfy the paragraph B criteria by causing at least two moderate
limitations or one extreme one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments
failed to meet or medically equal the severity of one of the Listings. (See id.) In
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challenging the ALJ’s step-three decision, Plaintiff focuses on the paragraph B
criteria, arguing that the ALJ erred when she found Plaintiff to have a merely
moderate, rather than marked, limitation in adapting or managing herself. (Pl. Br. at
13.)
Plaintiff contends that “it is not apparent” from reading the ALJ’s decision
“why the ALJ found greater limitations in concentration/persistence/pace than in
adapting/managing.” (Id. at 13.) The ALJ assessed the evidentiary record,
including Plaintiff’s testimony as well as objective medical facts, and concluded that
Plaintiff had a marked limitation in concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace,
citing Plaintiff’s ability to drive, play games, prepare meals, and manage her own
medical care as reasons why she was not extremely limited in this area of mental
functioning. (Tr. at 23.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis of adapting or
managing oneself is flawed because it does not explain—if the ALJ is relying on the
same evidence as she did in the previous domain, and Plaintiff is still capable of
performing the same activities—why those “same activities should not dispel only
extreme limitation (and allow marked limitation) in this domain.” (Reply at 2.) If
the ALJ’s analysis of one of the paragraph B criteria resulted in the finding that
“Plaintiff was more limited than opined by the opinion evidence that the ALJ found
persuasive,” why did the ALJ’s analysis of another not result in the same finding?
(Pl. Br. at 13.)
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Plaintiff’s argument suggests a set of paragraph B criteria that each measure
the same quality, taking in the same evidence and necessarily arriving at the same
limitation rating. But the four paragraph B criteria are distinct categories, each
capturing its own broad area of mental functioning defined with a list of example
actions and activities. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(E). Different
facts, opinions, and portions of testimony within the same evidentiary record will be
relevant to the ALJ depending on the area in which the claimant’s limitations are
being measured.
The concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace area of mental functioning
refers to “the abilities to focus attention on work activities and stay on task at a
sustained rate.” Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(E)(3). To assess Plaintiff’s
ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, the ALJ first analyzed her
testimony, weighing Plaintiff’s contention that “she has limitations in concentrating
generally, paying attention longer than 30 minutes before requiring a break, focusing
generally, following instructions, completing tasks, avoiding distractions, and
maintaining a regular work schedule,” against her claims that she is also “able to
drive, prepare meals, watch television, do crafts, read, play games, use the internet,
and handle her own medical care.” (Tr. at 23 (citing various records)). The ALJ
then turned to the objective medical evidence in the record and found no mention of
“distractibility.” (Id.) The ALJ concluded Plaintiff has marked limitations in this
domain. (Id.) By contrast, the adapting or managing oneself area of mental
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functioning refers to “the abilities to regulate emotions, control behavior, and
maintain well-being in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.00(E)(4). Given the different ranges of activity covered by each criterion, it was
reasonable for the ALJ to determine that not all of the evidence discussed in the
“concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace” analysis would be relevant to the
“adapting or managing oneself” analysis.
Plaintiff’s repeated references to McCullough v. Berryhill, No. SA-18-CV-00128-
ESC, 2019 WL 1431124 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2019), in its argument against the
ALJ’s step-three decision also indicate a misunderstanding of the paragraph B
criteria. In McCullough, a claimant challenged an ALJ’s step-three decision that the
claimant’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the criteria of then-Listing
1.04A (disorders of the spine). Id. at *5. The relevant criteria for Listing 1.04A was
evidence of “nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of
pain,” limited “motion of the spine, motor loss . . . accompanied by sensory or reflex
loss,” and “positive straight-leg raising test.” Id. at *9. Denying that the claimant’s
impairments met the criteria of Listing 1.04A, the ALJ merely wrote that “there is no
evidence of nerve root compression . . . resulting in an inability to ambulate.” Id. at
*9. The court found error in the ALJ’s decision. Id. at *10. In its appeal to the
court, the claimant cited to medical evidence in the record that the ALJ had ignored
that supported a finding that his impairments met the criteria of Listing 1.04A.
McCullough, 2019 WL 1431124, at *10. But the more fundamental error in the ALJ’s
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decision was that, even if her explanation was supported by substantial evidence, it
would have been insufficient to support a finding that the claimant’s impairments did
not satisfy the criteria of Listing 1.04A, because the Listing encompasses a broader
category of nerve root compressions than just those that result in an inability to
ambulate. Id. at *9.
Plaintiff likens the present case to McCullough, arguing that, just as the ALJ in
McCullough erred by only addressing a narrow subset of the relevant criteria, the ALJ
here erred in her treatment of the final paragraph B criterion by “focus[ing] on the
management of isolative activities,” ignoring that Plaintiff’s “issues in this domain
were centered on adapting to changes.” (Pl. Br. at 13.) But this comparison is not
well-founded. In McCullough, the ALJ was to determine if the claimant’s
impairments met or medically equaled the severity of “nerve root compression
characterized by” a list of specific conditions and side effects; the ALJ’s conclusion
was that there was no evidence the claimant suffered nerve root compression
characterized by a condition that is not mentioned in the Listing. McCullough, 2019
WL 1431124, at *9. The ALJ’s decision was faulty because the answer it provided
did not resolve the question it posed.
Here, the ALJ was tasked with rating Plaintiff’s ability to adapt or manage
herself. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s cited evidence for why she is only moderately
limited in this domain, such as her ability to handle self-care and personal hygiene, is
related solely to her ability to manage herself and does not weigh against her issues
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adapting to change. (Pl. Br. at 13.) In comparing the present case to McCullough, the
implication seems to be that the ALJ truly only decided that Plaintiff was moderately
limited in managing herself, ignoring her significant limitations in adapting herself
and failing to fully rate her abilities in this domain. But the ability to adapt or
manage oneself is a single criterion, covering a broad range of mental functioning
including “managing your psychologically based symptoms; distinguishing between
acceptable and unacceptable work performance; setting realistic goals; making plans
for yourself independently of others; [and] maintaining personal hygiene and attire
appropriate to a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(E)(4).
For each of the paragraph B criteria, the ALJ is to assess one “rating of limitation
[for] the whole area of mental functioning,” not separate ratings for “each individual
part.” Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(F)(3)(f)(ii). Thus, evidence concerning
Plaintiff’s ability to manage herself should not be siloed away from her difficulties
adapting to change.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ in this case, like the ALJ in McCullough,
“addressed part of the facts relevant to the issues assessed,” but failed to “consider[ ]
other, more relevant facts, the due consideration of which might change the result of
the case.” (Pl. Br. at 13.) But in that case, the claimant could cite to evidence in the
record supporting his contentions, and the ALJ’s decision was so lacking in
explanation or detail it was difficult “to understand how, or whether, [the ALJ]
evaluated this evidence” at all. McCullough, 2019 WL 1431124, at *10. Here,
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Plaintiff fails to identify the “relevant facts” ignored by the ALJ that could have
altered the outcome of her decision.
In her assessment, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s testimony when she acknowledged
Plaintiff’s “difficulties handling stress, handling change, and managing her mood.”
(Tr. at 23.) But the ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s statements in that same testimony that
she was “able to handle self-care and personal hygiene, care for pets, and care for
plants.” (Id.) The ALJ then surveyed the objective evidence, which showed Plaintiff
had “appropriate grooming and hygiene, no problem getting along well with
providers and staff, and no problems with temper control.” (Id.) Based on these
findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in the domain of
adapting or managing herself. (Id.)
This finding is rooted in substantial evidence—“such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Ripley, 67 F.3d at 555
(quoting Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236). In her assessment of Plaintiff’s limitations
across the four paragraph B criteria, the ALJ explained her analysis of each criterion
and cited the evidentiary sources she relied upon in determining each limitation
rating. (See Tr. at 22–24.) “In this regard, the ALJ’s decision far exceeds the
substantial evidence burden, which is satisfied by more than a mere scintilla but less
than a preponderance.” Daily o/b/o T.S. v. Comm’r, No. 4:20-CV-01347-O-BP, 2022
WL 598524, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2022) (cleaned up). Finding more than a mere
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scintilla of evidence in support of the ALJ’s conclusion, the undersigned sees no
reason to reverse the Commissioner’s decision at step three.
B. 	The ALJ’s step-five finding is supported by substantial evidence.
At step five of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the “Commissioner
bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is capable of performing work in
the national economy.” Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236 (citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at
146 n.5). “Work exists in the national economy when there is a significant number
of jobs (in one or more occupations) having requirements” which the claimant is able
to meet with her age, education, work experience, and assessed RFC. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1566(b), § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). To prove that such work exists, ALJs will often
rely on “the testimony of a VE” identifying occupations listed in the Department of
Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) “in response to a hypothetical
question.” Vogt v. Astrue, No. 3:11-CV-315-BH, 2011 WL 5245421, at *13 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 2, 2011) (citing Bowling, 36 F.3d at 435).
In this case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) subject to a list of limitations. (Tr. at 24.)
The limitation at issue here states that Plaintiff can “understand, remember and carry
out simple tasks with simple instructions in a routine work setting.” (Id.) During the
January 23, 2024, telephone hearing, the ALJ asked the VE what jobs could be
performed by a hypothetical person of the same age, education, and work experience
as Plaintiff, with limitations identical to those listed in Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at 96–
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98.) The VE identified retail marker (DOT 209.587-034), routing clerk (DOT
222.687-022), and mail clerk (DOT 209.687-026) as occupations the hypothetical
individual could perform, (id. at 98), and at step five of the evaluation process, the
ALJ cited these jobs when she found that there was other work in the national
economy that Plaintiff was capable of performing, (id. at 30–31).
The ALJ also asked the VE during the hearing to identify jobs at the level of
sedentary work that the same hypothetical person could perform. (Tr. at 98.)
Plaintiff contends harmful error on the part of the ALJ because the sedentary
occupations identified by the VE—document preparer, small item inspector, and
table worker—may not be significant in number. (Pl. Br. at 11.) But the number of
jobs available in these occupations is irrelevant to the ALJ’s decision. In determining
Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of light work with specific
limitations, not restricted to sedentary work, (Tr. at 24), and none of these sedentary
occupations factored into the ALJ’s written decision at any step of the evaluation
process, (see id. at 19–32). Plaintiff cannot show harmful error relating to the
identified sedentary jobs.
Plaintiff’s principal argument at this stage is that the ALJ’s step-five decision
was not supported by substantial evidence because Plaintiff’s assessed RFC conflicts
with the reasoning levels required to perform the jobs identified for her at this step.
(Pl. Br. at 8–10.) Plaintiff’s RFC determination provides that she can “understand,
remember and carry out simple tasks with simple instructions in a routine work
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setting.” (Tr. at 24.) Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was
capable of performing DOT-listed jobs like retail marker, routing clerk, and mail
clerk. (Id. at 31.) Retail marker and routing clerk each require a reasoning level of
two, defined as “Apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but
uninvolved written or oral instructions. Deal with problems involving a few concrete
variables in or from standardized situations.” E.g., DOT 209.587-034, available at
1991 WL 671802. Mail clerk requires the higher reasoning level of three, defined as
“Apply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written,
oral, or diagrammatic form. Deal with problems involving several concrete variables
in or from standardized situations.” E.g., DOT 209.687-026, available at 1991 WL
671813. Plaintiff’s contention is that the ALJ’s determination that her RFC is
limited to understanding and carrying out “simple tasks with simple instructions”
cannot coexist with an ALJ finding that she is capable of performing a job in which
she would be required to “carry out detailed but uninvolved” instructions. (See Pl.
Br. 8–10.)
Plaintiff’s argument is focused on a plain reading of the key phrases in a
vacuum, assigning importance to the ALJ’s decision to go beyond the limitation to
“simple and detailed but not complex tasks” recommended by state agency
psychological consultants and instead “further limit[ ] the claimant to simple tasks.”
(Tr. at 28.) If the ALJ decided Plaintiff could not handle “detailed but not complex
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tasks,” how can the ALJ then support the finding that she can carry out “detailed but
uninvolved” instructions? Because these phrases arise in different contexts.
“The use of the word ‘detailed’ in the DOT is not equivalent to the word
‘detailed’ as used in the Social Security regulations.” Godwin v. Comm’r, No. 4:23-
CV-00607-O-BP, 2024 WL 3015325, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2024) (cleaned up),
rec. adopted, 2024 WL 3015541 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2024). “The Social Security
Regulations have only two categories of abilities with regard to understanding and
remembering instructions—either ‘short and simple,’ or ‘detailed’ or ‘complex,’
while the DOT has six levels for measuring this ability.” Abshire v. Astrue, No. CV07-
1856-LC, 2008 WL 5071891, at *8 (W.D. La. Oct. 29, 2008) (cleaned up), rec.
adopted, 2008 WL 5746955 (W.D. La. Dec. 1, 2008). The DOT’s six levels of
reasoning, ranging from “the most mundane” to the “most complex,” provide a
“much more graduated, measured and finely tuned scale” to categorize occupations
than the Social Security Regulations’ two-tiered approach. Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F.
Supp. 2d 981, 984 (C.D. Cal. 2005). To treat “simple” and “detailed” as bearing
identical meanings in the DOT and the Social Security Regulations would
“necessarily mean that all jobs with a reasoning level of two or higher are” closed off
when an ALJ limits a claimant’s RFC to “simple tasks,” an approach that would not
be “in keeping with the finely calibrated nature in which the DOT measures a job’s
simplicity.” Id.
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Relying on a surface level reading of the key phrases at issue in this case,
Plaintiff fails to invoke any legal authority that supports her position. This is because
“courts in the Fifth Circuit, as well as appellate and district courts outside the Fifth
Circuit, have already determined that there is no direct or apparent conflict between
an RFC limiting a plaintiff to simple instructions or tasks and testimony that a
plaintiff may perform work at a reasoning level of two.” Alma H. v. Comm’r, No.
3:24-cv-1895-BK, 2025 WL 2592525, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2025) (cleaned up).
Rather, a “reasoning level of two has repeatedly been found to be consistent with”
the ability to understand “simple instructions and perform simple tasks.” Castillo v.
Colvin, No. H-12-3512, 2014 WL 897798, at *14 (S.D. Tex. March 6, 2014)
(collecting cases); see, e.g., Martinez v. O’Malley, No. EP-CV-00145-ATB, 2025 WL
913476, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025) (finding an RFC limitation to “simple
tasks” consistent with jobs requiring a reasoning level of two). There is no conflict
between Plaintiff’s RFC and the ALJ’s determination that she can perform jobs
requiring a reasoning level of two.
Plaintiff argues that, even if her RFC allows her to perform jobs requiring a
reasoning level of two, the ALJ cannot support the determination that Plaintiff is
capable of performing work as a mail clerk, requiring the more involved reasoning
level three ability to “carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or
diagrammatic form” and solve “problems involving several concrete variables in or
from standardized situations.” E.g., DOT 209.687-026, available at 1991 WL 671813.
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Circuits have split on the question of whether a claimant limited to “simple tasks
with simple instructions” can perform jobs requiring a DOT reasoning level of three.
Compare Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding no conflict
between job requiring reasoning level three and claimant’s limitation to simple
work), with Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding
claimant’s limitation to “simple and routine work tasks” inconsistent with “the
demands of level-three reasoning”).
The Fifth Circuit has not yet weighed in on this issue, but courts within the
Circuit have found that a reasoning level of three “does not directly conflict with an
RFC restricting a plaintiff to short and simple instructions.” Godwin, 2024 WL
3015325, at *5; McMilian v. Colvin, No. 4:12-CV-661-A, 2014 WL 61172, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 6, 2014) (highlighting a “series of cases” holding limitations to “simple,
routine work tasks” compatible with reasoning level three); Longoria v. Colvin, No.
3:13-CV-1690-B-BK, 2014 WL 2777473, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2014) (finding no
facial conflict between the definition of reasoning level three and an RFC limitation
to “simple, repetitive work”), rec. adopted, 2014 WL 2777375 (N.D. Tex. June 18,
2014). The undersigned is persuaded that the “weight of authority supports a
determination that” a limitation to simple tasks with simple instructions “could
support work with a reasoning level of two or three.” Smith v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-
1884-N, 2014 WL 1407437, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2014), rec. adopted, WL
1407440 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2014).
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V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the
Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 2, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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