Walker v. Director, TDCJ-CID

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANGELO DIVISION
ROBERT C. WALKIR,
Institutional ID No. 02384194
Petitioner,
No. 6:23-CV-00041-H
Respondent
OPINION AND ORDER
In this consolidated 28 U.S.C, ! 2254 habeas action, Petitioner Robert C. Walker, a state
prisoner proceeding pro se, challenges his 2022 Brown County convictions in Case Nos.
CR28270, CR28271. Dkt. Nos. 1, 15. Respondent filed an answer and relevant records,
arguing that the Cout should dismiss Walker's claims as barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Dkt. Nos. 27,29. W alker filed a reply. Dkt. No. 30 As explained below, the
Court concludes that Walker's claims must be dismissed as untimely.
l. Background
On February 3,2O22,Walker pled guilry to possessing a controlled substance and
assaulting a police offrcer, and was sentenced to two concurrent 1s-year sentences. Dkt. Nos-
29-2 at 2g4}i 29-4 at 29-37 . Walker did not appeal his convictions. On December 29 ,2022 at
the earliest, Watker f ed two state habeas applications challenging his convictions. Dkt. Nos.
29-2 at 440t 29-4 at 4-39. On March 1,2023, rhe Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA)
denied walker's applications without written order. Dkt. Nos. 29-1, 29-3. OnJune 22,2023,t
I Bccause Walkcr did not date cither perition or state whcn hc dclivcrcd them to prison authorities for
mailing, Rcspondent adopts the Clerk's Junc 22, 2023 file date as Walker's filing date. Dkt. No. 27 at 3;
see Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374,377 (Sth Cn. 1998) ("tAl prisoner's habeas petition is filed for purposcs
of ditermrning thc applicabiliry otthc AEDPA, when he dclivcrs thc papers to prison authoritics for
DIRECTOR, TDCJ.CID,
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Walker frled his two federal habeas petitions, which the Coun later consolidated into this single
action. Dkt. Nos. i, 13, 15.
2. Discussion
A. Statute of Limitations
It is undisputed that Walker's federal habeas petition is subject to the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which establishes a one-year time limitation for
a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition. Jimenez v. QuarteflflLn,555 U.S. t 13, 119
(2009); see 28 U.S.C. 0 224(d)(l). The limitation period begins to run from the latest of the
following dates:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the exptation of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to frling an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from frling by such State action;
(C) the d'ate on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Coun, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise ofdue diligence.
28 U.S.C. 0 2244(dXIXAHD).
The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgrtent or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under this subsection. Id. at $ 2244@)(2). However, state
habeas applications flr.led after the expiration of the limitation period do not toll the limitation
peiod. See Scottr. Johnson,227 F.3d260,263 (5th Ch. 2000).
mailing."). Walkcr docs not argue or othcrwisc plead any facts to show that another filing date should be
2
uscd,
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B. Equitable Tolling
AEDPA's one-year limitation period can be equitably tolled since it is not a
jurisdictional bar. (Jflited States v. Pattelsotl,21l F.3d 927,930 (5th Cir.2000). However, a
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligentiy; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
tiing. Lowrence v. Florida,549 U.S. 327 , 336 (2007).
Equitable tolling is only available in cases presenting rare and exceptional circumstances
and is not intended for those who sleep on their rights. Manning v. Epps,688 F.3d 177, 183(sth
Cn.2012). Equitable tolling is not warranted merely because a petitioner proceeds pro se and is
not well-versed in the law. Saahir v. Collins,956 F.2d 1 15, 118-19(5thCt. 1992). A mistaken
interpretation ofthe law or lack ofknowledge of filing deadlines are not "rare and exceptional
circumstances" that justifu equitable tolling. See Wion v. Qua/tefttlan, 567 F.3d 146, 149 (sth Cir.
2009); see also Felder v. Johnson, 204 F .3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2000).
3. Analysis
Respondent argues that, under Section 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitation period began to run
when Walker's judgment became "final." Because Walker fails to argue or demonstrate that
Sections 22M(d)(l)(B), (C), or (D) apply, the Court agrees with Respondent and concludes that
Seaion 22214(dXl)(A) governs the timeliness of his federal petitions.
A. Finality of Judgment
Under Section 22M(d)(1)(A), the limitation period begins to run on the date the
judgment becomes final on direct review or when the time for seeking direct review expires. .lee
28 U.S.C. $ 2244(dX1XA). Because Walker did not appeal his convictions, Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 26.2(a)(1) determines when his judgements became final under Section
22M(d)(l)(A). See Scott v. Johnson,227 F.3d260,262 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Tex. R. App. P.
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26.2(a)). Under Rule 26.2(a)(l), a criminal defendant has 30 days after the day his sentence ts
imposed to f e a notice of appeal. Id.
Here, the state trial court imposed Walker's sentence on February 3, 2022. Under Rule
26.z(a)(l), Walker's judgments became "frrnal"-and the one'year limitation period began to
run-thirty days afterward, on March 7,2022. Th!s, absent any statutory or equitable tolling,
Walker had to f, e his federal petition one year later, by March 7 , 2023. But' as noted by
Respondent, the time during which Walker's state habeas applications were pending tolled the
limitation period by 63 days. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Walker had until May 9,
2023 to flrle his federal petitions. But Walker filed them on June 22, 2023----over a month after
the limitation period expired.
B. Equitable Totll"g
In his reply, Walker appears to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the
limitation period. He contends that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, but is
uneducated, not a licensed attomey, rlliterate, and does not understand the law. Even if Walker
has pursued his rights diligently, the Court nevertheless concludes that he fails to demonstrate
that equitable tolling is warranted. Walker fails to show that some extraordinary circumstances
stood in his way and prevented him from timely fi.ling his federal petitions. As previously
noted, a petitioner's pro-se status, mistaken interpretation ofthe law, or lack ofknowledge of
frling deadlines does not justi$r equitable tolling. See wion, 567 F'3d at 149'
C. Acnral Innocence
To the extent Walker seeks to circumvent the limitation period based on his claim that
he is "acually innocent," for the reasons stated by Respondent in its answer' the Court finds
that he has not made the necessary showing to do so. See Hancock v. Davis,906 F.3d 387 ' 389
(5rh cir. 20 i 8) (citing Mc Quiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013)); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513
u.s. 298, 329(1995).
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4. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above and based on the facts and law set forth in the
Respondent's answer, the Court concludes that Walker's Section 2254 claims were filed after
the applicable one-year limitation period expired and should, therefore, be denied and dismissed
with prejudice.
Additionally, pursuant to Rule 22 ofthe Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and
28 U.S.C. $ 2253(c), Peritioner has failed to show that reasonable jurists would (l) find this
Court's "assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," or (2) find "it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim ofthe denial of a constitutional right" and "debatable
whether [this Court] was correct in its procedural ruling," and any request for a certifrcate of
appealability shouldbe denied. Stack v. McDaniel,529 U S 473' 484 (2000)'
All reliefnot expressly granted is denied, and any pending motions are denied.2
The Court will enter judgment accordingly.
So ordered.
DatedFebruary l*,zozo
JAMES SLEY HENDRIX
United ates District Judge
2 To the cxtent Walker's rccent motion, Dkt. No.4l, may be construed as sceking to voluntarily dismiss
this habcas action under Rulc 4l(a)(2), the Coun, in its discrction, denies the motion. ,See Fed. R. Civ. P.
4l(a)(2); see ako Kramer y. Butler,845 F.2d 1291,1295 (5rh Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Because walker
filed thc motion more than two years after Rcspondent filed its answer, the Court concludes that
dismissal would unfairly prqudice Respondent. And the reasons Walker provides for wanting to
,,withdraw" his petition-that having in "activc habeas petition" adversely affects his chances ofbeing
released on paroie, and he has gained a ncw appreciation for how valuable time is-are not compelling.
Moreover, Walker fails to dcmonstrate that hc will suffer "scrious prejudice" if thc Court does not pcrmit
him dismiss this case. See lJnited Ststes v, Lanfranca,24 F.3d 237 , at *l (5th Cir. May 18, 1994) (citations
omittcd).
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