Viscount David Cahal of Ir Express Trust and others et al v. Rocket Mortgage LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
VISCOUNT DAVID CAHAL OF IR 	§
EXPRESS TRUST AND OTHERS, ET AL., 	§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-CV-205-P
§
ROCKET MORTGAGE, LLC, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING
REMAND
On February 23, 2026, the above-styled and numbered cause was removed to this Court by
Defendant Rocket Mortgage LLC (“Rocket Mortage”).1 	Rocket Mortgage removed the case to
this Court [doc. 1] claiming that this Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), diversity jurisdiction. (Defendants’ Notice of Removal (“Not. of Rem.”)
at 2.) Subsequently, on March 2, 2026, Rocket Mortgage filed a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Standing i.e., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Rocket Mortgage LLC’s Rule
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing at 2.) Specifically, Rocket Mortgage now argues
that “Plaintiffs lack standing because the Trust is not represented by counsel and O’Brien is not an
attorney who can represent the Trust.” (Brief in Support of Rocket Mortgage, LLC’s Rule 12(b)(1)
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing (“Br. in Supp.”) at 4.) 	Confusingly, Rocket Mortgage
now asks this Court to dismiss the same case it removed because the Court does not, in fact, have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. (Br. in Supp. at 3, 7.)
1 The Court notes that there are two additional Defendant in this case, Jay Bray and CT Corporation, that did
not join in the Notice of Removal. (Not. of Rem. at 5.) Rocket Mortgage claims that “Jay Bray and CT Corporation
[were] improperly joined or [are] nominal parties whose consent is unnecessary to perfect removal.” (Id.)
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“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by
statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144,
151 (5th Cir. 1998). 	It is well settled that “the issue of standing is one of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Cobb v. Cent. States, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2006). 	In the context of a case
removed from state court, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (emphasis
added). Finally, a removing defendant has the burden of establishing the existence of federal
subject matter jurisdiction. See Estate of Martineau v. ARCO Chem. Co., 203 F.3d 904, 910 (5th
Cir. 2000).
Here, Rocket Mortgage, as the defendant who removed this case, bears the burden of
establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. Rocket Mortgage now state that
“Plaintiffs presently lack standing to pursue any claims against Rocket Mortgage” and, as a result,
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 	See Cobb, 461 F.3d at 635. 	Because this case was
removed from state court and it “appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,”
this case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c).
The Court feels compelled to note that Rocket Mortgage’s “litigation conduct reveals their
misunderstanding about federal jurisdiction and our federal system.” 	Lutostanski v. Brown, 88
F.4th 582, 588 (5th Cir. 2023). “Plaintiffs sued in state court—a choice that (as far as we know)
plaintiffs had every right to make.” Id. Rocket Mortgage “removed [this case] to federal court on
the assurance [this Court] would have the jurisdiction defendants invoked. Then, having invoked
federal jurisdiction, defendants turned around and sought a dismissal in federal court on the
grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing.” Id. As noted by the Fifth Circuit, “[t]hat is not how
the system works. Either the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs’
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claims can be adjudicated; or there is no federal jurisdiction, and the suit must be remanded to state
court. Federal jurisdiction is not a game of whack-a-mole.” Id.
After reviewing the Notice of Removal and Rocket Mortgage LLC’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that it does not have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this suit. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that this
case be REMANDED to the 67th Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, TX, cause no. 067-
373797-26. See Lutostanski, 88 F.4th at 588 (ordering the district court to remand a case to state
court when a case was removed to federal court and the defendants later moved to dismiss for a
lack of standing).
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C §
636(b)(1). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate
Judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation where the disputed determination is found.
Failure to file, by the date stated above, a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding
or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from
attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
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United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending
the time to file objections to 14 days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until March 18,
2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to
the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby
is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.
SIGNED March 4, 2026.
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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