Daley v. MidFirst Bank et al

4:25-cv-01240Txnd22 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
TIFFANY-SHARDE DALEY, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-01240-O-BP
§
MIDFIRST BANK, et al., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiff Tiffany-Sharde Daley sued Defendants on October 2, 2025, in the 48th
Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas. ECF No. 1-5 at 2. On November 3, 2025,
Defendant MidFirst Bank removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1. On November 4, 2025, the
Court ordered Daley to file an amended complaint by November 18, 2025, that complied with the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court’s Local Civil Rules.
ECF No. 5. Also on November 4, 2025, the Court ordered the parties to confer by December 4,
2025 regarding the contents of a scheduling order and submit a report of that conference by
December 18, 2025. ECF No. 6.
When Daley did not file an amended pleading by November 18, the Court on November
20 ordered her to do so by December 4, 2025. ECF No. 7. The Court warned Daley that
noncompliance “may result in a recommendation that the Court dismiss her case without
prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)” Id. at 1. To date, Daley has not
complied with either Order by filing an amended complaint, nor has she filed any other pleading
explaining her delay.
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Additionally, Defendants MidFirst Bank and Barret Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, LLP
(“Barrett Daffin”), have advised the Court that “[Daley] has not responded to attempts to hold a
scheduling conference” as the Court ordered in its November 4 Order. ECF No. 8.
Finally, before the court is the Motion to Dismiss that Barrett Daffin filed today seeking
dismissal of Daley’s petition against it. ECF No. 9.
Because 	Daley 	has 	not 	complied 	with 	three 	court 	orders, 	the 	undersigned
RECOMMENDS that Chief United States District Judge Reed O’Connor DISMISS this case
without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and DENY as moot Barrett
Daffin’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9).
I. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
District courts may dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or follow court
orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). This authority flows from a court’s inherent power to manage its
docket. Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice.
Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 880 (5th Cir. 1996). However, dismissals with prejudice for want
of prosecution are considered “an extreme sanction.” Id. Accordingly, the Court should employ
such dismissals only where a litigant’s acts or omissions are “the result of purposeful delay or
contumaciousness and the record reflects that the district court employed lesser sanctions before
dismissing the action [with prejudice].” Id.
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Court twice ordered Daley to file an amended complaint and ordered her to confer
with counsel for Defendants to prepare a scheduling report. Despite a clear warning that
noncompliance could result in dismissal of her case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b),
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Daley did not comply with any of these orders or file a pleading to explain her delay. Without
compliance with the Court’s orders, this case cannot proceed.
Accordingly, Chief Judge O’Connor should dismiss the case due to Daley’s failure to
prosecute or follow court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Hickerson v. Christian, 283
F. App’x 251, 253 (5th Cir. 2008) (observing that Rule 41(b) empowers district courts to dismiss
actions sua sponte and Courts routinely do so). This is precisely the circumstance envisaged by
the Rule, which flows from the Court’s inherent authority to manage its docket. Boudwin, 756 F.2d
at 401 (citing Link, 370 U.S. 626). Nevertheless, because nothing indicates Daley’s noncompliance
stems from “purposeful delay or contumaciousness,” the Court should dismiss Daley’s case
without prejudice. Long, 77 F.3d at 880.
Because Daley’s noncompliance with the Court’s orders predates Barrett Daffin’s filing of
its Motion to Dismiss, the undersigned recommends that Chief Judge O’Connor dismiss Daley’s
case and deny as moot the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Daley 	did 	not 	comply 	with 	prior 	court 	orders 	despite 	the 	Court’s 	warning 	that
noncompliance could lead to dismissal of her case without further warning. Because her
noncompliance does not appear to stem from purposeful delay or contumaciousness, the dismissal
should be without prejudice. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge
O’Connor DISMISS this case without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for
failure to prosecute or comply with court orders and DENY as moot the Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 9).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties
in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,
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and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with
a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). To be specific, an objection
must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis
for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates
by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except
upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
SIGNED on December 22, 2025.
____________________________________
Hal R. Ray, Jr.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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