Avila v. Transport Workers Union Local 575 et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
HUGO AVILA, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 4:25-cv-00878-O-BP
§
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION 	§
LOCAL 575, et al., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are the Motion for Funding Certification and Segregation of Union Funds
that Plaintiff Hugo Avila filed November 6, 2025 (ECF No. 43), Response and Brief (ECF Nos.
47, 48) that Defendants filed November 28, 2025, and Reply (ECF No. 49) that Avila filed
November 29, 2025. After considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief United States District Judge Reed O’Connor DENY the
Motion (ECF No. 43).
I. 	BACKGROUND
This suit involves a dispute between Hugo Avila and Transport Workers Union Local 575
(“the Union”) and several union officers in their official capacities. Avila asserts that the Union
violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”) in connection
with a proposed bylaw amendment, subsequent retaliation, refusal to let Avila copy Union
documents, limiting agenda time at meetings for member business, and permitting officers to use
union funds to pay for their legal defense in this case. ECF Nos. 10, 19, 26.
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Avila asks the Court to require the Union to certify the amount of Union funds expended
on the present litigation from July 15, 2025, to the present, and then continue to certify the amount
expended monthly. ECF No. 43 at 3. He also requests a Court order requiring the Union to
segregate payments used for the defense of individual officers “in a separate and identifiable
account or sub account, distinct from dues funded general operating funds.” Id. The Union
responds that the Court should deny the Motion in its entirety because it is based on a claim over
which the Court lacks jurisdiction, or in the alternative because Avila does not prove he is entitled
to the equitable relief requested. ECF No. 48 at 3.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Pro Se Standard
The Court subjects a pro se party's pleadings to less rigid analysis than those of a party
represented by counsel. “[A] pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976). However, “even a liberally-construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving
rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221,
224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825-26 (1977)). Thus, a court inquires
“whether within the universe of theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a
cause of action under [the] complaint, indulgently read.” Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370
(5th Cir. 1976). However, “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
conclusions will not suffice to state a claim for relief.” Masika Brown Ray v. Anthony Boone, No.
24-40169, 2024 WL 4372692, *1 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Coleman v. Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858
F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017)).
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B. 	Preliminary Injunction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the entry of injunctions and restraining orders.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The issuance of a preliminary injunction freezes the status quo and is intended
“to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Wenner v.
Tex. Lottery Comm'n, 123 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 1997). Preliminary injunctions “seek to maintain
things in their initial condition so far as possible until after a full hearing permits final relief to be
fashioned.” Id.
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United
Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). In the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff must show
four prerequisites to obtain preliminary injunctive relief:
(1) [A] substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2)
a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff
outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant, and
(4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest.
Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). The party seeking
injunctive relief must clearly carry the burden of persuasion on all four Callaway prerequisites to
prevail. Miss. Power & Light, 760 F.2d at 621. Given the extraordinary nature of a preliminary
injunction, “[t]he decision to grant a preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather
than the rule.” Id. (citing State of Tex. v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975);
Callaway, 489 F.2d at 576).
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III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	The Court should deny Avila’s Motion under Rule 65.
1. 	Relief under Rule 65 is inappropriate.
Avila does not explicitly seek a preliminary injunction in his Motion. However, he uses the
language of a temporary injunction when he requests that the Court “preserve the status quo
pending adjudication of the parties’ rights.” ECF No. 43 at 2. In Defendants argue in their
Response that Avila’s Motion is a request for equitable pre-trial injunctive relief under Rule 65.
ECF No. 48 at 2. In Avila’s reply, he acknowledges this argument and contends that if the Court
evaluates his Motion under Rule 65, relief is appropriate because he satisfies the preliminary
injunction factors. ECF No. 49 at 3.
However, the relief Avila requests does not preserve the status quo. See, e.g., Canal
Authority of State of Florida, 489 F.2d at 570 (preliminary injunction preserved status quo by
halting construction of a canal project while environmental litigation proceeded); Planned
Parenthood of Hous. & Southeast Tex. v. Sanchez, 480 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 2007) (trial court
issued preliminary injunction against impending enforcement of Texas law prohibiting distribution
of federal family planning funds to certain providers).
Here, Avila does not seek to preserve the status quo while the litigation proceeds. Instead,
he asks the Court to impose new requirements on the Union, specifically certifications identifying
funds expended on legal services related to the present litigation and segregation of funds used to
defend individual officers in the matter. Id. at 3. Far from preserving the status quo to protect his
rights while the case progresses, Avila seeks to impose new affirmative duties on the Union. These
requests do not fall within the Court’s authority under Rule 65 to grant preliminary injunctive relief
because they do not preserve the status quo.
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Additionally, Avila does not sufficiently show that he satisfies the four prerequisites for
granting injunctive relief. Miss. Power & Light, 760 F.2d at 621. For the first time in his Reply, he
argues that his claim meets all four of the requirements. ECF No. 49 at 3. First, he argues he has
“show[n] at least a substantial likelihood that some LMRDA violations will be proven.” ECF No.
49 at 4. But the Court already has rejected this argument once. See ECF No. 37 (accepting Findings
and Recommendations (ECF No. 31) holding that Avila did not show a substantial likelihood of
success on his claims for copying of records, retaliation, and using Union funds for defense of
officers).
Second, he contends that irreparable harms exists because the commingling of funds spent
for legal defense with other expenditures “may [make it] impossible to reconstruct how much of
the union’s money was used for” officer defense in the present litigation. ECF No. 49 at 4.
However, Avila does not show how an accounting of legal expenses after the litigation would
differ materially from the ongoing periodic accounting he requests. And even if these arguments
support a showing of irreparable harm, the Court still should find that entry of this relief is
inappropriate. Irreparable harm alone is insufficient to support equitable relief because “the
likelihood of success is the ‘main bearing wall’ of the test,” and Avila has not met this
requirement. Belknap v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CIV.A. G-12-198, 2012 WL 3150271, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 1, 2012).
Next, Avila claims the balance of harms “overwhelmingly favors” his requested relief
because the Union already accounts for its legal expenditures, and the potential harm of
commingled funds is significant. ECF No. 49 at 4. Yet the relief Avila seeks would require the
Union to take the additional steps of furnishing him with monthly reports of expenditures and
segregating funds into separate accounts. ECF No. 43 at 3. He seeks to impose these requirements
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on the Union without legal authority and only asserts negligible and theoretical potential harm.
This is insufficient to establish the third requirement of the test.
The final element requires a showing that granting the injunction does not disserve the
public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Courts are more
likely to both grant and withhold injunctive relief in furtherance of the public interest than when
merely private interests are involved. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 441 (1944). Here,
Avila argues that the relief he seeks is in the public interest as it would comport with congressional
goals in enacting the LMRDA to promote democratic union governance and union member rights.
ECF No 49 at 5. But his argument mainly bears upon the private interests of the parties involved
rather than the public at large. Such an assertion does not provide a sufficient basis to find that the
relief sought would serve the public interest. Therefore, Avila has not met his burden on the fourth
element of the preliminary injunction standard.
2. 	No other legal authority provides a basis for Avila’s Motion.
In the alternative, Avila notes that “[t]he Court has broad equitable authority to manage
conflicts of interest” regardless of whether Rule 65 applies. ECF No. 43 at 2. He argues that the
relief he requests falls within this equitable authority. Id. He claims that this authority “may include
targeted transparency and accounting measures when there is a colorable risk that dues[-]based
funds are being used for purposes that may later be found improper or non[-]reimbursable.” Id.
But Avila provides no legal authority for this contention. Nor does he provide any factual basis
that this case meets this unspecified standard.
In his reply, Avila also contends that “courts routinely exercise their inherent authority to
issue preservation and accounting orders to prevent the dissipation or untraceable commingling of
assets in ways that would frustrate final equitable relief.” ECF No. 49 at 3. Yet both cases he cites
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for this proposition either do not exist or he cites incorrectly. See id. Avila provides no other legal
authority for this contention, and the Court is not aware of any. As a result, the Court should deny
Avila’s Motion (ECF No. 43) for lack of a legal basis to support it.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Avila’s has not provided adequate legal support under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65
or any other authority for his Motion. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief
Judge O’Connor DENY Avila’s Motion (ECF No. 43).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties
in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,
and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with
a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). To be specific, an objection
must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis
for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates
by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except
upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
It is so ORDERED on December 5, 2025.
______________________________________
Hal R. Ray, Jr.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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