Aguilar v. State of Texas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
SERGIO ALEJANDRO AGUILAR ,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-0808-P
E RIC GUERRERO , DIRECTOR ,
T EXAS D EPARTMENT O F
CRIMINAL J USTICE-C ORRECTIONAL
I NSTITUTIONS D IVISION ,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the petition of Sergio Alejandro Aguilar under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Having considered the petition, the response, the reply,
the record, and applicable authorities, the Court concludes that the
petition must be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving a term of imprisonment of fifty years following
his conviction in Cause No. 1751244R in the 371st District Court,
Tarrant County, Texas, for continuous violence against the family
enhanced by a prior aggravated robbery conviction. Aguilar v. State, No.
02-22-00271-CR, 2023 WL 6631526 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 12,
2023, pet. ref’d). The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence,
although it reversed one of the convictions as being violative of the
double-jeopardy protections contained in the Texas Penal Code. Id. On
December 20, 2023, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”)
refused the petition for discretionary review. Id.; Aguilar v. State, PD-
0797-23 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2023).
On March 18, 2025, Petitioner filed his state habeas application. ECF
No. 14-23 at 33. On July 21, 2025, while the state writ was pending, he
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filed his federal habeas petition.1 ECF No. 1. On October 9, 2025, the
CCA denied relief based on the findings of the trial court and the CCA’s
own independent review. ECF No. 14-24.
GROUNDS OF THE PETITION
Petitioner raises three grounds for relief based on alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error.
ECF No. 1 at 5, 7 & 8.2
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Section 2254
A writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody under a state
court judgment shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated 	on 	the 	merits 	in 	state 	court 	proceedings 	unless 	the
petitioner shows that the prior adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) 	resulted 	in 	a 	decision 	that 	was 	based 	on 	an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal
law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by
the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state
court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405–06 (2000); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir.
2000). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
1 Although the federal petition was prematurely filed, the Court is satisfied that it has
jurisdiction to rule. See Herbst v. Scott, 42 F.3d 902, 905 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987) (requirement that a petitioner first
exhaust his state remedies is based on comity, not jurisdiction)). Petitioner’s state
court remedies have now been exhausted.
2 The page number references to the petition are to “Page __ of 16” reflected at the top
right portion of the document on the Court’s electronic filing system.
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86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)).
A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed
to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The presumption of correctness
applies to both express and implied factual findings. Young v. Dretke,
356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948
n.11 (5th Cir. 2001). Absent express findings, a federal court may infer
fact findings consistent with the state court’s disposition. Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983). Thus, when the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas denies relief without written order, such ruling is an
adjudication on the merits that is entitled to this presumption. Ex parte
Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The petitioner has
the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Hill, 210 F.3d at 486.
In making its review, the Court is limited to the record that was
before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
B. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To 	prevail 	on 	a 	claim 	of 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel, 	the
petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “[A] court need not determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id., 466
U.S. at 697; see also United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.
2000) 	(per 	curiam). 	“The 	likelihood 	of 	a 	different 	result 	must 	be
substantial, not just conceivable,” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112, and a
petitioner must prove that counsel’s errors “so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on
as having produced a just result.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 189 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Judicial scrutiny of this type of claim must
be 	highly 	deferential 	and 	the 	petitioner 	must 	overcome 	a 	strong
presumption that his counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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Where the state court adjudicated the ineffective assistance claims
on the merits, this Court must review a petitioner’s claims under the
“doubly deferential” standards of both Strickland and § 2254(d). Cullen,
563 U.S. at 190. In such cases, the “pivotal question” for the Court is not
“whether 	defense 	counsel’s 	performance 	fell 	below 	Strickland’s
standard”; it is “whether the state court’s application of the Strickland
standard was unreasonable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. In other
words, the Court must afford “both the state court and the defense
attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013)
(quoting Cullen, 563 U.S. at 190); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111,
123 (2009). “Unreasonable” is a substantially higher threshold than
“incorrect.” Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2010).
Simply making conclusory allegations of deficient performance and
prejudice is not sufficient to meet the Strickland test. Miller v. Johnson,
200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000).
ANALYSIS
In his first ground, Petitioner alleges that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance because counsel failed to: (1) conduct an adequate
pretrial 	investigation; 	(2) 	file 	a 	motion 	to 	quash 	for 	multiple
prosecutions and double jeopardy; (3) call several fact witnesses; and (4)
establish a proper defensive strategy. ECF No. 1 at 5. The allegations
are wholly conclusory and unsupported and fail to raise a proper ground
for relief. Miller, 200 F.3d at 282; Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012
(5th Cir. 1983). Moreover, Petitioner has made no attempt to rebut the
presumption of the correctness of the CCA’s findings in this regard. See
ECF No. 10 at 14–16 (citing extensive findings of trial court regarding
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel). He has not met his burden to
proceed here. Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020).
In his second ground, Petitioner alleges that the State engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct in charging him with different offenses arising
out of the same criminal conduct. ECF No. 1 at 7. Again, the allegation
is wholly conclusory and unsupported. The Court is not aware of any
authority 	prohibiting 	a 	prosecutor 	from 	pursuing 	a 	multi-count
indictment arising from a single act. See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 470
U.S. 	856, 	861–65 	(1985) 	(convicted 	felon 	may 	be 	prosecuted
simultaneously 	for 	violation 	of 	different 	statutes 	but 	may 	not 	be
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punished twice for the same offense). Indeed, the state court of appeals
granted Petitioner relief under double-jeopardy principles. Aguilar,
2023 WL 6631526, at *4–*6 (vacating conviction on count three, a
discrete act of bodily-injury assault that could have been charged as a
lesser-included offense of a continuous-violence offense such as count
four). Thus, claim of prosecutorial misconduct became moot. United
States v. Perez-Ceballos, 907 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 2018). The CCA
rejected this claim and Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to
relief. See ECF No. 10 at 19–20 (citing findings and conclusions).
Finally, in his third ground, Petitioner refers to “cumulative errors,”
citing a laundry list of conclusory allegations, to wit: right to a fair trial,
prosecutorial misconduct, double jeopardy violation, and ineffective
assistance of counsel.3 As Petitioner has not established any error, there
is nothing to cumulate. Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999) (en banc). See Valdez-Villalobos v. United States, No.
3:20-cv-3476-D-BH, 2023 WL 9327355, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2023)
(where movant fails to establish ineffective assistance under Strickland
or any of his other claims he is not entitled to relief based on cumulative
error), adopted, 2024 WL 235186 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2024).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, all relief sought by Petitioner is
DENIED.
Further, for the reasons discussed herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2553(c), a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 4th day of February 2026.
3 Petitioner refers to a memorandum of law, but no such document was filed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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