Williams et al v. City of Fort Worth et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
JARROD D. WILLIAMS, ET AL. 	§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-574-P
§
CITY OF FORT WORTH, ET AL., 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE CITY
OF FORT WORTH AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND THE COURT’S SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
Pending before the Court are the following five motions to dismiss: (1) one filed by
Defendant City of Fort Worth (hereinafter referred to as “the City”) [doc. 28] on September 3,
2025; (2) one filed by seven individual Defendants1 who are licensed police officers employed by
the City (hereinafter referred to as the “Seven Individual Officer Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”)
[doc. 49] on September 29, 2025; (3) one filed by five individual Defendants2 who are licensed
police officers employed by the City [doc. 51] on October 3, 2025; (4) one filed by six individual
Defendants3 who are licensed police officers employed by the City [doc. 55] on October 6, 2025;
and (5) one filed by Defendant Neil Noakes (“Chief Noakes”) [doc. 57], former Chief of the City
of Fort Worth Police Department, also on October 6, 2025. 	Having carefully considered the
1 These seven individual Defendants (with their badge numbers) are: (1) Sterling Rochester (#4314); (2)
Kristopher Donahey (#3807); (3) Jake Montgomery (“Montgomery”) (#4891); (4) Shawn Evans (#4512); (5) Kevin
Blasingame (#4343); (6) Christopher Cardona (#4880); and (7) Carlos Guardado (#4687). 	The Court notes that
Plaintiff, in his Amended Complaint, states that Montgomery’s badge number is 4897 (instead of 4891).
2 These five individual Defendants (with their badge numbers) are: (1) Joseph Smith (#4806); (2) Nadine
Bauman (#4818), incorrectly named by Plaintiffs as Nadine Dauman; (3) Joselin Frias (#4664); (4) Joel Perez (#4778);
and (5) Darrin Parr (“Parr”) (#3477).
3 These six individual Defendants (with their badge numbers) are: (1) Sergeant Joe Pittman (“Pittman”)
(#3611); (2) Douglas Cavanaugh (#4513); (3) John Garcia (#4666); (4) Brandon Roth (4761); (5) David Barber
(#4875); and (6) Julian Garcia (#4937) (incorrectly named by Plaintiffs as Julian Garcie).
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motions, responses, replies, and Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, the Court RECOMMENDS that
the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On May 30, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Jarrod D. Williams (“Williams”),4 on behalf of himself
and his two minor children, filed suit against the City, Chief Noakes, and the eighteen above-listed
individual police officer defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Individual Officer
Defendants”). Plaintiffs sue Chief Noakes and the Individual Officer Defendants in their “private
and public capacities [sic].” 	(Id. at 1-2.) 	In Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint [doc. 22] filed on
August 18, 2025, which is the live pleading before the Court, Plaintiffs allege that this suit arises
out a series of incidents that occurred at Plaintiffs’ home in Fort Worth, Texas, on July 8, 2023.
(See generally Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (“Pls.’ Am. Compl.”) at 2-7.) Plaintiffs state that
they are “seeking damages from Defendants for acts or omissions that violated the rights protected
by the Constitution for the [U]nited [S]tates of America, Texas’ Constitution, equity, and Texas
common law.” (Id. at 1.)
Williams claims that he was ultimately arrested at approximately 10:00 p.m. that evening
“after the FWPD S.W.A.T. forced entry into the home and flipped over most of the items in the
house, damaging almost everything in the house.” 	(Id. at 3.) 	The only Individual Officer
Defendants that Williams references by name throughout the “Statement of Facts” in his Amended
Complaint are Pittman and Parr. All the other seventeen Individual Officer Defendants are referred
to generically as, inter alia, “Officers” or “FWPD officers” 	(Id. at 2-7.) Plaintiffs claim that the
Individual Officer Defendants engaged in a multitude of unlawful acts while on his property,
including claims of official misconduct, conspiracy, due process violations, conversion, attempted
assault, assault, battery, false arrest, malicious arrest, false imprisonment, falsifying records,
4 While this suit is brought by Williams and two other Plaintiffs, these other Plaintiffs are Williams’ minor
children. Thus, the Court will reference Williams as Plaintiff or Plaintiffs interchangeably.
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kidnapping, destruction of property, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon
seclusion, prior restraint, abuse of power, burglary, joint trespass, negligence, malfeasance,
unlawful trespass, and cruel and unusual punishment for turning off Plaintiffs’ water for hours.
(Pls.’ Am. Compl. at 2-6.) As to the City and Chief Noakes, Plaintiffs allege:
The City of Fort Worth and it’s chief of police are responsible for the actions of its
agents under the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior and the principle of vicarious
liability. The customs, standards and lack of training are some of the reasons they
are liable under these set of rules. Officers should have known that by performing
a knock and talk, and not getting a response from Affiant, that their license to be on
Plaintiff’s private property were relinquished and that they needed a warrant to
perform any other actions on Plaintiff’s private property.
(Pls.’ Am. Compl. at 7 (mistakes in original).)
In all the above-referenced motions to dismiss, Defendants raise a multitude of reasons
why the claims against them should be dismissed. 	In his response to such motions, Williams
repeatedly denies that he is bringing any claims under Section 1983, and, instead, as set forth in
his Civil Cover Sheet, is bringing this suit for breach of contract or breach of trust. For example,
in his response to the City’s Motion to Dismiss, Williams states:
Plaintiffs has notified this Court that this action is not a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The
City’s Motion metioned 42 U.S.C. 1983 several times and Plaintiffs made it clear
that they were bringing this suit for breach of contract, and breach of trust, common
law, equity and constitutional violations. 	On Plaintiff’s Civil Cover Sheet,5
Plaintiffs made it clear that they were not suing any federal statutes and were only
using the law stated therein. This lawsuit is an attempt to sue police officers official
bonds, for breach of contract, breach of trust, and constitutional violations among
other things. 	42 U.S.C. 1983 was written to protect newly emacipated negros
against the KKK, state and local governments. This action is a common law tort
action, and is suit against the official bonds of the Defendants. 	It a public suit
against the bonds and a private suit to each official separately.
Plaintiffs have written The City, and have done open records request, to get
the of the insurer who has the indemnity bonds for the Defendants, but The City
has refused to give those names to me. . . .
5 On Plaintiffs’ Civil Cover Sheet [doc. 1, p. 9], Plaintiffs, under “Nature of Suit” only checked the box for
“Other Contract.” (Plaintiffs’ Civil Cover Sheet [doc. 1, p. 9]). In the “Cause of Action” section of the Civil Cover
Sheet, Plaintiff further indicated that “Breach of Contract/Breach of Trust” was a “brief description of cause.” (Id.)
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. . . Plaintiffs are not bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, so all
references of that statute should not be consider as the law of this action. This suit
is mainly an action against indemnity bonds. 	All officers swear an oath to the
constitution of the state and of the united states of America. That oath is backed by
an insured indemnity bond. This suit is mainly a suit against those bonds. In Texas
the Government Code, Title 6, Subtitle A., Chapter 604 is the section of that statute
states that public officers and employess have to have file an official bond with
their oath.
In Forth Worth Code of Ethics and General Orders, the last paragraph states,
“I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and accept it as a
public trust to be held so long as I ma true to the ethics of the police service.” Public
officials are trustees as the code of ethics state that it is a public trust. We the People
are the beneficiaries of that trust. This action is also a breach of trust lawsuit.
(Plaintiffs’ Response to City of Fort Worth’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pls’ Resp. to City’s Mot. to
Dismiss”) [doc. 42] at 1-2 (mistakes in original) (footnote inserted).)
Moreover, in Williams’ Response to the Seven Individual Officer Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, Williams, inter alia, states:
. . . This suit is mainily against the oaths and bonds of all the Defendants
named in the complaint. A bond is simply a promise to perform or a promise to
pay. 	Since the officers didn’t perform their duties correctly they have a bond in
place to indemnify them in these proceedings. 	The admilstrative code in Texas,
under Title 37, Part 7 requires all licensed and appointed peace officers to obtain a
surety bond. 	The government code of Texas in Chapter 604 outlines general
official bond requirements for public officers. . . .
. . . .
Defendants may not understand that Plaintiff’s have a remedy under
contract law. Plaintiff’s understand that most lawsuits against police officers are
under 42 U.S.C § 1983. This suit is mostly against the bonds and sureties of the
mentioned police officers. 	Plaintiff’s are purposefully suing the bonds and not
under section 1983. . . . Most of the principles that the Defendants are using are
not applicable under contract principles. All Defendant’s named in the Amended
Complaint, except Neil Noakes violated contract, trust, common law, and equity. .
. .
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(Plaintiffs’ Response to the Seven Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [doc. 53] at 1-2
(mistakes in original).) Furthermore, in Plaintiffs’ Response to the other three motions to dismiss
[docs. 51, 55, 57], Williams, inter alia, avers:
3. 	. . . Since part of Plaintiff’s claims is mainly for breach of contract
and breach of trust, Texas allows for four year to bring a suit for that claim, which
is located in Chapter 16.004 of the Texas civil practice and remedies code . . . .
. . . .
7. 	. . . This case is dealing with an indemnity bond by an insurance
company and the ability of when people can make claims on them. 	It also deals
with the pricipal of the law of agency.
. . . .
13. 	Once again, Plaintiffs remind the Defendant’s that this is a suit
mainly against the sureties and bonds of all defendants. 	All defendants have an
oath and official bond, and those bonds have at least two sureties who will
indemnify each officer. Though Plaintiffs may bring up the Texas Constitution and
the common law theories that the Defendants mentioned, Plaintiffs remind the
defendants that this suit is mainly for breach of trust and breach of contract of the
constitutions, that the officers swore an oath to and that they are bonded by. 	So
Plaintiffs are using the common law, the constitutions and the case law to prove
violations, but Plaintiffs know most of the monies that will be discharged them will
be from their sureties who indemnifies police officers. Defendants are reminded of
the principle that CONTRACT MAKES THE LAW. These officers have oaths and
bonds, which are contracts, that Plaintiffs will put into the record that will show
that they violated their contractual obligations, and that their sureties will indemnify
them for these violations.
. . . .
28. 	This is not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit, also known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act, which was officially written to protect newly freed slaves. Defendants
continues to use citations to reference this code, which this suit is not is not under
the code. This is a suit against the oaths and bonds of the City and police officers,
which are contracts.
(Plaintiffs’ “Response to Defendants Certain Defendants Motion to Dismiss” [doc. 67] at 2-8
(mistakes in original) (emphasis in original).)
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“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” 	Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Off. of the
Comptroller of the Currency of U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2004). “As courts created by
statute, they have no jurisdiction absent jurisdiction conferred 	by statute.” 	Id. 	“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The general rule is that a federal court obtains jurisdiction over subject
matter only if the elements necessary to constitute diversity of citizenship are met under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 or if the cause of action arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332. Absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or
the Constitution, federal courts lack power to adjudicate claims and must dismiss an action if
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. See Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison,
Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
As diversity of citizenship is not alleged, the Court will only have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this case if it has federal question jurisdiction. 	Plaintiffs, in their Amended
Complaint, make multiple references to the United States Constitution and protected rights under
such Constitution. 	(See generally Pls.’ Am. Compl.) 	However, Plaintiffs, in responding to the
various motions to dismiss, unequivocally and clearly state that they are not bringing this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	(See pp. 3-5, supra.) 	Instead, Plaintiffs repeatedly state that this is a
breach of contract case and an action against indemnity bonds. (Id.)
While Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, it provides a private right of
action against parties that, acting under color of law, deprive a person of rights secured by the
United States Constitution or federal law. See Carney v. New Orleans City, 468 F. Supp. 3d 751,
761 (E.D. La. 2020). 	Based on the allegations in this case, Section 1983 is the only available
mechanism in which Plaintiffs could seek relief for any constitutional or federal violations as there
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is no federal general common law that would otherwise allow Plaintiffs to sue for relief. 	See
Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp, 589 U.S. 132, 136 (2020) (“As this Court has put it, there is
‘no federal general common law.’”) (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1838)).
While the Court has an obligation to liberally construe Plaintiffs’ complaint,6 the Court also must
take Williams at his word when he unequivocally, clearly, and repeatedly states that he is not
bringing this action under Section 1983.7 See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that, when a district court is considering a motion to dismiss in a case filed by a pro se
plaintiff, the court is “required to look beyond the [plaintiff’s] formal complaint and to consider as
amendments to the complaint those material subsequently filed”); Nicolais v. Cheramie, No. 23-
7094, 2024 WL 4113752, at *3 n.6 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2024) (“[W]hen ruling on the defendants’
motions to dismiss, the Court should consider any additional allegations in [the pro se Plaintiff’s]
oppositions that embellish the original complaint’s averments.”) 	Based on Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint in conjunction with Plaintiffs’ additional statements in their responses to the motions
to dismiss, it is clear that Plaintiffs are intending to only bring state-law claims against Defendants.
Consequently, as there is no federal question, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear Plaintiffs’ claims.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF
FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
6 See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
7 In other words, this is not a case where it is unclear what Plaintiffs are intending in his Complaint as
Plaintiffs, in their responses, have clearly stated they are not bringing this action under Section 1983.
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been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). 	Failure to file, by the date stated above, a specific written objection to a proposed
factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until March 6,
2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to
the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby
is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.
SIGNED February 20, 2026.
_________________________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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