Citizens Defending Freedom et al v. Arlington Independent School District et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
CITIZENS DEFENDING, 	§
FREEDOM, et al., 	§
§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-00585-O
§
ARLINGTON INDEPENDENT 	§
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are the Motion for Attorney Fees and Appendix in Support that Arlington
Independent School District (“AISD”) filed on September 10, 2025. ECF Nos. 84, 85. By Order
dated September 17, 2025, Chief United States District Judge Reed O’Connor referred the Motion
to 	the 	undersigned 	for 	hearing, 	if 	necessary, 	and 	final 	determination 	if 	permitted 	or
recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Having considered the pleadings and applicable
legal authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge O’Connor GRANT the
Motion (ECF No. 84).
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court previously has described the circumstances that led to Plaintiffs’ suit against
AISD under the Texas Open Meetings Act (“TOMA”) and for retaliation. See ECF No. 81 at 1-4.
Chief Judge O’Connor and the parties are aware of the underlying facts, and further repetition is
unnecessary. On August 27, 2025, Chief Judge O’Connor granted the Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 52) and dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims. AISD now seeks an award of
$7,393.00 in attorney fees. ECF No. 84.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
The Court has “broad discretion in setting the appropriate award of attorney[] fees.”
Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
436-37 (1983)). The first step in setting an appropriate award is determining the “lodestar” of the
relevant fees. Id. “The lodestar is the product of the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly billing rate.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens No.
4552 v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1997) (“LULAC”) (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434). The lodestar is presumably reasonable, but the Court “may adjust it upward or
downward in exceptional cases.” Id.; see also Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1231 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“[T]he calculation of the lodestar does not end the inquiry[,] and [] other considerations may
persuade the district court to increase or decrease a fee award.”).
After calculating the lodestar, the Court must evaluate the amount considering the twelve
factors enumerated in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974),
abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). The Johnson factors
include: (1) “the time and labor required”; (2) “the novelty and difficulty of the questions”; (3)
“the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly”; (4) “the preclusion of other employment
by the attorney due to acceptance of the case”; (5) “the customary fee”; (6) “whether the fee is
fixed or contingent”; (7) “time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances”; (8) “the
amount involved and the results obtained”; (9) “the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys”; (10) “the ‘undesirability’ of the case”; (11) “the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client”; and (12) “awards in similar cases.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Tex.
Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.04, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G,
app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, §9) (incorporating some of the Johnson factors into the State Bar
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of Texas’s rules of professional conduct). “[O]f the Johnson factors, the court should give special
heed to the time and labor involved, the customary fee, the amount involved, and the result
obtained, and the experience, reputation and ability of counsel.” Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135
F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998).
“[I]t will not always be necessary for a district court to address each of the twelve factors
in explaining the considerations affecting its decision.” Davis v. Fletcher, 598 F.2d 469, 471 (5th
Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, “[i]t remains important . . . for the district court to provide a concise but
clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d
319, 329 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “Courts customarily require the applicant to produce
contemporaneous billing records or other sufficient documentation so that the district court can
fulfill its duty to examine the application for noncompensable hours.” Gagnon v. United
Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324)
(cleaned up). While the absence of contemporaneous billing records “does not preclude an award
of fees per se,” the evidence must be “adequate to determine reasonable hours.” Id. (quoting
Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 325) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court’s Local Civil Rule 7.1(e) requires that a “response and brief to an opposed
motion must be filed within 21 days from the date the motion is filed.” Twenty-one days have long
passed since AISD filed its Motion for Attorney Fees, but Plaintiffs have not filed a response or
objected to the Motion. Therefore, the Court construes the lack of response or objection as an
indication that Plaintiffs are unopposed to the attorney fees sought by AISD. However, even if
Plaintiffs are opposed, the Court finds that AISD’s requested attorney fees are reasonable under
the lodestar calculation. The Court bases this conclusion on the facts stated in the Motion, the
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declaration of Meredith Prykryl Walker (“the Walker Declaration”), the attached billing records,
and the fact that AISD has already reduced its fee claim to $7,393.00 of the $41,683.50 total to
reflect only half the fees associated with the Motion for Summary Judgment, The Court also finds
that the lodestar calculation should not be adjusted based on the Johnson factors.
A. 	Attorney fees are reasonable under the lodestar calculation.
The Court begins by calculating the lodestar, which “is the product of the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly billing rate.” LULAC, 119
F.3d at 1232. In support of its request for attorney fees, AISD offers the Walker Declaration and
timesheets, receipts, and invoices supporting the declaration. ECF No. 85.
The declaration and attached billing records show that Ms. Walker is an attorney and
shareholder in the law firm of Walsh Gallegos Kyle Robinson & Roalson P.C. in Irving, Texas.
ECF No. 85 at 2. She was admitted to practice in Texas in 2006, and her billing rate in this case
was $280.00 per hour. Id. at 4. Ms. Walker has represented school districts for fourteen years,
including in TOMA cases. Id. at 3. She opines that the fees charged to AISD were “the same or
below those customarily charged in this area for the same or similar services.” Id. at 4.
Ms. Walker associated with other attorneys and paralegals at her firm, who charged varying
rates between $115.00 and $255.00 per hour. Id. at 4. Ms. Beytebiere is an attorney at the firm
who was admitted to the Texas bar in 2023 and billed at a rate of $225.00 per hour. Id. Finally,
Ms. Osborne is a paralegal in the firm’s Irving office and billed at a rate of $115.00 per hour. Id.
Billing statements included with the Motion reflect that AISD incurred $41,683.50 in
attorney fees for 172.8 hours of work. Id. at 5. They also show that AISD seeks only to recover a
small portion of the attorney fees incurred ($7,393 of the $41,683.50 total), focusing on the fees
only of Ms. Walker, Ms. Beytebiere, and Ms. Osborne. ECF No. 85 at 4.
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AISD expended $14,786.00 on work in connection with the Motion for Summary
Judgment, which AISD reduced by half because the unmeritorious TOMA claim was one of two
claims at issue in the Motion. The lodestar for AISD’s fees is appropriate for the full amount it
seeks of $7,393.00 because AISD’s counsel expended a reasonable number of hours on the
litigation, and the firm charged AISD a reasonable hourly billing rate for the services of Ms.
Walker, Ms. Beytebiere, and Ms. Osborne. LULAC, 119 F.3d at 1232.
B. 	Adjustment under the Johnson factors is not appropriate.
While the lodestar is presumptively reasonable, the Court can adjust the lodestar up or
down in exceptional cases based on an analysis of the twelve Johnson factors. See Johnson, 488
F.2d at 717-19. After considering the briefing and supporting evidence that AISD filed, the Court
concludes that no adjustment is warranted. All the Johnson factors are neutral or indicate that the
lodestar amount is reasonable. Moreover, the most important of the Johnson factors,“the time and
labor involved, the customary fee, the amount involved and the result obtained, and the experience,
reputation and ability of counsel,” see Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047, suggest that the lodestar amount is
reasonable.
To briefly touch on the factors, factor two is not at issue here because this case is a TOMA
action involving few defendants and limited alleged violations of the Act, thus presenting no
“novel” or “difficult” legal questions. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. Likewise, the third factor is
not 	relevant because this case does not require attorneys with 	highly 	specific or niche
competencies, though AISD’s counsel did have significant experience in the subject matter at
issue. See id. And none of AISD’s counsel suggested that they were significantly precluded from
other work by taking this case, rendering the fourth factor inapplicable. See id. Further, there was
no suggestion that pressing time constraints apply to this action or atypical “time limitations
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imposed by the client or circumstances.” Id. Because the case presents nothing uniquely
undesirable from a practitioner’s perspective, the tenth Johnson factor also does not inform the
Court’s inquiry. See id. at 719. And finally, the eleventh factor, “the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client,” does not affect the Court’s reasonableness analysis
because nothing of record reflects the nature and extent of AISD’s relationship with any of its
lawyers. Accordingly, that factor is irrelevant for the Court’s reasonableness analysis. See id.
Initially, the Court must determine if the attorney fees requested represent a reasonable
number of hours expended at a reasonable hourly amount. Alexander v. City of Jackson Miss., 456
F. App’x 397, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2011). The Court concludes that under the first factor, the amount
of time spent on this case by AISD’s attorneys was reasonable. The attorneys billed a total of 172.8
hours in connection with this matter, of which AISD seeks only a tiny fraction in the present
Motion. The Court finds that the number of hours AISD’s counsel incurred did not exceed a
reasonable amount given the amount in controversy. Consequently, the first Johnson factor
indicates the lodestar amount of requested fees is reasonable and should not be adjusted. See
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717.
The fifth Johnson factor, which looks to the “customary fee” in similar cases, also does not
support an adjustment to the lodestar. See id. at 718. In this regard, “courts in the Northern District
[of Texas] have approved regular hourly rates of $345, $350, and $375.” Koehler v. Aetna Health
Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Paris v. Dallas Airmotive, Inc., 2004 WL
2100227, at *8 n.5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2004)). $280.00 and $225.00 for the work of Ms. Walker
and Ms. Beytebiere do not exceed these amounts. The Court concludes that the $280.00 hourly
rate for Ms. Walker, the $225.00 rate for Ms. Beytebiere, and the $115.00 rate for Ms. Osborne
were reasonable based upon the Court’s familiarity with the reasonable, usual, and customary
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billing rates in the Fort Worth Division of the Court for lawyers and paralegals with similar years
of experience and backgrounds under the ninth factor. The fifth factor is naturally accompanied
by the sixth— “whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” 488 F.2d at 718. Ordinarily, larger fees
may be justified if the fee is contingent. But here the fee is not relatively large, and the fact that
AISD’s counsel billed on an hourly basis facilitates efficient calculations like the one conducted
above. The sixth factor supports an attorney fee award of $7,393.00 here.
Johnson’s eighth factor further confirms AISD’s award is reasonable and that this is not an
exceptional case given the “amount involved and results obtained.” See id. at 718-19; Northwinds
Abatement, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. Of Wausau, 258 F.3d 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he most critical
factor in determining an award of attorney fees is the ‘degree of success obtained’ by the victorious
plaintiffs.”). The eighth factor suggests that an award of $7,393.00 is reasonable given AISD’s
success at summary judgment. Considering the significant reduction in attorney fees sought
compared to those incurred, Chief Judge O’Connor should grant attorney fees of $7,393.00. Under
the ninth factor, the experience, reputation, and ability of AISD’s attorneys in this action confirms
the reasonableness of the award.
Having examined the Motion, Walker Declaration, and relevant billing records, the Court
concludes that AISD’s requested attorney fees of $7,393.00 are reasonable under the lodestar
calculation. The Court also finds that the lodestar calculation should not be adjusted based on the
Johnson factors. The reasonable and just attorney fees that AISD should receive are $7,393.00.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chief Judge O’Connor GRANT
the Motion for Attorney Fees (ECF No. 84) and award AISD reasonable attorney fees of $7,393.00.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties
in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,
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and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with
a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must
identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for
the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates
by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file
specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except
upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
SIGNED on January 23, 2026.
____________________________________
Hal R. Ray, Jr.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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