Yan v. The State Bar of Texas et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
CONGHUA YAN, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-758-P
§
THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ET AL. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT
WILLIAM PIGG’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
Pending before the Court are two motions: (1) Defendant William Albert Pigg (“Pigg”)’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c)
(“Motion for Judgment”) [doc. 191], filed November 21, 2025, and (2) pro se Plaintiff Conghua
Yan (“Yan”)’s Opposed Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint (“Motion for Leave”)
[doc. 210], filed December 30, 2025. 	The Court, having carefully considered the motions,
responses, replies, and all other relevant filings and applicable law, RECOMMENDS that (1)
Pigg’s Motion for Judgment be GRANTED and all claims against Pigg be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and (2) Yan’s Motion for Leave be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
As 	noted 	in 	the 	undersigned’s 	December 	28, 	2023, 	Findings, 	Conclusions, 	and
Recommendation (“December 28, 2023 FCR”) on the Motions to Dismiss filed by all Defendants
(except Pigg) [doc. 121], Yan, on September 18, 2023, filed an eighty-two-page Third Amended
Complaint against eleven Defendants1 [doc. 60]. In this Third Amended Complaint, which is the
1 The Court notes that, in an order dated April 23, 2024, United States District Judge Mark Pittman accepted
and adopted the December 28, 2023 FCR that recommended dismissing all claims against all Defendants (except Pigg)
[doc. 148] and issued a Final Judgment [doc. 149] in this case. However, in an order filed on September 29, 2025,
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fourth complaint filed by Yan and the live pleading before the Court, Yan describes his suit as the
“[s]candalous [c]ase of the [d]ecades” in which he exposes “a decade-long and widespread pattern”
of “racketeering activity” promulgated by the State Bar of Texas and its members. 	(Plaintiff’s
Third Amended Complaint (“Pl.’s Compl.”) at 3-4 (emphasis omitted); see also Pl.’s Compl. at 5-
6.) Yan further asserts that “the merits of this suit are so important that any attempt to dismiss it
would harm the public interest statewide.” (Pl.’s Compl. at 35 (emphasis omitted).)
This lawsuit arose out of a lengthy state court divorce proceeding between Yan and his ex-
wife. 	(Pl.’s Compl. at 20-35.) 	Defendant Pigg was Yan’s attorney during part of this divorce
proceeding. 	(Pl.’s Compl. at 18.) 	Yan contends that the state court judge, Defendant Lori L.
DeAngelis, illegally ordered Yan to pay attorneys’ fees and spousal support from certain funds
under Yan’s control. 	(See, e.g., Pl.’s Compl. at 18-29.) 	In response to the state court’s orders,
Yan filed multiple grievance cases with Defendant State Bar of Texas, including against Pigg, in
which Yan alleged, inter alia, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”). (Pl.’s Compl. at 29-33.) The State Bar of Texas, initially and on reconsideration,
dismissed Yan’s complaints. 	(Id.) 	Yan claims that the State Bar’s dismissal of his complaints
shows that it is a conspirator in the RICO violations, and it protects its members by disposing of
grievances within its self-regulated discipline process. (Pl.’s Compl. at 31-32.) Subsequently, in
response to his revelation that the State Bar of Texas and its members were colluding to commit
racketeering activities, Yan filed a criminal complaint with the Tarrant County Sheriff’s
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded this case to this Court, stating Defendant “Pigg’s
liability was not adjudicated, or even addressed, elsewhere in the record” [doc. 175 (filed in this Court on October 20,
2025)]. If Judge Pittman adopts the undersigned’s FCR as to Defendant Pigg, then all claims against all Defendants
in this case will have been dismissed.
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Department. (Pl.’ Compl. at 32.) Yan alleges that his criminal complaint was shut down by other
members of the State Bar of Texas who worked in the Tarrant County District Attorney’s office
and wished to further the racketeering activities. (Id. at 32-33.) Yan seeks numerous injunctions
against the Defendants as well as a monetary award of tens of millions of dollars. (See generally
Pl.’s Compl.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Parties may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but
early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Rule 12(c) motions are “designed to dispose
of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered
by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Great Plains Trust
Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). 	“A motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6).” Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded,
non-conclusory allegations in the complaint and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the
plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). Indeed, the plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and his “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). 	The Court need not credit bare conclusory allegations or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Defendant Pigg’s Motion for Judgment
As relevant to Pigg’s Motion for Judgment, Yan alleges three causes of action against Pigg:
(1) RICO violations; (2) antitrust violations; and (3) violations of the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	(Pl.’s Compl. at 35-62, 66-68; see Pigg’s Motion for
Judgment (“Pigg’s Mot.”) at 10.) In his motion, Pigg argues, inter alia, that Yan’s claim against
him should be dismissed because (1) Yan’s RICO claims do not comply with “the factual predicate
mandates set forth in what is colloquially known as ‘Twombly/Iqbal’ nor has he alleged a pattern
of Racketeering activity based on at least two such instances[;]” (2) Yan has “pleaded no facts that
would support an Antitrust claim against Pigg[;]” and (3) Pigg is not a state actor subject to Yan’s
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Pigg’s Mot. at 10; see Pigg’s Mot. at 12-14.)
1. 	RICO and Antitrust Claims
In his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Pigg argue, inter alia, that Yan’s RICO and
antitrust claims against him should be dismissed for failing to plead non-conclusory facts to
support such claims. (Pigg’s Mot. at 12-13.) In addition, as to the RICO claims, Pigg argues that
Yan failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activities based on at least two such instances. (Id.)
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As to the RICO claims, Yan, in his Third Amended Complaint, alleges that Defendants,
including Pigg, engaged “in a continuous series of RICO racketeering activities (mainly 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 18 U.S.C. § 664) under the protection of their conspirators.” (Pl.’s
Compl. at 3 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff claims that the “alleged RICO schemes consisted of
a number of mail fraud and wire fraud offenses and ultimately amounted to acts of ‘theft or
embezzlement from employee benefit plan.’” (Id. at 4 (mistakes in original).) In addition, Yan
also refers to, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, 1027, 1056, 1349, and 1962 in support of his RICO claims.
(Id. at 36-50.) As to Yan’s antitrust claims, Yan alleges that Defendants, including Pigg, violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. (Pl.’s Compl. at 2; see also Pl.’s Compl. at 50-62.)
As noted in footnote 1, supra, Judge Pittman entered an order on April 23, 2024 [doc. 148]
that, inter alia, dismissed all claims against all Defendants (except Pigg as Pigg had filed an answer
and not a motion to dismiss). In the April 23, 2024 Order Judge Pittman detailed the reasons that
Yan had failed to state plausible RICO/antitrust claims against all other Defendants in this case.
(See Judge Pittman’s April 23, 2024 Order at 14-16.) It is clear that Judge Pittman’s analysis is
also applicable to Yan’s RICO/antitrust claims against Pigg. Thus, the undersigned incorporates
by reference Judge Pittman’s analysis regarding Yan’s failure to state RICO/antitrust claims
against all Defendants and applies such analysis to Pigg.2 (See id.)
2 The Court notes that Yan, in his response to Pigg’s motion, states:
Pigg suggests that because this Court previously dismissed RICO claims against other “Attorney
Defendants” with prejudice, it should now simply extend that reasoning to him. But the Fifth Circuit
remanded precisely because Pigg’s own rights and liabilities had not been adjudicated. On remand,
the Court must evaluate the [Third Amended Complaint]’s allegations as to Pigg himself. Rule
12(c) therefore does not permit judgment in his favor on the RICO claim.
(Yan’s Response in Opposition to Pigg’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment (“Yan’s Resp.”) at 17-18.) The Court has
done such an evaluation and finds that Judge Pittman’s prior analysis as to Yan’s RICO/antitrust claims against all the
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While adopting Judge Pittman’s analysis, the undersigned additionally makes note of the
following as to Yan’s antitrust claims. “Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization,
attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize.” 	David B. Turner Builders LLC v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 603 F. Supp. 3d 459, 465 (S.D. Miss. 2022) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2). In this
case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant State Bar of Texas is a “natural monopoly” (Pl.’s Compl. at
52- 53) and that the other Defendants, including Pigg, are conspirators in such monopoly (see id.
at 55-56). To establish a conspiracy to monopolize claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence
of a combination or conspiracy; (2) an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy; (3) a substantial
amount of commerce affected; and (4) specific intent to monopolize.” Weyerhaeuser, 603 F. Supp.
3d at 465 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, at the very least, Yan has failed to make any non-conclusory allegations that
Pigg, as an individual, had a specific intent to monopolize. 	Instead, Yan’s allegations of intent
regarding Yan’s conspiracy to monopolize claims relate, inter alia, to the following: (1) conclusory
statements about the intention (or lack thereof) of family law attorneys in Texas in advocating for
their clients (Pl.’s Compl. at 34); (2) Texas attorneys conspiring to utilize family court orders to
compel advanced payment or secure business income and “knowingly or intentionally refraining
from informing consumers about the limits” (Pl.’s Compl. at 53; see also Pl.’s Compl. at 56); (3)
Texas attorneys, including Defendants in this case that are attorneys, “either remained silent upon
learning about the crime [of Defendant State Bar of Texas possessing monopoly power to redefine
what is deemed unlawful as lawful] or intentionally denied it to cover up the criminal activities”
other Defendants applies equally to Pigg. As noted by Judge Pittman, “[T]he bottom line is simple: Yan fails to
furnish facts to support his allegations of ‘large-scale racketeering activities, shielded by the State Bar of Texas.’”
(Judge Pittman’s April 23, 2024 Order at 15.)
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(Pl.’s Compl. at 57). 	Such conclusory allegations fail to support Yan’s claim that Pigg had a
specific intent to monopolize.
In addition, Yan’s allegations regarding the existence of a conspiracy do not come close to
alleging “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” Bell Atl.
Corp., 550 U.S. at 556. In other words, Yan fails to allege “when, where, or how the conspiracy
was supposedly formed.” Elite Sub-Zero Repair v. Great Plains Appliance Parts, Inc., No. 1:23-
CV-118-DAE, 2023 WL 11916709, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2023); see Corr Wireless
Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. AT&T, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 789, 810 (N.D. Miss. 2012) (stating that claims
under Section 1 and under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for conspiracy to monopolize both require
Plaintiff “to plead sufficient plausible facts of any agreement or conspiracy”).
Based on the foregoing, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed to
state plausible RICO or antitrust claims against Pigg. Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS
that Pigg’s Motion for Judgment be GRANTED as to these claims and such claims against Pigg
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. 	Constitutional Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
As set forth above, Yan also sues Pigg under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Pigg violated
Yan’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Compl.
at 2, 15, 17, 28-29, 66-68.) Specifically, Yan, inter alia, alleges:
319. 	. . . Pigg’s other acts herein, including but not limited to his engaging
in RICO racketeering activities, under his individual capacity, deprived Plaintiff
$25,000 of his property to pay himself, violated the plaintiff’s Liberty, Equal
Protection and Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 	His acts also
violated Texas Constitution, Art. 1 §§ 13 and 19.
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320. 	. . . Pigg’s [sic] has been dishonest, intentionally concealed the court
activities to Plaintiff, under his individual capacity, deprived Plaintiff of Equal
Protection and Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
321. 	. . . Pigg’s acts herein, under his individual capacity, violated 42
USC 1983 . . . .
322. 	. . . the direct injury from Defendant’s act is that Plaintiff is losing
his access right to the employment retirement fund, located in the state of
Minnesota, from August 2022 until the present. Access rights to his employment
retirement fund are also protected under the “Liberty” clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
(Pl.’s Compl. at 67; see also Pl.’s Compl. at 15 (referencing Due Process clause); 28-29
(referencing Due Process clause).) Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not, by its text, apply
to private individuals like Pigg, Yan must show that Pigg acted “under color of law” to deprive
him of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Yan, in his response, argues that he alleges in his Third Amended Complaint that “Pigg
joined with state actors, including Associate Judge Lori DeAngelis and Tarrant County, in
misusing QDROs and court orders to deprive Yan of his property and due process.” (Pl.’s Resp.
at 22.) “The Fifth Circuit has held that to ‘maintain a claim that a private citizen is liable under §
1983 based on joint action with state officials,’ a plaintiff must allege, (1) ‘facts showing an
agreement or meeting of the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage in a
conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that the private actor was a
willing participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.’” Hernandez v. Causey, No. 2:17-
cv-123-TBM-MTP, 2024 WL 5200178, at *11 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 14, 2024) (quoting Pikaluk v.
Horseshoe Ent., L.P., 810 F. App’x 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2020)).
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In this case, while Yan alleges broad, conclusory statements that Pigg entered into an
agreement or conspiracy with several of the other Defendants to commit illegal acts (and, in turn,
violate Yan’s constitutional rights), just as with his antitrust claims, Yan fails to plead non-
conclusory allegations regarding the time, date, or circumstances in which Defendants made such
agreement. See, e.g., Polacek v. Kemper Cnty., Miss., 739 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 (S.D. Miss. 2010)
(“[I]t is not enough merely to recite that there was an agreement or that [state and private
Defendants] conspired or acted in concert, for these are conclusions, not facts.”); Tripathi v. St.
Edward’s Univ., No. 1:25-CV-01203-RP, 2025 WL 2629968, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2025)
(finding that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations against, inter alia, a private university and two law
firms that they engaged with state actors to violate Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights,
without specific facts, were “insufficient to render these defendants state actors for the purposes
of section 1983”); Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming
dismissal of Section 1983 claim against private actor when Plaintiff failed to “allege specific facts
to show an agreement”). Consequently, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Yan has failed
to state a claim under Section 1983 against Pigg for violating Yan’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that Pigg’s Motion for Judgment on this issue be GRANTED
and 	Yan’s 	claims 	against 	Pigg 	under 	Section 	1983 	and 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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B. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint
As noted above, Plaintiff, on December 30, 2025, filed an Opposed Motion for Leave to
File Fourth Amended Complaint.3 In his motion, Yan argues that such motion “is supported by
extraordinary circumstances: the late discovery of five fraudulent instruments [(as opposed to
two)] and evidence of a scheme to abstract $50,000, not $25,000 as previously understood—from
Plaintiff’s ERISA-protected retirement account.” 	(Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave (“Pl.’s Mot. for
Leave”) at 1 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff further states that he “did not discover the full scope
of the fraudulent scheme until August 2024, when he obtained the complete docket transaction
history from the Tarrant County District Clerk’s Office dated August 20, 2024, revealing three
garnishment orders and two writs of garnishment that had been concealed from him.” 	(Id.
(emphasis in original).) 	Yan also claims that he “recently obtained sworn testimony [executed
October 18, 2025,] from nonparty his ex-spouse Fuyan Wang.” (Id. at 2.)
Generally, a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend unless it is apparent that
Plaintiff has pled his best case. See Ricks v. Khan, 135 F. 4th 296, 300-01 (5th Cir. 2025); Bazrowx
v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998); Dark v. Potter, 293 F. App’x 254, 257 (5th Cir.
2008) (“While a precise definition of a plaintiff’s ‘best case’ is elusive, this court often assumes a
plaintiff asserts its best case after the plaintiff is ‘apprised of the insufficiency’ of the complaint.”).
In this case, however, the Court has already given Yan multiple opportunities to amend his
3 The Court notes that, in its September 18, 2023, Order [doc. 58] granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
File a Third Amended Complaint, the Court stated, “Because the Court has granted Plaintiff multiple opportunities to
file an amended complaint, the Court will not grant additional motions for leave to file an amended complaint absent
extraordinary circumstances.”
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complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that he filed this motion for leave promptly after receiving
new evidence is contradicted by the fact that he allegedly obtained such evidence in August 2024
and, for reasons unexplained, delayed filing such motion until December 30, 2025, which was also
over two weeks after he had already filed a response4 to Pigg’s pending Motion for Judgment.
Moreover, Yan’s proposed amendment would be futile for the same reasons set forth above in this
FCR recommending granting Pigg’s Motion for Judgment. 	As a result, the Court FINDS and
CONCLUDES that Yan has pled his best case and RECOMMENDS that Yan’s Motion for Leave
be DENIED.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set out above, the Court RECOMMENDS that: (1) Pigg’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [doc. 191] be GRANTED and all claims against Pigg be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE and (2) Yan’s Opposed Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended
Complaint [doc. 210] be DENIED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
4 Yan filed his response [doc. 206] to Pigg’s Motion for Judgment on December 11, 2025.
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636(b)(1). 	Failure to file, by the date stated above, a specific written objection to a proposed
factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending time to file objections to 14 days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until March 5,
2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed,
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to
the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions and recommendation, be and hereby
is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.
SIGNED February 19, 2026.
____________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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