Armstrong v. CCPRS/CH2M Hill-CDM PA TAC Recovery Services

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SANAE MICHELLE ARMSTRONG, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-03464-L (BT)
§
CCPRS/CH2M HILL-CDM PA TAC
RECOVERY SERVICES,
§
§
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Sanae Michelle Armstrong seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP) in this pro se civil action. See generally IFP App. (ECF No. 3). For
the reasons stated, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed
IFP and dismiss his case without prejudice unless she pays the $405.00 filing fee
within 30 days of an order accepting this recommendation.
Legal Standard and Analysis
A federal district court may authorize a person to bring a civil action IFP—
that is, without the prepayment of fees—when the person submits an affidavit
establishing she is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1). The goal of this provision is to allow access to federal courts for litigants
who lack the financial resources to pay any part of the statutory filing costs. Prows
v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court must examine the
financial condition of the applicant to determine whether the payment of fees
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would “cause undue financial hardship.” Id. “This entails a review of other
demands on individual plaintiff’s financial resources, including whether the
expenses are discretionary or mandatory.” Id. The Court may require a plaintiff to
complete a financial affidavit in support of a motion to proceed IFP. Nottingham
v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2016). Further, the
court may “look to where the litigant’s reported income is in relation to applicable
poverty guidelines.” Moates v. Biden, 2022 WL 3566451, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 29,
2022), rec. accepted 2022 WL 18110176 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2022).
Here, Plaintiff and her spouse received approximately $10,134.00 each
month from Plaintiff’s employment and her spouse’s disability payments. IFP App.
at 1–2. Plaintiff began new employment in October 2025 and now receives
approximately $4,167.00 each month from her employment. Id. at 2.
Based on the information provided, the Court cannot conclude that payment
of the $405.00 filing fee would cause Plaintiff undue financial hardship. Plaintiff
receives a substantial monthly income. This income places her well above the
federal poverty threshold for both a two- and three-person household in Texas. See
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, HHS Poverty
Guidelines for 2025, https://aspe.hhs.gov/topics/poverty-economic-
mobility/poverty-guidelines (last visited January 9, 2026).
Even if Plaintiff’s claimed expenses exceed her net income, this does not
indicate that payment of the filing would cause Plaintiff undue hardship.
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First, Plaintiff owns a home worth approximately $300,000 and
two luxury vehicles. IFP App. at 3. Courts in this Circuit have denied applications
to proceed IFP in similar circumstances. See Powell v. Gov. Federal Rsrv. of New
York, 2014 WL 1883672, at *2 (S.D. Miss. May 12, 2014) (denying IFP application
when the plaintiff's expenses exceeded income, but the plaintiff had valuable assets
including a home and a luxury vehicle).
Second, it appears that at least some of Plaintiff’s expenses are discretionary
and/or excessive. This includes $3,500 in credit card payments, $400 in vehicle
installment payments, $300 for transportation, and $200 for motor vehicle
insurance. Such expenses do not support waiver of the filing fee. See Dobbins v.
Kroger Co., 2009 WL 186141, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2009) (denying IFP
application because, among other things, certain expenses “appear[ed] excessive
without further detailed explanations”); Ramsey v. NFI Indus., 2022 WL 707234,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2022), rec. accepted 2022 WL 705965 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9,
2022) (treating credit card expenses as discretionary; LeBlanc v. Rodger’s L. Firm
PLLC, 2025 WL 2263723, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec.
adopted, 2025 WL 2256718 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2025) (treating expenses for motor
vehicle installment payments and insurance as excessive and discretionary);
Hobbs v. Stanley, 2022 WL 1510936, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2022) (treating
expenses for transportation as discretionary).
Third, Plaintiff states that she is unable to pay the filing fee because her
overall income has decreased and her husband “was forced to retire from his job
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in 2023.” IFP App. at 5. While the Court understands that decreasing income can
be burdensome, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequate assets to pay the
$405.00 filing fee and other costs of this suit.
Recommendation
The Court should DENY Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (ECF No. 3) and dismiss his case without prejudice unless she pays the
$405.00 filing fee within 30 days of an order accepting this recommendation.
Signed January 9, 2025.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other
grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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