James v. Navy Federal Credit Union et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SHAKKA SHANEAK JAMES, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3371-N-BN
§
ACURA FINANCIAL SERVICES, 	§
ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se plaintiff Shakka Shaneak James filed this action in a Dallas County,
Texas state court “seek[ing] redress for damages caused by multiple creditors who
[James alleges] have failed to properly verify alleged debts, engaged in fraudulent or
misleading contractual practices, and misrepresented the amount or validity of
debts.” E.g., Dkt. No. 1-9 at 2 (operative compl. at time of removal).
Citing that James alleges violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a federal
statute, Defendant Navy Federal Credit Union removed under the Court’s federal-
question subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Senior United States District Judge David C. Godbey referred the removed
action to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management.
After reviewing the state court record attached to the notice of removal and the
many filings made in this case since removal to federal court, the Court entered a
memorandum opinion and order regarding judicial screening on December 16, 2025
that enjoined further filings in this case until the Court completes its screening but
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allowed James leave to file a third amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 43. And she did
so, on December 26, 2025. See Dkt. No. 44.
James then moved for leave to report to the Court that she is dismissing her
claims against Defendant Lonestar Managing General Agency (“Lonestar”). See Dkt.
No. 47.
And the Court entered an order on January 21, 2026 noting that, “[t]o the
extent that this defendant remains a party to this lawsuit, because it has neither
answered nor moved for summary judgment, the Court construes James’s motion for
leave as a self-executing notice of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(i).” Dkt. No. 48.
That order was worded as such because James’s operative complaint filed prior
to the motion for leave does not mention Lonestar. See Dkt. No. 44-1. Nor has
Lonestar otherwise appeared in this lawsuit.
Despite that, James now moves the Court to enforce her settlement agreement
with Lonestar. See Dkt. No. 50.
The Court should deny this motion for multiple reasons.
Rule 41(a)(1) – which “cover[s] individual defendants – thus allowing plaintiffs
… to use Rule 41(a) to dismiss individual defendants” but not individual claims,
Williams v. Seidenbach, 958 F.3d 341, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (collecting
cases) – “is the shortest and surest route to abort a complaint when it is applicable,”
Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Am. Cyanamid
Co. v. McGhee, 317 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1963)), as a Rule 41(a) “stipulation of
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dismissal is ‘effective immediately’ and renders subsequent action by the district
court ‘superfluous’ with ‘no force or effect,’” Whittier v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C.,
128 F.4th 724, 727 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Smallbizpros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d
458, 463 (5th Cir. 2010)).
So, “[i]f a district court is to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a
settlement agreement effectuated by [such a] stipulation of dismissal, then one of two
things must happen: either (1) an order expressly retaining jurisdiction over, or
expressly incorporating the terms of, the settlement agreement must enter ahead of
the stipulation; or (2) the stipulation’s efficacy must be made contingent upon the
district court issuing such an order.” Id. (citing Smallbizpros, 618 F.3d at 463-64;
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1994); Nat’l City
Golf Fin. v. Scott, 899 F.3d 412, 416-17 (5th Cir. 2018); Hosp. House, Inc. v. Gilbert,
298 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Because “[n]either happened here,” the Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement.
What’s worse for James is that all the authority above is built on a foundation
that the settling defendant was at one time part of the lawsuit, such that the Court
had jurisdiction but then lost it.
That does not appear to be the case here, where not only is Lonestar not listed
in the operative complaint, but it also seems that James dropped Lonestar as a
defendant when she filed the second amended complaint on December 11, 2025. See
Dkt. No. 15.
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More fundamentally, there is no record that Lonestar was ever properly served
– the first step to making it a party to this action, as service of process is “fundamental
to any procedural imposition on a named defendant,” and, so, it is “the official trigger
for responsive action by an individual or entity named defendant.” Murphy Bros., Inc.
v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350, 353 (1999); cf. Webster v. Kijakazi,
No. 21-50455, 2021 WL 4468889, at *3 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2021) (per curiam) (“When
a plaintiff fails to properly serve process on a defendant, the district court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant and any default judgment would be void.”
(citing Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1999))).
So James has not shown that the Court ever had jurisdiction over Lonestar.
Recommendation
The Court should deny Plaintiff Shakka Shaneak James’s motion to enforce
her settlement agreement with Defendant Lonestar Managing General Agency [Dkt.
No. 50].
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
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reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 11, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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