Sosa v. State of Texas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
THOMAS C. SOSA, JR., §
TDCJ No. 02374326, §
§
Petitioner, §
§ No. 3:25-cv-3344-E-BN
V. §
§
STATE OF TEXAS, §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Thomas C. Sosa, Jr., convicted for aggravated robbery in Dallas
County, Texas, submitted a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus. See Dkt.
No. 2. And United States District Judge Ada Brown referred Sosa’s case to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
Sosa originally challenged his conviction through a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in 2022, which was denied. See Sosa v. State of Texas, No. 3:22-cv-2078-K-BN,
2025 WL 463315 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2025), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 462086 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 11, 2025). Sosa appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals but was denied a
certificate of appealability. See Sosa v. Guerrero, No. 25-10355, slip op. (5th Cir. May
12, 2025).
While his original petition was pending in this Court, Sosa filed a second
petition, which was dismissed without prejudice as duplicative. See Sosa v. Dir.,
TDCJ-CID, No. 3:24-cv-75-E-BK, 2024 WL 1144946 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2024), rec.
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accepted, 2024 WL 1144241 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2024). Sosa’s motion for a certificate
of appealability as to that judgment was also denied. See Sosa v. Lumpkin, No. 24-
10482, slip op. (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024).
Sosa has also moved for authorization to file a successive Section 2254
application twice. The Fifth Circuit denied the first motion because his arguments
were more appropriately addressed in his then-pending motion for a certificate of
appealability. See In re Sosa, No. 25-10318, slip op. (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025). The
second motion was denied for failure to make the required prima facie showing. See
In re Sosa, No. 25-10796, slip op. (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2025).
And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that, because Sosa’s petition is an unauthorized successive habeas
application, and considering his numerous past challenges to his conviction, the
Court should dismiss the application without prejudice to Sosa’s right to seek
authorization from the Fifth Circuit to file a successive habeas application.
Discussion
“A state prisoner is entitled to one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief
from his conviction. But he may not usually make a ‘second or successive habeas
corpus application.’” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507 (2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)). As such, Section 2244
lays out the requirements for filing successive petitions, serving as gate-
keeper by preventing the repeated filing of habeas petitions that attack
the prisoner’s underlying conviction. The statute does not define “second
or successive,” however, and we have made clear that a petition is not
“second or successive” merely because it is numerically second.
...
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Later habeas petitions attacking the same judgment that was attacked
in a prior petition tend to be labeled successive and must meet the
standards for authorization under § 2244. In contrast, later habeas
petitions attacking distinct judgments, administration of an inmate’s
sentence, a defective habeas proceeding itself, or some other species of
legal error – when the error arises after the underlying conviction – tend
to be deemed non-successive. In essence, if the purported defect existed,
or the claim was ripe, at the time of the prior petition, the later petition
is likely to be held successive even if the legal basis for the attack was
not. If, however, the purported defect did not arise, or the claim did not
ripen, until after the conclusion of the previous petition, the later
petition based on that defect may be non-successive.
Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 220, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) (footnotes omitted).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) “requires a
prisoner to obtain authorization from the federal appellate court in his circuit before
he may file a ‘second or successive’ petition for relief in federal district court. Without
such authorization, the otherwise-cognizant district court has no jurisdiction to
entertain a successive § 2254 petition.” Id. at 219 (footnotes omitted).
As discussed above, Sosa previously exercised his “one fair opportunity to seek
federal habeas relief from his conviction,” Banister, 590 U.S. at 507, and his current
claims allege defects in that conviction that “existed ... at the time of the [first federal]
petition ... even if the legal basis for the [current] attack was not” known to Sosa when
he filed an initial Section 2254 application, Leal Garcia, 573 F.3d at 222; accord In re
Will, 970 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
Sosa therefore presents claims that are successive. And his failure to first
obtain authorization from the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) deprives
the district court of jurisdiction to consider the habeas application. See Leal Garcia,
573 F.3d at 219 (“AEDPA requires a prisoner to obtain authorization from the federal
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appellate court in his circuit before he may file a ‘second or successive’ petition for
relief in federal district court. Without such authorization, the otherwise-cognizant
district court has no jurisdiction to entertain a successive § 2254 petition.” (footnotes
omitted)).
The Court could cure this want of jurisdiction by transferring this application
to the Fifth Circuit for appropriate action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631. But given Sosa’s
history of filing petitions aimed at his state conviction and of seeking but failing to
obtain authorization from the Fifth Circuit to file a successive petition, “a dismissal
without prejudice appears more efficient and better serves the interests of justice
than a transfer in this instance.” United States v. King, Nos. 3:97-cr-0083-D-01 &
3:03-cv-1524-D, 2003 WL 21663712, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2003).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss Petitioner Thomas C. Sosa, Jr’s pro se application
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [Dkt. No. 2] without prejudice to his
right to file, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), a motion for authorization to file a
successive Section 2254 application in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
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recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 6, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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