Lukose v. City of Carrollton Texas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
BIJU MATHEW LUKOSE, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-3137-G-BW
§
CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS, 	§
et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Biju Mathew Lukose, appearing pro se, has sued a municipality, a county, a
state prosecutor, and multiple other individuals relating to his arrest, detention, and
prosecution on assault or sexual assault charges that were later dismissed. Before the
Court is Lukose’s Motion to Extend Time for Service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m),
Motion for Alternative Service, and Motion for Limited Expedited Discovery to
Identify Doe Defendants filed on February 17, 2026. (Dkt. No. 12 (“Mot.”).) No
defendant that has been served in this case has filed a response to the motion.
As discussed below, the Court grants Lukose’s request for an extension of time
to serve defendants, denies his motion for alternate service, and denies his request for
expedited discovery.
1 This pro se action was automatically referred to the undersigned magistrate judge
for case management by Special Order 3-251. (See Dkt. No. 1.)
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I. BACKGROUND
In his pro se complaint, Lukose alleges that officers of the Carrolton Police
Department arrested him for misdemeanor assault and seized his phone in October
2023, after his then-fiancée, Defendant Usha Roselin Ravi Shankar, assaulted him.
(Dkt. No. 3 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 23-26.) He alleges that Shankar continued to voluntarily
have contact with him after his release from jail but threatened to accuse him of rape
if he contacted police, stopped paying her expenses, or “did not support her
immigration plans[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 29-31.) Then, in November 2023, Lukose self-
surrendered at the Dallas County jail after a warrant was issued based on Shanker’s
allegations of sexual assault. (Id. ¶ 43.) He was released on November 17, 2023 on
bond conditions that included electronic monitoring. (Id. ¶ 47.) The Dallas County
prosecution ended in February 2024 after a grand jury no-billed him. (Id. ¶ 49.)
Lukose alleges that he and Shankar continued having regular contact after his
case was dismissed. In March 2024, they had another altercation in Denton County
that resulted in Carrolton police officers arresting Shankar for assault. (Compl. ¶ 51.)
Then, on March 4, 2025, Lukose was arrested in Denton County on charges arising
out of sexual assault allegations made by Shankar in connection with the March
2024 altercation. (Id. ¶ 53.) Lukose’s charges were dismissed in October 2025.
(Compl. ¶ 53.)
Lukose asserts claims against government agencies, state actors (e.g., police
officers, prosecutor), and private individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See generally
Compl.) Characterizing his allegations charitably, he avers that Shankar, with the
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help of an unidentified other individual, fabricated evidence against him and
conspired with the prosecutor, and possibly other state actors, to cause him to be
arrested, detained, and prosecuted without probable cause.
Despite this case having been on file for months, Lukose has not served
several of the defendants in this action. Included among them are Shankar, Dallas
County, and the more than 20 John Doe and Jane Doe defendants. In the instant
motion, Lukose seeks an extension of his deadline to serve these defendants,
authorization to serve Shankar and Dallas County by alternate methods, and
expedited discovery to identify the Doe defendants.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Deadline to Serve Defendants
Upon filing suit, a plaintiff has a duty to serve each defendant with a summons
and a copy of the complaint and then to file proof of service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c),
(l). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) establishes a deadline by which a plaintiff
must serve the defendant, and it provides:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed,
the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must
dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an
appropriate period.
When a plaintiff shows good cause for the failure to timely serve a defendant, the
court must provide an extension. McAfee v. Lear Corp., No. 3:24-CV-1811-D, 2024
WL 5012063, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2024). But when a plaintiff fails to establish
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good cause, a court may either dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice or direct that
the plaintiff serve the defendant within a specified period. Id.
Establishing good cause requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “at least as much
as would be required to show excusable neglect. . . . Simple inadvertence or mistake
of counsel or ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice.” Id. at *2 (quoting
Newby v. Enron Corp., 284 F. App’x 146, 149 (5th Cir. 2008)). “In addition to good
cause, ‘some showing of good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement
and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified is normally
required.’” Id. (quoting Newby, 284 F. App’x at 149 (internal quotation marks,
emphasis, and citations omitted)).
Lukose filed this lawsuit on November 17, 2025, and the clerk issued
summonses for the identified defendants that same day. (See Dkt. Nos. 3, 5.) Two
days later, the Court notified Lukose that his deadline to serve defendants was
February 17, 2026. (Dkt. No. 6 as 2.) Lukose filed his motion for an extension on
that deadline. (See Mot.)
Lukose’s supporting documents do not show that he made any effort to serve
any defendant until shortly before his February 17 deadline. He served both
Marquita Cheri Ruff and the City of Carrolton on February 13. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.)
Lukose provides an affidavit by John McGuinness, a process server in New Jersey,
who states that he unsuccessfully attempted to serve Shankar at an address in
Edison, New Jersey on February 13, 2026, at 9:17 a.m., on February 14, 2026, at
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4:35 p.m., and on February 16, 2026, a 3:25 p.m. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at ECF p. 7.)2
Another process server, Dana Chernin, testifies by affidavit that she spoke with
Shankar by phone on February 12 and that Shankar confirmed she lived at the
Edison address but said she was on her way to the airport to travel internationally
and did not know when she would return. (Id. at ECF p. 9.) As for Dallas County,
Lukose provides a process server’s affidavit memorializing a February 12, 2026
attempt to serve the county that was stymied by locked doors. (Dkt. No. 12-4 at
ECF p. 2.)
Lukose has not shown that he has made any effort to serve any of the
unidentified defendants in this case. Nonetheless, it is within a court’s discretion to
extend the deadline under Rule 4(m) even when a plaintiff has failed to show good
cause for the failure to serve a defendant. See Smith v. City of Garland, No. 3:25-CV-
949-B-BW, 2026 WL 245675, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2026), accepted, 2026 WL
243014 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2026).
Despite Lukose’s belated efforts to serve Dallas County and Shankar—and his
complete failure to show good cause as to all other unserved defendants—the Court
GRANTS Lukose’s motion for an extension of the deadline established by Rule 4(m)
and extends the deadline to serve each defendant and file proof of service until May
2 The Court calls Lukose’s attention to court rules requiring a separate appendix with
sequentially numbered pages when filing documents to support a motion or response. See
N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i), 7.2(e). Failure to comply with the rules may result in striking
pleadings or the denial of motions in the future.
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1, 2026. In light of the length of this extension and Lukose’s lack of diligence in
effecting service during the 80 days after filing this lawsuit, the Court does not intend
to provide any further extension absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances.
B. 	Alternate Service
The methods for serving an individual defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4
depends on whether the individual is served in a federal judicial district in the United
States or is instead served in a foreign country. An individual may be served within
the United States by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought
in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or
where service is made,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), or by personally serving the
individual, leaving a summons and complaint at the defendant’s usual place of abode
with another resident of suitable age, or delivering the documents to an agent
authorized by law to receive service, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). “Unless federal law
provides otherwise,” a person who is in a foreign country must be served, in relevant
part:
(1) 	by an internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably
calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents; [or]
* 	* 	*
(3) 	by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the
court orders.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
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Serving a local government, such as a county, is controlled by Rule 4(j). It
provides that a “state-created governmental organization that is subject to suit must
be served by: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief
executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that
state’s law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(j)(2). In Texas, the county judge is considered the chief executive officer of a
county. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.024(a) (“In a suit against a county,
citation must be served on the county judge.”); see also Clark v. Johnson County, No.
3:01-CV-2231-M, 2002 WL 912778, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2002) (“Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) requires that service on a governmental organization
subject to suit shall be effectuated by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to its chief executive officer, which in this case is the County Judge.”).
Because this Court is located in Texas, a plaintiff may—through either Rule
4(e)(1) as to an individual or Rule 4(j)(2)(B) as to a county—serve the respective
defendant in a manner permitted by state law. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
106, a plaintiff may effect service by personal delivery or by “mailing to the
defendant by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the
citation and of the petition.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(1)-(2). The Texas rule also
provides for alternate methods of serving a defendant with court authorization
supported by certain evidence:
Upon motion supported by a statement—sworn to before a notary or
made under penalty of perjury—listing any location where the
defendant can probably be found and stating specifically the facts
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showing that service has been attempted under (a)(1) or (a)(2) at the
location named in the statement but has not been successful, the court
may authorize service:
(1) 	by leaving a copy of the citation and of the petition with
anyone older than sixteen at the location specified in the
statement; or
(2) 	in any other manner, including electronically by social media,
email, or other technology, that the statement or other
evidence shows will be reasonably effective to give the
defendant notice of the suit.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b).
Lukose requests authorization to serve Shankar and Dallas County by
alternate means. Lukose has not established that substitute service is appropriate as
to Shankar. Lukose states that Shankar told a process server that she was traveling
internationally with no foreseen return date. And Shankar has identified an address
where she might be served if she is in India. (See Mot. at 6.) India is a signatory to
the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. See Hague Conference on Private Int’l
Law, India, available at https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members/details1/
?sid=101 (last visited Mar. 17, 2026). Because Lukose knows of an address where
Shankar might be served in India and such service requires the transmission of
judicial documents abroad, he must abide by the requirements of the Hague
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Convention to serve Shankar there. See Prem Sales, LLC v. Guangdong Chigo Heating &
Ventilation Equip. Co., 494 F. Supp. 3d 404, 418–19 (N.D. Tex. 2020).3
If, however, Shankar is in the United States, Lukose has not made the
showing necessary to permit alternate service by any of the methods he requests. A
plaintiff requesting alternate service must provide a supporting affidavit that strictly
complies with the requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b). See Mockingbird Dental
Grp., P.C. v. Carnegie, No. 4:15-CV-404-A, 2015 WL 4231746, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July
10, 2015). The supporting sworn statement must state (1) “the location of the
defendant’s usual place of business or usual place of abode or other place where the
defendant can probably be found” and (2) specifically state the facts showing that
traditional methods of service were unsuccessful. Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b).
Importantly, the plaintiff must also explain how the requested method of alternative
service is likely to give the defendant actual notice of the lawsuit. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
106(b)(2) (authorizing method that “the statement or other evidence shows will be
reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the suit”).
Here, Lukose fails to provide the support necessary for the Court to authorize
alternate service on Shankar. Among other things, his failure to determine whether
she is in the United States or abroad gives the Court little confidence that some of his
3 To the extent Lukose suggests that Rule 4(f)(3) enables the Court to authorize
another method of service irrespective of the Hague Convention’s applicability, the Court
declines to adopt that view. See Prem Sales, 494 F. Supp. 3d at 418-19 (requiring plaintiff to
fulfill requirements of Hague Convention, identifying (f)(3) as a “safety valve for
unanticipated situations” (quoting 4B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N.
Steinman, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1133 (4th ed. 2020))).
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requested methods—e.g., mailing documents, posting documents to apartment
door—would be reasonably effective in giving Shankar notice of the lawsuit.
Lukose’s request to serve Shankar through an alternative method is DENIED.
For the same reason—i.e., failure to provide a supporting affidavit that strictly
complies with the requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(b)—the Court also DENIES
Lukose’s request as to Dallas County. Even though the Court must deny the request,
it addresses one method of service for which he requests court authorization. Lukose
asks to serve Dallas County by “by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed
to Dallas County’s chief executive officer[.]” (Mot. at 11.) As explained above, a
plaintiff may, under Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(2) through Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2), serve
the county judge by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. See Abelar v.
Harris Cnty. Texas, No. CV H-23-21, 2023 WL 3467214, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 15,
2023). Lukose is already authorized to serve Dallas County in this manner, and
court authorization is unnecessary.
C. 	Expedited Discovery
Lukose has named numerous Doe defendants in this case. He identifies the
following: John Does 1 through 5 are Carrolton police officers; John Does 6 through
10 are Dallas County jail employees; Jane Does 1 through 5 are nurses, victim
advocates, or safehouse staff; John Doe 12 is an attorney who Lukose alleges met
with Shankar and discussed a civil action against Lukose; John Doe 11 is a friend of
Shankar who assisted her in preparing false evidence against Lukose; and John/Jane
Does 12 through 20 are “additional unknown persons,” such as other officers, jail
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staff, medical or victim-services personnel, or “private actors.” (Compl. ¶¶ 12-20.)
In his motion, Lukose generally requests authorization to conduct expedited
discovery to learn the identities of these unidentified defendants. (See Mot. at 9, 11-
12.)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) provides that a party “may not seek discovery from
any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f)” except by
agreement of the parties, when authorized by the rules, or permitted by the court.
“The Fifth Circuit has not adopted a standard for determining whether expedited
discovery is warranted, but district courts within the circuit have applied the ‘good
cause’ standard.” Hunsinger v. Doe Corp., No. 3:22-CV-2444-M-BH, 2022 WL
16722344, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2022) (citing authorities). “In a ‘good cause’
analysis, a court must examine the discovery request ‘on the entirety of the record to
date and the reasonableness of the request in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.’” Mary Kay Inc. v. Beyou-Cosms. storefront on www.eBay.com, No. 3:21-
CV-1074-B, 2021 WL 2315097, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2021) (quoting St. Louis
Grp., Inc. v. Metals & Additives Corp., 275 F.R.D. 236, 239 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Although the precise factors considered may depend on
the particular facts of the case, courts have looked at the breadth of the requested
discovery, the purpose for the expedited discovery, whether the moving party can
identify the missing party with sufficient specificity, and whether the plaintiff’s
claims could withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. The party requesting expedited
discovery has the burden to establish good cause. Hunsinger, 2022 WL 16722344, at
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*1. “Courts have found good cause for allowing limited expedited pre-service
discovery to identify an unknown defendant.” Id. at *2. But “the subject matter
related to requests for expedited discovery should be narrowly tailored in scope.”
Mary Kay Inc., 2021 WL 2315097, at *1.
Lukose has not established good cause for the apparently broad discovery that
he requests. He has not submitted any proposed subpoena or other discovery
request, nor has he identified the parties or non-parties from which he intends to seek
discovery. He either intends for the Court to specify the scope and recipients of
discovery for him or he is asking for authorization to conduct unbounded discovery,
neither of which the Court will grant. In these circumstances, Lukose has failed to
show good cause to allow the requested discovery. Cf. MODE Glob., LLC v. Kuriger,
350 F.R.D. 271, 275 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (ordering party to respond to particular
discovery requests); Mary Kay Inc., 2021 WL 2315097, at *2 (authorizing plaintiff to
“serve the . . . subpoenas attached to its motion”).4 Lukose’s motion for expedited
discovery is therefore DENIED.
4 The Court denies Lukose’s broad request to for expedited discovery because he so
patently fails to establish good cause. In the event he renews the motion, there may be
additional reasons—such his lack of diligence in attempting to identify the defendants prior
to expiration of the limitations period—that might preclude him from obtaining expedited
discovery. See Monacelli v. City of Dallas, No. 3:21-CV-2649-L, 2023 WL 9052013, at *3–5
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2023) (denying expedited discovery to identify officers because doing so
would be futile where limitations period passed and plaintiff showed no basis for tolling).
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III. CONCLUSION
Lukose’s February 17, 2026 motion (Dkt. No. 12) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. Specifically, the Court extends Lukose’s deadline to serve
defendants pursuant to Rule 4 until May 1, 2026. It denies Lukose’s request for
alternate service and denies his request for expedited discovery.
SO ORDERED on March 18, 2026.
______________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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