Davis v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KENNETH ARNEZ DAVIS, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-3048-X-BW
§
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY 	§
AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, et al., §
Defendants. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Based on the relevant findings and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS
this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure
to prosecute or follow orders of the Court.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kenneth Arnez Davis, appearing pro se, initiated this action by filing,
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a complaint against
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services and numerous individuals and
other entities. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff’s allegations relate to assertions of
unconstitutional or unlawful conduct by defendants in removing his minor child
from his custody or otherwise interfering with his parental rights. (See generally id.)
Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a motion
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been referred for full case
management.
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for a temporary restraining order. (Dkt. No. 2, 3.) The case was transferred to his
district on October 17, 2025. (Dkt. No. 8.)
After the case was received in this district, the undersigned entered on
November 17, 2025, Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United
States Magistrate Judge recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order be denied. (Dkt. No. 12.) That same day, the Court also entered a
Notice of Deficiency and Order explaining that the application to proceed IFP filed
in the District of Columbia did not provide sufficient information for the Court to
determine whether IFP status was appropriate. (Dkt. No. 13.) The Court therefore
instructed Plaintiff to complete and file an Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form) no later than December 1, 2025. (Id.
at 1.) The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to do so would result in a
recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). (Id.)
The order also required Plaintiff to register as a user of the electronic filing system by
December 1 as required by N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 5.1(f). (Id. at 2.) United States
District Judge Brantley Starr has denied Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary
restraining order. (Dkt. No. 16.)
Plaintiff’s deadline to comply with the Court’s November 17 order to submit
an amended application to proceed IFP and register to use the electronic filing
system has passed, and he has done neither of these things. Additionally, filings in
this Court mailed to him have been returned as undeliverable. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 15.) In
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fact, since submitting the documents that initiated this action on August 8, Plaintiff
has not taken any action that manifests an intent to proceed with the case.
II. INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “authorizes the district
court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or comply with [a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C.,
905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018). This authority flows from a court’s inherent
power to control its docket, prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases,
and avoid congested court calendars. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31
(1962). Further, a court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted merely because a
party proceeds pro se, as “[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party
from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Wright v.
LBA Hospitality, 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order requiring him to file an
amended application to proceed IFP and register to use the electronic filing system.
Nor has he filed anything else in this case since initiating the action in the District of
Columbia. By not complying with the Court’s order or otherwise showing he
intends to proceed with this case, Plaintiff prevents this action from proceeding and
has failed to prosecute his lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court should exercise its
inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and
dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute and
follow court orders.
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III. RECOMMENDATION
This action should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b) for failure to prosecute or follow court orders.
SO RECOMMENDED on December 5, 2025.
______________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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