Johnson v. Volunteers of America-Tx et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DERRICK JOHNSON,
#34654-177,
§
§
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. §
§
No. 3:25-cv-2411-L (BT)
§
VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA-TX, et
al.,
§
§
§
Respondents. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Derrick Johnson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 3), motion for emergency restraining order
(TRO) (ECF No. 6), and amended petition (ECF No. 11). Based on the relevant
filings and applicable law, the Court should dismiss Johnson’s § 2241 petition
without prejudice and deny his motion for a TRO.
Background
Derrick Johnson, a federal inmate housed at a Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
residential reentry center (RRC) in Hutchins, Texas, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging disciplinary action against him.
See Pet. at 7.
Specifically, on August 24, 2025, Johnson was issued an incident report for
attempting to “escape” his RRC. Id. According to Johnson, he had a pass to leave
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the RRC so he could attend court-ordered therapy—and Johnson had put the RRC
on notice of his appointment. Id. Johnson contends that his therapy appointment
simply ran longer than expected. Id. Nevertheless, his RRC imposed work
restrictions on Johnson that allegedly prohibited him from continuing his
employment See id.; TRO at 1–2 (ECF No. 6).
Johnson argues that he is the victim of arbitrary disparate treatment. See
Pet. at 7; TRO at 1. He cites the fact that the RRC did not punish him when a
different medical appointment similarly went long two days after the incident
report, on August 26, 2025. Pet. at 7. Moreover, other inmates housed at the RRC
have purportedly been allowed to “maintain their employment under a ‘work only’
leave restriction” after similar conduct. TRO at 1.
Johnson also complains that: (i) RRC staff improperly confiscated his
cologne in March 2025; and (ii) RRC staff “interacted with Mr. Johnson’s employer
in an unprofessional manner[,] which cost him [his] job.” Pet. at 7.
Johnson’s petition seeks expungement of the August 24, 2025 incident
report, the vacatur of restrictions related to the incident report, and clarification of
his employment options, among other relief. Id. at 8.
On November 4, 2025, Johnson filed an amended petition that merely re-
attached his original petition. See generally Am. Pet. (ECF No. 11).
Legal Standards and Analysis
I. Johnson failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
A federal prisoner seeking relief under § 2241 generally must exhaust his
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administrative remedies through the BOP before presenting his claims in federal
court. See Broderick v. Chapman, 364 F. App’x 111, 112 (5th Cir.
2010) (citing Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994)). “The basic purpose of
the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions
within its special competence—to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and
to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies.” Parisi v. Davidson,
405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972). Courts may sua sponte dismiss § 2241 petitions for lack of
exhaustion. See, e.g., Pritchett v. Upton, 2016 WL 7971334, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
30, 2016).
An administrative remedy procedure for federal prisoners is provided at 28
C.F.R. §§ 542.10–542.19. Under this administrative procedure, if informal
resolution fails, the inmate must pursue a three-level process within the prescribed
time intervals. Typically, the inmate must formally appeal to the Warden, via a
Request for Administrative Remedy (a “BP-9 form”); then to the Regional Director,
via a BP-10 form, within twenty days; and finally to the BOP’s Central Office, via a
BP-11 form, within thirty days. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14–542.15. If, at some level,
the prisoner does not receive a response within the time allowed for reply, the
prisoner may consider the lack of a response to be a denial at that level. See 28
C.F.R. § 542.18. Administrative remedies have not been exhausted until the
inmate’s claim has been filed at all levels and has been denied at all levels. See 28
C.F.R. § 542.15; Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993).
A petitioner need not exhaust administrative remedies, however, when “the
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available administrative remedies either are unavailable or wholly inappropriate
to the relief sought, or where the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself be
a patently futile course of action.” Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62 (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Such “exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in
‘extraordinary circumstances,’ and [the petitioner] bears the burden of
demonstrating the futility of administrative review.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). If a petitioner carries his burden to show an applicable exception to the
exhaustion requirement, he may obtain a merits ruling on his § 2241 petition
despite a lack of exhaustion. See id.
Here, Johnson has not shown that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies. Rather, he admits in his petition that he only partially pursued
exhaustion. See Pet. at 3. Moreover, Johnson filed this action a mere 12 days after
the August 24, 2025 incident report—though he prepared the petition on August
27 and placed it in the prison mail system on August 28. See id. at 9. This timing
also suggests that Johnson failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Pate v.
Volunteers of Am. Halfway House, Hutchins, 2025 WL 1900725, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
June 2, 2025), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 1898587 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2025) (finding
that federal inmate housed in an RRC failed to exhaust administrative remedies
related to disciplinary action where he filed his habeas application so soon after
the disciplinary action that the petitioner did not have time to exhaust
administrative remedies).
Johnson claims that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
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because he never received a response to his complaint and because exhaustion
would be futile. Pet. at 3, 8. But Johson does not make any attempt to show that
exceptional circumstances exist that would make exhaustion futile. See Rourke, 11
F.3d at 49. Exhaustion is required even where the remedy sought is
unavailable. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss Johnson’s petition for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.
II. Johnson may not assert non-habeas claims in this action.
Johnson also appears to allege non-habeas civil claims, such as confiscation
of his personal belongings and interference with his employment. See Pet. at 7.
These claims may not be raised in this habeas action, and the District Judge should
dismiss them without prejudice to Johnson’s raising them in a separate civil action.
Because Johnson is a prisoner under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
he must pay the full $405 filing fee for a non-habeas civil action, should he pursue
one, although he may pay the fee in installments that are automatically withdrawn
from his inmate trust account if the Court grants him leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
III. Johnson is not entitled to a TRO.
Johnson requests a TRO seeking the same core relief sought in his § 2241
petition.
To obtain injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if
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the injunction is not issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage
the order might cause to the responding party; and (4) that the injunction will not
disserve the public interest. Enrique Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d
439, 442 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. If the party seeking an
injunction fails to carry the “heavy burden” to show each of these prerequisites, a
preliminary injunction is not warranted. Enter. Int’l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
As the Court has explained, Johnson’s grounds for relief are unexhausted or
not properly raised in this § 2241 action and are thus subject to dismissal. So
Johnson, at a minimum, cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits of
claims that are not properly before this Court, and the Court should deny his
motion for a TRO.
Recommendation
The Court should DISMISS without prejudice Derrick Johnson’s habeas
claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and DISMISS without
prejudice any non-habeas civil claims because Johnson cannot bring them in this
habeas case. The Court should also DENY the Motion for a TRO (ECF No. 6).
SO RECOMMENDED.
February 18, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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