Wilkerson v. LaFuente et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SENRICK SHERN WILKERSON, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-2374-B-BN
§
STEPHEN RAY LAFUENTE, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Senrick Shern Wilkerson filed a pro se complaint alleging state-law
claims for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and fraud and misrepresentation
relating to felony cases from 2008 and 2010. See Dkt. Nos. 3, 9. And United States
District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred Wilkerson’s lawsuit to the undersigned United
States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order
of reference.
After reviewing the complaint, the undersigned questioned whether there was
subject matter jurisdiction and entered a notice of deficiency and order (“NOD”)
requiring Wilkerson to file an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 6. And in response,
Wilkerson filed an amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 10. But the amended complaint
generally does not resolve the deficiencies in the original complaint and to the extent
that it should be liberally construed as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
relating to Wilkerson’s convictions, those claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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So the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action.
Legal Standards
A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without
payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion
of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint
on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,
470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).
“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to
dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano
v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.
Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court
may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’
More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention
and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”
(citations omitted)).
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And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while
the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,
2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).
And, because “‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing
‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994)), “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own
initiative even at the highest level,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
583-84 (1999) (citations omitted).
And, if the party invoking federal jurisdiction fails to establish it, the lawsuit
must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction
depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established
argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d
1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633,
636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc.,
929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction,
parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’
in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)).
As to dismissal for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, just
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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). So,
“[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a]
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of
categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60
F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th
1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).
And, so, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that
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the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and
directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));
see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899
(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
Analysis
Wilkerson’s listed causes of action are all state law claims directed at his
defense attorneys – (1) a claim for legal malpractice, (2) a claim for breach of the
contract for legal representation, and (3) a claim for fraud and misrepresentation
based on representations about defendants’ “intentions and ability to provide
competent legal representation.” See Dkt. No. 9 at 11-12. So at least with respect to
the fully pled causes of action, there is no basis for federal question jurisdiction. And
because all the parties appear to be citizens of Texas, see id. at 3, there is no basis for
diversity jurisdiction.
But, while it is not listed as a cause of action, Wilkerson does assert that he
brings his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights and
“conspiracy to violate due process,” id. at 2, and many of the defendants are not
subject to the claims listed under causes of action. But to the extent that Wilkerson’s
complaint should be liberally construed as bringing claims under Section 1983, he
“demands relief [currently] barred by Heck v. Humphrey,” 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and
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therefore “fails to state a claim.” Ray v. Recovery Healthcare Corp., No. 22-10303,
2022 WL 16945898, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 2022) (per curiam) (citing Crittindon v.
LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2022)).
That is, a Section 1983 claim that “falls under the rule in Heck is legally
frivolous unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or otherwise called into question.” Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102
(5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
As to whether a particular civil claim is subject to the rule in Heck,
[i]t is well settled under Heck that a plaintiff who has been convicted of
a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his
constitutional rights if that “violation arose from the same facts
attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves
‘that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’”
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d
391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting, in turn, Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)); accord Magee v.
Reed, 912 F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court
held that if a plaintiff’s civil rights claim for damages challenges the validity of his
criminal conviction or sentence, and the plaintiff cannot show that such conviction or
sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside, the claim is not
cognizable under § 1983.” (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)).
Put differently, “Heck does not allow a civil rights lawsuit to be an alternative
vehicle to a criminal case for challenging law enforcement decisions that resulted in
arrest or prosecution unless the criminal case was resolved ‘in favor of the accused.’”
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Morris v. Mekdessie, 768 F. App’x 299, 301 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; quoting Heck,
512 U.S. at 484).
Wilkerson fails to show that the criminal conviction that underlies his civil
claims has been reversed, invalidated, set aside, or otherwise resolved in his favor.
To the contrary, the allegations in the complaint indicate that the criminal conviction
still stands. See Dkt. No. 9 at 5 (“Plaintiff is being forced to register[] with the State
of Texas sex control unit as a sex offender….”). So the claims asserted – calling that
conviction into question – are currently subject to the rule in Heck and thus not
cognizable.
And, where this is the case, the Court should dismiss the lawsuit without
prejudice, as a Heck “dismissal ‘does not preclude a later claim meeting the
preconditions for suit.’ That is, a Heck dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice.”
Cook v. City of Tyler, Tex., 974 F.3d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (cleaned up;
quoting Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996); citing Clarke v.
Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
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recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: December 30, 2025
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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