Author Anderson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N A

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
AUTHOR ANDERSON, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-2214-K-BW
§
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 	§
Defendant. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Author Anderson’s Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint filed on December 3, 2025. (Dkt. No. 31 (“Mot.”).)
Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMC”) filed a response on December 18
(Dkt. No. 35 (“Resp.”)), and Anderson filed a reply on December 19 (Dkt. No. 36).
Based on the briefing and applicable authority, the undersigned recommends
that Anderson’s motion to amend be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Anderson filed this lawsuit in state court in November 2024 alleging claims
against JPMC relating to an authorized disclosure of his personal information. (See
Dkt. No. 1 at ECF 32-36 (“Orig. Pet.”).)2 JPMC first removed the action on
1 This pro se case was automatically referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for
case management by Special Order 3-251. (See Dkt. No. 3.)
2 The undersigned cites “ECF” to refer to the page assigned by the ECF system and
displayed in blue on the top of the page.
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February 7, 2025, based on federal question jurisdiction, and the suit was docketed in
Case No. 3:25-CV-312-E-BK. JPMC, however, did not oppose remand after
Anderson clarified that he asserted no federal claims in this lawsuit. (No. 3:25-CV-
312-E-BK, Dkt. Nos. 6, 11.) But JPMC removed the action a second time—this time
based on diversity of citizenship—on August 15, 2025, soon after Anderson
amended his petition in state court to clarify that he sought monetary damages
greater than $250,000. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ECF p. 76.)
Anderson moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that he did not
assert federal claims, that JMPC’s ubiquitous presence and business in Texas should
preclude it from claiming diversity of citizenship, and that JPMC’s settlement offer
and arguments devaluing his claim prove the amount in controversy has not been
met. (See Dkt. No. 8.) In reply, however, Anderson raised for the first time an
argument that the case should be remanded because he intended to amend the
complaint to add at least four defendants—two of whom are Texas citizens—“who
were personally involved in the handling of [his] sensitive documents and directly
facilitated the breach giving rise to this suit and/or the mishandling after the fact.”
(Dkt. No. 14 at 2.) Anderson argued, therefore, that his proposed amendment would
destroy diversity. (Id.)
The Court denied Anderson’s motion to remand. (See Dkt. Nos. 16, 27.) As
for Anderson’s assertion that he would destroy diversity by amending his complaint
to add Texas citizens, the undersigned rejected it, first, because it was raised in reply,
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and, second, because a Court generally considers jurisdictional facts at the time of
removal and there were no Texas citizens in the case as defendants at that time.
(Dkt. No. 16 at 8-9.)
Anderson filed the instant motion for leave to file an amended complaint on
December 3, 2025. (Dkt. No. 31.)3 Anderson proposes adding four defendants
through this amendment: James Christopher Phillips IV, Shearita Rondeno
Despenza, Anabel Grace Ventura Umambong, and Arnena Karmel Sheikh
Houssein. (See Dkt. No. 31-1 ¶¶ 12-15.) According to Anderson, Phillips and
Despenza are Louisiana citizens, and Umambong and Houssein are Texas citizens.
(See id.) Anderson alleges that Umambong and Houssein are JPMC employees who
received his sensitive and confidential information to add him to a business account
and that both “explicitly assured Plaintiff that the information would be securely
handled and used solely for internal verification.” (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.) He further alleges
that neither of them advised that his information could be printed or distributed by
anyone. (Id. ¶ 19.) Phillips, apparently a JPMC employee in Louisiana, allegedly
printed Anderson’s sensitive personal information and disseminated it to a third
party without authorization. (Id. ¶ 20.) Despenza is a JPMC employee who
communicated with Anderson after the unauthorized disclosure was detected.
3 Anderson filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint on October 28,
2025, but the Court summarily denied that motion because Anderson failed to attach a
proposed amended complaint to the motion as required by N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 15.1(a).
(See Dkt. Nos. 22, 28.)
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) provides that a “court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Where the court’s jurisdiction is predicated on diversity,
however, the Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to “scrutinize . . . more closely” a
proposed amendment “to add a nondiverse nonindispensable party” and “use its
discretion in deciding whether to allow that party to be added.” Hensgens v. Deere &
Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987). “The court must . . . balance the original
defendants’ interest in maintaining a federal forum with the competing interest in
avoiding potentially parallel litigation.” Smith v. Buffalo Wild Wings, No. 3:20-CV-
2875-D, 2020 WL 7629226, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2020). The Court’s discretion
is guided by balancing four factors: (1) the extent to which the purpose of the
requested amendment is to defeat jurisdiction, (2) whether the plaintiff has been
dilatory in seeking to amend, (3) whether the plaintiff will be significantly injured by
disallowing amendment, and (4) any other factors bearing on the equities. Hensgens,
833 F.2d at 1182.
III. ANALYSIS
The parties agree that the Hensgens factors provide the framework for resolving
Anderson’s motion. They disagree as to the result reached by weighing those factors.
The first consideration is the extent to which amendment is sought for the
purpose of defeating diversity. Anderson implicitly acknowledges that destroying
diversity provides at least some of the motivating force for the motion when he states
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that he does not seek to amend “solely” to defeat jurisdiction. (Mot. at 3.) He avers
that he would have included Umambong and Houssein at the outset of this lawsuit
but lacked their complete identifying information or an ability to serve them. (Id.)
JPMC contends that destroying jurisdiction is Anderson’s primary motivation for
amending, noting that he never expressed any intention to add Texas citizens during
the life of this lawsuit until after JMPC undermined his arguments for remand the
second time. It also argues that Anderson’s motivation is belied by the sheer number
of times in reply on the motion to remand and in the instant motion that he has
mentioned that his proposed amendment would defeat jurisdiction. Indeed, in the
first sentence of the introduction in the motion for leave, Anderson states, “Plaintiff
seeks to amend [the] complaint to join at least 4 individual defendants, two of whom
are Texas residents whose joinder will destroy diversity jurisdiction.” (Mot. at 1.)
As Anderson appears to concede, defeating jurisdiction is at least part of the reason
he seeks to amend the complaint.
The second factor examines whether Anderson has been dilatory in seeking to
add the Texas defendants. Anderson avers that he sought leave to amend promptly
after he confirmed the new defendants’ full names and addresses for service. (Mot.
at 3.) JPMC argues that Anderson did not include the four individuals in his original
petition in November 2024 although he expressly discussed the two Louisiana
citizens. (See Orig. Pet. at 2-3.) And despite knowing of all the individuals’
involvement at the outset, Anderson never manifested any intent to join the Texas
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individuals until after realizing that doing so would defeat diversity. The
undersigned finds that the year between Anderson’s original petition and the instant
motion to amend demonstrates that he has not been diligent in joining the Texas
citizens. See Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 2016)
(affirming denial of amendment where court found plaintiff had been dilatory when
two months passed between original complaint and attempt to join nondiverse
defendant); Smith, 2020 WL 7629226, at *3 (finding plaintiff was dilatory in waiting
four months between filing original petition and seeking amendment). This record
demonstrates that Anderson manifested his first thought about joining the Texas
citizens late in the briefing cycle on JMPC’s second motion to remand. He presents
no evidence supporting an assertion that he intended to include them from the outset
of this case, diligently pursued their information, or satisfied himself that he had the
information he needed (coincidentally) during the remand briefing.
The third factor considers whether Anderson would be significantly harmed if
he is precluded from asserting claims against the Texas citizens in this action.
Anderson asserts that he would suffer great prejudice by having to pursue his claims
in piecemeal litigation. (Mot. at 3.) JPMC contends that the individual defendants
are unnecessary because Anderson presents nothing suggesting he cannot fully
recover damages from JPMC if awarded a judgment. (Resp. at 7.) It also argues that
he would suffer no harm by denial of his motion because he can sustain no claims
against the employee defendants.
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This factor weighs in favor of denying the motion. The basis for Anderson’s
proposed claims against Umambong and Houssein—the two Texas employees—is
that they received his personal information and assured him that it would be kept
safe. Despite these assurances, another employee in Louisiana later made an
unauthorized disclosure of his information. These bare facts do not support claims
against Umambong or Houssein personally. That is, Anderson alleges no facts
suggesting that they breached any duty owed to him, invaded his privacy, or
breached any contract or that they are otherwise personally liable to him. See Allen v.
Walmart Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 185–86 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial of
amendment where plaintiff sought to join cashier who sold product because plaintiff
could not state viable claim of liability against the employee); Moore v. Manns, 732
F.3d 454, 457 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of amendment to add nondiverse
employees where plaintiff’s “allegations were general in nature [and] he had offered
no evidence of personal fault on behalf of the [defendant’s] employees”). Anderson’s
failure to state a plausible claim against these JPMC employees can “outweigh the
other Hensgens factors.” Allen, 907 F.3d at 186.
Finally, the undersigned weighs any other factors bearing on the equities
surrounding Anderson’s proposed amendment. “This factor allows courts to address
any unique circumstances presented by the parties in weighing the plaintiffs’
overarching interest in avoiding parallel litigation, with the defendants’ desire to
pursue the case in federal court.” Smith, 2020 WL 7629226, at *4 (cleaned up)
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(citations omitted). Anderson argues that JPMC will not be prejudiced by adding
additional parties, because discovery has not yet begun. (Mot. at 4.) JPMC
contends otherwise, stating that it might incur additional legal expenses associated
with providing defenses for its employees if they are added to this lawsuit. (Resp. at
7.) The undersigned finds that neither of the parties’ arguments presents unique
circumstances that weigh significantly in the relevant assessment.
Upon considering the factors in their totality, the undersigned concludes that
Anderson’s motion to amend should be denied. The case chronology leads the
undersigned to find that defeating jurisdiction is Anderson’s primary motivation for
amendment, at least with respect to joining the Texas employees. Anderson
certainly knew when he filed the suit in November 2024 of Umambong or
Houssein’s involvement, but he made no apparent attempt then to hold them
personally liable. Even crediting his current unsupported averment that he was
unable to do so at that time for lack of information, he provides nothing to show that
he was diligently seeking the necessary information to bring them into the lawsuit.
Instead, Anderson first raised the possibility of adding nondiverse defendants when
the prospect of a second remand appeared dim.
Even setting aside that defeating jurisdiction is the primary purpose of
Anderson’s motion, implausibility of any claims against Umambong and Houssein
provide sufficient independent grounds to deny the motion. A court may deny
amendment based on futility—that is, where the amendment would fail to state a
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claim. See Villarreal, 814 F.3d at 766. Particularly under the close scrutiny
appropriate in present circumstances, see id. at 768, Anderson fails to allege claims
against JPMC’s Texas employees that would proceed beyond the dismissal stage.
This fact doubly impacts the undersigned’s analysis. The absence of viable claims
against the nondiverse proposed party corroborates that defeating jurisdiction is the
goal of Anderson’s motion. And, of course, Anderson will not be significantly
injured by being denied the opportunity to add a meritless claim to this lawsuit. See
Wilson v. Bruks-Klockner, Inc., 602 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2010).
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Guijarro v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., 39 F.4th 309
(5th Cir. 2022), reinforces this conclusion. In that case, a plaintiff sued a car rental
company after suffering an injury in a rented vehicle. Id. at 312-13. After the
defendant removed the action, Guijarro sought to join two Texas defendants to the
action, including the car-rental agent who conducted the rental transaction with the
plaintiff. Id. at 313. The Fifth Circuit held that amendment was properly denied, in
part based on the lack of viable claims against the employee. Id. at 315. “Under
Texas law, an employee must ‘owe[ ] an independent duty of reasonable care to the
injured party apart from the employer’s duty.’” Id. (quoting Leitch v. Hornsby, 935
S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996)). Where the plaintiff asserted no such independent
duties or breaches thereof, the plaintiff failed to plead viable claims against the
nondiverse employee. And, the Fifth Circuit noted, “[t]he plaintiff’s failure to state a
plausible claim against a proposed [nondiverse] defendant is evidence of the
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amendment’s improper purpose and sufficient reason to deny leave to amend.” Id.
Similarly, Anderson fails to present facts suggesting that Umambong or Houssein
owed him any duty independent of JPMC’s duties, formed a contract with him
personally, or breached any duty.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District
Judge DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Dkt. No. 31).
SO RECOMMENDED on January 20, 2026.
____________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation will be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this
report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after
being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be
specific, an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is
found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections
will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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