Wilson v. Dallas County et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DANELLE WILSON, §
PLAINTIFF, §
§
V. § CIVIL CASE NO. 3:25-CV-2167-N-BK
§
DALLAS COUNTY, ET AL., §
DEFENDANTS. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se case was referred to the
United States magistrate judge for pretrial management, including the issuance of findings and a
recommended disposition when appropriate. Upon review of the relevant pleadings and
applicable law, this action should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to
comply with a court order and for lack of prosecution.
I.
On October 8, 2025, in the interest of justice, the Court issued a second questionnaire
requiring pro se Plaintiff Danelle Wilson to provide by October 22, 2025, a copy of (1) the
charge(s) of discrimination submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and (2) the EEOC notice of right to sue notice related to the claims in the instant
complaint.1 Doc. 14. As of the date of this recommendation, however, Plaintiff has again failed
to provide the requested documents or seek an extension of time to do so.
1 When the Court requested the documents previously, Plaintiff responded that she did not have
the documents but would obtain them from the EEOC. Doc. 13 at 2-3 (Response to Magistrate
Judge Questionnaire).
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II.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action sua
sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the federal rules or any court order.
Larson v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1998). “This authority flows from the court’s
inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending
cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)).
Generally, such dismissal is without prejudice. However when, as here, a litigant may be
barred by the statute of limitations from re-asserting his claims, a Rule 41(b) dismissal is akin to
a dismissal with prejudice and the court has to apply a higher standard of review. See Berry v.
CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that where limitations
prevents or could prevent further litigation, the court may dismiss for want of prosecution only
when there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, and the district
court has expressly determined that lesser sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution, or
the record shows that the district court employed lesser sanctions that proved to be futile).
In applying the higher standard, the court must find “at least one of three aggravating
factors: ‘(1) delay caused by [the] plaintiff himself and not his attorney; (2) actual prejudice to
the defendant; or (3) delay caused by intentional conduct.’” Id.; see also Nottingham v. Warden,
Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Although ‘[l]esser sanctions such as
fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a
Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious
conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.’”
(internal quotations and quoted cases omitted)).
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Those requisites are met here. This case has been pending for over four months and,
despite the issuance of two questionnaires, Plaintiff has failed to meet the Court’s directive to
provide the requested documents so that the Court cannot complete the judicial screening of the
complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring screening of in forma pauperis actions).
Since Plaintiff is representing herself, the delay caused by her implied refusal to comply with the
Court’s questionnaires is also attributable to her alone. See Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191. Moreover,
considering her failure to respond to the second questionnaire and provide the requested
documents, no lesser sanction will prompt diligent prosecution of this case. Indeed, the case
cannot proceed absent the documents requested in the magistrate judge’s questionnaires.
Under these circumstances, the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss under Rule
41(b) even if limitations may prevent further litigation of Plaintiff’s claims. See Nottingham,
837 F.3d at 441 (holding court did not abuse its discretion in applying higher standard of review
and dismissing pro se civil rights action because of plaintiff’s intentional noncompliance with
court orders); Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (same as
to habeas petition).
For all these reasons, this action should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to comply with court orders and for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
SO RECOMMENDED on December 19, 2025.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by
law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific
written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.
1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to object
to 14 days).
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