Chambers v. Dallas County Commissioners Court et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
BRYANT B. CHAMBERS, §
#24020848, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-1845-E-BN
§
DALLAS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS §
COURT, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Bryant B. Chambers, while incarcerated in Dallas County Jail,
submitted a pro se civil rights complaint. See Dkt. No. 3. United States District Judge
Ada Brown referred the complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge
for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
The undersigned entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending
that the Court dismiss the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
unless Chambers could show that leave to amend should be granted within the time
for filing objections [Dkt. No. 6] (the “FCR”).
Chambers did not file objections or a timely motion for leave to amend. And
the Court accepted the FCR and entered judgment dismissing the complaint with
prejudice on September 8, 2025. See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.
Within 28 days, Chambers filed a motion for leave to amend that the
undersigned liberally construes as a motion for reconsideration. See Dkt. No. 11.
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Where a litigant requests that a district court reexamine a prior ruling that
adjudicates all the claims among all the parties, such a motion filed “within twenty-
eight days after the entry of the judgment … is treated as though it was filed under
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 59.” Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d
177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also Washington v.
UTMB, No. 20-20434, 2022 WL 2527665, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 2022) (per curiam)
(“Regardless of how it is labeled or classified, a motion seeking reconsideration is
treated as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion if it is filed within the
applicable 28-day time limit.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); Mangieri v. Clifton, 29
F.3d 1012, 1015 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994))).
A Rule 59(e) motion timely filed, within 28 days of judgment, “‘suspends the
finality of the original judgment’ for purposes of an appeal.” Banister v. Davis, 590
U.S. 504, 508 (2020) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
373, n.10 (1984)).
So, upon the timely filing of an initial Rule 59(e) motion, “there is no longer a
final judgment to appeal from,” and a district court must rule on such a motion to
“restore the finality of the original judgment” and “start the 30-day appeal clock,” id.
(cleaned up), even where a litigant files that motion after noticing an appeal, see FED.
R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A).1
1 Compare Washington, 2022 WL 2527665, at *1 (“Under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4, the filing of a timely Rule 59(e) motion renders a notice of
appeal ineffective until an order is entered disposing of the post-judgment motion.
Because Washington filed objections to the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983
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The Court’s “ruling on the Rule 59(e) motion” will therefore merge “with the
prior determination, so that the reviewing court takes up only one judgment.”
Banister, 590 U.S. at 509 (citation omitted).
Rule 59(e) “is ‘an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.’” Rollins
v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). And, while
its text “does not specify the available grounds for obtaining such relief,” the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has explained that Rule 59(e) motions “are for the narrow purpose of
correcting manifest errors of law or fact or presenting newly discovered
evidence” – not for raising arguments “which could, and should, have
been made before the judgment issued.” [The Fifth Circuit has] further
noted that Rule 59(e) allows a party to alter or amend a judgment when
there has been an intervening change in the controlling law.
Id. (citations omitted); accord Demahy, 702 F.3d at 182.
Under these standards, Chambers fails to show a basis for this remedy.
Controlling law has not changed since the Court entered judgment; he presents no
newly discovered evidence that could question the correctness of the judgment; nor
does he show that the Court need correct a manifest error of law or fact.
And to the extent that Chambers’s late-filed request for leave to amend is
complaint within 28 days of the entry of final judgment, those objections are properly
construed as a Rule 59(e) motion. The district court has not yet ruled on Washington’s
Rule 59(e) motion; therefore, his notice of appeal is not yet effective, and this appeal
is premature.” (citations omitted)), with Wilmington Savs. Fund Soc’y, FSB v. Myers,
95 F.4th 981, 982 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (“Successive motions under Rule 59(e),
however, ‘will not indefinitely toll the prescribed period for filing a notice of appeal.’
As one of our sister circuits put it, ‘A party may not continue to file Rule 59(e) motions
in order to forestall the time for appealing; only the first motion stops the clock.’”
(citations omitted)).
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intended to attack the Court’s determination to dismiss with prejudice rather than
granting leave to amend, Chambers’s request for leave to amend is rambling and
conclusory and ultimately suffers from the same deficiencies as the original
complaint. See generally Dkt. No. 11. The FCR already addresses the deficiencies in
the claims against the individual defendants in both their official and individual
capacities, see Dkt. No. 6 at 6-8, so amending to change the capacity would not affect
the prior determination. Leave to amend is not required when a plaintiff has already
pled his “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). And
Chambers’s request for leave to amend does not cure the defects identified in the
original complaint.
In sum, Chambers offers no compelling reasons to reconsider the Court’s
decision to dismiss his claims with prejudice. So the Court should deny the construed
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) [Dkt. No. 11].
Recommendation
The Court should deny Plaintiff Bryant B. Chambers’s construed motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) [Dkt. No. 11], and should, solely for statistical
purposes, reopen and then close this case based on any order accepting or adopting
these findings, conclusions, and recommendation.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
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P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: December 3, 2025
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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