Crawford v. City of Dallas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CASSANDRA BRYANT CRAWFORD §
PLAINTIFF, §
§
V. § CASE NO. 3:25-CV-01758-S-(BK)
§
CITY OF DALLAS, §
ET AL., §
DEFENDANTS. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se case has been referred the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management. Doc. 1. Defendants Mark
Adams, Perry Kilgo, and Texas Receivership Group LLC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, Doc. 43, and Defendant City of Dallas and Emily Worland’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim, Doc. 52, are before the undersigned United
States magistrate judge for findings and a recommended disposition. As detailed here, both
motions should be GRANTED. Further, Plaintiff Cassandra Crawford’s Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 58, should be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cassandra Bryant Crawford (“Crawford”), proceeding without the assistance of
counsel, filed this civil action against the City of Dallas, Emily Worland, Mark Adams, Perry
Kilgo, Texas Receivership Group LLC, Isiah Payne, and other unknown agents.1 Crawford
1 Isiah Payne and Party Other Unknown Agents were previously terminated as defendants per
Crawford’s First Amended Complaint. Doc. 34.
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asserts violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Texas law, seeking an ex parte
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction halting all receivership
enforcement actions in a Texas state court action.
In April 2024, a state court in Dallas County, Texas, entered an agreed permanent
injunction and final judgment in a lawsuit brought by the City of Dallas against Crawford, Isiah
T. Payne, and 3528 Colonial Avenue, Dallas, Texas (Crawford’s address according to the
Complaint filed in this case) (hereinafter, the “Property”). See City of Dallas v. Crawford, No.
DC-23-08770, 134th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dall. Cnty., Tex. (Apr. 12, 2024). The state court identified
Dallas City Code violations at the Property, permanently enjoined a commercial operation at the
Property, and ordered that the identified violations at the Property be abated (and a fine be paid),
and that the state court shall have continuing jurisdiction over the enforcement of the injunction.
See Crawford, No. DC-23-08770; cf. Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816 F. App’x
888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a district court may
“take judicial notice of the state court’s orders, final judgment, and docket as matters of public
record” (citations omitted)).
In March 2025, the state court, after finding that Crawford and Payne violated the final
judgment, granted the City’s motion to appoint a receiver of the Property and authorized the
receiver to make any reasonable repairs necessary to bring the Property into substantial
compliance with city code (the “Appointment Order”). See Crawford, No. DC-23-08770,
docket. In May 2025, the state court granted the receiver’s motion to issue a receiver’s
certificate of $369,852.15 secured by the Property. See id. In June, the state court, after finding
that Crawford had “intentionally and willfully violated” the Appointment Order, granted the
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Receiver Defendants’ motion to compel and, among other things, ordered Crawford to allow the
Receiver Defendants access to the Property and to refrain from interfering with their access to
the Property. See id.
Subsequently, Crawford filed an appeal and numerous emergency motions in the state
appellate court and in this Court. Prior to filing the instant lawsuit, Crawford filed another civil
action in this Court styled, Crawford v. City of Dallas; Civil Action No. 3-25-CV-1211-X
(“Crawford I”). In Crawford I, the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the Younger
abstention doctrine. (Crawford I, Doc. 5). The Court later denied Crawford’s attempt to reopen
Crawford I. (Crawford I, Doc. 9). A few weeks after the denial, Crawford filed the instant
lawsuit.
Defendants Mark Adams, Perry Kilgo and Texas Receivership Group LLC (collectively,
the “Receiver Defendants”) move to dismiss Crawford’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under the Barton doctrine. Docs. 43; 44. Crawford has filed a response, Doc. 47,
and the Receiver Defendants have filed a reply. Doc. 49.
The City of Dallas and Emily Worland2 (collectively, the “City” or “Dallas”), also move
to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Crawford’s claims as
they violate the abstention doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 91 (1971).
In the alternative, the City argues Plaintiff’s claims constitute collateral attacks on final state
2 Worland is an Assistant City Attorney for the City of Dallas, Doc. 34 at 4. To the extent that
Crawford sues Worland in her official capacity, it is essentially a claim against the City of Dallas.
See Harmon v. Dallas Cnty., Texas., 927 F.3d 884, 891 (5th Cir. 2019) (Observing that when “‘a
defendant government official is sued in his individual and official capacity, and the city or state
is also sued,’ the ‘official-capacity claims and the claims against the governmental entity
essentially merge.’” (quoting Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478,
485 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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court judgments in violation of the doctrine established by Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 (1983). Docs. 52; 53.
Crawford has filed a response in opposition, Doc. 55, and the City has filed a reply. Doc. 64.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A federal court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining
that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit ([i.e.,] subject-matter jurisdiction).”
Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007). A motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed when the court lacks
statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate the claim. See Home Builders Ass’n of Miss.,
Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, courts
should consider the “jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming
v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court must first address subject matter
jurisdiction because, without it, the case can proceed no further. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999); Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. Moreover, when both Rule 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) grounds for dismissal have merit, the court should dismiss only on the jurisdictional
ground. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). This prevents a court
without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice, and thereby allows a
plaintiff to pursue his claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction. Id.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
“a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
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court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d
420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Unlike a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule
56 motion, district courts have a ‘unique power . . . to make factual findings which are decisive
of [subject matter] jurisdiction’ when considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) that raises
questions of fact relevant to subject matter jurisdiction. Hernandez v. United States, 739 F. Supp.
3d 541, 544 (S.D. Tex. 2024) (alterations in original) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1981)).
The Court must also liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and “held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)
(“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under the most liberal construction,
however, Crawford has not alleged facts that establish subject matter jurisdiction with respect to
her claims against Receiver Defendants and the City.
III. ANALYSIS
Crawford’s claims should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to address them. As such, the Court does not reach the other issues raised in
Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Crawford’s Claims Against
the Receiver Defendants Under the Barton Doctrine.
Under the Barton doctrine, when a plaintiff sues a court-appointed receiver, the plaintiff
must first obtain leave from the appointing court. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 136-37
(1881). Without leave of the appointing court, a different court lacks “jurisdiction to entertain a
suit.” See Barton, 104 U.S. at 131; Satterfield v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2012)
(citing Barton and noting Barton doctrine is “jurisdictional in nature”); Burch v. Aurzada, No.
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3:19-CV-948-S-BN, 2019 WL 2089086, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2019) (Horan, J.), rpt. and rec.
adopted, No. 3:19-CV-948-S, 2019 WL 2085991 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2019).
When a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the party asserting jurisdiction
has the burden of establishing it. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas v. United States, 757 F.3d
484, 487 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, Crawford does not indicate that she first obtained leave of the
state court before bringing the filing the instant lawsuit against the Receiver Defendants.
Instead, her pleadings merely challenge the appointment of the Receiver Defendants and their
exercise of authority under the Appointment Order and other state court orders.
When, as here, a plaintiff complains about actions within the receiver’s official capacity
or related to the receiver’s duties, the Barton doctrine requires dismissal for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Quintana v. Lowe, No. 5-22-CV-00706-OLG-RBF, 2023 WL 3077879, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2023) (Farrer, J.), rep. and rec. adopted, No. SA22CV00706OLGRBF, 2023
WL 3077876 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023) (Garcia, J.). In Quintana, the plaintiff complained that
various sales of properties by a bankruptcy trustee violated his rights, constituted theft and were
part of an unlawful conspiracy.3 Id. at *1. Because the sale of the properties was part of a
bankruptcy trustee’s duties, the Barton doctrine applied and required dismissal. Id. at *3; see
Villegas v. Schmidt, 788 F.3d 156, 157-58 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal, under Barton, of
claim alleging that bankruptcy trustee violated his fiduciary duty).
Here, the Receiver Defendants’ actions, entering and taking control of the property and
changing locks, were within the Receiver Defendants’ duties as set forth in the Appointment
Order. See Doc. 45 at 206-16. Because Crawford has not obtained leave of the state court to sue
3 The Barton doctrine applies equally to receivers and bankruptcy trustees. Villegas v. Schmidt,
788 F.3d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 2015).
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the Receiver Defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the Receiver Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc.
43, should be GRANTED under Barton.
B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Crawford’s Claims Against
the City Under the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
The City correctly argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims
alleged against it under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Doc. 44. In “exceptional
circumstances,” the Younger abstention doctrine instructs federal courts to decline to hear a case
when a parallel state proceeding is ongoing. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). Younger abstention is rooted in “the basic doctrine
of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . to restrain a criminal prosecution,
when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if
denied equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (emphasis added). Following a period of
continuous expansion, the Supreme Court firmly cabined the scope of the doctrine, holding that
Younger applies only to three categories of cases (the NOPSI categories): (1) “ongoing state
criminal prosecutions”; (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings”; and (3) “civil proceedings
involving certain orders . . . uniquely in the furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform
their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (cleaned up).
If a state proceeding falls into one of the NOPSI categories, Younger abstention is
applicable, but only if the three additional factors laid out in Middlesex County Ethics Committee
v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) are also met: “(1) the federal
proceeding would interfere with an ‘ongoing state judicial proceeding’; (2) the state has an
important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has ‘an
adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.’” Bice v. La.
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Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432)
(cleaned up).
Younger abstention is appropriate when a federal plaintiff requests an injunction that
would have the practical effect of enjoining state proceedings. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1987) (“Both Juidice [v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977),] and this case involve
challenges to the processes by which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its
courts. Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the execution of state
judgments, but they would do so on grounds that challenge the very process by which those
judgments were obtained.”); see also Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d
660, 671 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[B]oth Juidice and Pennzoil involved requests to directly or
indirectly thwart state court compliance processes.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Crawford seeks to enjoin the Texas proceedings and nullify the Receivership Order.
Doc. 34 at 4. Thus, this clearly falls into the third NOPSI category. The three Middlesex factors
also support the declination of subject matter jurisdiction under Younger. First, Crawford has
filed this federal suit attempting to enjoin ongoing state proceedings. Second, “the state
proceedings are judicial in nature and represent important state interests, as state courts must be
empowered to enforce their own orders and judgments.” Dandar v. Church of Scientology Flag
Serv. Org., Inc., 619 F. App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Namely, Texas has an
important interest in enforcing orders related to property in violation of Dallas City and Dallas
Fire Codes. Indeed, the Court has already previously held in this case that an injunction barring
enforcement of “the state court’s receivership order would certainly interfere with those state
court proceedings.” Doc. 15 at 3. Third, Crawford has an adequate opportunity to raise her
federal claims in state court. Crawford’s complaint includes several constitutional claims. See
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Doc. 13. Crawford can raise constitutional challenges in the Texas proceedings, and the record
of those proceedings show that she already has. See City of Dallas v. Crawford, No. DC-23-
08770.
In any event evaluating the adequacy of state proceedings, the plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating inadequacy. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1987).
Crawford has not presented any evidence demonstrating that the Texas courts are inadequate for
addressing her constitutional claims. Further, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to hold that
Texas state courts are inadequate to address federal constitutional claims. See id. at 15-16 (“In
light of this demonstrable and long-standing commitment of the Texas Supreme Court to provide
access to the state courts, we are reluctant to conclude that Texas courts would have construed
state procedural rules to deny [Plaintiff] an effective opportunity to raise its constitutional
claims.”).
Accordingly, this Court must abstain because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Crawford’s claims against the City of Dallas and Worland4 under the principles of federalism
enunciated in Younger.5
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint before
dismissal, but leave is not required when she has already pled her “best case.” Brewster v.
4 Crawford has not specified whether she sues Worland in her official or individual capacity.
Regardless, Younger abstention would bar this Court from considering her claims either way.
Bowling v. Roach, 816 F. App’x 901, 904 (5th Cir. 2020).
5 The City also insists that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The Court, however, need not address this issue because dismissal of this action under
Younger is warranted as to the City.
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Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Crawford has already amended her complaint
once. And as discussed here, the facts alleged in Crawford’s amended complaint establish a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court that is not curable by amendment. Under these
circumstances, granting leave to amend would be futile and cause needless delay. Thus,
Crawford’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 58, is DENIED.6
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Mark Adams, Perry Kilgo, and Texas Receivership
Group LLC’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Doc. 43, and Defendant City of Dallas
and Emily Worland’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a
Claim, Doc. 52, should be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants should be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. And as no
claims will remain, the Clerk of the Court should be directed to close this case.
SO RECOMMENDED on December 22, 2025.
6 In any event, the 14-day objection period will permit Crawford to proffer any viable claims,
supported by the facts alleged by her, over which this Court can exercise subject matter
jurisdiction.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file
specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate where in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely
incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.
Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
time to file objections to 14 days).
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