Olali v. Ampex Brands Limited Liability Corporation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SHAWN OLALI, §
PLAINTIFF, §
§
V. § CASE NO. 3:25-CV-1602-K-BK
§
AMPEX BRANDS, LLC, §
DEFENDANT. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se case has been referred to
the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management. Doc. 1. Defendant’s
Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Doc. 19, is
before the Court for findings and a recommended disposition. For the reasons detailed herein,
the motion should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shawn Olali, proceeding pro se, filed his Original Complaint on June 23, 2025,
asserting employment discrimination claims against his former employer, Defendant Ampex
Brands LLC, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. Doc. 1,
passim.
Per the Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as general manager of a
Kentucky Fried Chicken (“KFC”) franchise in Texas from May 2024 until his termination on
June 28, 2024. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in discriminatory hiring and
promotion practices and “selective enforcement of employment terms and conditions” and also
terminated him based on his race. Doc. 1 at 3-4.
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Defendant seeks a partial dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. Doc. 19 at 6. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient
facts to demonstrate he exhausted his administrative remedies as to any claim of discrimination
in hiring and promotion practices. Doc. 19 at 6. Plaintiff filed a response, Doc. 27, and
Defendant has filed a reply, Doc. 30.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. 12(b)(6) Motions
A plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) when the complaint does not
contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making this determination, the court “accepts all well-
pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). But the court cannot
“accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact.” Collins v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and footnote omitted). Put
differently, a court must be able to reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court “may rely on the complaint, its proper
attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a
court may take judicial notice.” Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763
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(5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Further, the Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed
by pro se litigants. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (holding that pro
se pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”)
(cleaned up); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”).
B. Title VII Claims
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes an employer’s discrimination against
individuals with respect to their “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of [their] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Before
a Title VII action can be commenced in federal court, however, a claimant must exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to filing suit by filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory
acts, after which the EEOC issues claimant a “right to sue” notice. Taylor v. Books A Million,
Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002). Any ensuing civil action must be filed within 90 days of
the right-to-sue notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This exhaustion requirement is a mandatory
procedural rule, “not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of
courts.” Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551 (2019).
Generally, an employee cannot base a Title VII claim on an employer’s adverse action
“that was not previously asserted in a formal charge of discrimination to the EEOC, or that could
not ‘reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” Filer v. Donley, 690
F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2006)). A
claim only grows out of the charge if it “placed the employer on notice of the claims against
them.” Haferbier v. IMER USA, 2024 WL 3094616, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2024) (Pittman,
J.) (citing Manning v. Chevron Chem Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 879 (5th Cir. 2003)). Failure to
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hire and promote are considered “discrete act[s]” that requires exhaustion of remedies. See Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (“Discrete acts such as termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. Each incident of
discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate
actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’”).
III. ANALYSIS
In his EEOC charge, Plaintiff alleged only that Defendant fired him because he is African
American and of Kenyan descent and that Hispanic and Latin employees were not held to the
same high standards of employment. Doc. 19-1 at 3. Importantly, however, Plaintiff’s EEOC
charge did not allege that Plaintiff was not hired or promoted based on his race or national origin.
And while Plaintiff’s factual allegation in his Complaint includes allegations of “discriminatory
hiring or promotional practices that disparately target persons on the basis of a protected class,”
Doc. 3 at 4, no such allegations were included in his EEOC charge, nor could they “reasonably
be expected to grow out of the [ ] charge, such that the charge placed the employer on notice of
the claims against them.” Haferbier v. IMER USA, 2024 WL 3094616, at *3.
Thus, as Defendant correctly contends, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to the discriminatory hiring and promotional practices claims asserted in
his Complaint. See id. at *2 (finding that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies for
his hostile work environment claim when the “two discrete acts” alleged in his EEOC charge—
that (1) his bonus was withheld and (2) he was terminated and replaced by a much younger
employee—“do not even hint at the work environment's conditions”); Johnson v. MBNA
Hallmark Info. Servs., Inc., 2003 WL 21418670, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 16, 2003) (Kinkeade, J.)
(finding that “[n]othing in [plaintiff's EEOC] charge would put either the EEOC or [the
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employer] on notice that [plaintiff] had claims for discrimination in hiring practices. . .” when
there was merely one allegation in his EEOC charge alleging discrimination based on race and
gender for failing to promote him).
Ordinarily, a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is without prejudice
to the plaintiff's right to return to court after exhausting the required administrative remedies.
Kojin v. Barton Protective Servs., 339 F. Supp. 2d 923, n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2004). However, when
the time has already passed for filing a charge of discrimination based on the conduct alleged,
dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1995)
(dismissal with prejudice is warranted when administrative relief is time-barred or otherwise
precluded). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated on June 14, 2024. Doc. 3 at 3. Thus,
any denied hiring or promotion must have occurred before this termination date, which is more
than 300 days ago. Thus, because Plaintiff is time-barred from exhausting his administrative
remedies as to his failure to hire or promote claims, these claims should be dismissed with
prejudice. 1
IV. PLAINTIFF’S IMPROPER CITATION TO NONEXISTENT AND LIKELY AI-
GENERATED AUTHORITY
The Court’s review of Plaintiff’s filings reveals that he has cited multiple nonexistent or
“hallucinated” legal cases, indicative of reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) or other Large
Language Models to prepare his filings. For example, in his initial complaint, Plaintiff cites
EEOC v. Gulf States paper Corp., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Ala. 2002), which does not appear
1 Defendant also contends that Plaintiff has failed to follow FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) in his Answers
to the Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire and requests that the Court order Plaintiff to replead his
Complaint to incorporate the allegations in his Answers. Doc. 19 at 6. And while that might be
preferrable, it is not required. See Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97
(5th Cir. 1994). (pro se plaintiff’s answers to questions posed by the Court constitute an
amendment to his complaint).
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to exist. See Doc. 3 at 14. Other examples of similarly problematic citations include: EEOC v.
State of Texas, Dep’t of Human Services, 878 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1989), Doc. 3 at 14, and
EEOC v. Exxon Shipping Co., 745 F. Supp. 474 (D. N.J. 1990), Doc. 3 at 16. Plaintiff has also
used quotes that are incorrectly cited to real cases, such as Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574
F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2009). Doc. 3 at 14. Other examples include Henry v. Lennox Indus., Inc.,
768 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1985), Doc. 3 at 14, and Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d
151 (1st Cir. 1998), Doc. 3 at 14.
“It is no secret that generative AI programs are known to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistent cases,
and with the advent of AI, courts have seen a rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se
litigants have cited such fake, hallucinated cases in their briefs.” Sanders v. United States, 176
Fed. Cl. 163, 169 (2025) (cited source omitted); see also Boggess v. Chamness, No. 6:25-cv-64-
JDK-JDL, 2025 WL 978992, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2025) (Kernodle, J.) (“Plaintiff’s citation
to a hallucinatory case was likely generated via artificial intelligence and violates this Court’s
Local Rule CV-11(g), which makes clear that ‘generative artificial intelligence tools may
produce factual and legal inaccuracies and reminds attorneys that they must verify the
information that they submit to the court.’”) (quoting Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
No. 1:23-CV-281, 2024 WL 4882651, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2024) (Crone, J.)).
Here, the Court’s local civil rules require litigants to disclose the use of Generative AI:
1. A brief prepared using generative artificial intelligence must disclose
this fact on the first page under the heading “Use of Generative Artificial
Intelligence.” If the presiding judge so directs, the party filing the brief
must disclose the specific parts prepared using generative artificial
intelligence.
2. “Generative Artificial Intelligence” means a computer tool (whether
referred to as “Generative Artificial Intelligence” or by another name)
that is capable of generating new content (such as images and text) in
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response to a submitted prompt (such as a query) by learning from a
large reference database of examples.
3. A party who files a brief that does not contain the disclosure required
by subsection (f)(1) of this rule certifies that no part of the brief was
prepared using generative artificial intelligence.
N.D. TEX. LOC. CIV. R. 7.2(f)(1)-(3). While this rule does not forbid the use of tools like
Generative AI, it requires that parties disclose such use, which Plaintiff failed to do.
Further, such conduct violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See FED. R. CIV. P.
11(b)(2) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law. . .”). Under Rule 11, all parties, including pro se litigants, must
“confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely.” Park v. Kim, 91
F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024). This is because “the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter
baseless filings in district court.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
Plaintiff’s filings—built on AI-generated cases that stand for legal propositions in
direct contravention of actual case law—are “the epitome of baseless.” Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n as Tr., Igloo Series Tr., No. 3:25-CV-516-BN, 2025 WL 1224273, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
28, 2025) (Horan, J.) (citing Sanders, 176 Fed. Cl. at 168). And while courts afford pro se
litigants’ considerable leeway, that does not relieve them of their obligation under Rule 11 to
confirm the validity of all cited legal authority. Sanders, 176 Fed. Cl. at 169; cf. id. (“Beyond
the waste of resources and the violation of her Rule 11 obligations, Plaintiff’s unquestioning
reliance on AI hindered her own ability to effectively represent herself. Misled by the fake
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cases, Plaintiff cost herself an opportunity to make the best possible arguments in support of her
claim for relief.”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Doc. 19, should be GRANTED IN PART, to the extent that
Plaintiff discriminatory hiring and promotion practices claims be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Further, Plaintiff should be admonished that any further failure to comply with the notice
requirements set out in Local Civil Rule 7.2(f)(1)-(3) or filing of pleadings with citations to
nonexistent cases, in violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 11, may result in the imposition of sanctions,
including the striking of filings, the imposition of filing restrictions and monetary penalties, or
the Fed. dismissal of this civil action.
SO RECOMMENDED on January 23, 2026.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file
specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate where in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely
incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.
Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending
the time to file objections to 14 days).
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