Limbaugh v. Grant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
STEPHEN GLEN LIMBAUGH, 	§
# 28266-078, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-533-L-BW
§
S. GRANT, 	§
Respondent. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, received on March 3, 2025. (Dkt. No. 3.) Based on the relevant
filings and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS the petition without prejudice
for lack of jurisdiction as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Stephen Glen Limbaugh, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at the
Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Seagoville in Seagoville, Texas, filed this
habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the calculation of the duration of
his sentence by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). (See id.) He names the warden of
FCI Seagoville as the respondent (“Respondent”). (See id. at 1.)2
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this habeas case has been automatically referred for
full case management.
2 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each
page rather than the page numbers at the bottom of each filing.
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On June 19, 2018, the Lamar County Sheriff’s Office arrested Limbaugh on
state drug charges and for violation of his parole on a state burglary offense. (See
Dkt. No. 9 at 5-6.) On December 12, 2018, a grand jury in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division, returned a multi-party
indictment charging Limbaugh with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine. See United States v. Limbaugh, No. 4:18-CR-233-
ALM-AGD-4, Dkt. No. 1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2018). Because Limbaugh was in
state custody, that court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on
December 18, 2018. See id., Dkt. No. 26. The United States Marshals Service
(“USMS”) arrested Limbaugh on the writ, and he appeared in federal court on
January 7, 2019. See id., Dkt. Nos. 39, 57; (Dkt. No. 9 at 7-8, 13-15, 26.) After being
charged with the same offense in two superseding indictments, Limbaugh pled guilty
under a plea agreement to the charged offense on September 7, 2021. See Limbaugh,
No. 4:18-CR-233-ALM-AGD-4, Dkt. Nos. 67, 179, 723, 732. By judgment dated
May 31, 2022, the court sentenced him to 162 months of imprisonment, to run
consecutively to any time imposed for his state parole revocation and to be followed
by five years of supervised release. See id., Dkt. No. 789.
During the pendency of his federal case, one of his state drug charges was
dismissed, and on June 1, 2022, the day after he was sentenced in federal court, his
remaining state drug charges were dismissed. (See Dkt. No. 9 at 7-8, 11, 28-30.) The
USMS returned Limbaugh to state custody on February 17, 2023, where he was
released the same day. (See id. at 6, 14.) The USMS re-arrested Limbaugh on
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August 24, 2023. (See id.) Limbaugh’s state parole violation warrant was withdrawn
on November 13, 2023, and he was deemed to have discharged his parole on May
28, 2023. (See id. at 6, 8-9, 32.) Limbaugh’s federal sentence was computed to
commence on August 24, 2023, when the USMS re-arrested him following his
release from state custody. (See id. at 7.)
After pursuing BOP administrative remedies, Limbaugh filed this § 2241
action, asserting multiple grounds for relief based on the BOP’s alleged denial of time
credit toward his federal sentence for time spent in pre-trial detention. (See Dkt. No.
3 at 5-6.) The only relief sought is for Respondent “[t]o correctly apply a 1,240 day
jail credit for time spent in primary federal custody in pre-tr[ia]l detention as ordered
by a U.S. magistrate judge.” (Id. at 6.) In April 2025, after Limbaugh filed his
§ 2241 petition in this Court, the BOP applied a total of 1,705 days of time credit
against his federal sentence for time spent in prior custody. (See Dkt. No. 9 at 7.)
The 1,705 days of prior custody time credit consisted of 202 days for the period of
June 19, 2018, through January 6, 2019, 1,240 days for the period of January 7,
2019, through May 30, 2022, and 263 days for the period of May 31, 2022, through
February 17, 2023. (Id.)
On May 28, 2025, Respondent filed a response to the § 2241 petition seeking
dismissal of the petition as moot based on the BOP’s corrected calculation of the
duration of Limbaugh’s sentence after the April 2025 application of 1,705 days of
prior custody time credit. (See Dkt. No. 8.) 	Limbaugh did not file a reply.
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II. JURISDICTION
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-
court jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” United States Parole Comm’n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980). A case or controversy becomes moot “when the
issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome.” Id. at 396 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
This 	case-or-controversy 	requirement 	subsists 	through 	all 	stages 	of
federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. . . . The parties must
continue to have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. This
means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered,
or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). It “is well-settled, that mootness is a threshold jurisdictional inquiry.”
Ermuraki v. Renaud, 987 F.3d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). If a controversy becomes moot, the court should dismiss the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,
477-78 (1990).
Here, Limbaugh sought only the correct application of “a 1,240 day jail credit
for time spent in primary federal custody in pre-tr[ia]l detention[.]” (Dkt. No. 3 at 6.)
Specifically, he appears to have sought 1,240 days of time credit against his sentence
“from 01-07-2019 to 05-31-2022[.]” (Id.) Respondent’s unrebutted evidence shows
that, based on the BOP’s corrected recalculation of his sentence, Limbaugh has now
received the 1,240 days of time credit he requested for time spent in custody, as well
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as an additional 465 days of time credit for other periods spent in prior custody for
which he did not seek relief in his petition. (See Dkt. No. 9 at 7, 9, 34-36.) Because
Limbaugh has received all of the relief he sought in this case, there is no live case or
controversy before the Court, and the petition has been rendered moot. Accordingly,
the Court should dismiss the § 2241 petition as moot.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should DISMISS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, received on March 3, 2025 (Dkt. No. 3), without prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction as moot.
SO RECOMMENDED on January 26, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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