Doe v. Alame

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JANE DOE, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-0329-B
§
NABIL ALAME, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 28). For the
following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case involves non-consensual disclosure of explicit sexual and intimate videos and
images. Plaintiff Jane Doe and Defendant Nabil Alame began a romantic relationship in October
2022, while Doe was working at a restaurant co-owned and managed by Alame. Doc. 1, Compl., 4.
With Doe’s knowledge and consent, Alame took images and videos of Doe where she was naked
and/or engaged in sexually explicit activities (the “explicit depictions”) during their relationship. Id.
But during these encounters Doe was often under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol. Id. For
instance, during one encounter, while Doe was intoxicated, she agreed to Alame recording her, but
was “unaware that [Alame] would force her to engage in a degrading act by consuming his urine.”
Id.
Doe did not consent to Alame’s disclosure of the explicit depictions to third parties. Id. at 5.
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Indeed, Doe asked Alame to delete the explicit depictions in his possession. Id. at 4. Alame told Doe
he deleted the explicit depictions. Id. In support of her allegations, Doe submits to the record her
sworn statement, which includes message screenshots between her and Alame. See generally Doc. 5-
1, Doe Aff. For example, on October 30, 2023, Alame messages Doe an image and writes “no
screenshot,” and in response Doe tells Alame to delete the explicit depiction. Id. at 3, 8. Additionally,
prior to November 5, 2023, Alame told Doe he would delete all of the explicit depictions. Id. at 3.
Then, on November 5, 2023, he told Doe “I play games sometimes but by [n]ow you should know
that if I say ima do something that[] means I’ll do it” and “[w]hen you asked me to delete whatever
was taken from my phone, that means I deleted it.” Id. at 3, 10.
But Alame did not delete the explicit depictions or keep them private. In July 2024, Doe
learned from the Tulsa Police Department that Alame had sent the explicit depictions to third
parties from his phone five times—on November 21, 2022; December 3, 2022; January 16, 2023;
February 22, 2024; and February 26, 2024. Doc. 1, Compl., 4-5. Several of the disclosures of the
explicit depictions were made via “WhatsApp.” Doc. 5-2, Hutcherson Aff., 2. According to Sergeant
Ryan Ver Meer, Doe’s face is visible in the explicit depictions Alame sent to third parties. Id.
Additionally, one of the explicit depictions that was sent to a third party was the recording where
Almae forced Doe, naked, to drink his urine. Id.
Police confiscated Alame’s phone when he was arrested on April 11, 2024. Doc. 9-1, Second
Hutcherson Aff., 2. After the charges were dismissed on September 30, 2024, he received his phone
back, and he now has access to any sexually explicit depictions that are stored there. Id. at 2-3.
Doe has suffered emotional distress, recurring nightmares, crying episodes, and fear that
people she encounters might have seen the images or videos. Doc. 1, Compl., 6. Additionally, Doe
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stopped attending therapy sessions because discussing the events causes her emotional distress. Id.
Doe filed suit against Alame on February 10, 2025, for disclosing explicit depictions of her
without her consent, in violation of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (“VAWRA”),
15 U.S.C. § 6851(b); Texas Unlawful Disclosure of Intimate Visual Material (“UDIVM”), Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 98B.001 et seq.; and the common law right to privacy. Id.
at 7-10.
On February 24, 2025, this Court granted in part Doe’s Motion for Ex Parte Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. See generally Doc. 10, Mem. Op. & Order. On March
12, 2025, Doe served Alame. See generally Doc. 22, Proof of Service. The Court then ordered Alame
to respond to Doe’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction by April 2, 2025. Doc. 23, Order, 1. When
Alame failed to file a response by the deadline, the Court ordered Alame to file an answer to Doe’s
complaint and a response to Doe’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction by April 10, 2025. Doc. 24,
Order, 1. To date, Alame has failed to file a response to any motion or otherwise appear in this case.
On April 4, 2025, the Clerk entered default as to Alame. Doc. 27, Entry Default, 1. On May
9, 2025, Doe filed her Motion for Default Judgment against Alame. See generally Doc. 28, Mot.
Default J. The Court evaluates the motion below.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for the entry of default judgments in federal
court. Rule 55 states that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend, . . . the clerk must enter the party’s default.” F ED . R. CIV . P.
55(a). Once default has been entered, the Court may enter a default judgment against the defaulting
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defendant upon motion by the plaintiff. F ED . R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). However, default judgments are a
“drastic remedy” and thus are only used by courts in “extreme situations.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican
Homest’d & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). As such, a party is not
entitled to a default judgment merely because the defendant is technically in default. Ganther v. Ingle,
75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). A default judgment is rather “committed to the
discretion of the district court.” United States v. 1998 Freightliner Vin # 1FUYCZYB3WP886986, 548
F. Supp. 2d 381, 384 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977)).
To determine whether to enter default judgment against a defendant, courts in the Fifth
Circuit employ a three-part analysis. First, courts consider whether the entry of default judgment is
procedurally warranted. See Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). Second, courts
assess the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims and determine whether there is a sufficient basis
in the pleadings for the judgment. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Hou. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d
1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). In doing so, courts assume that due to the defendant’s default, the
defendant admits all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. Third, courts determine what
form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive. See Ins. Co. of the W. v. H & G Contractors, Inc., No.
CIV.A. C-10-390, 2011 WL 4738197, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2011). A court may determine damages
without a hearing “where the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical
calculation.” Leedo Cabinetry v. James Sales & Distrib., Inc., 157 F.3d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1998) (cleaned
up).
III.
ANALYSIS
Applying the three-part analysis, the Court first concludes that a default judgment in this
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case is procedurally warranted. Second, the Court determines there is a sufficient basis for entering
default judgment on Doe’s VAWRA claim. Third, the Court determines damages without a hearing
because the amount claimed is a liquidated sum and capable of mathematical calculation.
A. 	Whether a Default Judgment is Procedurally Warranted
The Court must first determine whether the entry of default judgment is procedurally
warranted pursuant to the Lindsey factors. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. The factors are: (1) “whether
material issues of fact exist”; (2) “whether there has been substantial prejudice”; (3) “whether the
grounds for default are clearly established”; (4) “whether the default was caused by a good faith
mistake or excusable neglect”; (5) “the harshness of a default judgment”; and (6) “whether the court
would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.” Id. Here, each factor
suggests that an entry of default judgment is procedurally warranted.
First, by defaulting, Alame “admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact[.]”
Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. Thus, no material facts here, as pleaded, are in dispute. See Sanchez v.
Maddies Mayhem, LLC, No. 419CV00574SDJCAN, 2020 WL 4808604, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 27,
2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:19-CV-574, 2020 WL 4785046 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 18,
2020). Second, Alame’s “failure to respond threatens to bring the adversary process to a halt,
effectively prejudicing [Doe’s] interests.” See H & G Contractors, 2011 WL 4738197, at *3 (citing
Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893) (other citation omitted). Third, the grounds for default are clearly
established because no potential claimant has filed any responsive pleadings or otherwise
participated in this case. See F ED . R. C IV. P. 55(a). Fourth, there is no evidence before the Court
indicating that Alame’s silence is the result of a “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.” See Lindsey,
161 F.3d at 893. Fifth, default judgment would not be a harsh result, as Alame has completely failed
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to respond to Doe’s complaint or the Court’s Orders. Sixth, the Court is not aware of any facts that
would give rise to “good cause” to set aside the default. See id. In sum, after reviewing the Lindsey
factors, the Court concludes that Doe has met the procedural requirements for default judgment.
B. 	Whether the Pleadings Contain a Sufficient Basis for Judgment
Due to his default, Alame is deemed to have admitted the allegations set forth in Doe’s
complaint. Nonetheless, the Court must still review the pleadings to determine whether they present
a sufficient basis for Doe’s claims for relief. See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. In conducting this
analysis, “the Fifth Circuit looks to the [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8] case law for guidance.”
Morales v. Rausch Grp. & Assocs., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-2850-B, 2020 WL 6583023, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 10, 2020) (Boyle, J.) (citation omitted). “Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Wooten v. McDonald
Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “The factual allegations in
the complaint need only ‘be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’” Id. (citation
omitted). But “the pleading must present more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Additionally,
evidence submitted to the record can support the allegations in the complaint. Merchs. Bonding Co.
(Mut.) v. Veteran Owned Servs. Grp., LLC, No. 3:23-CV-324-E (BK), 2024 WL 1120996, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 28, 2024) (Toliver, Mag. J.) (citing Wooten, 788 F.3d at 500), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:23-CV-324-E, 2024 WL 1122048 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2024) (Brown, J.).1
1 In Wooten, the Fifth Circuit found the movant’s testimony provided “factual details that fleshed out his
claim,” and in reviewing the evidence in conjunction with the allegations from the complaint, found there
was a sufficient basis for default judgment. 788 F.3d at 498-500.
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The Court reviews each of Doe’s claims in turn to determine whether there is a sufficient
basis for the Court to enter default judgment.
1. 	The VAWRA Claim
Doe first brings a claim under the VAWRA, which provides that:
[1] an individual whose intimate visual depiction [2] is disclosed, in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign
commerce, [3] without the consent of the individual, [4] where such disclosure was
made by a person who knows that, or recklessly disregards whether, the individual
has not consented to such disclosure, may bring a civil action against that person in
an appropriate district court of the United States for relief.
15 U.S.C. § 6851(b)(1)(A). The Court finds there are sufficient allegations in the complaint,
bolstered by the sworn statements of Doe and her attorney, Mr. Hutcherson, to support an entry of
default judgment on the VAWRA claim. First, an intimate visual depiction is one that shows “the
uncovered genitals . . . or post-pubescent female nipple of an identifiable individual,” among other
things. § 6851(a)(5)(A)(i). In the explicit depictions at issue here, Doe is naked and/or engaging in
sexually explicit acts, and her face is visible. The explicit depictions therefore meet the statutory
definition of intimate visual depiction. Second, Alame disclosed the explicit depictions through
interstate commerce when he transmitted them via his phone. See United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d
223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (holding that the “transmission of photographs by means
of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes
transportation in interstate commerce”); Doe v. Serpa, No. 3:25-CV-0057-X, 2025 WL 332555, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2025) (Starr, J.) (same); United States v. Elkins, 725 F. Supp. 3d 570, 574 (N.D.
Tex. 2024) (Boyle, J.) (“The Fifth Circuit has recognized phones to be facilities of interstate
commerce[.]”), aff’d, No. 24-10753, 2025 WL 3537272 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025). Third, Doe did not
consent to Alame’s disclosure of the explicit depictions to third parties. Doc. 1, Compl., 5. Lastly,
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while we do not have direct evidence of Alame’s level of knowledge, Doe’s complaint and supporting
affidavits provide a sufficient basis to show Alame acted with at least a reckless disregard of Doe’s
non-consent when he disclosed the explicit depictions. Doe states in her affidavit that the explicit
depictions were “created in the context of a private, consensual relationship with the understanding
that the material would remain private.” Doc. 5-1, Doe Aff., 2. Additionally, Alame acknowledged
Doe’s request to delete the explicit depictions and even told Doe he deleted them. Therefore, Doe
has provided a sufficient basis to show Alame was aware the explicit depictions were private in nature
and not meant to be shared with others.
In sum, after considering the evidence in addition to the allegations in Doe’s complaint, the
Court finds sufficient basis to enter the requested default judgment on the VAWRA claim.
2. 	The UDIVM Claim
Under this statute, a defendant is liable “to a person depicted in intimate visual material for
damages arising from the disclosure of the material if” the plaintiff can establish the following four
elements:
(1) the defendant discloses the intimate visual material without the effective consent
of the depicted person and with the intent to harm that person;
(2) at the time of the disclosure, the defendant knows or has reason to believe that
the intimate visual material was obtained by the defendant or created under
circumstances in which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that the
material would remain private;
(3) the disclosure of the intimate visual material causes harm to the depicted person;
and
(4) the disclosure of the intimate visual material reveals the identity of the depicted
person in any manner, including through:
(A) any accompanying or subsequent information or material related to the
intimate visual material; or
(B) information or material provided by a third party in response to the
disclosure of the intimate visual material.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 98B.002(a). The first element requires Doe to sufficiently allege
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Alame disclosed the explicit depictions with the intent to harm her. See id., subsec. (a)(1). After
reviewing the record, the Court finds there are not sufficient allegations in the complaint or evidence
in the record to satisfy the intent requirement in the first element, which means default
judgment cannot be entered on the UDIVM claim.
Under Texas law, “[a]ctions taken with the specific intent to inflict harm are characterized
as intentional torts.” Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 99 (Tex. 2012) (citation omitted).
“With regard to intentional torts, the Texas Supreme Court has made clear that the distinguishing
feature of an intentional tort is ‘the specific intent to inflict injury.’” Vasquez v. Six Flags Hou., Inc.,
120 S.W.3d 445, 448 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (quoting Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689
S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985)). “The Restatement Second of Torts defines intent to mean that ‘the
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.’” Reed Tool Co., 689 S.W.2d at 406 (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 8A (1965)).
Doe points the Court to paragraphs 12-15, 39, and 40 of her complaint to show she
sufficiently alleged Alame acted with the intent to harm her when he disclosed the explicit
depictions. Doc. 28, Mot. Default J., 7. But those paragraphs discuss only Doe’s non-consent and
assert conclusory allegations that Alame acted with the intent to harm Doe.
Contrast the allegations here with the facts in Bilal v. Khan, where the plaintiff asserted a
UDIVM claim after the defendant “collected pornographic images and videos from her cell phone
without her knowledge or consent and sent them to her mother.” No. 05-24-00390-CV, 2025 WL
1547741, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 30, 2025, no pet.). “When [the defendant] sent the videos to
[the plaintiff’s mother], he asked her to tell [the plaintiff] to marry him and threatened to send the
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videos to more people if [the plaintiff] refused to do so.” Id. The plaintiff additionally testified that
she and her family are Pakistani Muslims, and it is “‘extremely negative’ for a woman to have sex
outside of marriage” in her community. Id.
On the facts of Bilal, a fact finder could infer the defendant acted with the intent to harm
the plaintiff because of the defendant’s blackmail threat. See Olavarria v. State, No. 05-94-01092-CR,
1995 WL 376787, at *4 (Tex. App. June 5, 1995) (“Intent can be inferred from acts, words, and
conduct.”) (citation omitted). In contrast, here, Doe includes no allegation in her complaint
regarding why Alame disclosed the explicit depictions, only that he did it without her consent and,
in some instances, after he told her he would delete the explicit depictions. Those allegations,
without more, are insufficient to permit the Court to infer Alame disclosed the explicit depictions
with the intent to harm Doe. Thus, the Court finds there is not a sufficient basis in the complaint
for entry of default judgment on Doe’s UDIVM claim.
3. 	The Invasion of Privacy Claim
“Invasion of privacy is [a] widely recognized . . . common law tort.” Perrill v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, 205 F. Supp. 3d 869, 873 (W.D. Tex. 2016). “Texas recognizes three separate types of
invasion of privacy: (1) intrusion upon seclusion or solitude or into one’s private affairs; (2) public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts; and (3) wrongful appropriation of one’s name or
likeness.” Doggett v. Travis Law Firm, P.C., 01-17-00098-CV, 2018 WL 2141412, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] May 10, 2018, pet. denied) (citing Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 578
(Tex. 1994)). Here, Doe moves for default on an intrusion upon seclusion claim. Doc. 1, Compl.,
9; Doc. 28, Mot. Default J., 14.
For an intrusion upon seclusion claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) an intentional intrusion,
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physically or otherwise, upon another’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or concerns; (2) which
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) that caused injury.” Rogers v. City of Hou.,
627 S.W.3d 777, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (citing Valenzuela v. Aquino,
853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993)) (other citations omitted). “The intrusion tort typically involves
some sort of physical invasion of a person’s property and is thus conceptually a quasi-trespass tort.”
Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 833, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (emphasis in original). Texas Courts
“have consistently held that an intrusion upon seclusion claim fails without evidence of a physical
intrusion or eavesdropping on another’s conversation with the aid of wiretaps, microphones, or
spying.” Morales v. Barnes, No. 05-17-00316-CV, 2017 WL 6759190, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec.
29, 2017, no pet.) (collecting cases).
Applying the elements to this case, the Court finds there is not a sufficient basis in the
complaint for entry of default judgment on Doe’s intrusion on seclusion claim. Doe does not allege
any facts supporting a finding of physical intrusion. Indeed, Doe admits Alame created the
recordings of her with her knowledge and consent. Therefore, these facts do not support the “quasi-
trespass” nature of an intrusion on seclusion claim.
C. 	Forms of Relief
Doe seeks (1) a permanent injunction, (2) liquidated statutory damages in the amount of
$150,000 per violation of the VAWRA, (3) exemplary damages authorized by the UDIVM; (4)
attorney’s fees, (5) costs, (6) pre-judgment interest, and (7) post-judgment interest. Doc. 28, Mot.
Default J., 15-27. The Court must now determine whether Doe’s motion, along with its attached
supporting documentation, is sufficient to allow the Court to award her relief.
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1. 	Permanent Injunction
Under the VAWRA, a court can order “equitable relief, including . . . a permanent
injunction ordering the defendant to cease display or disclosure of the visual depiction.”
§ 6851(b)(3)(ii). A permanent injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff can establish “(1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 626-27 (5th
Cir. 2013) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). “Courts have
acknowledged 	that 	default 	against 	a 	defendant 	is 	tantamount 	to 	actual 	success 	on 	the
merits.” Chevron Intell. Prop., L.L.C. v. Allen, No. 7:08-CV-98-O, 2009 WL 2596610, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 24, 2009) (O’Connor, J.) (citation omitted).
Here, Doe’s request for a permanent injunction is valid. First, dissemination of one’s sexually
explicit images causes irreparable harm. See Serpa, 2025 WL 332555, at *3 (citations omitted); see
Doe v. Unknown Party, No. CV-24-00252-PHX-DLR, 2024 WL 492231, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2024)
(“The harms Plaintiffs allege from these disclosures [of their intimate visual depictions]—such as
emotional distress—are the type of harms that lack an adequate legal remedy.”); Doe v. Constant, No.
24-554, 2024 WL 3512136, at *3 (W.D. La. July 23, 2024) (finding a plaintiff “demonstrated an
immediate risk of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief” because defendant’s behavior
“pose[d] an imminent risk of dissemination of Plaintiff’s intimate visual depictions”). Doe has
suffered significant harm from Alame’s prior disclosures, including severe emotional distress.
Second, monetary relief is an inadequate remedy because Alame’s phone was returned to him by the
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police, making it is possible for Alame to continue to disseminate the explicit depictions absent a
permanent injunction. Because the dissemination of Doe’s sexually explicit images constitutes
irreparable harm, and the Court finds that Alame could disseminate these images again, the first
two elements are met. Third, requiring Alame to refrain from future unlawful disseminations of
Doe’s intimate materials will cause him minimal to no harm, and any potential harm caused by
requiring him to comply with the law is insignificant compared to the continuing harm to Doe.
Fourth, the public interest is not undermined by restraining Alame from disseminating sexually
explicit images of Doe without her consent. As stated previously, this Court cannot conceive of any
public interest in allowing Alame to continue disseminating these images. See Doc. 10, Mem. Op.
& Order, 7.
Therefore, a permanent injunction ordering Alame to cease disclosure of the visual
depictions at issue is a proper remedy upon the entry of default judgment.
2. 	Damages
Doe asks for statutory damages totaling $750,000 and exemplary damages totaling $750,000.
Doc. 28, Mot. Default J., 10-11. Under the VAWRA, “an individual may recover the actual damages
sustained by the individual or liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000[.]” § 6851(b)(1). Here,
Doe seeks the $150,000 in liquidated damages per disclosure of the explicit depictions. Doc. 28,
Mot. Default J., 10.
As discussed above, considering the evidence provided by Doe in addition to the allegations
in her complaint, there are sufficient grounds for entry of default judgment on the VAWRA claim
for the five disclosures. Therefore, the Court awards Doe statutory damages in the amount of
$150,000 per disclosure, totaling $750,000.
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Exemplary damages are authorized under Texas law for UDIVM claims and intrusion upon
seclusion claims but are not provided under the VAWRA. Because Doe has not prevailed on her
UDIVM claim or intrusion upon seclusion claim, the Court declines to award exemplary damages
at this time.
3. 	Attorney’s Fees
Doe next asks for $28,965.60 in attorney’s fees. Doc. 28, Mot. Default J., 17. Here, the
VAWRA provides for attorney’s fees for Doe as a prevailing party. See § 6851(b)(3)(a)(i).
The Fifth Circuit uses a two-step process for determining attorney’s fees. Paisano Cap. SA de
CV v. 23 Tex. Produce, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-0852-B, 2019 WL 3239152, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2019)
(Boyle J.) (quoting Smith v. Acevedo, 478 F. App’x 116, 124 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)). First, a
court calculates the “lodestar” by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by an
appropriate hourly rate in the community for such work.” Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 829
(5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “The court should exclude all time that is excessive, duplicative,
or inadequately documented.” Smith, 478 F. App’x at 124 (citation omitted). Second, a court can
adjust the lodestar amount based on twelve factors set by the Fifth Circuit. Id. (citation omitted).
Those factors are:
(1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3)
skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4) preclusion of other
employment; (5) customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) amount involved and the
result obtained; (9) experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10)
“undesirability” of the case; (11) nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other
grounds by, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)). Accordingly, the Court will look to the
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presented evidence, apply the lodestar method, and make adjustments, if necessary, with respect to
the Johnson factors.
The first step in the lodestar analysis requires the Court to determine the reasonable number
of hours expended by Doe’s attorney on the suit, as well as his reasonable hourly rate. Id. (citation
omitted). The party requesting fees has the burden of establishing a reasonable hourly rate. Kryptek
Outdoor Grp., LLC v. Salt Armour, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-348, 2016 WL 7757267, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28,
2016) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)) (other citation omitted), vacated on
unrelated grounds, No. 1:15-cv-348, 2017 WL 11767678 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2017). “The reasonable
hourly rate is the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. RidgeAire, Inc., No. 6:12-
cv-550, 2014 WL 12612803, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2014) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 & n.11.).
Here, Doe’s attorney, Mr. Hutcherson, provided a declaration, the retainer agreement,
invoices, and a timekeeping report detailing the amount of time spent and work performed in the
case. Doc. 30, Hutcherson Decl., 2-28. Mr. Hutcherson performed 59.6 hours of work at a rate of
$600 per hour. Doc. 30, Hutcherson Decl., 6-7. Mr. Hutcherson states he applied a 10% reduction
to his hours total for potential inefficiencies, reducing the total hours worked to 53.64. Id. Mr.
Hutcherson segregates his time between the three claims as 90% devoted to the statutory claims and
10% devoted to the common law invasion of privacy claim. Id. To account for the fact that the
common law claim does not provide for attorney’s fees, Mr. Hutcherson asserts 90% of the total
hours worked is recoverable attorney’s fees. Id.
Because Doe prevailed only on her VAWRA claim, only the time Mr. Hutcherson spent on
that claim is recoverable. The Court therefore reduces the 90% of the total hours worked by 50%.
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Therefore, the lodestar amount for total hours worked is (0.5 x (53.64 x 0.9)), which results in 24.138
compensable hours.
After reviewing Mr. Hutcherson’s declaration as well as the supporting time report, the
Court finds that the time expended by Mr. Hutcherson was reasonable. Nothing indicates that any
individual was billing for “excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented” time. See Smith, 478
F. App’x at 124. Consequently, the Court accepts these hours as part of its lodestar calculation.
With respect to the hourly rates, Mr. Hutcherson states $600 is “reasonable and customary
in the Dallas legal market for attorneys with [his] level of experience and specialized expertise in
privacy and internet related litigation.” Doc. 30, Hutcherson Decl., 6. Mr. Hutcherson has practiced
for over twenty years, and filed his first revenge porn case over ten years ago. Id. at 3.
The Court finds Mr. Hutcherson’s hourly rate reasonable. See Vanliner Ins. Co. v.
DerMargosian, No. 3:12-cv-5074-D, 2014 WL 1632181, at *2 & n.5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014)
(Fitzwater, C. J.) (noting that courts are experts on the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees) (citation
omitted). Recent attorneys’ fees awards in the Northern District of Texas show Mr. Hutcherson’s
rate is reasonable for attorneys of his skill and experience in the Dallas market. See Michaels Stores
Procurement Co. v. DMR Constr., Inc., No. 3:18-CV-1436-B, 2019 WL 399074, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
31, 2019) (Boyle, J.) (finding hourly rates from $575 to $675 reasonable); Salt & Light Energy Equip.,
LLC v. Origin Bancorp, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-00654-N, 2025 WL 2322790, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12,
2025) (Godbey, J.) (“Recent Northern District of Texas decisions indicate that the prevailing market
rate in commercial litigation cases is around $300–$700 per hour for attorneys, increasing based on
level of experience.”) (collecting cases). Thus, considering the declaration and other exhibits, as well
as the Court’s own knowledge of rates charged for legal services by attorneys in the area with similar
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levels of skill, experience, and competence, the Court will apply Mr. Hutcherson’s proffered hourly
rate.
Accordingly, the Court finds the lodestar amount is the result of multiplying ($600/hour x
21.138 hours), which is $14,482.80. Considering the twelve Johnson factors described above, the
Court does not find it necessary to make any adjustment to these figures. Doe is awarded $14,482.80
in attorney’s fees.
4. 	Costs
A prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to recover its costs unless a federal statute, the
federal rules, or the court provides otherwise. See F ED . R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). In relevant part, t axable
court costs include: (1) fees paid to the clerk and marshal; (2) court reporter fees for all or part of a
transcript; (3) witness fees and related expenses; (4) printing costs; and (5) fees for copies of papers
necessarily obtained for use in the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)-(4).
Doe seeks $3,115.89 in costs, namely the filing fee ($405.00), PACER expenses ($3.20),
process server fees ($1,000.78), private investigation fees ($150.00), and LexisNexis legal research
expenses ($1,556.91). Doc. 28, Mot. Default J., 18-19; see Doc. 30, Invoices, 24-27. But private
process-server fees, private investigation fees, and legal research expenses are not typically recoverable
costs in this circuit. See Flying R Aviation, LLC v. Bondio, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-1341-B, 2023 WL
4826217, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2023) (Boyle, J.) (finding that private process server fees and
online legal research expenses are not recoverable costs) (citation omitted); Crown Distrib. LLC v. Ice
Suppz, LLC, No. 3:21-CV-1052-B, 2022 WL 1524119, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2022) (Boyle, J.)
(finding that “private investigator fees are not recoverable costs”). Therefore, the Court awards Doe
costs in the amount of $408.20, which is attributable only to the filing fee and PACER expenses.
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5. 	Pre-judgment Interest
A prevailing plaintiff’s request for an equitable award of pre-judgment interest should be
granted “in all but exceptional circumstances.” Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d
1048, 1057 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Am. Int’l Trading Corp. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 835 F.2d 536, 541
(5th Cir. 1987) (applying Texas law)). Because Doe prevailed on a federal law claim that is silent on
the issue of pre-judgment interest, the Court looks to Texas Law to guide its determination of the
interest rate. See Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 984 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that where a
claim is governed by a federal statute that is silent on the issue of pre-judgment interest, state law
guides the court’s discretion in determining the interest rate) (citing United States ex rel. Canion v.
Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d 1188, 1193 (5th Cir. 1987)), abrogated on other grounds by, CIGNA Corp. v.
Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011).
“When, as here, there is no statute specifying the rate of prejudgment interest, ‘Texas allows
for the award of prejudgment interest under “general principles of equity” and follows the principles
currently set out in [Texas Finance Code § 304].’” Wesley v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-2266-
D, 2010 WL 3606095, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2010) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court looks to the prime rate published by “the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System on the date of computation” to determine the pre-judgment interest rate. Tex. Fin.
Code § 304.003(c)(1). “Prejudgment interest will only accrue as to actual damages awarded and not
on any attorney’s fees awarded.” Halff Assocs., Inc. v. Warner Pac. Props., LLC, No. 3-08-CV-0574-B,
2008 WL 3874673, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2008) (Boye, J.).
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The current prime rate is 6.75%.2 Pre-judgment interest starts accruing on the earlier of: (1)
180 days after the date the defendant received written notice of a claim; or (2) the date suit is filed.
See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.104. The pre-judgment interest period ends on the date preceding
the day on which judgment is rendered. Id. Here, Doe is awarded pre-judgment interest at the rate
of 6.75%, computed as simple interest, from February 10, 2025, to the date preceding final judgment
as to actual damages awarded, and not attorney fees.
6. 	Post-judgment Interest
The Court next turns to post-judgment interest. Regardless of whether a cause of action is
based on state law or federal law, federal law determines post-judgment interest. See Boston Old Colony
Ins. Co. v. Tiner Assocs., Inc., 288 F.3d 222, 234 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that federal post-judgment
interest applies even in diversity cases). The federal post-judgment interest rate (“federal rate”) is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which sets the rate at the weekly average one-year constant maturity
Treasury yield for the calendar week preceding the date of judgment. Post-judgment interest is
available “on the entire amount of the final judgment, including damages, prejudgment interest,
and attorney’s fees.” See Fuchs v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 939 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir. 1991). Post-
judgment interest accuses from the date of judgment. See § 1961(a).
The federal rate is 3.53%.3 Therefore, the Court awards post-judgment interest on the final
judgment award, including attorney’s fees, costs, and pre-judgment interest, at the rate of 3.53%,
calculated from the date of the entry of judgment on January 21, 2026.4
2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Bank Prime Loan Rate [DPRIME], retrieved from
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DPRIME (Jan. 21, 2026).
3 The applicable post-judgment interest rate is found at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WGS1YR (Jan. 21,
2026).
4 “Post judgment-interest shall be computed daily to the date of payment . . . and shall be compounded
annually.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in Part and DENIES in Part Doe’s Motion for Default
Judgment. The Court will enter a separate judgment.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: January 21, 2026.
JANE J. BOYLE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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