Clayton v. Amazon.com Services LLC

3:25-cv-00269Txnd17 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JACQUETTA L. CLAYTON,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-00269-G-BT
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC
Defendant.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Plaintiff 	JacQuetta 	Clayton’s 	Motion 	for 	Default
Judgment (ECF No. 13), Motion to Strike (ECF No. 16), and Motion for Hearing to
Enter Default Judgment (ECF No. 19). For the following reasons, the Court should
DENY Clayton’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 13) and Motion to Strike
(ECF No. 16). Accordingly, the Court should TERMINATE AS MOOT Plaintiff’s
remaining Motion for Hearing to Enter Default Judgment (ECF No. 19).
Background
Clayton, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this civil
action seeking to vacate an arbitration award dismissing her negligence claims
against 	Amazon.com 	Services, 	LLC 	(Amazon) 	due 	to 	“evident 	partiality,
procedural misconduct, and the failure of Amazon to adhere to the required
arbitration procedures.” Compl. at 1 (ECF No. 3); see also id. at 33–40 (final
arbitration 	award). 	On 	April 	3, 	2025, 	the 	United 	States 	Marshals 	Service
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effectuated service of process on Amazon. Business Reply Card (ECF No. 11); Proof
of Service (ECF No. 12). After failing to timely respond to the complaint, Clayton
moved for default judgment against Amazon on May 19, 2025. See generally Mot.
for Default J. (ECF No. 13). Shortly thereafter, Amazon filed an answer asserting
affirmative defenses to Clayton’s claims (ECF No. 14) and a response to Clayton’s
Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 17). Clayton then moved to strike Amazon’s
answer and affirmative defenses as untimely (ECF No. 16).
Legal Standard and Analysis
Default Judgment
Rule 55 governs applications for default and default judgment. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55. Three steps are required to obtain a default judgment: (1) default by the
defendant; (2) entry of default by the Clerk’s office, and (3) entry of a default
judgment. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). A
default occurs when a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise respond within
the time required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The Clerk will enter
a default when the party’s default is established by an affidavit or otherwise. Id.
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). After the entry of default, a plaintiff may apply to the
court for a default judgment. Id. “A party is not entitled to a default judgment as a
matter of right, even where a defendant is technically in default.” Ganther v. Ingle,
75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
Here, Clayton is not entitled to a default judgment. The Clerk never entered
default against Amazon. Hunsinger v. Multi Hous. Tr. LLC, 2021 WL 3930040, at
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*2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2021) (Horan, J.) (“[Plaintiff’s] failure to obtain an entry of
default against the defendant is reason alone to deny his request for default
judgment.”); Coleman v. FEMA, 2019 WL 2124897, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2019)
(Ramirez, J.) (“Without a prior entry of default, a party has no basis to seek a
default judgment.”), adopted by 2019 WL 2123539 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (Lynn, J.);
Lucas v. Ocwen Home Loan Serv., 2015 WL 2152772, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2015)
(Fish, J.) (“Because no default has been entered . . . Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
second requirement for a default judgment[.]”). As Clayton failed to meet the
procedural requirements to obtain a default judgment, her Motion should be
denied.
Although Amazon admits that it failed to timely respond to Clayton’s
complaint, that admission alone does not entitle Clayton to a default judgment. See
Abor v. Planet Home Lending LLC, 2024 WL 4920767, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29,
2024) (McKay, J.) (“[E]ven if the answer was filed late, ‘a party is not entitled to a
default judgment as a matter of right, even where the defendant is technically in
default.’”) (quoting Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)),
adopted by 2024 WL 5240160 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2024) (Boyle, J.); Youngs v.
Haugh, 	2009 	WL 	10705239, 	at 	*1 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	Feb. 	24, 	2009) 	(Means, 	J.)
(“[A]lthough a technical default occurred in this case, it does not warrant a default
judgment.”). Amazon has now appeared in this action and asserted affirmative
defenses to Clayton’s claims. And default judgments are “a drastic remedy”
generally disfavored by the Federal Rules. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 767 (quoting Sun
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Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead and Savings Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
In view of the damages sought by Clayton, the parties’ disagreement on
material facts related to vacatur of the arbitration award, and the strong policy
favoring decisions on the merits, default judgment is not warranted in this case.
See Compl. at 6–7 (ECF No. 3) (seeking over $1 million in damages); Def.’s Resp.at
6 (ECF No. 17) (highlighting Clayton’s requested damages and issues of material
fact); Stelax Indus., Ltd. v. Donahue, 2004 WL 733844, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25,
2004) (Lynn, J.) (considering “the amount of money at stake, the possibility of
dispute concerning material facts, and the strong policy favoring decisions on the
merits” when denying motion for default judgment). Thus, the Court should DENY
Clayton’s Motion for Default Judgment.
Motion to Strike
Clayton also moves to strike Amazon’s answer as untimely and improper.
See Mot. to Strike at 2, ¶ 4 (ECF No. 16).1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)
permits the court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
“Motions to strike a defense are generally disfavored.” Priester v. Long Beach
Mort. Co., 2018 WL 1833255, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2018) (citing Kaiser
1 Although Clayton does not cite to any federal authority in her Motion to Strike,
the Court liberally construes her motion having been brought under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(f). See Collins v. Dall. Leadership Found., 77 F.4th 327, 330
(5th Cir. 2023) (liberally construing filings of pro se litigant).
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Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057
(5th Cir. 1982)); see also S.E.C. v. Cuban, 798 F. Supp. 2d 783, 787 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(“Both because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy, and because it
is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic, motions under Rule 12(f)
are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted.”) (quoting Jacobs v.
Tapscott, 2004 WL 2921806, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2004) (Fitzwater, J.), aff’d
on other grounds, 277 F. App’x 483 (5th Cir. 2008)). However, a court may grant
a motion to strike a defense if the defense is legally insufficient, irrelevant, or
prejudicial. Priester, 2018 WL 1833255, at *4 (citing Kaiser, 677 F.2d at 1057 and
F.D.I.C. v. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993)). The decision whether to
grant a motion to strike is within the court’s discretion. Cuban, 798 F. Supp. 2d at
787.
The Court finds no reason to strike Amazon’s answer and defenses under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Amazon asserts the defenses of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. Answer at 6 (ECF No. 14). These defenses bear a relation
to Clayton’s claims. See Bridgestone Am. Tire Operations, LLC v. Speedways
Tyres Ltd., 2023 WL 5105776, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2023) (Pittman, J.) (“A court
should only grant a motion to strike ‘when the pleading to be stricken has no
possible relation to the controversy.’”) (quoting Veranda Assocs., L.P. v. Hooper,
496 F. App’x 455, 458 (5th Cir. 2012)). Further, Amazon’s defenses contain enough
factual particularity to give Clayton fair notice. See Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d
354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A] defendant . . . must plead an affirmative defense with
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enough specificity or factual particularity to give the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the
defense that is being advanced.”). Therefore, the Court should DENY Clayton’s
Motion to Strike.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should DENY Clayton’s Motion for
Default Judgment (ECF No. 13) and Motion to Strike (ECF No. 16). Accordingly,
the Court should TERMINATE AS MOOT Clayton’s Motion for Hearing to Enter
Default Judgment (ECF No. 19).
SO RECOMMENDED.
December 17, 2025.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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