Lockhart v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
NICOLE DENEECE LOCKHART, 	§
§
VS. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-244-E
§
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL 	§
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
AND
NOTICE AND ORDER
This case was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of
Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b). The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation
of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Nicole Deneece Lockhart (“Lockhart”) filed this action pursuant to Section 405(g)
of Title 42 of the United States Code for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security denying her claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) and for supplemental security income
(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the SSA. 	On April 20, 2022, Lockhart protectively filed her
applications, alleging that her disability began on February 1, 2022. (Transcript (“Tr.”) 14; see,
e.g., Tr. 34, 202-11.) After her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, Lockhart
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 14; see Tr. 52-79, 90-128.)
On June 7, 2024, the ALJ held a telephone hearing and, on July 5, 2024, found that Lockhart was
not disabled within the meaning of the SSA. (Tr. 14-51.) Lockhart then filed a request for review
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of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 198-99.) On December 17, 2024, the Appeals
Council denied Lockhart’s request, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the
Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6.) Lockhart subsequently filed this civil action seeking review of the ALJ’s
decision.
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Disability insurance is governed by Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and SSI benefits are
governed by Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385, of the SSA. In addition, numerous regulatory
provisions govern disability insurance and SSI benefits. 	See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 (disability
insurance); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 416 (SSI). 	Although technically governed by different statutes and
regulations, “[t]he law and regulations governing the determination of disability are the same for
both disability insurance benefits and SSI.” 	Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.
1994).
The SSA defines a disability as a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
lasting at least twelve months that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful
activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1999). To determine
whether a claimant is disabled, and thus entitled to disability benefits, a five-step analysis is
employed. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the claimant must not be presently working
at any substantial gainful activity. 	See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 	Substantial
gainful activity is defined as work activity involving the use of significant physical or mental
abilities for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. Second, the claimant must have an
impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. 	See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),
(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c); see also Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). Third,
disability will be found if the impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals an
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impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(iii), (d), 416.920(a)(iii), (d).1 Fourth, if disability cannot be found
based on the claimant’s medical status alone, the impairment or impairments must prevent the
claimant from returning to his past relevant work. 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.l520(a)(4)(iv), (f),
416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). And fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any work,
considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and past work
experience. Id. §§ 404.l520(a)(4)(v), (g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194,
197- 98 (5th Cir. 1999). At steps one through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to
show she is disabled. Crowley, 197 F.3d at 198. If the claimant satisfies this responsibility, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other gainful employment the claimant is
capable of performing in spite of his existing impairments. 	Id. 	If the Commissioner meets his
burden, it is up to the claimant to then show that she cannot perform the alternate work. See Carey
v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000).
A denial of disability benefits is reviewed only to determine whether the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standards, and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis v. Bowen,
837 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th
Cir. 2001). It is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. A finding of no
substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings
1 Before moving from the third to the fourth step of the inquiry, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to determine the most the claimant is able to do notwithstanding her physical
and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (e), 416.920(a)(4), (e). The claimant’s RFC is used at both the
fourth and fifth steps of the five-step analysis. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At Step Four, the claimant’s
RFC is used to determine if the claimant can still do her past relevant work. 	Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(a)(4)(iv). At Step Five, the claimant’s RFC is used to determine whether the claimant can adjust to other
types of work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
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support the decision. Id. (emphasis added). An ALJ’s decision is not subject to reversal, even if
there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported the opposite conclusion, so
long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion that was reached by the ALJ. 	Dollins v.
Astrue, No. 4:08-CV-00503-A, 2009 WL 1542466, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2009). This Court
may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s,
but it will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if substantial evidence is present. Harris v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000); Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383.
II. 	ISSUE
In her brief, Lockhart presents the following issues:
1. 	Whether the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is supported by
substantial evidence because it fails to include mental restrictions to account for the
finding of mild limitations in all four areas of mental functioning; and
2. 	Whether the ALJ erred by failing to point out actual inconsistencies between
Lockhart’s subjective allegations and other evidence in the record in violation of 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4), which, if properly considered, would lead to
a finding of disabled under Rule 201.12 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines
(“GRIDS”).
(Plaintiff’s Brief (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 3; 15-24; see Plaintiff’s Reply (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 1-6.)
III. 	ALJ DECISION
In his July 5, 2024 decision, the ALJ found that Lockhart had not engaged in any substantial
gainful activity since February 1, 2022, her alleged onset date of disability, and that she met the
disability insured status requirements of the SSA through March 31, 2022. (Tr. 16-17.) At Step
Two, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	that 	Lockhart 	suffered 	from 	the 	following 	“severe” 	impairments:
“degenerative disc disease and stenosis of the cervical spine; degenerative joint disease of the hips;
coronary artery disease; rheumatic heart disease; history of mitral valve and aortic valve
replacements; and obesity.” 	(Tr. 17 (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted). 	As to
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Lockhart’s anxiety and depressive disorders, the ALJ found that such impairments were non-
severe because they “do not cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform
basic mental work activities.” (Tr. at 17.) In analyzing Lockhart’s mental impairments under the
“paragraph B” criteria, the ALJ found that Lockhart had no more than mild limitations in all four
broad functional areas. (Id.)
At Step Three, the ALJ found that Lockhart did not suffer from an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or equaled any section in the Listing. 	(Tr. 19-20.) 	As to
Lockhart’s RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the . . . [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
and 416.967(b) except: she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; she can
occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; she can occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and she can have occasional exposure to hazards
such as unprotected heights and moving mechanical parts.
(Tr. 23 (emphasis omitted).) At Step Four, the ALJ found that Lockhart had no past relevant work.
(Tr. 24.) 	Subsequently, the ALJ categorized Lockhart, who was born on January 14, 1972, as an
individual closely approaching advanced age on the alleged disability onset date of February 1,
2022, as she was 50 years old.2 (Tr. 24.) In addition, the ALJ noted that Lockhart had “at least a
high school education.” (Id.) That said, the ALJ described Lockhart’s transferable job skills as
“not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work.” (Id.) Finally, at Step Five,
the ALJ concluded that, based on Lockhart’s age, education, work experience, RFC, and
vocational expert testimony, “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy” that Lockhart could perform. (Tr. at 24; see Tr. at 24-26.) Accordingly, the ALJ found
that Lockhart was not disabled as defined in the SSA from February 1, 2022, through the date of
the decision. (Tr. 26.)
2 A person closely approaching advanced age is 50 to 54 years old. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d), 416.963(d).
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Failure to Include Mental Limitations in the RFC Determination
As to first issue, Lockhart, citing no case law in support from this circuit, argues that
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s mental RFC determination because the ALJ failed
to include in such determination the mental limitations she found in the Paragraph B analysis.
(Pl.’s Br. at 1, 15-19.) In support of her claim, Lockhart asserts:
Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in all four areas
of mental functioning along with several severe impairments. 	The ALJ briefly
describes each of the areas of mental functioning, and repeats the same benign
examples from adult function reports while ignoring more severe evidence before
creating an RFC with zero mental restrictions corresponding to the identified
mental limitations and zero analysis as to why such limitations were excluded.
(Pl.’s Br. at 16 (internal citations omitted).) 	Lockhart then evaluated each of the four areas of
mental functioning known as the “paragraph B” criteria, pointing out the information noted by the
ALJ and how such information was allegedly inaccurate based on other evidence in the record.
(Id. at 16-19.)
RFC is what an individual can still do despite his limitations.3 	Social Security Ruling
(“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). It reflects the individual’s maximum
remaining ability to do sustained work activity in an ordinary work setting on a regular and
continuing basis. 	Id.; see Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 2001). 	A regular and
continuing basis is an eight-hour day, five days a week, or an equivalent schedule. SSR 96-8p,
1996 WL 374184, at *2. RFC is not the least an individual can do but the most. Id. The RFC is
a function-by-function assessment, with both exertional and nonexertional4 factors to be
3 The Commissioner’s analysis at steps four and five of the disability evaluation process is based on the
assessment of the claimant’s RFC. 	Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2005). The Commissioner
assesses the RFC before proceeding from step three to step four. Id.
4 Exertional capacity addresses an individual’s ability “to perform each of seven strength demands: Sitting,
standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. Each function must be
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considered, and it is based upon all of the relevant evidence in the case record. Id. at 3–6. The
responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC lies with the ALJ. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d
1019, 1023–24 (5th Cir. 1990). The ALJ must discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained
work activity on a regular and continuing basis and resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence.
SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7.
In making the RFC assessment, the ALJ must consider all symptoms, including pain, and
the extent to which these symptoms can be reasonably accepted as consistent with objective
medical evidence and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a); SSR 16-3p, 2017
WL 	5180304, at *1 (Oct. 25, 2017); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. 	The ALJ must also
consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even
impairments that are not severe. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. 	The ALJ may draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence in making his decision, but the social security ruling also
cautions that presumptions, speculation, and supposition do not constitute evidence. See e.g., SSR
86-8, 1986 WL 68636, at *8 (1986), superseded by SSR 91-7c, 1991 WL 231791, at *1 (Aug. 1,
1991) (changing the ruling only to the extent the SSR discusses the former procedures used to
determine disability in children).
The ALJ is not required to incorporate limitations in the RFC that he did not find the record
supported. See Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 790 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The ALJ as factfinder has
the sole responsibility for weighing the evidence and may choose whichever physician’s diagnosis
is most supported by the record.”). In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, a finding of no substantial
considered separately, but the final RFC assessment may combine activities. Id. Nonexertional capacity “considers
all work-related limitations and restrictions that do not depend on an individual’s physical strength,” including mental
limitations. Id. at *6.
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evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the
decision. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001).
Federal regulations require the ALJ to follow mandatory steps when evaluating the severity
of a claimant’s mental impairments, known as the “special technique.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.l520a(b),
416,920a(b); see Hogue v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:24-CV-1926-K, 2025 WL 2232339,
at *9 (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2025). 	The ALJ, in evaluating mental impairments, first considers a
claimant’s symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to decide whether they suffer from a
medically determinable impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520a(b)(1), 416.920a(b)(1). For most
mental impairment listings, the ALJ must evaluate the degree of functional limitation resulting
from the claimant’s mental impairments pursuant to criteria identified in paragraphs A and B or A
and C of the adult mental disorders contained in the Listings.5 See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1 § 12.00; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)(2), (c), 416.920a(b)(2),(c). 	“Paragraph B” contains
four broad functional areas: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)
interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting and
managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3)-(4), 416.920a(c)(3)-(4); see also 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00E. 	To satisfy the criteria in paragraph B, the claimant’s
impairment must result in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations.6 See 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(A)(2)(b). 	The ALJ’s written decision must incorporate pertinent
findings and conclusions based on the technique, along with a specific finding of the limitation’s
5 “Listing 12.05 has two paragraphs that are unique to that listing (see 12.00A3); [the claimant’s] mental
disorder must satisfy the requirements of either paragraph A or paragraph B.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1
§ 12.00A.2.
6 The five-point scale that the ALJ uses to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation is as follows: none, mild,
moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4). “If [the ALJ] rate[s] the degrees of
[a claimant’s] limitation as ‘none’ or ‘mild,’ [he or she] will generally conclude that [the claimant’s] impairment(s) is
not severe . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1), 416.920a(d)(1).
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degree 	in 	each 	of 	the 	functional 	areas 	described. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520a(e)(4),
416.920a(e)(4).
After the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting from any mental
impairment, the ALJ determines the severity of such impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520a(d),
416.920a(d). 	If the ALJ finds the mental impairment is severe at Step Two, then the ALJ must
determine at Step Three if it meets or equals a listed mental disorder in the Listing. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520a(d)(2), 416.920a(d)(2). If the impairment is severe but does not meet or equal a listed
mental impairment, then the ALJ must conduct an RFC assessment. 	See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(d)(3), 416.920a(d)(3).
In this case, the ALJ found at Step Two, as stated above, that Lockhart had no severe mental
impairments. (Tr. 17.) In making this determination, the ALJ stated:
The undersigned considered all of the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing the claimant’s
residual functional capacity.
. . . .
The claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments of anxiety and
depressive disorders, considered singly and in combination, do not cause more than
minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities
and are therefore non-severe. 	In making this finding, the undersigned has
considered the broad functional areas of mental functioning set out in the disability
regulations for evaluating mental functioning set out in the disability regulations
for evaluating mental disorders and in the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR, Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1). These four broad functional areas are known as the
“paragraph B” criteria.
(Tr. 17.) The ALJ, after considering Function Reports, progress notes, and other evidence in the
record, then found that Lockhart had “no more than mild limitations” in all four functional areas.
(Tr. 17-18.) The ALJ then stated:
Because the claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments cause
no more than “mild” limitation in any of the functional areas and the evidence does
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not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s
ability to do basic work activities, they are non-severe.
The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a residual
functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental
impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. 	The mental
residual functional capacity assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential
evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment. 	The following residual
functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has
found in the “paragraph B” mental function analysis.
(Tr. 18-19 (internal citations omitted).) In making the RFC determination, the ALJ did not include
any mental RFC limitations in such determination. (Tr. 20-24.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that
the “prior administrative findings provided by the State Agency at the initial level[, which found
that there were no mental impairments established,] are persuasive (Exhibits D2A-D3A).”7 (Tr.
24.)
As set forth above, Lockhart claims that the ALJ’s RFC determination is incomplete
because the ALJ relied “on a few benign pieces of evidence to justify everything regarding mental
functioning” and on progress notes from anticoagulation appointments (as opposed to mental
status examinations) and failed to include any limitations in the RFC determination regarding her
mild limitations in the four functional areas. (Pl.’s Reply at 2; see Pl.’s Br. at 15-19; Pl.’s Reply
at 1-4.) However, the Court notes that the paragraph B criteria limitation of having mild limitations
in the four functional areas in the special technique is not an RFC assessment. See SSR 96–8p,
7 In the Psychiatric Review Technique of a Disability Determination Explanation signed December 21, 2022,
the State Agency Psychological Consultant (“SAPC”) stated that “[t]here are no mental medically determinable
impairments established.” (Tr. 55.) In addition, the SAPC averred:
Claimant is a 50 year old female alleging a congenital heart condition, history of stroke,
shortness of breath, and depression.
No current mental treatment was available. Claimant was scheduled for a CE and her
representative confirmed her intended attendance. She did not attend. Insufficient evidence.
(Tr. 55 (emphasis omitted).)
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1996 WL 374184, at *4. 	Instead, it is used to rate the severity of Lockhart’s mental impairments
at Steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process. Id. “The mental RFC assessment used at
steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing
various functions contained in the broad categories found in paragraphs B and C of the adult mental
disorder listings in 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments . . . .” 	Id. 	Moreover, “[w]hile the
regulations require the ALJ to evaluate[ ] the limitations imposed by Plaintiff's mental impairments
in certain areas and direct the ALJ to proceed to the RFC determination if Plaintiff's impairments
are found severe, the regulations do not specifically require the ALJ to find that the limitations
found in evaluating the mental impairment must be word-for-word incorporated into either the
RFC determination or the hypothetical question posed to the VE.” Patterson v. Astrue, No. 1:08–
CV–109–C, 2009 WL 3110205, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009).
The Court notes that Lockhart does not appear to take issue with the ALJ’s analysis of the
paragraph B criteria or the ALJ’s findings at Step 2 that her mental impairments were non-severe.
(See Pl.’s Br. at 15-19; Pl.’s Reply at 1-4.) Rather, Lockhart claims that the ALJ erred by failing
to account for Lockhart’s mild limitations in the four functional areas in the RFC determination or
explain why such limitations were excluded. (Pl.’s Br. at 16; see Pl.’s Reply at 1-4.) In general,
“all relevant evidence in the case record” should be considered when making an RFC
determination, and even non-severe impairments should be considered.” Jeansonne v. Saul, 855
F. App’x 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original). 	“However, the Fifth Circuit has
explained that the ALJ must consider non-severe mental impairments in the RFC determination
only when evidence supports a finding that the impairments significantly affect a claimant’s ability
to work.” Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 7:23-CV-00084-O-BP, 2024 WL 4169173, at *8
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(quoting Jeansonne, 855 F. App’x at 197-98) (collecting cases).8 In this case, Lockhart does not
argue that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s decision at Step Two. 	“Therefore,
because the ALJ found at [S]tep [T]wo that [Plaintiff’s] non-severe mental impairments did not
cause ‘more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities,’ there
was no error in not considering them in the RFC determination.’” Brown, 2024 WL 4169173, at
*4 (quoting Jeansonne, 855 F. App’x at 197-98); see also Scott v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin, No.
4:20-CV-01136-BJ, 2022 WL 4240888, at *10 	(N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2022) (finding substantial
evidence supported RFC determination that did not contain any limitations for non-severe mental
impairments that were rated as mildly limited in all four paragraph B functional areas).
The record shows, as set forth above, that the ALJ clearly considered and analyzed the
evidence in the record relating to Lockhart’s mental impairments. 	The ALJ exercised his
responsibility as factfinder in weighing the evidence and choosing to incorporate limitations into
the RFC. See Jacobs v. Berryhill, No. 5-17-CV-429-XR-RBF, 2018 WL 3323764, at *5 (W.D.
Tex. July 6, 2018), rep. and recommendation adopted, No. 5-17-CV-429, 2018 WL 4688775
(W.D. Tex. July 24, 2018). Accordingly, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
RFC determination and remand is not required.
B. 	Failure to Point Out Inconsistencies Between Subjective Allegations and Other
Evidence in the Record
Lockhart also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to point out actual inconsistencies
between her subjective allegations and other evidence in the record in violation of 20 C.F.R. §§
8 While not all courts are unanimous in so holding, such cases either fail to mention the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
in Jeansonne or they mention it but decide the cases on other grounds of harmless error. See Brown, 2024 WL
4169173, at *9 (collecting cases); see also Kevin F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:24-cv-00324, 2025 WL 1186304,
at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2025). While Jeansonne is not a precedential opinion, it merits great persuasive force.
See Kevin F., 2025 WL 1186304, at *4.
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404.1529 and 416.929. (Pl.’s Br. at 19-24; see Pl.’s Reply at 4-6.) Lockhart claims that, if the
ALJ had properly followed these regulations as well as SSR 96-7p,9 then Lockhart’s RFC would
have been limited to sedentary work and, consequently, she would have been found to be disabled
under Rule 201.12 of the GRIDS, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2.10 (Pl.’s Br. at 19, 24)
Lockhart claims that the ALJ “appears to rely solely on a few statements on activities of daily
living (“ADLs”) in her adult function reports to discount a record full of evidence supporting
Plaintiff’s allegations.” (Pl.’s Br. at 21.)
When evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ first considers whether a
medically determinable impairment exists that could reasonably be expected to produce the
claimant’s pain or other symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16-3P, 2017
WL 5180304, at *3 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017). Second, once an impairment is established, the ALJ
then assesses the symptoms’ intensity, persistence, and limiting effects on the claimant’s ability to
perform work-related activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL
5180304, at *4.
In evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ considers multiple factors,
including: 1) the claimant’s daily activities; 2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
pain or other symptoms; 3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 4) the type,
9 The Court notes that SSR 96-7p has been superseded by SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *1.
10 “The GRIDS provide an analysis of the various functional factors such as age, education, and work
experience in combination with the individuals [RFC] for work in evaluating a claimant’s ability to engage in
substantial gainful activity.” Hunt v. Astrue, No. 4:12-CV-244-Y, 2013 WL 2392880, at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2013)
(citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(a)). “When findings of fact coincide with all the criteria of a
particular rule, the rule directs a conclusion as to whether the claimant is or is not disabled.” Id. However, “[t]he
Fifth Circuit has held that the use of the GRIDS is appropriate when a claimant suffers only from exertional
impairments or if a claimant’s nonexertional impairments do not significantly affect his RFC.” Hunt, 2013 WL
2392880, at *12 (emphasis added) (citing Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 2000)). Rule 201.12 directs a
finding of disabled for a person limited to sedentary work that, as relevant here, is closely approaching advanced age,
is a high school graduate, and who has no previous work experience.
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dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate
pain or other symptoms; 5) treatment, other than medication, that the claimant receives or has
received for relief of pain or other symptoms; 6) any measures other than treatment the claimant
uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and 7) any other factors concerning the
claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain. 	See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3),
416.929(c)(3); SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8. 	“However, neither the regulation nor
interpretive case law requires that an ALJ name, enumerate, and discuss each factor in outline or
other rigid, mechanical form.” Prince v. Barnhart, 418 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 (E.D. Tex. 2005). An
administrative decision is “sufficiently specific” when it amply reflects the ALJ’s awareness and
consideration of the regulatory factors. Id.
As to Lockhart’s subjective complaints, the ALJ, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929
and SSR 16-3p, 	first set forth the two-step process in considering a claimant’s subjective
complaints. 	(Tr. 20.) 	Then, the ALJ discussed and analyzed various evidence in the record,
including multiple adult function reports and Lockhart’s testimony at the hearing before the ALJ.
(Tr. 21.) Thereafter, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms. 	However, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence on the record for the
reasons explained in this decision.
(Tr. 21-22.) The ALJ then proceeded to go through the various medical and other evidence in the
record in finding that Lockhart was capable of performing light work with several additional
limitations. (Tr. 21- 24.)
As set forth above, Lockhart argues that the ALJ improperly assessed her subjective
allegations. (Pl.’s Br. at 19-24.) The Court disagrees, noting that, “[w]hen considering medical
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evidence relative to a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ may discredit the claimant’s
complaints . . . [so long as the ALJ] carefully weigh[s] the evidence and articulate[s] the reasons
for doing so.” Guidry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:23-CV-01742, 2025 WL 1119267, at *4 (W.D.
La. Mar. 31, 2025) (citing Smith v. Astrue, 914 F. Supp. 2d 764, 787 (E.D. La. 2012)). In this case,
as set forth above, the ALJ began his analysis regarding Lockhart’s subjective complaints by
setting forth and citing the regulations governing symptom evaluation, acknowledging its
relevance to his determination. (Tr. 20 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929 and SSR 16-3p.)
Thereafter, the ALJ, inter alia, summarized evidence relevant to five of the seven factors listed in
the regulation. (Tr. 21-25; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).)
As to claimant’s daily activities, the ALJ noted that Lockhart, on a typical day, inter alia,
“woke up, took care of personal hygiene, watched TV, and went to bed.” (Tr. 21.) The ALJ also
acknowledged that Lockhart stated: (1) she had problems with personal care, (2) needed special
reminders to take care of personal needs, grooming, and to take her medication, (3) was unable to
prepare meals or do chores, (4) could use public transportation, shop by computer, and sometimes
count change, (5) enjoyed watching sports and movies every day, (5) went to church and doctors’
appointments on a regular basis, (6) had a short attention span, and (7) could not stand or walk for
five minutes due to swelling and shooting pain. (Id.) 	As to the location, duration, frequency, and
intensity of pain or other symptoms, the ALJ reiterated Lockhart’s testimony (as well as her
statements in the medical records) indicating Lockhart experienced, inter alia, bone arthritis and
neck, hip, and ankle pain, whole body pain, fluid in her hips, swelling in her leg, and shooting pain
from her neck to her back. (Tr. 21-23.) The ALJ noted that the medical records indicated Lockhart
also had complaints of shortness of breath, chest pain, palpitations, irregular heartbeat, and loss of
consciousness. (Tr. 23.)
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As to information related to Lockhart’s medications, the ALJ noted, inter alia, that
Lockhart took medication, which did not cause any side effects. (Tr. 21.) The ALJ also indicated
that Lockhart’s medical records indicated she was prescribed Tylenol, baclofen, lidocaine patch,
diclofenac, blood thinners, gabapentin (which did not provide relief) for neck and shoulder pain,
warfarin for mitral valve replacement and atrial flutter, and furosemide for coronary artery disease.
(Tr. 22-24.) 	In addition, the ALJ stated that Lockhart’s fluctuating numbers related to her
International Normalized Ratio related to her anticoagulation treatment “were attributed to
cranberry juice or missed dosages.” (Tr. 23.)
As to treatment, other than medications, the ALJ noted that Lockhart wore a hearing aid
and attended physical therapy to address neck pain. (Tr. 21-22.) As to any other factors concerning
Lockhart’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain, the ALJ acknowledged that Lockhart
“has had a large body habitus, complaints of pain, and findings of tenderness with some related
decreased ranges of motion” and some swelling and joint pain. (Tr. 24.) The ALJ also stated that
the “evidence also reasonably supports environmental limitations involving exposure to hazards.”
(Id.)
In addition, the ALJ articulated legitimate reasons for his determination that Lockhart’s
subjective complaints were not entirely consistent with medical and other evidence in the record.
(Tr. 20-24.) 	Moreover, the ALJ sufficiently indicated the persuasiveness and weight given to
Lockhart’s subjective complaints and also incorporated some environmental limitations into the
RFC determination to account for her subjective complaints (Id.). See, e.g., Salgado v. Astrue, 271
F. App’x 456, 462-63 (5th Cir. 2008). Relying in part on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ reasonably
concluded at Step Five that there was work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that Lockhart could perform. 	(Tr. 25-26.) 	In sum, the ALJ’s findings regarding
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Lockhart’s subjective complaints of pain were “sufficiently specific to make clear to the [claimant]
and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the [ALJ] gave to the [claimant’s] statements and the
reasons for that weight.” Salgado, 271 F. App’x at 462. Thus, the ALJ did not err, and remand is
not required as to this issue.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual
finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until February
9, 2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
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findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be file within seven (7) days
of the filing date of objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to
the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby
is returned to the docket for the United States District Judge.
SIGNED January 26, 2026.
____________________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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