Semien v. Dallas Independent School District et al

Order – Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
PRENTISS SEMIEN, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-3147-L-BW
§
DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 	§
DISTRICT; W.H. ADAMSON HIGH 	§
SCHOOL; and STEPHANIE AMAYA,1 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
ORDER
On January 8, 2026, the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge (“Report”) (Doc. 27) was entered, recommending that the court grant Defendant
Dallas Independent School District’s (“DISD”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16), filed August 11,
2025, and dismiss with prejudice all claims against it in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint—for
alleged hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, discrimination based on sex, and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act—pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 	For the reasons
herein explained, the court accepts the Report (Doc. 27); grants DISD’s Motion (Doc. 16); and
overrules all objections by Plaintiff to the Report and the magistrate judge’s October 24, 2025
Order denying his Motion for Leave to File Surreply.
I. 	The Magistrate Judge’s Report (Doc. 27) and Reasoning
The magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim
based on sexual harassment is time-barred because all of the events that he alleges in support of
1 Defendants W.H. Adamson High School and AHS Principal Stephanie Amaya were dismissed from this action on
July 28, 2025.
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this claim occurred more than 300 days before he filed his charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); and the allegations in his Amended Complaint
are conclusory and do not plausibly allege conduct that qualifies as sexual harassment because of
his sex, or harassment that was severe or pervasive.
The magistrate judge also concluded that Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims—based on
his assertion that he experienced a “pattern of materially adverse actions” because of his reports
or complaints of sexual harassment, racial discrimination by a student, and “differential retaliatory
treatment”— should also be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, as his EEOC charge does not mention retaliation or identify any retaliatory conduct or
actions that were taken in retaliation for any protected activity; and (2) the allegations in his
Amended Complaint do not establish the necessary elements for retaliation, as he does not
plausibly allege that he reported activity made unlawful by Title VII, and he does not allege any
adverse employment actions taken in retaliation for any of his “reports.”
The magistrate judge further recommends that the court should not allow Plaintiff to further
amend his pleadings with respect to DISD, as he was previously allowed to amend, and amendment
would be futile because his discrimination claim is time-barred, and his retaliation claim is barred
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report (Doc. 28)
Plaintiff filed objections to the Report on January 22, 2026 (Doc. 28). He first contends
that the magistrate judge failed to apply the correct legal standard. According to Plaintiff, the
magistrate judge conducted a merits-based analysis, did not accept his allegations as true, and did
not draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. 	Plaintiff argues that the following sequence of
events substantiates his argument:
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The FCR confirms that: “On September 21, 2025, Semien sought leave to
file a sur-reply (Dkt. No. 20), which was denied. (See Dkt. No. 23.)” (FCR,
Background). After constraining Plaintiff’s briefing, the present FCR then faults
Plaintiff for alleged pleading deficiencies, weighs facts in Defendant’s favor, and
recommends dismissal with prejudice. This sequence denial of sur-reply (Dkt. No.
23, Oct. 14, 2025), followed by merits-based fact-weighing and a with-prejudice
dismissal recommendation (Jan. 8, 2026) demonstrates a procedurally imbalanced
process in which Plaintiff was restricted from fully responding and then penalized
for alleged deficiencies on an undeveloped record.
Doc. 28 at 8.
In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the Report improperly faulted him for failing to provide
proof of discrimination, thereby elevaing his pleading burden beyond that required by Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff contends that, contrary to the Report, his allegations
when viewed cumulatively, including those regarding DISD’s post-complaint conduct, support a
reasonable inference of retaliation and hostile work environment. 	Plaintiff takes issue with the
magistrate 	judge’s 	characterization 	of 	his 	pleadings 	as 	“subjective 	beliefs” 	and 	“routine
employment matters,” and he contends that the magistrate judge ignored his allegations that
administrators had actual knowledge of his sexual-harassment complaint and failed to refer it for
appropriate investigation. Plaintiff also takes issue with the magistrate judge’s conclusions that
he failed to exhaust his retaliation claim and did not engage in protected activity because retaliation
claims may reasonably grow out of the facts alleged in an EEOC charge and may include post-
charge conduct. For similar reasons, Plaintiff contends that the magistrate judge’s recommendation
prematurely forecloses discovery and amendment based on information that he might obtain in
discovery that lends support for his claims, particularly his retaliation claim as pleaded, or a
retaliation claim based on additional retaliatory conduct that has not been pleaded. 	Finally,
Plaintiff 	disagrees 	with 	the 	determination 	that 	he 	has 	pleaded 	his 	“best 	case” 	and 	the
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recommendation that he should not be allowed to further amend under Rule 15’s liberal
amendment standard.
III. 	DISD’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report (Doc. 29)
DISD responded to Plaintiff’s objections on February 5, 2026, arguing that Plaintiff’s
objections do not meaningfully address the magistrate judge’s analysis; rather, they simply express
disagreement with the outcome of that analysis without identifying any impermissible fact finding
or legal error based on misapplication of the law. In this regard, DISD contends that: (1) the
objections are not supported by citations to legal authority; (2) nothing in the Report reflects
impermissible fact-finding because characterizing Plaintiff’s allegations as supervision rather than
sex-based harassment is not improper fact-weighing but a legal conclusion based on the pleaded
facts, 	and 	evaluating 	whether 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	plausibly 	show 	severe 	or 	pervasive
harassment, protected activity, or causation is an application of governing law to the pleaded facts,
not a credibility determination, as Plaintiff suggests; (3) the magistrate judge correctly recognized
the conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s allegations and was not required to accept conclusory labels
like “harassment” or “retaliation” that are not supported by facts; (4) the magistrate judge
considered Plaintiff’s allegations regarding post-complaint conduct, and correctly concluded that
such conduct was not actionable because conduct does not become actionable simply because it
occurs after an internal complaint, and temporal sequence alone is not enough; (5) Plaintiff
misstates the law, and contrary to his assertion, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that his
charge of discrimination does not allege retaliation or provide facts from which a retaliation
investigation could reasonably be expected to grow; (6) the magistrate judge correctly concluded
that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also fails because complaints about supervision and workplace
discomfort alone do not constitute protected activity; (7) Plaintiff’s hostile work environment
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claim is flawed because the complained of conduct must be sex-based and sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, and the magistrate judge correctly concluded that,
even accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations, they do not plausible support a finding that he was
subjected to severe or pervasive harassment “because of sex”; and (8) Plaintiff’s contentions
regarding “procedural imbalance” and his challenge to the denial of his request to file a surreply
in connection with DISD’s Motion again express nothing more than disagreement with the rulings
or recommendations in this case without demonstrating any ground for legal error. Additionally,
DISD contends that Plaintiff’s objections regarding further amendment should be overruled
because the court has already allowed him to amend his pleadings, his amended pleadings continue
to fail to plausibly allege facts supporting the Title VII claims he has asserted against DISD, no
amendment could cure the deficiencies in his EEOC charge, and he does not identify any other
factual allegations that would save his claims.
IV. 	Discussion
A. DISD’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16)
The court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, DISD’s Motion,
the parties’ briefs, and the Report, and finds no errors in the magistrate judge’s application of the
Rule 12(b)(6) legal standard or the law governing Plaintiff’s claims to the allegations in his
pleadings, which are deficient for the reasons stated in the thorough Report issued by the magistrate
judge. As DISD correctly notes, while Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge failed to correctly
apply the law to the allegations in his pleadings, he fails to cite or discuss any legal authority in
his objections that is contrary to that discussed and applied in the Report. That Plaintiff disagrees
with the magistrate judge’s Report and unfavorable recommendation is not evidence of bias or
failure to accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. 	Plaintiff is correct that courts liberally
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construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. The magistrate judge, however, was not required to accept
as true conclusory allegations or Plaintiff’s characterizations of his claims that are inconsistent
with applicable law or not supported by the facts alleged by him, and it would have been error for
the magistrate judge to have done so here. Further, the issue at the pleading stage is not whether
Plaintiff might be able to support the claims he has asserted or new claims if allowed to conduct
discovery; rather, the focus is solely on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s pleadings
and whether those factual allegations, taken as true, state a plausible claim for relief.
Thus, for all of these reasons, the court overrules Plaintiff’s objections to the Report that
pertain to dismissal of his claims.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply and Related Objections (Docs. 20, 24,
26)
Plaintiff’s contention regarding the magistrate judge’s denial of his request to file a surreply
appears to stem from his misunderstanding of the law applicable to reply briefs and surreplies. In
addition to his objections to the Report, Plaintiff filed separate objections (Doc. 24) to the
magistrate judge’s October 24, 2025 Order that denied his Motion for Leave to File Surreply. Like
his Motion for Leave, Plaintiff argues in his objections to the October 24, 2025 Order that he was
entitled to file a surreply to address new arguments and alleged mischaracterizations of his claims
included the reply that DISD filed in connection with its Motion. For support, he relies on Vais
Arms, Inc. v. Vais, 383 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2004), for the conclusion that “[a] district court
may rely on new arguments and evidence presented for the first time in a reply brief only if it gives
the non-movant an adequate opportunity to respond.” He also relies on Thompson v. Dallas City
Attorney’s Office, 913 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 2019), for the same conclusion. Plaintiff contends
that the magistrate judge, therefore, erred in not allowing him to address DISD’s new arguments
and mischaracterizations. After DISD responded to this objection, Plaintiff filed a Notice of
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Clarification and Rebuttal in Support of Rule 72(a) Objections, which the court construes as a
reply.
The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply, the parties’ briefing
filed in connection with this Motion, and the magistrate judge’s October 24, 2025 Order and denial
of the Motion, and it finds no error. It is “well-established that the party with the burden on a
particular matter will normally be permitted to open and close the briefing.” Dondi Props. Corp.
v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 291 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc). “This principle
is sound” because, [i]n our jurisprudence the party who must persuade the court of the merits of
the relief it seeks is almost always given the final word.” Springs Induss., Inc. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 238, 239 (N.D. Tex. 1991). “Thus, the movant is entitled to file the
last pleading.” Lacher v. West, 147 F. Supp. 2d 538, 539 (N.D. Tex. 2001). The purpose of a reply
brief under this District’s Local Rule 7.1(f), “is to rebut the nonmovant[s’] response, thereby
persuading the court that the movant is entitled to the relief requested by the motion.” Id. at 239-
40. When a movant injects new arguments or evidence in a reply without affording the nonmovant
an opportunity for further response, the decision of whether to strike or consider the new arguments
and evidence is left to the discretion of the presiding magistrate judge and district judge and
decided in accordance with the Dondi standards. Id. at 240 & n.2 (citing Dondi Props. Corp., 121
F.R.D. at 286 & n.4). Neither this district’s Local Civil Rules nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allow a party to file a surreply “as a matter of right.” Gezu v. Charter Commc’ns, 17
F.4th 547, 555-56 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lacher, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 539). Moreover, surreplies
are “highly disfavored” and allowed only “in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances.” Id.
Plaintiff followed the correct procedure in seeking leave to file a surreply, but he has not
demonstrated exceptional or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant allowing him to file
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his surreply because the arguments in DISD’s reply that he seeks to address via a surreply do not
constitute new arguments, as they flow from or rebut the arguments included in Plaintiff’s
response. For example, Plaintiff contends that DISD’s reply raised a new “abandonment”
argument, but DISD’s argument that Plaintiff abandoned his discrimination claim is based on
DISD’s contention that Plaintiff’s response failed to address an argument in DISD’s Motion
pertaining to his discrimination claim. Thus, this argument flows directly from and derives from
the adequacy of Plaintiff’s response and arguments and, more specifically, his alleged failure to
address all arguments raised in DISD’s Motion. In any event, the magistrate judge did not rely on
this argument in addressing DISD’s Motion.
As noted, Plaintiff also contends that certain arguments in DISD’s reply mischaracterize
his claims. Plaintiff’s disagreement with DISD’s characterizations of his claims, however, does
not constitute the type of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant allowing
him to file his surreply. While Plaintiff contends that DISD “re-cast[ed] [his] factual allegations
as ‘trivalties’ by lifting phrasing out of context from [his] response,” Doc. 22 at 3, DISD’s reply
does not refer to the conduct alleged by Plaintiff as “trivalties.” Instead, this argument was made
in Plaintiff’s response. See Doc. 18 at 12 (“Defendant argues that walkthroughs, lesson plan
criticisms, and classroom observations cannot support retaliation. Plaintiff does not rest his claim
on such trivialities.”) (emphasis added); Doc. 18 at 13 (“Each of these actions would dissuade a
reasonable employee from making or pursuing a complaint of harassment. That is the standard
under Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Defendant’s
contrary position attempts to trivialize concrete retaliatory acts that materially altered Plaintiff’s
terms and conditions of employment.”) (emphasis added). Thus, DISD was entitled to address this
responsive argument by Plaintiff in its reply brief.
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Finally, Plaintiff objects to the denial of his request to file a surreply on the grounds that
DISD’s reply impermissibly expanded or reframed the exhaustion and timeliness arguments
asserted in their Motion. 	As DISD correctly notes, however, this ground was not raised in
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply. It was raised for the first time in the reply he filed
in support of his Motion for Leave. 	Thus, it is not an appropriate basis for objecting to the
magistrate judge’s denial of his request to file a surreply. 	In any event, Plaintiff acknowledges
that DISD argued in its Motion that his claims should be dismissed on exhaustion and timeliness
grounds, and the magistrate judge’s recommendation that DISD is entitled to dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims was not limited to exhaustion and timeliness grounds.
For all of these reasons, the court overrules Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s
denial of his Motion for Leave to File Surreply and affirms the magistrate judge’s October 24,
2025 Order.
C. Amendment of Pleadings
Rule 15(a)2 provides that leave to amend shall be “freely” given “when justice so requires,”
and ordinarily, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his [or her] complaint
before it is dismissed.” Wiggins v. Louisiana State Univ.-Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x
625, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Granting leave to amend, however, is not necessary when the plaintiff has pleaded his or her “best
case” after being apprised of pleading deficiencies. Wiggins, 710 F. App’x at 627 (quoting
Brewster, 587 F.3d at 768). Likewise, a district court need not grant a motion to amend if doing
2 The decision to allow amendment of a party’s pleadings under Rule 15(a) is within the sound discretion of the district
court. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted). In determining whether to allow an amendment of the pleadings, a court considers the following:
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
[and] futility of amendment.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
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so would be an exercise in futility. Wiggins, 710 F. App’x at 627 (citing Legate v. Livingston, 822
F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was previously given an opportunity to amend
his pleadings the last time DISD and the other Defendants moved to dismiss his claims. Plaintiff
also fails to explain how he would cure the deficiencies identified in his pleadings if he was
allowed to amend. 	See Nixon v. Abbott, 589 F. App’x 279, 279 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(“Contrary to Nixon’s argument, he was given the opportunity to amend his complaint in his
responses to the magistrate judge’s questionnaire, which has been recognized as an acceptable
method for a pro se litigant to develop the factual basis for his complaint.”). Plaintiff contends that
it would be unfair if his claims were dismissed before he has an opportunity to conduct discovery
that could possibly uncover additional information that may support his current claims or other
actionable conduct not yet pleaded. This, however, would require the court to ignore the Rule
12(b)(6) standard and unnecessarily delay the resolution of this litigation to allow Plaintiff to
engage in an impermissible fishing expedition in the hopes of unearthing information that may
support a claim for relief against DISD. Proceeding in an open-ended manner such as this would
unduly prejudice DISD.
Moreover, Plaintiff has taken the position that his claims as pleaded are adequate despite
DISD’s contentions and the magistrate judge’s conclusions to the contrary. The court, therefore,
determines that Plaintiff has pleaded his “best case” such that further amendment would be futile
and unnecessarily delay the resolution of this litigation. Accordingly, the court overrules
Plaintiff’s objections to the Report with respect to whether he should be allowed to further amend
his pleadings.
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V. 	Conclusion
Having considered DISD’s Motion to Dismiss, the briefs of the parties considered by the
magistrate judge, the pleadings, record in this case, and Report, and having conducted a de novo
review of the portions of the Report to which objection was made by Plaintiff, the court determines
that the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are correct, and accepts them as those of
the court. 	Thus, the court overrules all objections by Plaintiff to the Report; grants DISD’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16); and dismisses with prejudice this action and all claims by Plaintiff
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court also
overrules Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s October 24, 2025 Order (Doc. 23)
denying his Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Doc. 20), and it affirms that Order and ruling. As
no claims remain, the court will issue judgment by separate document as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58.
It is so ordered this 23rd day of February, 2026.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
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