Ray-Sampson v. Uplift Education et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ALETHA RAY-SAMPSON, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:24-cv-2967-E-BN
§
UPLIFT EDUCATION and
SHAQUELA FORD,
§
§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge
for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference
from United States District Judge Ada Brown. See Dkt. No. 1.
Ray-Sampson filed a pro se complaint against Defendant Uplift Education and
Defendant 	Shaquela 	Ford, 	in 	her 	official 	capacity, 	asserting 	claims 	of 	age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1) (“ADEA”); retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
First Amendment; due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and wrongful
termination. See Dkt. No. 3 at 1-13.
Defendants filed this motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. See Dkt. No. 15. The Court stayed their deadline to file a responsive
pleading to the complaint pending the Court’s disposition of the motion. See Dkt. No.
17; F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(4).
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The Court should grant in part the motion to dismiss [Dkt. No. 15], to the
extent explained below, and grant Ray-Sampson leave to amend her complaint.
Legal Standards
Considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007).
Such a motion is therefore “not meant to resolve disputed facts or test the
merits of a lawsuit” and “instead must show that, even in the plaintiff’s best-case
scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief.” Sewell v. Monroe
City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020).
Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must
plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” id. at 555.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); cf. Bryant v. Ditech
Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as
plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible
inferences using speculation.”).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,
Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random
puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is
not satisfied.”).
And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed
factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions, and, so, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,
it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of 	action, 	supported 	by 	mere 	conclusory 	statements, 	will 	not 	suffice. 	See 	id.;
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume
true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of
Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).
And, so, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs
must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend
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entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per
curiam) (citing F ED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).
“Pro se complaints receive a ‘liberal construction.’ Even so, ‘mere conclusory
allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.’” Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d
489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018),
then United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). And
“liberal construction does not require that the Court ... create causes of action where
there are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL
2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013).
“To demand otherwise would require the ‘courts to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff” and would “‘transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
arguments and most successful strategies for a party.’” Jones v. Mangrum, No. 3:16-
cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Analysis
I. 	Consideration of Exhibits
Aside from “matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule
of Evidence 201,” Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.2d
890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), a court cannot look beyond the pleadings
in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th
Cir. 1999); see also Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 976 F.3d 585,
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589 (5th Cir. 2020) (Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d) “expressly provides that a court
‘may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding,’ and our precedents confirm
judicially noticed facts may be considered in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion.” (citations
omitted)).
Pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context include attachments to the complaint.
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205; see also Gill as Next Friend of
K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The Civil Rules provide that an
attachment to a complaint generally becomes ‘part of the pleading for all purposes,’
including for ruling on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting F ED. R. CIV. P. 10(c); citations
omitted)). And, “[w]hen ‘an allegation is contradicted by the contents of an exhibit
attached to the pleading, then indeed the exhibit and not the allegation controls.’”
Rogers v. City of Yoakrum, 660 F. App’x 279, 285 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(quoting United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 377
(5th Cir. 2004) (citing, in turn, Simmons v. Peavy-Welsh Lumber Co., 113 F.2d 812,
813 (5th Cir. 1940))).
Documents “attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be part of the
pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her
claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir.
1993)). And, while the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has not
articulated a test for determining when a document is central to a plaintiff’s claims,
the case law suggests that documents are central when they are necessary to
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establish an element of one of the plaintiff’s claims. Thus, when a plaintiff’s claim is
based on the terms of a contract, the documents constituting the contract are central
to the plaintiff’s claim.” Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D.
Tex. 2011). But, “if a document referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint is merely
evidence of an element of the plaintiff’s claim, then the court may not incorporate it
into the complaint.” Id.
If the Court is presented as part of a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion with matters
outside the pleadings, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) gives the Court “complete
discretion” either (1) to disregard the materials or (2), provided that the Court gives
all parties “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to
the motion,” to accept and consider them in treating the motion as one for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205; Isquith ex rel. Isquith v. Middle S.
Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 196 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988).
The Court exercises this discretion by determining whether the proffered
material, and the resulting conversion from Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) to Rule 56, is likely
to facilitate disposing of the action. Isquith, 847 F.2d at 193 n.3. But, “[i]f ... matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must
be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be
given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the
motion.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
Defendants filed exhibits to support their motion to dismiss and asked the
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Court to treat their motion as one for summary judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 15 & 18. Ray-
Sampson also attached exhibits to her response. See Dkt. No. 21.
The undersigned finds that, at this early stage in the litigation, converting the
motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment would be premature. Ray-
Sampson has not amended her complaint, and Defendants have not filed an answer.
And discovery is not yet complete. See Dkt. No. 27 at 7. Accord Mitchell v. Baylor
Univ., No. 6:22-cv-195-ADA, 2022 WL 3219418, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2022) (“As
to Defendant’s request to convert its 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment, the Court finds this premature. The Plaintiff must be given an opportunity
to conduct discovery, collect and present its own evidence, depose relevant witnesses,
and challenge the admissibility of any evidence offered by the Defendant.”); Fulcrum
Credit Partners LLC v. Chipmos Technologies, Inc., No. A-10-ca-60-SS, 2010 WL
11444280, at *7 n.5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2010) (“The Court declines to convert the
present motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment because it is premature at
this early stage, in which the parties have conducted little, if any, discovery.”).
And, so, the Court should decline to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment, and it should consider only those exhibits that are attached to
the complaint or otherwise part of the pleadings.
II. 	All official capacity claims against Ford should be dismissed with
prejudice.
Ray-Sampson brings claims against Ford in her “professional” capacity, Dkt.
No. 3 at 1, which the undersigned construes as official capacity, accord Randle v. PNC
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Fin. Servs. Grp., No. 4:23-cv-263-O-BP, 2024 WL 3862793, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24,
2024).
Ray-Sampson brings the same claims against Uplift. See Dkt. No. 3.
Where a plaintiff brings claims against both a public official in their official
capacity 	and 	the 	public 	entity 	for 	which 	they 	work, 	the 	claims 	“essentially
merge.” Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 485 (5th
Cir. 2000). The Court may then dismiss the claims against the public official
as duplicative. See Flores v. Cameron Cnty., 92 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1996) (where
the district court had dismissed claims against county commissioners in their official
capacities 	“because 	those 	claims 	were duplicative of 	the 	claims 	against 	the
County”); see also Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 832 (S.D. Tex.
2011) (“The Fifth Circuit has held that it is appropriate to dismiss claims against
officers in their official capacities when the ‘allegations duplicate claims against the
respective governmental entities themselves.’” (quoting Castro Romero v. Becken, 256
F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001))).
Because Ray-Sampson has sued Uplift, her official capacity claims against
Ford are duplicative. And the Court should dismiss them with prejudice.
Below, the undersigned considers the remaining claims against Uplift.
III. 	The Title VII – but not First Amendment – retaliation claim against
Uplift should be dismissed with prejudice.
A. Timely Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Title VII claims “may only be adjudicated in federal court if the plaintiff
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exhausted [ ] administrative remedies in a timely manner.” Brown v. Jimmons, Civ.
A. H-15-2108, 2016 WL 4570758, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)(1); Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1994)). “[T]o exhaust
administrative 	remedies” 	under 	Title 	VII, 	a 	plaintiff 	“must 	file 	a 	charge 	of
discrimination 	with 	the 	EEOC 	within 	180 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	alleged
discrimination, or within 300 days of the alleged discrimination if he institutes his
action with the appropriate state agency.” Owens v. Dallas Cty. Cmty. College Dist.,
No. 3:16-cv-3162-L, 2017 WL 3190727, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2017) (citing Dao v.
Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996)), rec. accepted, 2017 WL
3172748 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2017).
“The EEOC filing requirement functions as a statute of limitations rather than
a jurisdictional prerequisite. It is a pre-condition to filing suit in district court, but it
is not related to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.” Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools Div., 927 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citation
omitted); see also Stith v. Perot Sys. Corp., 122 F. App’x 115, 118 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“Filing a charge with the EEOC is a condition precedent to the filing of a title VII
… suit.”); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc. of N. Tex., 139 F.3d 532, 537 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“Congress intended the limitations period contained in Section 2000e-
5(e)(1) to act as a statute of limitations.” (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1982)).
So, under Title VII, “a discrimination claim not brought within 300 days of the
alleged discriminatory act is time-barred” unless equitable tolling applies. Lord v.
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Union Social Sector, No. A-14-cv-235-SS, 2014 WL 1333250, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 1,
2014) (citations omitted), rec. accepted, 2014 WL 1761688 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2014).
But “[e]quitable tolling applies to plaintiff's deadline for filing an EEOC charge only
in extraordinary circumstances, such as where the parties have a pending case in the
wrong forum, where plaintiff is unaware of the facts as a result of defendant’s
purposeful concealment, and where EEOC misleads plaintiff about the claim.” Deleon
v. Gen. Insulation, Inc., 575 F. App’x 292, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(citing Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that its
precedent “leaves the door open to recognize other” bases for equitable tolling in this
regard but recognizing that “[e]quitable tolling is to be applied ‘sparingly’” and that
“[t]he plaintiff has the burden to provide justification for” its application (citations
omitted))).
Defendants argue that Ray-Sampson did not exhaust her administrative
remedies because she did not include a Title VII claim in her EEOC complaint. Dkt.
No. 16 at 11. The undersigned cannot determine if this contention is true because
neither party has provided a copy of the EEOC charge. Cf. Nunez-Renck v. Int’l Bus.
Machines Corp., No. 3:23-cv-1308-D, 2024 WL 1495787, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
2024) (dismissing claim after considering the EEOC charge attached to the motion to
dismiss and finding plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies); see also
Luebano v. Off. Depot, L.L.C., No. 22-50767, 2023 WL 4249268, at *3 (5th Cir. June
29, 2023) (“Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant must raise.”).
And, so, the undersigned cannot find that Ray-Sampson failed to exhaust her
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administrative remedies as to her Title VII claim.
And the Court should not dismiss the Title VII claim on this basis.
B. No Plausible Title VII Retaliation Claim
When 	a 	court 	applies Rule 	12(b)(6)’s 	standards 	to 	a Title VII claim, 	the
complaint 	“need 	not 	contain 	specific 	facts 	establishing 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of
discrimination 	[or retaliation] 	under 	the 	framework 	set 	forth 	... 	in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Norsworthy v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
70 F.4th 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up); accord Hamilton v. Dall. Cnty., 79
F.4th 494, 502 n.45 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
“But a plaintiff is still required to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate
elements of [each] claim.” Norsworthy, 70 F.4th at 336 (cleaned up; emphasis in
original). The “ultimate elements” of a retaliation claim are “1) [the plaintiff] engaged
in protected activity, 2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and 3) a causal
link 	exists 	between 	the 	protected 	activity 	and 	the 	adverse 	employment
action.” Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
A protected activity under Title VII includes (1) opposition to any practice
rendered unlawful by Title VII and (2) participation in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under Title VII or making a charge, testifying, or assisting in such
activity. See Davis v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 492 (5th Cir. 2011).
“Magic words are not required, but protected opposition must at least alert an
employer to the reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.” Brown v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 406 F. App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). Put
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another way, “a vague complaint, without any reference to an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII, does not constitute protected activity.” Davis, 448 F. App’x
at 493 (collecting cases); see also EEOC v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d
678, 	705-06 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	2007) (“Vague 	concerns 	and 	even 	vague 	assertions 	of
discrimination 	are 	not 	sufficient 	to 	constitute 	an 	opposition 	to 	an 	unlawful
employment practice.” (collecting cases)). Walker v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch –
Galveston, No. 3:17-cv-313, 2018 WL 3850827, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2018) (noting
that courts in this circuit “uniformly hold that an informal complaint must reference
a discriminatory practice to constitute a protected activity” (citations omitted)), rec.
accepted, 2018 WL 3844691 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2018).
Ray-Sampson makes allegations about three of her students to support her
retaliation claims.
As to the first student, she alleges that she “voiced concerns” about their
“problematic” behavior. Dkt. No. 3 at 5. She also alleges that she “documented [the
student’s] behaviors for more than two months and sent the required letter to [Ford]
with documentation in October 2021 to set a hearing for the removal of this student.”
Id.
Ray-Sampson alleges that the second student had “severe cognitive, academic
and social deficiencies.” Id. at 6. And she alleges that the third student was
“diagnosed with aggressive behavior and ADHD.” Id.
She “filed a Special Education complaint for these three students with the
Texas Education Agency to ensure that they received their correct educational
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placement.” Id.
But, insofar as Ray-Sampson claims that she complained about disability
discrimination, disability is not a protected class under Title VII. See Williamson v.
Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 2d 341, 443 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin”)). And she does not allege that she reported discrimination against
any other trait, protected or not.
And her allegations suggest her internal complaints were meant to remove a
student from her classroom, not to alert Defendants to discrimination.
And, so, because Ray-Sampson cannot allege a plausible Title VII retaliation
claim based on reports of disability discrimination, these claims should be dismissed
with prejudice.
But the undersigned notes that Defendants have not moved to dismiss, or
otherwise raised any arguments relevant to, Ray-Sampson’s First Amendment
retaliation claim. And, so, the Court should not dismiss that claim.
IV. 	The ADEA claim against Uplift should be dismissed without prejudice.
A. Timely Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The same exhaustion requirements for Title VII claims apply to ADEA claims.
See Stith, 122 F. App’x at 117 (5th Cir. 2005). And, so, an EEOC charge must be filed
within 300 days of the alleged ADEA violations. See id.
Ray-Sampson alleges that she filed her EEOC charge for ADEA violations on
June 3, 2022. See Dkt. No. 3 at 2. And, so, any events that occurred before August 7,
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2021 – 300 days before the EEOC charge was filed – cannot form the basis of her
ADEA claim.
But Ray-Sampson does not state on which date she was passed over for the
team leadership role. She states only that the decision was made some time between
2021 and 2022. Dkt. No. 3 at 2.
In support of their argument that the claim is barred, Defendants attached a
school calendar to their motion to dismiss, from which they infer that team leadership
decisions would necessarily have been made before August 2, 2021, when “[s]taff
reported to work for professional development.” See Dkt. No. 16 at 10; Dkt. No. 18-1
at 86. But the calendar is not part of the pleadings because it is not attached to the
complaint, nor is it referenced in the complaint and central to the claims.
And, so, the undersigned cannot find that the ADEA claim is time-barred
under this limitation.
In addition to the 300-day limitation, “a plaintiff has 90 days to bring suit in
federal court after receipt of a statutory notice of right to sue from the EEOC.” Boyd
v. AT&T Mobility Servs LLC, No. 3:23-cv-2882-D, 2024 WL 3952586, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 27, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); January v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice,
760 F. App’x 296, 299 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Under Title VII … and the ADEA,
a plaintiff has ninety days to bring suit in federal court after receipt of a statutory
notice of right to sue from the EEOC.”); citations omitted).
“The 90-day period is treated ‘as a statute of limitations.’ See Espinoza v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1248 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) (‘[C]ommencing an action
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within 	ninety 	days 	of 	receipt 	of 	a right-to-sue letter 	is 	not 	a 	jurisdictional
prerequisite; 	rather, 	the 	ninety-day 	requirement 	is 	akin 	to 	a 	statute 	of
limitations.’); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002)
(characterizing 90-day period under Title VII as a ‘limitation period’).” Id.
“The 90-day limitations period is ‘strictly construed,’ and courts routinely
dismiss claims that are filed after the limitations period expires, even if they are filed
only one day late.” Id. (citations omitted).
Ray-Sampson alleges that she “was issued a right to sue via email on August
27, 2024,” Dkt. No. 3 at 2, which is attached to her complaint, see id. at 65-66. She
filed this lawsuit on November 26, 2024 – 91 days after the letter was issued.
In her reply, Ray-Sampson attempts to clarify that she did not receive the
letter until August 29, 2024 because the email went into her spam folder. See Dkt.
No. 21 at 2. But this allegation is not in her complaint, so the undersigned cannot
accept it as true. And, so, reading the complaint in the light most favorable to Ray-
Sampson, the undersigned finds that she pleaded the date the letter was issued but
not the date she received it.
And, where the plaintiff has not pleaded a date of receipt, “[i]n the Fifth
Circuit, there is a presumption that a party receives the right-to-sue notice three days
after it is mailed” or issued – here, August 30, 2024. Dorest v. Piney Point Surgical
Ctr., No. 4:10-cv-3908, 2011 WL 2633575, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2011) (cleaned up).
So the undersigned finds that Ray-Sampson’s ADEA claim is not time-barred under
this provision, either.
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B. No Plausible ADEA Claim
Like Title VII claims, a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case under
the ADEA at the pleading stage. See Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d
762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019); Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013).
But a plaintiff must “plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of
his claim to make his case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467,
470 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
A court may rely on the prima facie elements “to frame [its] inquiry” at the
pleading stage. Norsworthy v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th at 336; see also
Meadows v. City of Crowley, 731 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(Raj “does not exempt a plaintiff from alleging facts sufficient to establish the
elements of her claims.” (citations omitted)); Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 387 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Although not a pleading standard,
this court has looked to the ‘evidentiary framework’ set forth in McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. 792, to determine whether a plaintiff pleads discriminatory intent.” (cleaned
up)).
So, at this stage, the Court must ask whether Ray-Sampson has pleaded
enough facts, accepted as true, to plausibly allege an ADEA claim. See Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
“The prima facie elements of a cause of action for violation of the ADEA are,
the plaintiff: 1) is within the protected class; 2) is qualified for the position; 3) suffered
an adverse employment decision; and 4) was replaced by someone younger or treated
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less favorably than similarly situated younger employees.” Saunders v. Hous. Foam
Plastics, No. SA-23-cv-00156-XR, 2023 WL 3313118, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 5,
2023) (citing Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2013)).
Ray-Sampson alleges that, between 2021 and 2022, she “began to experience
discriminatory treatment based on her age such as marginalization, a refusal to
provide [discipline] support, [and] a refusal or denial to provide [her] with relevant
training regarding the numerous changes to the guided reading program.” Dkt. No.
3 at 2. And she alleges that she was “subjected to unfavorable treatment compared to
younger colleagues, including … [b]eing passed over, marginalized, and replaced by
a younger, less experienced employee in the team leadership role.” Id. at 3. She also
alleges that she was terminated. See id. at 5, 62-63.
Defendants concede that Ray-Sampson “is a member of a protected class based
on her age” and “met the minimum qualifications for the position that she held.” Dkt.
No. 16 at 14.
But they argue that she “does not assert any adverse employment action to
support a discrimination claim other than the termination of her employment.” Id.
And they argue that she fails to “allege that she was replaced by someone younger or
outside the protected class, treated less favorably than a similarly situated younger
employee, or was otherwise discharged because of her age.” Id.
Even if the Court accepts that Ray-Sampson has alleged adverse employment
actions, she fails to allege facts from which the Court may infer that she was treated
less favorably than similarly situated employees outside her protected class.
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The closest Ray-Sampson comes to demonstrating this required element is by
alleging that a younger employee was received a position on the team leadership role
instead of her. But she provides no facts about the younger employee. And the ADEA
requires “an employee [to] proffer a comparator who was treated more favorably
‘under nearly identical circumstances,’ which is satisfied when ‘the employees being
compared held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had
their employment status determined by the same person, and have essentially
comparable violation histories,’” Reyna v. Donley, 479 F. App’x 609, 611-12 (5th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (quoting Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir.
2009)); see also Barfield v. Fed. Express Corp., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1041, 1054-55 (S.D.
Tex. 2019) (applying Lee to an ADEA claim); Marable v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 3:18-
cv-3291-N, 2021 WL 536510, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2021) (“Marable’s ability to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA turns on
his identifying a proper comparator, to meet the fourth prong.”), rec. accepted, 2021
WL 535851 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2021), aff’d, 857 F. App’x 836 (5th Cir. 2021).
And, so, Ray-Sampson fails to allege a plausible claim under the ADEA.
But Ray-Sampson is proceeding pro se, her ADEA claim is not procedurally
barred, and it is not clear that she has pled her best case. And, so, the Court should
dismiss the claim without prejudice.
V. 	The Section 1983 due process claim against Uplift should be dismissed
with prejudice.
Ray-Sampson alleges that she was denied due process when Defendants “failed
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to conduct a fair and impartial process in investigating [her] complaints” and “fail[ed]
to provide notice or a hearing prior to [her] termination.” Dkt. No. 3 at 12.
Claims for violations of the Constitution brought under Section 1983 are
governed by Texas’s two-year, personal-injury limitations statute. See Helton v.
Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1987); Shelby v. City of El Paso, Tex., 577 F.
App’x 327, 331 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). But courts “determine the accrual date
of a § 1983 action by reference to federal law.” Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th
Cir. 2008) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)).
And “[f]ederal law holds generally that an action accrues when a plaintiff has
a complete and present cause of action, or, expressed differently, when the plaintiff
can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)). In
sum, “the limitations period begins to run ‘the moment the plaintiff becomes aware
that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been
injured.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Ray-Sampson was terminated on March 11, 2022. See Dkt. No. 3 at 9, 62-63.
And, although she does not specify the dates of the relevant “complaints,” it is clear
from her pleading that her internal complaints were made before her termination.
See Dkt. No. 3 at 7.
And, so, over two years elapsed between the latest possible due process
violation and the filing of this lawsuit on November 26, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
Nonetheless, 	“a 	litigant 	is 	entitled 	to 	equitable 	tolling 	of 	a 	statute 	of
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limitations” “if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way
and prevented timely filing.’” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577
U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010))
In her response, Ray-Sampson argues that she filed her lawsuit after receiving
her right-to-sue letter on August 29, 2024, suggesting that filing her EEOC charge
tolled the statute of limitations on her Section 1983 claim. See Dkt. No. 21 at 3.
But 	“[f]iling 	a 	charge 	with 	the 	EEOC under Title 	VII does 	not 	toll 	the
limitations period for a related claim under section 1981 or 1983.” Jones v. City of
Bryan, 	No. 	4:07-cv-3874, 2008 WL 2557469, at *4 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	June 23, 2008)
(citing Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted)).
And, so, Ray-Sampson’s due process claims, brought under Section 1983, are
time-barred. And the Court should dismiss these claims with prejudice.
VI. 	The 	wrongful 	termination 	claim 	should 	be 	dismissed 	without
prejudice.
Defendants 	do 	not 	move 	to 	dismiss 	Ray-Sampson’s 	claim 	for 	“wrongful
termination in violation of public policy.” See Dkt. No. 3 at 11-12 (caps omitted).
But “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on its
own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
[be] granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL
6069969, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d
1171 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing, in turn, Shawnee Int’l, N.V. v. Hondo Drilling Co., 742
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F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1984))), rec. adopted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20,
2018), aff’d, 763 F. App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 928
(2019).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint
on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,
470 F.3d at 1177 (quoting, in turn, Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.
1998)); citation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit has
“suggested that fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention
to dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (quoting Lozano v. Ocwen
Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting, in turn, Carroll, 470 F.3d
at 	1177); 	internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	brackets 	omitted). 	These 	findings,
conclusions, and recommendation provide notice, and the period for filing objections
to them affords an opportunity to respond. Accord Starrett, 2018 WL 6069969, at
*2 (citations omitted).
Here, the undersigned notes that Ray-Sampson has not specified on which
statute or common-law rule she bases her wrongful termination claim. She states
only that her termination “violated the public policy interest in protecting employees
from unlawful discrimination and retaliation.” Dkt. No. 3 at 12.
Without more, the undersigned cannot find that Ray-Sampson has pleaded a
claim for relief. As explained above, though a pro se complaint is construed liberally,
this “does not require that the Court ... create causes of action where there are none.”
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Smith, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8.
And, so, the wrongful termination claim should be dismissed without prejudice
so that Ray-Sampson may plead it with more specificity.
Recommendation
The Court should grant in part and deny in part Defendants Uplift Education
and Shaquela Ford’s motion to dismiss [Dkt. No. 15]. The Court should dismiss all of
Plaintiff Aletha Ray-Sampson’s claims against Defendant Ford with prejudice;
dismiss the Title VII retaliation and Section 1983 due process claims against
Defendant Uplift with prejudice; dismiss the ADEA and wrongful termination claims
against Defendant Uplift without prejudice; and grant Plaintiff Ray-Sampson leave
to amend her complaint by a reasonable deadline to be set by the Court.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
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adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 3, 2026
_______________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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