Al-Atoum v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KIMBERLY AL-ATOUM, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:24-cv-2734-S-BN
§
WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, LLC, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Kimberly Al-Atoum filed this negligence/premises liability action in a
Dallas County, Texas state court against Defendant Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC
(“Wal-Mart”), and Wal-Mart removed, alleging that there is diversity subject-matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Dkt. No. 1.
After granting Al-Atoum’s then-counsel leave to withdraw, see Dkt. Nos. 15 &
17, United States District Judge Karen Gren Scholer referred this lawsuit to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), see Dkt. No. 18.
Under the scheduling order that Judge Scholer entered on January 21, 2025,
see Dkt. No. 11, Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment on Al-Atoum’s allegations,
see Dkt. Nos. 26-28.
In response to the Court’s August 19, 2025 order [Dkt. No. 29], Wal-Mart filed
an amended motion for summary judgment, see Dkt. Nos. 30-32.
And, on the deadline to respond set by the August 19 order, Al-Atoum filed an
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opposed motion requesting that the Court extend her deadline to respond to the
amended summary judgment motion, explaining in part that she needed “additional
time to complete discovery” and “depose a key witness whose testimony is materially
relevant in refuting the claims made in Defendant’s Motion.” Dkt. No. 33.
Because Al-Atoum’s motion did not comply with the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), the Court denied an extension under that rule but found
good cause to extend deadlines set by the supplemental (summary judgment)
scheduling order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). See Dkt. No. 34.
Al-Atoum then responded to the summary judgment motion by the extended
deadline. See Dkt. Nos. 39 & 40. And Wal-Mart replied. See Dkt. No. 41.
Al-Atoum then filed a second response, see Dkt. No. 43, which the undersigned
finds to be an unauthorized surreply, see N.D. TEX. L. CIV. R. 7.1(e) (allowing for a
single response to a motion), and will not be considered in the analysis below, see
Gezu v. Charter Commc’ns, 17 F.4th 547, 556 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Because the rules do
not provide for surreplies as a matter of right, the district court only accepts such
filings ‘in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances.’” (quoting Lacher v. West, 147
F. Supp. 2d 538, 539 (N.D. Tex. 2001))).
And, for the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that Court grant
Wal-Mart’s motion for summary judgment and enter judgment dismissing Al-
Atoum’s lawsuit with prejudice.
Legal Standards
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if the
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movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual “issue is
material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Weeks Marine, Inc.
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2003). And “[a] factual dispute
is ‘genuine,’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1997).
If the moving party seeks summary judgment as to his opponent’s claims or
defenses, “[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of
the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact, but is not required to negate elements of the
nonmoving party’s case.” Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625
(5th Cir. 1998). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that
an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” FED . R.
CIV. P. 56(c)(1). “Summary judgment must be granted against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. If the moving party
fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the
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nonmovant’s response.” Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511
(5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
“Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must set
forth” – and submit evidence of – “specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and
not rest upon the allegations or denials contained in its pleadings.” Lynch Props., 140
F.3d at 625; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
accord Pioneer Expl., 767 F.3d at 511 (“[T]he nonmovant 	cannot rely on the
allegations in the pleadings alone” but rather “must go beyond the pleadings and
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” (internal
quotation marks and footnotes omitted)).
The Court is required to consider all evidence and view all facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve
all disputed factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party – but only if the
summary judgment evidence shows that an actual controversy exists. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Pioneer Expl., 767 F.3d at 511;
Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005); Lynch Props.,
140 F.3d at 625.
“The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in [her] favor. While the court must disregard evidence favorable to
the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, it gives credence to evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached if that evidence
comes from disinterested witnesses.” Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth. Bd. of
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Comm’rs, 810 F.3d 940, 942-43 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
footnotes omitted).
And “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment,” Brown v.
City of Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003), and neither will “only a scintilla of
evidence” meet the nonmovant’s burden, Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; accord Pioneer Expl.,
767 F.3d at 511 (“Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable
inferences, 	unsubstantiated 	assertions, 	and 	legalistic 	argumentation 	do 	not
adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” (internal
quotation marks and footnote omitted)); Hassen v. Ruston La. Hosp. Co., L.L.C., 932
F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (A court must “view the evidence and draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Even so, barebones, conclusory, or otherwise-
unsupported assertions won’t cut it; the nonmovant ‘must go beyond the pleadings
and come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial.’” (footnotes
omitted)).
So, “when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its
opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, the non-moving party must “set forth specific facts showing
the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component of its case.”
Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).
“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
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address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: (1)
give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the
movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order.” FED . R. C IV. P. 56(e).
And “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Pioneer
Expl., 767 F.3d at 511 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (internal quotation
marks and emphasis omitted). And, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
“After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual
issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be
granted.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Minor, 420 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (footnote and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for
trial.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court will not assume “in the absence of any proof ... that the nonmoving
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party could or would prove the necessary facts” and will grant summary judgment “in
any case where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it
could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
“Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in
search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment,” and “[a]
failure on the part of the nonmoving party to offer proof concerning an essential
element of its case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and mandates a
finding that no genuine issue of fact exists.” Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn.,
465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If, on the other hand, “the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, either
because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he
must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or
defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.,780 F.2d 1190,
1194 (5th Cir. 1986).
The “beyond peradventure” standard imposes a “heavy” burden. Cont’l Cas. Co.
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 3:04-cv-1866-D, 2007 WL 2403656, at *10 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 23, 2007); accord Wilson v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:18-cv-34-G-BN,
2020 WL 825819, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2020) (“[B]eyond peradventure” means
“beyond doubt.” (cleaned up)), rec. adopted, 2020 WL 821034 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18,
2020).
The moving party must demonstrate that there are no genuine and material
fact disputes and that the party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
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See, e.g., Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). On
such a motion, the Court will, again, “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.” Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2002).
And, so, “summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence would require a
directed verdict.” Hernandez v. Trendy Collections, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-2049-BN, 2018
WL 4103723, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2018) (cleaned up).
“[T]he traditional leniency afforded to [ ] pro se plaintiff[s] does not excuse
[them] from [their] burden of opposing summary judgment through the use of
competent summary judgment evidence.” Malcolm v. Vicksburg Warren Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Trs., 709 F. App’x 243, 246 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing Davis v.
Fernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]his is not to say that pro se plaintiffs
don’t have to submit competent evidence to avoid summary judgment, because they
do.”)).
And, “[a]lthough courts should advise pro se [parties] of procedural rules,”
Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 289 n.1 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Davis, 798 F.3d at 293-
94), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has held that they need
not be given additional notice of the consequences of a summary judgment motion
and the right to submit opposing affidavits as the notice given by Rule 56 and the
local rules suffices,” id. (citing Martin v. Harrison Cnty. Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th
Cir. 1992)); see also Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996)
(“[T]here is a point at which even pro se litigants must become responsible for the
prosecution of their own cases if their claims are to warrant the court’s attention. It
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is not unjustifiably onerous to require pro se parties to respond to proper motions for
summary 	judgment. 	All 	summary 	judgment 	nonmovants 	shoulder 	the 	same
obligation. District courts can make appropriate allowances for pro se responses that
may be somewhat less-artfully written than those of represented parties. This can be
accomplished, however, without excusing them from the most basic requirement that
they file a response.”).
But the verified complaint and sworn interrogatory answers of a pro se litigant
can be considered as summary judgment evidence to the extent such pleadings meet
the requirements of Rule 56(e). See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994);
accord Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2003) (“On summary judgment,
factual allegations set forth in a verified complaint may be treated the same as when
they are contained in an affidavit.”).
Analysis
The Court must begin with its subject-matter jurisdiction – its “power to say
what the law is.” United States v. Willis, 76 F.4th 467, 479 (5th Cir. 2023); see also
Louisiana v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Jurisdiction is
always first.” (citation omitted)).
Because “‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute,’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,
256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994)), “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own
initiative even at the highest level,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
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583-84 (1999) (citations omitted).
And Wal-Mart, as the party invoking the Court’s diversity subject-matter
jurisdiction through removal, must, “[a]t the summary judgment stage,” “provide
evidence sufficient to support a jury finding of the citizenship of each” party,
Megalomedia Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 115 F.4th 657, 659 (5th Cir. 2024)
(published order), as the undersigned further explained in the August 19 order
discussing this requirement as framed by recent decisions of the Fifth Circuit, see
Dkt. No. 29 at 2.
The amended notice of removal and its attachments include factual allegations
from which the Court may infer (1) that Al-Atoum is a citizen of Texas and (2) that
Wal-Mart is a citizen of Delaware and Arkansas, see Dkt. No. 23, ¶¶ 2 & 7-16; Dkt.
No. 23-1; Dkt. No. 23-2; Dkt. No. 23-3; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); SXSW v. Fed. Ins. Co.,
83 F.4th 405, 407-09 (5th Cir. 2023); Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 1996).
But the record at summary judgment must also include sufficient evidence.
And attached to the amended notice of removal is evidence sufficient to support
a jury finding as to Al-Atoum’s citizenship. Compare Dkt. No. 23-3 (deposition
excerpts supporting that Al-Atoum is domiciled in Texas, where she has continuously
lived and raised a family, worked, and shopped), with Coury, 85 F.3d at 251 (“In
determining a litigant’s domicile, the court must address a variety of factors. No
single factor is determinative. The court should look to all evidence shedding light on
the litigant’s intention to establish domicile. The factors may include the places where
the litigant exercises civil and political rights, pays taxes, owns real and personal
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property, has driver’s and other licenses, maintains bank accounts, belongs to clubs
and churches, has places of business or employment, and maintains a home for his
family.”).
As for Wal-Mart, as a limited liability company, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 23, ¶¶ 9-14;
Dkt. No. 31 at 9, its Ҥ 1332 citizenship is determined by the citizenship of all of its
members,” so, “[t]o establish diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or against an LLC, a
party must specifically allege the citizenship of every member of every LLC,” SXSW,
83 F.4th at 407-08 (cleaned up).
And Wal-Mart has provided evidence sufficient to support a jury finding as to
its citizenship through the appendix in support of the motion for summary judgment.
See Dkt. Nos. 32-5, 32-6, 32-7, & 32-8.
And, 	so, 	sufficient 	evidence 	shows 	that 	there 	is 	complete 	diversity 	of
citizenship to support subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 1332. And the Court
may turn to the merits of the motion for summary judgment.
Al-Atoum filed an amended complaint after removal alleging that, “[o]n
September 26, 2022, [she] was injured on the premises of a Wal-Mart grocery store,
located [in DeSoto, Texas]” when she “was walking down an isle inside of Wal-Mart”
and “slipped and fell onto her hands and knees, causing injury,” further alleging that
“[t]here appeared to be a brown substance on the floor” but “[t]here were no wet floor
or caution signs in the area warning of a dangerous condition” and that, “[a]t the time
of injury, the premises were being used as a retail store by [Wal-Mart].” Dkt. No. 6,
¶ 5.
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Based 	on 	this 	incident, 	Al-Atoum 	asserts 	a 	single 	cause 	of 	action, 	for
negligence. See id., ¶¶ 8 & 9.
Moving 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	Wal-Mart 	begins 	by 	arguing 	that 	this
negligence claim sounds in premises liability:
Plaintiff alleges that Wal-Mart owed her, an invitee, a duty of ordinary
care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, inspect for
defects, and make safe or warn of dangers. She claims that that Wal-
Mart knew or should have known about the substance on the floor and
that the substance created an unreasonable risk of harm and caused her
injuries. Under a premises liability cause of action, a Texas store owner
owes a duty of reasonable care to protect invitees against known or
discoverable conditions that are unreasonably dangerous. As such,
Defendant subsequently refers to Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action
as a premises liability claim.
Dkt. No. 31 at 10 (cleaned up).
And the undersigned agrees with Wal-Mart that this is a premises liability
case. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 3:21-cv-440-D, 2022 WL
1102862, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2022) (“A plaintiff injured on another’s property
can assert either a general negligence claim or a premises liability claim.” But
“[w]hen the plaintiff slips on a condition on the floor, her proper claim is a premises
liability claim.” (citations omitted)).
“A successful premises liability claim must show ‘(1) the property owner had
actual or constructive knowledge of the condition causing the injury; (2) the condition
posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the property owner failed to take reasonable
care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) the property owner’s failure to use
reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk was the proximate cause of injuries to
the invitee.’” Weathered v. Family Dollar Stores of Tex. LLC, No. 3:22-cv-2409-K-BN,
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2023 WL 8628929, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2023) (quoting Henklel v. Norman, 41
S.W.3d 248, 251-52 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam)), rec. accepted, 2023 WL 8627816 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 13, 2023).
And “[a] plaintiff can show knowledge by demonstrating that the defendant
‘placed the substance on the floor,’ the defendant ‘actually knew the substance was
on the floor,’ or that ‘the condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a
reasonable opportunity to discover it.’” Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81
S.W.3d 812, 814-15 (Tex. 2002)); accord Gonzales, 2022 WL 1102862, at *4 (“There
are ‘three methods by which a plaintiff may satisfy the knowledge element in a slip-
and-fall case.’ The plaintiff may show that (1) the defendant placed the substance on
the floor; (2) the defendant actually knew the substance was on the floor; or (3) the
condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to
discover the condition.” (quoting then citing McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864
F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2017))).
Al-Atoum offers an affidavit through her response. See Dkt. No. 39-1. But
neither that affidavit nor the substance of the response (if it could be considered
evidence) provides the evidence needed to show that Wal-Mart had knowledge (actual
or constructive) of the condition that caused her injury – and thus defeat Wal-Mart’s
motion for summary judgment on the sole cause of action. See Gonzales, 2022 WL
1102862, at *4-*5.
Still, Al-Atoum does argue that, because store video footage that Wal-Mart
produced to her during discovery [Dkt. No. 40] fails to either show her shopping that
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day, the brown substance at issue, or her slipping on that substance, Wal-Mart must
have destroyed video evidence, and, so, she’s entitled to raise and benefit from a
spoliation claim, see Dkt. No. 39 at 7-11.
Wal-Mart replies that it
did not destroy video evidence, it preserved it within one day of the
incident. Defendant saved footage from the two cameras that could have
captured the incident. This footage was produced to Plaintiff during
discovery. After downloading both cameras’ footage for one hour before
and one hour after the incident, Defendant’s employee checked “yes,” on
Walmart’s Evidence Collection Sheet to indicate that the footage had
been saved.
Plaintiff acknowledges that she received Defendant’s “4 complete
hours” of surveillance footage. These cameras are not fixed, they swivel
around the store, and unfortunately, did not capture when the spill
occurred, what caused the spill, any Walmart associates in the area, or
the actual incident. While Defendant preserved and produced the
footage it had, Plaintiff believes that Walmart destroyed evidence. She
provides no evidence of such. Because there is no evidence that Walmart
intentionally/deliberately destroyed or negligently failed to preserve
evidence, Defendant respectfully asks the Court to deny Plaintiff’s
requested spoliation instructions and inferences.
Dkt. No. 41 at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
A court “permits an adverse inference against the spoliator or sanctions
against the spoliator only upon a showing of ‘bad faith’ or ‘bad conduct.’” Costal Bridge
Co., L.L.C. v. Heatec, Inc., 833 F. App’x 565, 572 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting
Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005)).
When evaluating allegations regarding spoliation of evidence, federal
courts sitting in diversity are to apply federal evidentiary rules rather
than state spoliation laws. A plaintiff alleging spoliation must establish
that the defendant intentionally destroyed the evidence for the purpose
of depriving opposing parties of its use. It is insufficient to show that a
party acted negligently, rather than intentionally, in spoliating the
evidence.
A spoliation claim has three elements: (1) the spoliating party
must have controlled the evidence and been under an obligation to
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preserve it at the time of destruction; (2) the evidence must have been
intentionally destroyed; and (3) the moving party must show that the
spoliating party acted in bad faith.
A party seeking the sanction of an adverse-inference instruction
based on spoliation of evidence must establish that: (1) the party with
control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it
was destroyed; (2) the evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of
mind; and (3) the destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party’s claim
or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would
support that claim or defense.
Id. at 573-74 (cleaned up).
Al-Atoum offers no nonconclusory support for any assertion that Wal-Mart
either intentionally destroyed evidence, acted in bad faith, or destroyed evidence with
a culpable state of mind.
So her unsupported allegations of spoliation do not prevent granting summary
judgment for Wal-Mart on the record before the Court.
Recommendation
The Court should grant Defendant Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC’s motion for
summary judgment as amended [Dkt. Nos. 26 & 30] and enter judgment dismissing
Plaintiff Kimberly Al-Atoum’s lawsuit with prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
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where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 23, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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