Reaves v. Smith

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SAMUEL LYN REAVES, §
TDCJ No. 02363039, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
V. § No. 3:24-cv-1631-K-BN
§
KEVIN SMITH ET AL., §
§
Respondents. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Through a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, see Dkt. Nos. 1, 10, Petitioner Samuel Lyn Reaves challenges his Johnson
County convictions for Driving While Intoxicated (3rd or More, Habitual Felon)
(“Felony DWI”) and Retaliation. See State v. Reaves, No. DC-F201700692 (18th Dist.
Ct., Johnson Cnty., Tex. Sept. 17, 2021). United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade
referred Reaves’s habeas petition to the undersigned United States magistrate judge
for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
Reaves pled not guilty. See Dkt. No. 22-1 at 22. On September 17, 2021, Reaves
was convicted after a jury trial of Felony DWI and Retaliation and acquitted of a third
count (Attempt to Take Weapon from an Officer). See id. at 22-23, 345-48. Reaves was
sentenced by the jury to 99 years in prison for Felony DWI and 25 years in prison for
Retaliation to run concurrently. See id. at 23, 363-66, 391, 397.
Reaves appealed. See id. at 375. The direct appeal raised two issues – the
sufficiency of the evidence for each of his convictions. See Dkt. No. 22-21. The Eighth
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Court of Appeals affirmed. See Reaves v. State, No. 08-21-00186, 2022 WL 17851678
(Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 22, 2022) [Dkt. No. 22-24]. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review (“PDR”). See Reaves v. State, No.
PD-0038-23 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2023) [Dkt. No. 22-28].
On January 30, 2024, Reaves filed a state habeas petition pro se alleging
multiple claims combined in seven grounds. See Dkt. No. 24-29 at 60-81. The petition
was “denied without written order” by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on April
17, 2024. See In re Reaves, No. WR-33,535-09 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2024) [Dkt.
No. 24-32]. Reaves filed a second state habeas petition on May 31, 2024. See Dkt. No.
24-37 at 32-47. The second petition was dismissed as subsequent under Texas Rule
of Criminal Procedure article 11.07, section 4. See In re Reaves, No. WR-33,535-10
(Tex. Crim. App. June 19, 2024) [Dkt. No. 24-38].
Reaves filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on June
27, 2024. See Dkt. No. 2.1 He filed an amended application on June 28, 2024. See Dkt.
No. 10.
The Court ordered the State to respond. See Dkt. No. 13. The State responded.
See Dkt. No. 30. And Reaves filed a reply. See Dkt. No. 40.
1 Reaves attached the brief submitted with his second state habeas petition as one of
the exhibits to his application for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court and referenced
the attached exhibits generally as the facts supporting his habeas grounds. Compare
Dkt. No. 24-37 at 55-86, with Dkt. No. 1 at 45-76. The State’s response largely
references the grounds in that brief and as it appears that Reaves intended to
incorporate the brief by reference into his federal habeas petition, the undersigned
will follow the State in liberally construing it as a brief in support of the federal
habeas petition.
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And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation that the Court should deny federal habeas relief.
Legal Standards
“Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and
caselaw authority.” Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the district
court, this process begins – and often ends – with the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), under which “state prisoners face strict
procedural requirements and a high standard of review.” Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682
(citation omitted). This is because, “[u]nder AEDPA, state courts play the leading role
in assessing challenges to state sentences based on federal law.” Shinn v. Kayer, 592
U.S. 111, 124 (2020) (per curiam).
So, where a state court has already rejected a claim on the merits, a federal
court may grant habeas relief on that claim only if the state court adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The statute therefore “restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs of
habeas corpus based on claims that were ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by a state court,”
Shinn, 592 U.S. at 112 (citation omitted). And, “[w]hen a state court has applied
clearly established federal law to reasonably determined facts in the process of
adjudicating a claim on the merits, a federal habeas court may not disturb the state
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court’s decision unless its error lies ‘beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
Further, “[u]nder § 2254(d),” the reasonableness of the state court decision –
not whether it is correct – “is ‘“the only question that matters.”’” Id. at 124 (quoting
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102); accord Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (“The
question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s
determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable – a
substantially higher threshold.”); Grace v. Hooper, 123 F.4th 800, 807 (5th Cir. 2024)
(“AEDPA ‘respects the authority and ability of state courts and their dedication to
the protection of constitutional rights,’” so where “fairminded jurists might
disagree…, that is precisely why federal habeas relief cannot be granted.”) (quoting
Shoop v. Hill, 586 U.S. 45, 48 (2019))); Sanchez v. Davis, 936 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir.
2019) (“[T]his is habeas, not a direct appeal, so our focus is narrowed. We ask not
whether the state court denial of relief was incorrect, but whether it was
unreasonable – whether its decision was ‘so lacking in justification’ as to remove ‘any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” (citation omitted)).
A state court adjudication on direct appeal is due the same deference under
Section 2254(d) as an adjudication in a state post-conviction proceeding. See, e.g.,
Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 756-57 (5th Cir. 2000) (a finding made by the
Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal was an “issue ... adjudicated on the merits
in state proceedings,” to be “examine[d] ... with the deference demanded by AEDPA”
under “28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)”). And nothing “in AEDPA or [the Supreme] Court’s
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precedents permit[s] reduced deference to merits decisions of lower state courts.”
Shinn, 592 U.S. at 121 n.2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
Starting with Section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary” to clearly
established federal law if “it relies on legal rules that directly conflict with prior
holdings of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme
Court on materially indistinguishable facts.” Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th
Cir. 2004); see also Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) (“We have
emphasized, time and time again, that the [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of
appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular
constitutional principle is ‘clearly established.’” (citation omitted)).
“A state court unreasonably applies clearly established Supreme Court
precedent when it improperly identifies the governing legal principle, unreasonably
extends (or refuses to extend) a legal principle to a new context, or when it gets the
principle right but ‘applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s
case.’” Will v. Lumpkin, 978 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 407-08 (2000); citation omitted). “But the Supreme Court has only
clearly established precedent if it has ‘broken sufficient legal ground to establish an
asked-for constitutional principle.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 569 U.S. at 380-82; citations
omitted).
As noted above, “[f]or purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of
federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.... A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as
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fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”
Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under
§ 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or
... could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Evans v. Davis, 875 F.3d 210, 216 (5th
Cir. 2017) (recognizing that Section 2254(d) tasks courts “with considering not only
the arguments and theories the state habeas court actually relied upon to reach its
ultimate decision but also all the arguments and theories it could have relied upon”
(citation omitted)).
The Supreme Court has further explained that “[e]valuating whether a rule
application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more
general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). And
“even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. at 102. The Supreme Court has explained that, “[i]f this standard
is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be,” where, “[a]s amended by
AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation
of claims already rejected in state proceedings,” but “[i]t preserves authority to issue
the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that
the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents,” and “[i]t goes no
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further.” Id. Thus, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court,
a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented
in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Id. at 103; accord Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (“If this
standard is difficult to meet – and it is – that is because it was meant to be. We will
not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the
extreme malfunction for which federal habeas relief is the remedy.” (internal
quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
As to Section 2254(d)(2)’s requirement that a petitioner show that the state
court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding,” the Supreme Court has explained that “a state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would
have reached a different conclusion in the first instance” and that federal habeas
relief is precluded even where the state court’s factual determination is debatable.
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 303 (2010). Under this standard, “it is not enough
to show that a state court’s decision was incorrect or erroneous. Rather, a petitioner
must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, a substantially higher
threshold requiring the petitioner to show that a reasonable factfinder must conclude
that the state court’s determination of the facts was unreasonable.” Batchelor v. Cain,
682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Court must presume that a state court’s factual determinations are correct
and can find those factual findings unreasonable only where the petitioner “rebut[s]
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001).
This presumption applies not only to explicit findings of fact but also “to those
unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court’s conclusions of mixed
law and fact.” Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Ford
v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (Section 2254(e)(1) “‘deference extends not
only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court.’ As long
as there is ‘some indication of the legal basis for the state court’s denial of relief,’ the
district court may infer the state court’s factual findings even if they were not
expressly made.” (footnotes omitted)).
And, even if the state court errs in its factual findings, mere error is not enough
– the state court’s decision must be “based on an unreasonable factual
determination.… In other words, even if the [state court] had gotten [the disputed]
factual determination right, its conclusion wouldn’t have changed.” Will, 978 F.3d at
942.
Further, “determining whether a state court’s decision resulted from an
unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion
from the state court explaining the state court’s reasoning.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98;
see Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003) (“a federal habeas court is
authorized by Section 2254(d) to review only a state court’s ‘decision,’ and not the
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written opinion explaining that decision” (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246
(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam))); Evans, 875 F.3d at 216 n.4 (even where “[t]he
state habeas court’s analysis [is] far from thorough,” a federal court “may not review
[that] decision de novo simply because [it finds the state court’s] written opinion
‘unsatisfactory’” (quoting Neal, 286 F.3d at 246)); see also Hughes v. Vannoy, 7 F.4th
380, 387 (5th Cir. 2021) (observing that a federal habeas court also “must ‘carefully
consider all the reasons and evidence supporting the state court’s decision”” and that
a decision that “does not explain its reasoning does not affect [federal habeas] review,”
as federal courts “are required to ‘determine what arguments or theories could have
supported the state court’s determination’ and examine ‘each ground supporting the
state court decision’” (footnotes omitted)).
Section 2254 thus creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state
court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). And, while “AEDPA sets a high
bar,” it is “not an insurmountable one.” Hughes, 7 F.4th at 392. To surmount it, a
petitioner must show that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. That is, in sum, a petitioner must “show, based on the
state-court record alone, that any argument or theory the state habeas court could
have relied on to deny [him] relief would have either been contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court.” Evans, 875 F.3d at 217; see also Hughes, 7 F.4th at 392 (Federal
courts “are obligated to correct” those “rare ‘extreme malfunctions in the state
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criminal justice system.’” (quoting Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731, 739 (2021) (per
curiam))).
Analysis
I. Reaves has procedurally defaulted claims that were not raised in his PDR or
first state habeas petition.
Because “state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges to state
sentences based on federal law,” Shinn, 592 U.S. at 124, a state petitioner must fully
exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A); Loynachan v. Davis, 766 F. App’x 156, 159 (5th Cir. 2019) (“A federal
court may not grant habeas relief unless the petitioner ‘has exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A))).
This entails submitting the factual and legal basis of any claim to the highest
available state court for review in a procedurally correct manner. See Satterwhite v.
Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1989).2
Texas prisoners must present their claims to the Court of Criminal Appeals in
2 See also Nickleson v. Stephens, 803 F.3d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The exhaustion
doctrine demands more than allusions in state court to facts or legal issues that might
be comprehended within a later federal habeas petition. The exhaustion doctrine is
based on comity between state and federal courts, respect for the integrity of state
court procedures, and ‘a desire to protect the state courts’ role in the enforcement of
federal law.’” (quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (quoting, in turn,
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)))); Loynachan, 766 F. App’x at 159 (“To
determine whether a § 2254 petitioner has exhausted a claim, his federal claim
should be compared with the claim he raised in state court ‘It is not enough that all
the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a
somewhat similar state-law claim was made.’ ‘Rather, the petitioner must afford the
state court a “fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing
upon his constitutional claim.”’ This reflects the fact in the habeas system, state
courts are provided the first opportunity to assess the claim.” (citations omitted)).
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a petition for discretionary review or an application for state post-conviction relief.
See Bautista v. McCotter, 793 F.2d 109, 110 (5th Cir. 1986). “A petitioner need merely
press a claim through one of these avenues to exhaust that claim. [But, t]o exhaust a
claim, it must also be presented in a procedural context in which state courts
necessarily review the claim on the merits.” Loynachan, 766 F. App’x at 159 (citations
omitted); see also Campbell v. Dretke, 117 F. App’x 946, 957 (5th Cir. 2004) (“‘The
exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the substance of the habeas claim has been
fairly presented to the highest state court’ so that a state court has had a ‘fair
opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing on the
petitioner’s constitutional claim.’” (quoting Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 465 (5th
Cir. 2004))).
And unexhausted claims should be found procedurally barred if “the court to
which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the
exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991).
Texas law precludes successive habeas claims except in narrow circumstances.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 4. This is a codification of the judicially
created Texas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. See Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741,
759 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this state law, a habeas petitioner is procedurally
barred from returning to the Texas courts to exhaust his claims unless the petitioner
presents a factual or legal basis for a claim that was previously unavailable or shows
that, but for a violation of the United States Constitution, no rational juror would
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have found for the State. See id. at 758 n.9.
Therefore, unexhausted claims that could not make the showing required by
this state law would be considered procedurally barred from review on the merits in
this Court unless an exception is shown. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 264
(5th Cir. 2001). An exception to this procedural bar allows federal habeas review if a
petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of
the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims
will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
Reaves has already attempted to file a second state habeas application that the
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as successive, see Dkt. No. 24-38, and “nothing
in its perfunctory dismissal of the claims … suggests that it actually considered or
ruled on the merits.” Hughes v. Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 2008). And
as to those claims not yet presented to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Reaves has not
presented a factual or legal basis for a claim that was previously unavailable or shown
that, but for a violation of the United States Constitution, no rational juror would
have found for the State.
Specifically, Reaves’s claims that his trial counsel were ineffective because it
failed to interview Sergeant Smith before trial, failed to strike certain venire
members, and failed to argue Reaves was actually innocent were not raised to the
Court of Criminal Appeals in a procedurally correct manner through Reaves’s PDR
or first state habeas petition. And, although Reaves made general and conclusory
claims in his first habeas petition that his counsel failed to object to inadmissible
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evidence, see Dkt. No. 24-29 at 68, 87, there is no mention of the specific evidence
Reaves claims was objectionable and irrelevant in section 1.d of Ground One in the
brief attached to his original federal habeas petition, see Dkt. No. 1 at 16-19. See
Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2001) (“It is not enough that all the
facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a
somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S.
4, 6 (1982)).
Reaves’s claims that his sentence is cruel and unusual punishment and
violates the sentencing guidelines, that the stenographer’s record of his trial is
inaccurate, and that the prosecution withheld Brady evidence are also procedurally
barred without a showing an exception applies. But Reaves has not shown that “cause
for the default and actual prejudice exist” nor has he shown that the “fundamental
miscarriage of justice” exception to the procedural bar applies.
So those claims should be denied as procedurally barred.
II. Reaves’s actual innocence claims should be denied.
Reaves asserts in Grounds Nine and Ten of his amended petition that he is
actually innocent of the charges of Retaliation and Attempt to Take a Weapon from
an Officer. See Dkt. No. 10 at 10; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 71-74. The jury acquitted
Reaves of the charge of Attempt to Take a Weapon from an Officer, so any habeas
claims related to that charge are moot.
Reaves’s claim as to the charge of Retaliation relates to the interpretation of
the phrase “public servant” under state law. See Dkt. No. 1 at 71-74. But “the proper
interpretation of state law is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.” Beazley,
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242 F.3d at 261. And, even if Reaves did raise a claim under federal law, convincing
actual innocence and fundamental miscarriage of justice claims constitute a gateway
to allow a petitioner to overcome the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA
and proceed on the merits. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 396-98 (2013);
Floyd v. Vannoy, 894 F.3d 143, 154-55 (5th Cir. 2018). But the Fifth Circuit “does not
consider habeas relief based on ‘freestanding claims of actual innocence.’” Floyd, 894
F.3d at 155 (quoting In re Swearingen, 556 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2009); see also
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (“Claims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief
absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state
criminal proceeding.”).
So Reaves’s claims of actual innocence should be denied.
III. Reaves has not established that his trial counsel was ineffective.
The two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel established in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), requires a petitioner to “show that
counsel’s failure was both (1) objectively deficient and (2) prejudicial.” Crawford v.
Cain, 122 F.4th 158, 160 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
The first prong “sets a high bar.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 118 (2017). To
count as objectively unreasonable, counsel’s error must be “so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “The Supreme Court has admonished
courts reviewing a state court’s denial of habeas relief under AEDPA that they are
required not simply to give [the] attorney’s the benefit of the doubt, ... but to
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affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [petitioner’s] counsel may have
had for proceeding as they did.” Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, on habeas review under AEDPA, “if there is any ‘reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,’ the state court’s
denial must be upheld.” Rhoades v. Davis, 852 F.3d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Sanchez, 936 F.3d at 305 (“As the State rightly puts
it, we defer ‘both to trial counsel’s reasoned performance and then again to the state
habeas court’s assessment of that performance.’” (quoting Rhoades, 852 F.3d at 434)).
To demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus,
“the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect
on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been
established if counsel acted differently.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. “Instead, Strickland
asks whether it is ‘reasonably likely’ the result would have been different,” which
“does not require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the
outcome,’ but the difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a more-
probable-than-not standard is slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.” Id. at 111-
12 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 696, 697). “The likelihood of a different result
must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.
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Ineffective assistance claims are considered mixed questions of law and fact
and are therefore analyzed under the “unreasonable application” standard of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Gregory v. Thaler, 601 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2010); Adekeye,
938 F.3d at 682.
Where the state court has adjudicated claims of ineffective assistance on the
merits, this Court must review a habeas petitioner’s claims under the “doubly
deferential” standards of both Strickland and Section 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 190, 202 (2011); see alson Rhoades, 852 F.3d at 434 (“Our federal habeas
review of a state court’s denial of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is ‘doubly
deferential’ because we take a highly deferential look at counsel’s performance
through the deferential lens of § 2254(d).” (citation omitted)); Canfield v. Lumpkin,
998 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Strickland … imposes a high bar on those alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. But 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) … raises the bar even
higher.”); cf. Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 525 (“recogniz[ing] the special importance of the
AEDPA framework in cases involving Strickland claims,” since “[i]neffective-
assistance claims can function ‘as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture,’ and
they can drag federal courts into resolving questions of state law” (quoting Richter,
562 U.S. at 105)).
Several of Reaves’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are conclusory. But
“mere conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas
proceeding.” Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1983). “Absent evidence in
the record, a court cannot consider a habeas petitioner’s bald assertions on a critical
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issue in his pro se petition … to be of probative evidentiary value.” Id. at 1011. In his
amended federal habeas petition, Reaves asserts with no explanation or citation to
evidence that his counsel was ineffective because they filed no motions and made no
objections, failed to object to the jury instructions, and failed to seek a 38.23 jury
instruction. See Dkt. No. 10 at 7. These claims are conclusory and should be denied.
Reaves also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his
sentence as cruel and unusual punishment. See Dkt. No. 1 at 66. That claim is likely
procedurally barred since the brief and conclusory mention in Reaves’s first state
habeas petition of “not a single word to cruel/unusual punishment” did not provide
the full factual and legal basis of the claim made here to the state court in a
procedurally correct manner. See Wilder, 274 F.3d at 259. And Reaves has not shown
any exception to the procedural bar applies.
But, even if it is not procedurally barred, Reaves cannot show that the failure
to object was deficient performance or a reasonable probability that the result would
have been different if counsel had objected to preserve a cruel and unusual
punishment claim based on the length of Reaves’s sentence. Neither Eighth
Amendment precedent on non-capital sentencing nor Texas precedent on habitual
DWI offenders supports such an objection. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
28-29 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991); Vrba v. State, 69
S.W.3d 713, 724-25 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).
And claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to quash the
indictment or to suppress the blood draw should be denied because those motions are
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not supported by the evidence and would have been frivolous.
Reaves claims that counsel should have moved to quash the indictment
because the State enhanced Reaves’s charge on Felony DWI with both the general
enhancement and felony DWI enhancement statutes. See Dkt. No. 1 at 64-65. But
Texas law allows both enhancements to be used so long as the same prior conviction
is not applied to both enhancements. Cf. Phillips v. State, 992 S.W.2d 491, 494-95
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc) (not ineffective assistance to fail to object to
indictment where two DWI convictions were used for both enhancements because,
even if those convictions were omitted, other prior convictions alleged in the
indictment would have been sufficient to show both enhancements applied). Here,
different convictions were used to allege each enhancement. See Dkt. No. 22-1 at 25-
26. So it would have been frivolous for Reaves’s counsel to seek to quash the
indictment on that basis.
And, as to the claim related to the motion to suppress the blood draw, the
evidence and prior state court findings of fact do not support the claim that the blood
draw was conducted without a warrant. See Dkt. No. 22-17 at 16; Reaves, 2022 WL
17851678, at *2 (“Walters applied for the search warrant to draw Appellant’s blood,
which a judge granted.”). So it would have been frivolous for Reaves’s counsel to move
to suppress the blood draw.
As to Reaves’s claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
his history of diabetes and schizophrenia or to hire any experts to testify to those
issues, Reaves cannot meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Reaves’s counsel followed a line of questioning with witnesses indicating that they
were aware of Reaves’s history of diabetes. In fact, the full exchange with Lindsay
Hatfield, the drug section supervisor at the Department of Public Safety Crime Lab
in Waco, cited by Reaves in his brief (Dkt. No. 1 at 50) supports that Reaves’s counsel
was aware of Reaves history of diabetes and asked about the acetone because of that
awareness. See Dkt. No. 22-18 at 57-58; see also Dkt. No. 22-17 at 35-36 (questioning
Corporal Walters on diabetes and ketoacidosis).
And Reaves also does not show that his counsel was unaware of his history of
schizophrenia. The hearing transcripts reflect that his counsel was aware of his
history of mental health issues and competency evaluations and restoration. See Dkt.
No. 22-14 at 4-5, 8.
And “complaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus
review because the presentation of testimonial evidence is a matter of trial strategy
and because allegations of what a witness would have stated are largely speculative.”
Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Bray v. Quarterman,
265 Fed. App’x 296, 298 (5th Cir.2008). So to make out a claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to call witnesses to testify on these issues, Reaves would need
to “demonstrate that the witness was available to testify and would have done so, set
out the content of the witness’s proposed testimony, and show that the testimony
would have been favorable to a particular defense.” Id. Without such a showing,
Reaves cannot show prejudice even if he had established deficient performance. See
id. But Reaves has not made this showing.
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And finally, as to Reaves’s claims that his counsel was ineffective for
withdrawing their request for a competency hearing, the record does not support the
claim.
For Reaves to be found incompetent to stand trial, the trial court would have
had to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not have sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer or a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him. See TEX. CRIM. PRO. ART. 46B.003(b). In an ineffective
assistance claim for failure to request a competency examination, the petitioner
“must show a reasonable probability that the district court would have found [him]
incompetent if trial counsel had moved for a competency examination or hearing.”
United States v. Israel, 838 F. App’x 856, 866 (5th Cir. 2020). But Reaves cannot make
that showing here because of evidence set out in his last competency evaluation and
presented to his trial counsel between the time they requested the hearing and
withdrew the request indicating that Reaves was using competency to avoid trial. See
Dkt. No. 22-1 at 281; Dkt. No. 22-15 at 4.
For these reasons, Reaves’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be denied.
IV. Reaves’s claim that his sentence is illegal under the Texas Penal Code is not
cognizable on federal habeas review.
Reaves asserts that his sentence is illegal because it was enhanced under both
sections 49.09 and 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code, which he argues violates section
49.09(g) of the Texas Penal Code. See ECF No. 1 at 75. The claim is addressed above
in the context of Reaves’s claim that counsel was ineffective for filing to move to quash
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the indictment. But as to the legal interpretation issue raised, “the proper
interpretation of state law is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.” Beazley,
242 F.3d at 261.
So Reaves’s claim as to the interpretation of the enhancement provisions of the
Texas Penal Code should be denied.
V. Reaves’s Fourth Amendment claim that the blood draw constituted an
unlawful search and seizure is barred.
Reaves’s claim that his blood draw was an illegal search and seizure is barred
from federal habeas review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), “bars habeas review
of Fourth Amendment claims when the state has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of the claim .... [And t]he Fifth Circuit applies the bar as long as the
state gives the defendant an opportunity to litigate the issue, whether or not the
defendant takes advantage of the opportunity.” ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d
514, 524-25 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316,
320-21 (5th Cir. 2002)). Because Texas provides a defendant an opportunity to litigate
an unlawful search claim and there are no “additional allegations that state processes
routinely or systematically are applied in such a way as to prevent the actual
litigation of Fourth Amendment claims,” the Stone bar applies. Janecka, 301 F.3d at
321.
So Reaves’s claim that the blood draw was an unlawful search and seizure
should be denied.
VI. Reaves’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant ‘the right to a speedy and
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public trial.’” Leachman v. Stephens, 581 F. App’x 390, 402 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. VI). This right “applies to the states via incorporation by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citing Divers v. Cain, 698 F.3d
211, 215 (5th Cir. 2012)). And whether this right has been violated is “a mixed
question of law and fact,” which in the current context – federal habeas review of the
state court’s rejection of a speedy-trial claim – triggers “the deferential standard of
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).” Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (footnotes omitted). “Accordingly, [a state prisoner] is entitled to relief only
if the state court’s rejection of his speedy-trial claim resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an objectively unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law as articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court.” Id. (footnote
omitted); see also Russell v. Denmark, 68 F.4th 252, 263 (5th Cir. 2023) (district court
erred in reweighing Barker factors rather than giving deference to state court
determination).
“Very few petitioners” can make the requisite showing, and due to the
somewhat indeterminate and fact-intensive nature of the speedy trial
right, [a federal court’s] “always-substantial deference is at an apex.” In
resolving speedy trial issues, [the Court should] consider: “(1) the length
of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his
right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” These factors
are guides that require a delicate balancing.
Divers, 698 F.3d at 217 (quoting Amos, 646 F.3d at 204-05, 205; citation omitted); see
also Speer v. Lumpkin, 824 F. App’x 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Because [the speedy
trial] right is ‘amorphous,’ ‘imprecis[e],’ ‘necessarily relative,’ and ‘slippery,’ the
Supreme Court established ‘a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed.’ Relevant factors include the length of
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the delay, the reason for it, the defendant’s diligence in asserting the right, and
whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
522, 529-30 (1972), then citing Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009))). And
“[a]bsent extreme prejudice or a showing of willfulness by the prosecution to delay
the trial in order to hamper the defense, a delay of less than one year is not sufficient
to trigger an examination of the Barker factors.” Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 647
(5th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).
Here, although Reaves was arrested in July 2017, indicted in August 2017, but
did not go to trial until September 2021, his trial began 78 days after he was found
competent to stand trial on June 28, 2021. And as discussed above, evidence in the
record indicates that Reaves attempted to prolong and manipulate the competency
evaluation and restoration process to avoid trial. See Dkt. No. 22-1 at 281; Dkt. No.
22-15 at 4. Further, Reaves has not attempted to explain how he was prejudiced by
the delay and has not shown that he was diligent in asserting his speedy trial rights.
See Dkt. No. 22-1 at 216-18 (pro se motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation filed
more than 3 years after indictment).
So Reaves’s speedy trial claim should be denied.
VII. Reaves’s claims that the state court of appeals committed judicial misconduct
and as to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel should be denied.
Reaves’s claim that the state court of appeals committed judicial misconduct
by denying his motion to be appointed new appellate counsel or represent himself is
conclusory and should be denied.
And Reaves’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective because she did
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not communicate with him, refused to raise additional issues, and has a conflict of
interest because she has a child by District Attorney Dale Hanna should also be
denied. Reaves’s claims as to lack of communication and refusal to raise additional
issues are conclusory. In particular, Reaves does not set out what issues were not
raised. With appellate counsel, “although ‘it is still possible to bring a Strickland
claim based on counsel’s failure to raise a particular claim, ... it is difficult to
demonstrate that counsel was incompetent.’” Diaz v. Quarterman, 228 F. App’x 417,
427 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)).
And, “[g]enerally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented,
will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Smith, 528 U.S.
at 288 (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986); internal quotation
marks omitted).
And as to the conflict-of-interest claim, Reaves must show an actual conflict
that adversely affected counsel’s performance not “a mere theoretical division of
loyalties” and “that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses
of action” based on this conflict. Vasquez v. Thayler, 389 Fed. App’x 419, 431 (5th Cir.
2010) (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002); United States v. Garcia-
Jasso, 472 F.3d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 2006); cleaned up). But Reaves has not made this
showing and has not provided any evidence to substantiate his claim as to the conflict.
So Reaves’s claims as to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel should be
denied.
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Recommendation
The Court should deny the application for a writ of habeas corpus.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 6, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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