USA v. Wilkins

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
§
V. § CASE NO. 3:24-CR-224-X
§
IRA LEE WILKINS §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the referral of the presiding district judge, Doc. 49,
before the undersigned magistrate judge are Defendant Wilkins’ pro se Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea, Doc. 47 and pro se Supplementary Motion to/for Motion to Withdraw Plea Hearing.
Doc. 57. The Government filed a response in opposition on October 15, 2025, Doc. 52, and
Defendant Wilkins’ counsel filed a response on October 22, 2025, Doc. 53.
An evidentiary hearing was held before the undersigned on December 11, 2025, at which
Defendant Wilkins appeared in person and with counsel, Assistant Federal Public Defender
Maria Torres Chin (“Attorney Chin”), and the Government appeared by and through Assistant
United States Attorney Marissa Albaugh. Doc. 55.
Upon review of the pleadings, relevant docket entries, and applicable law, and for the
reasons stated here, Defendant Wilkins’ motions should be DENIED.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 22, 2025, Defendant Wilkins, with the assistance and representation of Assistant
Federal Public Defender George Lancaster (“Attorney Lancaster”)1, appeared before United
1 On September 16, 2024, at his initial appearance, the Federal Public Defender was appointed to
represent Wilkins. At that hearing, Wilkins was represented by Assistant Federal Public
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States Magistrate Judge Brian McKay and pled guilty without a plea agreement to the sole count
of the Superseding Indictment filed February 5, 2025, to-wit: Escape from a Halfway House, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Doc. 22 (Superseding Indictment); Doc. 38 (Report and
Recommendation); Doc. 51 (Transcript of Rearraignment Hearing). No objections were filed to
the magistrate judge’s report recommending that the district judge accept the guilty plea, and on
September 8, 2025, District Judge Brantley Starr accepted the Report and Recommendation and
Defendant Wilkins’ guilty plea, and adjudged Defendant Wilkins guilty of Escape from a
Halfway House, as alleged in the sole count of the Indictment.2 Doc. 39.
In the interim period after the entry of initial order adjudging Defendant Wilkins guilty,
on August 12, 2025, the Presentence Report (“PSR”) was filed. Doc. 43-1. The Government
filed its notice of no objections to the Presentence Report on August 29, 2025. Doc. 44.
Attorney Chin also filed a notice of no objections to the Presentence Report on Defendant
Wilkins’ behalf on September 4, 2025. Doc. 45. On September 24, 2025, Wilkins filed the
instant pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Doc. 47, and Affidavit in Support of Motion to
Withdraw Plea, Doc. 48. The sentencing hearing, originally scheduled for October 15, 2025,
Doc. 40, was cancelled on October 8, 2025, Doc. 50, and has yet to be rescheduled.
An evidentiary hearing was held before the undersigned on December 10, 2025, at which
Defendant Wilkins appeared in person and with counsel, Attorney Chin, and the Government
appeared by and through Assistant United States Attorney Marissa Albaugh. Doc. 55.
Defender Sherry Kime-Goodwin. Subsequently, Attorney Chin entered her appearance as
counsel.
2 District Judge Starr entered an Amended Order Accepting the Report and Recommendation of
the United States Magistrate Judge Concerning Plea of Guilty on September 8, 2025, correcting
a scrivener’s error in the applicable penal statute. Doc. 46.
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Although given the opportunity, Defendant Wilkins offered little or no additional evidence, and
merely reiterated his arguments that, inter alia, counsel was ineffective for failure to obtain
records from the United States Marshal Service (USMS) that could support his contention that
USMS was aware of the problems he experienced at the halfway house prior to leaving it and the
fact that he had left the halfway house before he was arrested for the instant offense (apparently
suggesting that the USMS acquiesced in his absence from the halfway house).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
“[I]t is well settled that there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea before the
imposition of sentence. Instead, the right to do so is within the sound discretion of the trial court
which will be reversed by an appellate court only for an abuse of that discretion.” United States
v. Rasmussen, 642 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). Indeed, a district court may
permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing for “any reason the granting of
the privilege seems fair and just.’” United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 1984)
(cited and quoted cases omitted). In determining whether to permit a defendant’s withdrawal of
his guilty plea under this standard, a district court should consider seven factors: (1) whether the
defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether withdrawal would prejudice the Government;
(3) whether the defendant has delayed in filing his withdrawal motion; (4) whether withdrawal
would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assistance of counsel was
available; (6) whether the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether withdrawal
would waste judicial resources. Id. at 343-44. These factors are considered under the totality of
the circumstances, and it is the defendant’s burden to establish that withdrawal of his guilty plea
is justified. Id. at 344.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant Wilkins’ Arguments
Although they lack clarity, Defendant Wilkins’ motions to withdraw, as liberally
construed, appear to allege that his attorney was ineffective for failure to provide Defendant
Wilkins with documents and information requested by him prior to entering his guilty plea. Doc.
47, passim. Defendant Wilkins alleges that he:
Repeatedly ask[ed] [Attorney Chin] to request all documents of USMS records;
regarding Two (2) false write-ups/disciplinaries while at the VOA (RRC) in
Hutchins, Tx., by Two (2) employees of VOA which were dismissed during a
Disciplinary Hearing at the VOA (Volunteers of America), with a finding of clear
malicious intent towards Defendant, by Two employees (Mr. Bradley and Mr.
Malone), whom threatened Defendant after the fictional, malicious disciplinaries
were dismissed/thrown out [] within days of the alleged escape.
Doc. 47 at 1-2 (errors in original). Defendant Wilkins further avers that in court, just prior to the
May 22, 2025 rearraignment hearing, he asked Attorney Lancaster, in Attorney Chin’s absence,
about the VOA records and “critical USMS (United States Marshall’s [sic] Service records of
tracking, geolocating, and every record involving” the USMS meeting with Defendant Wilkins
and giving Defendant Wilkins permission to relocate to his family’s residence upon his
explanation of the “circumstances involving employees of the VOA(RRC).” Doc. 47 at 2.
Defendant Wilkins suggests that, at the rearraignment hearing, he did not ask Attorney
Lancaster “critical questions” because Attorney Lancaster indicated that Attorney Chin had
“specifically mandated [Attorney Lancaster] not to answer [Defendant Wilkins’] questions
regarding the documents and records that [Defendant Wilkins had] been requesting” prior to the
rearraignment hearing. Doc. 47 at 3. Defendant Wilkins further contends that his “Due Process
Rights have been deprived because of [Attorney Chin’s] negligence and intentionally depriving
Defendant of his opportunity to present evidence on Defendant’s own behalf.” Doc. 47 at 3.
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In his Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw Plea, Defendant Wilkins complains,
inter alia, that Attorney Chin: (1) did not provide him the opportunity to read the Presentence
Report or consult him prior to filing objections to the same; (2) allowed a “third party” to be
present during her jail visit with him, thereby disallowing Defendant Wilkins the “Right to
Attorney/Client Priviledge [sic]”; and (3) failed to obtain upon Defendant Wilkins’ request
documents “withheld” by the United States Marshals Service (USMS) which indicated that
Defendant Wilkins was “approached and followed by USMS only hours within the alleged
‘escape’ from VOA(RRC) and given permission, not arrested, and followed with permission
after being located” by a vehicle tracker. Doc. 48 at 2. In his “affidavit,” Wilkins also avers that
Deputy U.S. Marshal Christopher McCarty lied to the prosecutor in an email dated May 20,
2025, attached to the “affidavit,” in which Deputy McCarty wholly refutes Defendant Wilkins’
claims that USMS deputies met with Defendant Wilkins after Defendant Wilkins was in “escape
status,” but failed to arrest him.3 Doc. 48 at 2-3.
Finally, the assertions contained in Defendant Wilkins’ Supplementary Motion to/for
Motion to Withdraw Plea Hearing. Doc. 57, are of little significance. In it, he essentially (1)
requests that the Court liberally construe his pleadings; (2) misstates that Magistrate Judge
McKay’s May 22, 2025 Report and Recommendation Concerning Plea of Guilty, Doc. 38, was
filed on September 8, 2025—seemingly suggesting that the instant pro se motion to withdraw
guilty plea, purportedly signed by him on September 11, 2025, was timely; (3) alleging that
Deputy McCarty “approached [Defendant Wilkins] while in a ‘holding cell’ and in front of all
3 The Court notes that Defendant Wilkins’ so-called “Affidavit” is neither sworn and executed
under penalty of perjury nor executed before an official authorized to administer oaths, and it
merely recites, “True and Correct. Sincerely,” followed by Defendant Wilkins’ signature. Doc.
48 at 2.
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other detainees that were awaiting Court, and tried to coerce Defendant that he should just ‘plead
[sic] guilty’ and that he doesn’t have any other choice”; (4) alleging again that Deputy McCarty
lied in his email to the prosecutor; and (5) suggesting that the United States Attorney
intentionally withheld evidence that Defendant Wilkins had the tacit permission of the USMS to
remain away from the halfway house. Doc. 57 at 1-4.
B. Defendant’s Pro Se Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Lacks Merit
The Carr factors, delineated supra, weigh against permitting Defendant Wilkins to
withdraw his guilty plea.
(i) Assertion of Actual Innocence
With respect to the first factor, whether the defendant has asserted his innocence,
Defendant Wilkins has not explicitly asserted that he is innocent of the offense to which he pled
guilty. However, liberally construing his claims, he appears to suggest that he is innocent of the
charge to which he pled guilty because he never intended to escape from custody but left the
halfway house because of harassment and threats by two of its employees and that the USMS
subsequently acquiesced in his absence from the halfway house. Doc. 47, passim; Doc. 48,
passim. Defendant Wilkins offers no credible evidence that supports his contentions, however.
Counsel’s Alleged Failure to Obtain Records Is No Basis for Withdrawal
Defendant Wilkins wholly fails to explain in his pleadings (or at the evidentiary hearing)
how his failure to receive the records he requested of Attorney Chin prior to the entry of his
guilty plea demonstrates his actual innocence of the offense to which he pled guilty. To the
extent that he contends he would not have pled guilty if Attorney Chin had obtained records of
the halfway house indicating that its employees had falsely accused him of infractions and
records of the USMS that support his claim that USMS deputies tacitly approved of his absence
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from the halfway house, such contentions are unsupported. Defendant Wilkins’ supposition that
such records were available and would corroborate his claims, is just that—supposition. At the
evidentiary hearing, Attorney Chin indicated that she did obtain records of the halfway house
disciplinary proceedings against Defendant Wilkins. However, at best, any such records appear
only relevant to mitigation in sentencing, if they do—as Defendant Wilkins appears to suggest--
support his claims that he left the halfway house due to false accusations and threats against him
by halfway house employees. See Doc. 47 at 1-2. But any such records lack relevance to the
issue of whether Defendant Wilkins is innocent of intentionally absenting himself from the
halfway house—which, as discussed in detail infra, is contrary to his admissions under oath at
the rearraignment hearing.
Further, there is no reason whatsoever to believe in the existence of any USMS records
that support Defendant Wilkins’ claims that USMS deputies met with him after he left the
halfway house and tacitly approved his absence from the halfway house. Indeed, the only
credible evidence is Deputy McCarty’s statement to the prosecutor, the essence of which is that
he never met Defendant Wilkins on February 7, 2024 (the day after the commission of the
offense to which Defendant Wilkins pled guilty) and, if he had, “would have taken steps to arrest
Defendant [Wilkins] at the time since [he] was aware of [Defendant Wilkins’] escape status with
the Bureau of Prisons and that there would be a pending Escape investigation against him.” Doc.
48 at 3. Deputy McCarty further explained that he was “the only Deputy assigned to this case
and the only one with knowledge of [Defendant Wilkins] being wanted by the USMS. . . . [and
had no] documentation for this contact since there was no contact by the USMS with
[Defendant] Wilkins on 2/7/2025.” Doc. 48 at 3. Considering this and Deputy McCarty’s sworn
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duty to uphold the law, Wilkins’ protestations to the contrary lack credibility and appear wholly
delusional.
Defendant’s Prior Sworn Testimony Refutes Any Assertion of Innocence
Most damning of any attempted assertion of actual innocence by Defendant Wilkins,
however, is that it is directly contradicted by his statements at the rearraignment hearing on May
22, 2025, when he admitted under oath before Magistrate Judge McKay that he had committed
all of the essential elements of the crime and that the stipulated facts in the Factual Resume
supporting his guilty plea were true and correct.
Specifically as to Defendant Wilkins’ intimations that he lacked the requisite mens rea to
commit the offense,” the record refutes such claim. See, e.g., Doc 47 at 1 (alleging he “was
denied critical information and records regarding information requested concerning Defendant’s
innocense [sic] and Mens Rea of Defendant” until after the rearraignment hearing); Doc. 57 at 4
(alleging “Defendant had no knowledge of escape status and was misled by USMS to going
somewhere safe, as instructed”).
At the rearraignment hearing, the prosecutor read aloud the essential elements of the
offense:
That the Defendant was in federal custody; that the Defendant was in federal
custody due to a lawful arrest on a felony charge or due to a conviction for any
offense; that the Defendant left federal custody without permission; and [t]hat the
Defendant knew leaving would result in his absence from custody without
permission.
Doc. 51 at 14-15. And at the conclusion of the elements being read, Defendant Wilkins affirmed
his understanding of each essential element and acknowledged without equivocation that he
committed each of the essential elements. Doc. 51 at 15. Notably, the essential elements were
also included in the text of the Factual Resume which, again, Defendant Wilkins confirmed
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under oath that he reviewed with counsel and understood before signing. Doc. 26 at 1; Doc. 51
at 18. Finally, the facts that Defendant Wilkins stipulated in the Factual Resume and
subsequently confirmed under oath before Magistrate Judge McKay were true and correct leave
no doubt that he possessed the requisite mens rea. See Doc. 26 at 3 (the stipulated facts,
including that Defendant “did knowingly and intentionally escape from custody. . . knowing that
he did not have permission to leave federal custody”) (emphasis added); Doc. 51 at 19 (affirming
at the rearraignment hearing that “the stipulated facts in the Factual Resume are true and
correct”). Indeed, in his motions, Defendant Wilkins does not contest the veracity of the
stipulated facts establishing the essential elements of the escape offense to which he pled guilty,
yet he persists in his contention that he did not intend to escape.
In sum, Defendant Wilkins falls well short of asserting his innocence. See United States
v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998) (“a defendant ordinarily will not be heard to
refute her testimony given at a plea hearing while under oath”) (citing United States v. Fuller,
769 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)
(“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. . . .”); Carr, 740 F.2d
at 344 (“[Innocence] claim alone is far from being sufficient to overturn denial of a withdrawal
motion. Otherwise, the mere assertion of legal innocence would always be a sufficient condition
for withdrawal, and withdrawal would effectively be an automatic right.” (citation omitted)).
This Carr factor weighs against permitting Defendant Wilkins to withdraw his guilty
plea.
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C. Delay in Filing Motion to Withdraw
Although Defendant Wilkins was specifically admonished at the rearraignment hearing
that he had 14 days from the filing of the Magistrate Judge’s report recommending that his guilty
plea be accepted to object, Doc. 51 at 19, no objection was filed. Subsequently, the Report and
Recommendation of the magistrate judge was accepted, and Defendant Wilkins was adjudged
guilty on June 9, 2025. Doc. 39 (see also Doc. 46, Amended Order accepting Report and
Recommendation on Guilty Plea entered September 8, 2025). The first evidence of Defendant
Wilkins’ desire to withdraw his guilty plea is the pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea dated
September 11, 2025—some 112 days after Defendant Wilkins’ guilty plea was entered. Doc.
47.
Defendant Wilkins offers no explanation for the delay, and such delay is significant. See
United States v. Thomas, 13 F.3d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1994) (six-week delay in requesting to
withdraw guilty plea deemed “significant”); United States v. Rinard, 956 F.2d 85, 88–89 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that a 69-day delay weighed against defendant); United States v. Hurtado,
846 F.2d 995, 997 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a seven-week delay weighed against
withdrawal); Carr, 740 F.2d at 345 (finding that the motion “was not promptly filed” 22 days
after the plea).
It is also notable that Defendant Wilkins did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea until
after the Presentence Report was issued in his case on August 12, 2015, Doc. 43; Doc. 43-1.
This timing is strongly suggestive of “buyer’s remorse,” rather than the involuntariness of his
guilty plea.
Under the totality of the circumstances, this Carr factor weighs against permitting
Defendant Wilkins to withdraw his guilty plea.
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D. Close Assistance of Counsel Was Available
Up to and including the rearraignment hearing, Defendant Wilkins was always
represented by counsel. At the rearraignment hearing, Defendant Wilkins confirmed
unequivocally while under oath that he (1) had a full opportunity to discuss his case and whether
he should plead guilty with his counsel, (2) understood the information and advice provided by
his counsel; (3) was satisfied with the representation of his retained counsel; and (4) discussed
the Factual Resume with his counsel before signing it. Doc. 51, passim. Further, nothing in the
transcript of the hearing suggests that Defendant Wilkins was at all hesitant during rearraignment
or that the hearing was paused so that he could discuss any matter privately with counsel who
stood with him throughout. Doc. 51, passim.
This Carr factor also weighs against permitting Defendant Wilkins to withdraw his guilty
plea.
E. Defendant’s Guilty Plea Was Knowing and Voluntary
Despite Defendant Wilkins’ self-serving and conclusory assertions to the contrary, the
record establishes that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. To be constitutionally valid, a
guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. United States v. Hernandez,
234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). In determining the voluntariness of a plea, the court considers
all relevant circumstances, including whether the defendant: (1) had notice of the charges against
him; (2) understood the constitutional protections he was waiving; and (3) had access to
competent counsel. United States v. Shepherd, 880 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2018); see also
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969) (finding that to be knowing and intelligent, the
defendant must have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence”).
Here, review of the Factual Resume, Doc. 26, and the Transcript of Rearraignment Hearing
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(specifically Defendant Wilkins’ sworn declarations therein), Doc. 51, establishes that he fully
understood the process and consequence of pleading guilty before doing so.
And as to Defendant Wilkins’ rather salacious assertions that while Defendant Wilkins
was in a holding cell prior to a court appearance, Deputy McCarty “tried to coerce Defendant
that he should just ‘plead [sic] guilty’ and that he doesn’t have any other choice,” Doc. 57 at 3,
they are likewise refuted by Defendant Wilkins’ sworn testimony. Judge McKay’s admonitions
included that any guilty plea “must not be because of any threats, force, or coercion.” Doc. 51 at
11. And when he explicitly inquired of Defendant Wilkins whether anyone had “threatened
[him] or in any way attempted to force [him] to plead guilty,” Defendant Wilkins answered,
“no,’ and confirmed that he was choosing to plead guilty because, in fact, [he] committed the
offense charged.” Doc. 51 at 17.
Further, the findings of Magistrate Judge McKay, who directly addressed Defendant
Wilkins and had the opportunity to observe his demeanor throughout the rearraignment hearing
and thus was in the best position to judge the veracity of his answers given under oath, should be
granted great weight. Magistrate Judge McKay specifically found that Defendant Wilkins was
“fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, and . . . [his] plea of guilty [was]
knowing and voluntary….” Doc. 51 at 19.
Based on the foregoing, this Carr factor weighs also against permitting the withdrawal of
Defendant Wilkins’ guilty plea.
F. Permitting Withdrawal Will Substantially Inconvenience the Court and Waste
Judicial Resources
The Government argues no specific prejudice it would suffer if Defendant Wilkins’ guilty
plea is set aside, other than that attendant to having to prepare for trial. Doc. 52 at 9. However,
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“the absence of a showing of prejudice to the government, by itself, should [not] be sufficient to
mandate permission to withdraw a plea when, as here, no credible reason is proffered.” Carr,
740 F.2d at 345. In any event, just as the Government notes in its response, Doc. 52 at 9, the
Court necessarily would be inconvenienced by the disruption to its docket to schedule and
conduct a jury trial in this case. Id. And in the event of conviction following a jury trial, United
States Probation would also be required to rewrite the presentence report—a further waste of
judicial resources.
Because the most significant Carr factors weigh against granting Defendant Wilkins’
request to withdraw his guilty plea, as detailed herein, any inconvenience to the Court or waste
of judicial resources, or lack thereof, would not alone or in combination change the inevitable
conclusion. Thus, the Court has given relatively little weight to this single Carr factor.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons outlined supra, Defendant Wilkins’ pro se Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, Doc. 47, and pro se Supplementary Motion to/for Motion to Withdraw Plea Hearing, Doc.
57, should be DENIED.
Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within
fourteen (14) days from the date of its service shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking
such Report and Recommendation before the assigned United States District Judge. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
SO RECOMMENDED on February 25, 2026.
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