Viral DRM, LLC v. DTX Media Group, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
VIRAL DRM, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
DTX MEDIA GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 3:23-CV -02447-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff VIRAL DRM, LLC (“VIRAL”) sued DTX Media Group, LLC (“DTX”)
for alleged copyright infringement. 	Having already obtained the clerk’s default on
liability, VIRAL now seeks a default judgment against DTX that includes a damages
award and attorney’s fees. 	For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion
for default judgment and enters judgment in favor of VIRAL.
I. Background
VIRAL 	contracts 	with 	professional 	videographers 	and has 	built a 	video
portfolio consisting primarily of footage of encounters with tornadoes and dangerous
storms. 	DTX owns and operates a commercial website and social media account.
VIRAL acquired the rights to a video depicting a tornado hitting a red pickup truck
and registered the video on April 22, 2022. 	On or about March 25, 2022, DTX
displayed the video on its website and social media account without licensing the
video from VIRAL or obtaining permission or consent to publish the video. 	VIRAL
asserts one count of copyright infringement arising from the unauthorized display of
the video on DTX’s account. 	When DTX failed to retain licensed counsel to appear
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and defend this action, VIRAL obtained a clerk’s default and moved for default
judgment.
II. Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides that, in proceedings not
involving a certain sum:
the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. 	A default
judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if
represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary
who has appeared. 	If the party against whom a default judgment is
sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its
representative must be served with written notice of the application at
least 7 days before the hearing. 	The court may conduct hearings or
make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial—
when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to:
(A) conduct an accounting;
(B) determine the amount of damages;
(C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or
(D) investigate any other matter.
A default requires a court to accept as true a plaintiff’s well-pled allegations in a
complaint.1
In determining whether to enter a default judgment, courts conduct a two-part
analysis. First, courts examine whether a default judgment is appropriate under the
circumstances.2 	Relevant factors (called the Lindsey factors) include: (1) whether
disputes of material fact exist; (2) whether there has been substantial prejudice;
1 See, e.g., Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 499 (5th Cir. 2015) (a
complaint is well-pled when “all elements of [a] cause of action are present by implication”); Matter of
Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It is universally understood that a default operates as a
deemed admission of liability.”).
2 Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).
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(3) whether grounds for default are clearly established; (4) whether the default was
caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect; (5) the harshness of a default
judgment; and (6) whether the court would be obliged to grant a motion from the
defendant to set the default judgment aside.3 Second, the Court assesses the merits
of the plaintiff’s claims and whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings.4
III. Application
The Court deems the facts on liability to be admitted and finds DTX not to be
incompetent or a minor. 	While Rule 55 allows for hearings, it does not command
them. VIRAL’s motion is supported by a declaration. As a result, a ruling without a
hearing is proper.
A. Procedural Appropriateness of Default Judgment
The Court now turns to the six Lindsey factors. 	First, there are no material
facts in dispute because DTX has failed to appear or otherwise defend the action.
Second, DTX’s failure to defend the action has brought adversarial proceedings to a
halt and thus has prejudiced VIRAL. Third, default is proper due to DTX’s failure to
appear via licensed counsel to defend this action. 	Fourth, DTX has not offered any
evidence that it is acting under a good faith mistake or excusable neglect. 	Fifth,
nothing suggests that it would be too harsh to enter default judgment against DTX,
who received ample notice of the action and sufficient time to respond. 	The sixth
factor is whether the Court would grant a motion to set aside the default. DTX’s lack
3 Id.
4 Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Hou. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).
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of defense indicates a lack of good cause for the Court to set aside the default
judgment. Thus, the Court concludes a default judgment is appropriate under these
circumstances.
B. Sufficiency of VIRAL’s Infringement Claim
Next, the Court must assess the merits of VIRAL’s infringement claim.
Although DTX, by virtue of its default, is deemed to have admitted VIRAL’s well-pled
allegations, the Court must nonetheless review the complaint to determine whether
it established a viable claim for relief.5
Under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), to state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff
must establish: (1) that the subject work is original and that the plaintiff is the owner
or author of the work; (2) compliance with all formalities required to secure a
copyright under Title 17; (3) that the plaintiff is the proprietor of the copyright of the
video involved in this action; (4) that the work was displayed publicly; and (5) that
the defendant did not received permission from the plaintiff to use the work.6
VIRAL alleges that DTX is liable for copyright infringement based on DTX’s
reproduction of the video and display of the video on DTX’s website and social media
account.7 VIRAL pled and proved by competent evidence that it owns the copyright
for the original video.8 	VIRAL complied with all formalities required to secure a
copyright under Title 17. 	Copyright registration certificates serve as prima facie
5 Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206.
6 Neutral Gray Music et al. v. Tri-City Funding & Mgmt. LLC, No. 4:19- CV-04230, 2021 WL
1521592, *4 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 30, 2021).
7 Doc. 17-3 at 4.
8 Doc. 17-6 at 2.
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evidence of the first three elements of the infringement claim.9 	The video was
publicly displayed for commercial purposes.10 And VIRAL alleges that DTX was not
authorized to use the video. Accordingly, VIRAL has alleged and proved all required
elements under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
C. Damages
VIRAL’s complaint and motion show it is entitled to $30,000.00 in statutory
damages for copyright infringement, $1,275.00 in attorney’s fees, and $482.00 in
costs.
The Copyright Act provides district courts wide discretion when awarding
damages in a copyright case.11 As authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), the Court may
award statutory damages of “not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court
considers just” for each infringed work.12 	“Ultimately, statutory damages are
intended not merely for the restitution of profits or reparation of injury, but to deter
wrongful conduct.”13 	This Court has a duty under the relevant case law to put
Defendants “on notice that it costs less to obey the copyright laws than to violate
them.”14 The Court has previously found awards of statutory damages in the amount
9 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). See Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F. 3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (“A certificate of registration, if timely obtained, is prima facie evidence both that
a copyright is valid and that the registrant owns the copyright.”).
10 Doc. 17-1 at 6.
11 Mouse On Tha Track LLC v. Parg Mgmt. LLC, 2019 WL 6970946, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13,
2019).
12 Bee Creek Photography v. TexasRealFood, Inc., 2024 WL 3100762, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 6,
2024).
13 Future World Elecs., LLC v. Over Drive Mktg., LLC, No. 3:12- CV-2124- B, 2013 WL 5925089,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2013) (Boyle, J.) (cleaned up).
14 EMI April Music Inc. v Jet Rumeurs, Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 619, 628 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008)
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of $30,000 reasonable for copyright infringements.15 	DTX did not file a response
contesting the amount of damages requested by VIRAL.
The Copyright Act provides that a court may award costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party.16 	The Court uses the lodestar method to
determine the reasonableness of the requested attorney’s fees. 	VIRAL submits a
supporting declaration showing hourly rates of $750 for Craig Sanders’ prosecution
of copyright infringement matters. 	The Court finds these hourly rates to be
reasonable and customary in this area for this type of work. VIRAL’s counsel billed
for 1.7 hours of work.17 	The Court has reviewed the itemized invoice to ensure the
attorney exercised billing judgment. 	The Court sees no basis under the Johnson
factors to depart from the lodestar, and VIRAL asks for none.18
17 U.S.C. § 505 allows the prevailing party to recover its “full costs” incurred
in protection of its copyright. 	VIRAL is thus entitled to $482.00 for costs of Court,
consisting of the $402 court filing fee and $80 service fee.
Finally, Flex is entitled to post-judgment interest as allowed by law.19
(Lynn, J.).
15 See Stokes v. TMM Corp., 2022 WL 16577862 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2022) (Starr, J.); see also
Carmel Capital, LLC v. Nu Home Source Realty LLC, 2019 WL 13491383 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2019)
(O’Connor, J.).
16 17 U.S.C. § 505.
17 Doc. 17-2 at 8.
18 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th. Cir. 1974).
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (“Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case
recovered in a district court. . . . Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the
judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of
the judgment.”). The 1-year average Treasury yield on January 2nd, 2026 was 3.48%. See Selected
Interest Rates (Daily) - H.15, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 31, 2024, at
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS VIRAL’s motion for default
judgment 	against 	DTX. 	The 	Court 	awards 	VIRAL 	$30,000 	in 	damages 	for
infringement, attorney’s fees of $1,875, costs of $482, and post-judgment interest of
3.48%. This is a final judgment. All other relief not expressly granted is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of January 2026.
___________________________________
BRANTLEY STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/.
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