Betancurt v. USA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
ANTONIO FRANCISCO BETANCURT,
Petitioner,
v. Civil Case 2:25-CV-106-Z
(Criminal Case 2:23-CR-59-Z-BR-1)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE
Petitioner Antonio Francisco Betancurt (“Betancurt”) filed a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 by a person in federal custody. ECF
Nos. 2, 4. Having considered Betancurt’s amended motion and the response thereto, the
record, and applicable authorities, the Court hereby DENIES the amended motion for the
reasons stated below.
BACKGROUND
The record in Betancurt’s underlying criminal case, No. 2:23-CR-59-Z-BR-1 (the “CR”),
shows the following:
On December 4, 2023, Betancurt pleaded guilty to one count of Possession With Intent
to Distribute Methamphetamine and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. Section 2. CR ECF No. 34. After Betancurt’s guilty
plea, the probation officer prepared a presentence report (“PSR”), showing that Betancurt’s
criminal history was Category I and his total offense level was 38. CR ECF No. 39-1 ¶¶ 30,
35. Betancurt’s sentencing guideline range was 235 to 240 months. Id. ¶¶ 69. On April 18,
2024, the Court sentenced Betancurt to a term of imprisonment of 240 months, followed by
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three years of supervised release. CR ECF No. 42. Betancurt filed a direct appeal, which was
dismissed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as frivolous on November 8, 2024. CR ECF
No. 56.
On May 13, 2024, Betancurt timely filed his motion to vacate. CR ECF No. 63; ECF
No. 2. Because the motion was not on the proper form, the Court ordered Betancurt to amend
his motion, which he did on June 9, 2025. ECF No. 4. The government responded, alleging
that Betancurt’s request for relief is meritless and should be denied. ECF No. 7. Betancurt
did not file a reply.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
After conviction and exhaustion or waiver of a defendant’s right to appeal, courts are
entitled to presume that the defendant stands fairly and finally convicted. United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164-165 (1982); United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir.
1991) (same). A defendant can challenge his conviction or sentence after it is presumed final
only on issues of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, and may not raise an issue for
the first time on collateral review without showing both cause for his procedural default and
actual prejudice resulting from the errors. Id. at 232.
Section 2255 does not offer recourse to all who suffer trial errors. “[A]n error that may
justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final
judgment.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979). Section 2255 is reserved for
transgressions of constitutional rights and other narrow injuries that could not have been
raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.
United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). In other words, a
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal. Davis v. United States,
417 U.S. 333, 345 (1974); United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996). Further,
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if issues are raised and considered on direct appeal, a defendant is thereafter precluded from
urging the same issues in a later collateral attack. Moore v. United States, 598 F.2d 439, 441
(5th Cir. 1979) (citing Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 517-18 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Section 2255 motions do not automatically require a hearing. United States v. Hughes,
635 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981); see also Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings. “When the files and records of a case make manifest the lack of merit of a
Section 2255 claim, the trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Hughes,
635 F.2d at 451. A prisoner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he or she “presents
‘independent indicia of the likely merit of [his] allegations.’” United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d
369, 373 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court has reviewed the record and concluded that an
evidentiary hearing is not necessary because the record categorically refutes Betancurt’s
claims, as set forth below.
ANALYSIS
A. Complaint About Drug Amount.
Betancurt’s sole complaint in his amended motion is “[t]he amount of drugs they said
[he] had.” ECF No. 4 at 4. He provides no further explanation. As a result, Betancurt’s motion
is fatally conclusory. Murray v. United States, No. 3:17-CV-1830-B-BH, 2020 WL 2145378,
*6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2020) (“Movant’s ‘mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are
insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.’”), R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 2132943 (N.D. Tex.
May 5, 2020). Thus, to the extent Betancurt is attempting to raise a substantive claim, he
fails.
In addition, even assuming Betancurt stated a viable claim based on the amount of
drugs for which he was found to be responsible, Betancurt procedurally defaulted such claim
by not raising it on appeal. He also has not shown cause and actual prejudice, or actual
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innocence to excuse his default. See Anderson v. United States, No. 3:17-CR-00222-M-1, 2024
WL 1776378, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2024) (“When a movant fails to raise a claim on direct
appeal, the claim is procedurally defaulted and can only be considered under § 2255 if the
movant can show cause for his failure to raise the claim on direct appeal and actual prejudice,
or that he is actually innocent”) (citing United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir.
1996)). Betancurt’s claim is procedurally defaulted.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Even construing the motion as a complaint about the effectiveness of his counsel, such
claim is fatally conclusory. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant
must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). “[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id.;
see also United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Failure to meet either
the deficient performance prong or the prejudice prong will defeat a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.”). Simply making conclusory allegations of deficient performance and
prejudice is not sufficient to meet the Strickland test. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282
(5th Cir. 2000).
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 371 (2010). The likelihood of a different result “must be substantial, not just
conceivable,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011), and a movant must prove that
counsel’s errors “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
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189 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Judicial scrutiny of this type of claim must
be highly deferential and the movant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689.
Betancurt’s one-sentence allegation in his amended motion is insufficient to support
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Whitehead, 393 F. App’x 226, 227
(5th Cir. 2010) (“A movant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be stated with
specificity; conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue”) (citing Koch
v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 1990)). In addition, although pro se filings are liberally
construed, this deferential standard does not require the Court to guess or to develop
arguments on the movant’s behalf. See United States v. Pineda, 988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir.
1993) (ruling that pro se litigants are still required to provide sufficient facts in support of
their claims, and “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient to raise a
constitutional issue”).
In deference to Betancurt’s pro se status, the Court reviewed his original motion in an
effort to determine a basis for his claim. In the original filing, Betancurt claimed that, despite
multiple requests, his attorney never obtained photographic evidence purportedly in the
government’s possession that showed 183 grams of drugs found in Betancourt’s vehicle
during a traffic stop. ECF No. 2. Betancurt stated that “[t]he only reason [he] got 20 years . .
. was because of the 183 grams that the government lied about and [his] attorney never
helped [him] or showed [him] pictures of the drugs.” Id. However, even if counsel was
deficient in failing to obtain the photographs, Betancurt fails to show how he was prejudiced
by such failure. Assuming that obtaining the photographs somehow would have led to the
drugs from the traffic stop being excluded, the drugs accounted for a mere fraction of the
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95,226.9 kilograms of converted drug weight attributed to Betancurt and would not have
changed his sentencing guideline calculations. See USSG Section 2D1.1(c)(1); CR ECF No.
39-1 at ¶¶ 13, 22.
Lastly, Betancurt was not prejudiced because the Court at sentencing made it clear
that even if the guidelines were incorrect, it would have still imposed the same sentence
under the Section 3553(a) factors. CR ECF No. 54 at 17. Betancurt’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is meritless. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“The subsequent
presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary
dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.”).
For the reasons stated above, Betancurt’s motion to vacate is DENIED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
February 4, 2026.
___________________________________
MATTHEW J. KACSMARYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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