USA v. Medina

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	2:25-CR-126-Z-BR-1
§
DAVID MEDINA, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION
Defendant initially appeared before the undersigned on December 3, 2025 in connection
with a two-count criminal indictment alleging charges of: (1) Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess
with Intent to Distribute 50 grams or More of Methamphetamine (Actual), and (2) Distribution
and Possession with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of Methamphetamine (Actual). (ECF 8
and ECF 1 at 1). Now before the Court is the Government’s motion to detain Defendant pending
trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3142. (ECF 6).
The parties appeared and argued the motion before the undersigned at a detention hearing
on December 5, 2025. (See ECF 19 (minute entry) and ECF 22 (transcript)). Each side proffered
evidence, and the Government called one witness to testify. (See ECF 20 at 1) (Exhibit and Witness
List). The undersigned then ordered each party to submit supplemental briefing while the matter
was taken under advisement. (ECF 23).
Having considered the motion, the evidence and arguments of the parties, and the
applicable law, the Court finds for the following reasons that the Government’s motion should be
DENIED. Defendant will be ORDERED released at a hearing on Monday, December 22, 2025
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at 11:15 a.m., subject to the conditions established by the forthcoming Order Setting Conditions
of Release, an unsigned copy of which is attached to this Order.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The circumstances giving rise to this case were recounted by the Government’s witness at
the detention hearing—Eric Johnson, a special agent with Homeland Security Investigations
(“HSI”). (ECF 22 at 4). Johnson testified that HSI, acting on information that Defendant was
“moving large amounts of methamphetamine in and around the Amarillo area[,]” worked with the
narcotics unit at the Amarillo Police Department to put an undercover officer in contact with
Defendant. (Id.). In July of 2024, Defendant agreed to sell the undercover officer one pound of
methamphetamine, and informed the officer that it would be one of five pounds that a courier was
bringing him from Albuquerque, New Mexico. (Id. at 4–5).
Due to a delay in the delivery, the original agreed transaction was not consummated until
September 24, 2024. (Id. at 5). On that date, the Defendant and his wife drove together to a pre-
arranged meeting spot, where Defendant sold 461 grams—approximately one pound—of
methamphetamine to the undercover officer, and made assurances that he would be able to get
more in the future. (Id. at 6–7). The bundle of methamphetamine was sent to a Drug Enforcement
Agency laboratory for testing, where it was confirmed to be approximately 96% pure. (Id. at 7).
In January of 2025, Johnson and an Amarillo Police Department officer contacted
Defendant at his residence, where they spoke with him about this case and attempted to enlist his
aid in apprehending the courier out of New Mexico. (Id. at 7–8). In that interview, Defendant
admitted to selling methamphetamine, but claimed he only dealt in “small amounts.” (Id. at 8). He
informed the officers that the courier was a Mexican national and an illegal alien, and that the
vehicle driven by the courier was registered in Defendant’s wife’s name. (Id. at 9).
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That investigation did not ultimately result in capture of the courier. (Id. at 10). While those
efforts were ongoing, however, in March of 2025, Defendant attempted to arrange another drug
transaction with the original undercover officer. (Id. at 10–11). He did not inform the Amarillo
Police Department or the Department of Homeland Security of those continued efforts at drug
distribution. (Id. at 10).
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
Once a person has been arrested for a federal crime and brought before a judicial officer,
federal law requires that officer1 to determine whether the person should be “be released or
detained, pending judicial proceedings[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3141.
In keeping with the presumption of innocence until guilt is proven, the standard is to release
the person on their personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond in
an amount set by the Court. Id. at § 3142(b); see also Chavez v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 805, 808 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 503 (1976)). The sole conditions attaching to such release are those that apply in all
cases; the defendant must cooperate in providing a DNA sample, if the law authorizes one to be
taken, and must not violate any laws while on release. Id. at § 3142(b).
The law only permits a judicial officer to deviate from that standard if “such release will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any
other person or the community.” Id. The first of these elements, the reasonable assurance of the
person as required, is commonly evaluated in terms of a defendant’s “flight risk.” The second, the
1 The term “judicial officer” is used here because federal law permits a wide variety of federal, state, and local officials
to perform this function. 18 U.S.C. § 3041.
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danger posed by a defendant’s release to the safety of other persons and the community, is often
paraphrased as a defendant’s “dangerousness.”
If a defendant’s flight risk and dangerousness do not permit release on personal
recognizance or an unsecured bond, the law requires they be released “subject to the least
restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that” will reasonably account for the
defendant’s flight risk and dangerousness. Id. at § 3142(c)(1)(B). The statute then lists fourteen
different examples of such conditions, the last of which is “any other condition that is reasonably
necessary to assure the appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other
person and the community.” Id. at 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)–(xiv). Some of these conditions are mandatory
in cases involving minor victims or failure to register as a sex offender, and no financial conditions
can be imposed in any case that would result in pretrial detention of those too poor to satisfy it;
otherwise, conditions of release are left to the discretion of the judicial officer, who may amend
them at any time. Id. at 3142(c)(1–3).
None of the options described above—release on personal recognizance, on an unsecured
bond, or on conditions of release—require a prior hearing. The judicial officer must hold a hearing,
however, before ordering any person detained before trial. Id. at 3142(e)(1). A government
attorney can request a detention hearing in limited categories of cases. Id. at 3142(f)(1)–(2). If the
Government does not move for a detention hearing, the judicial officer can only hold one if there
is “a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee[,] or a serious risk that [the defendant] will [or will]
attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate . . . a prospective witness or juror.” Id.
at 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B) (internal numbering omitted).
The law sets various standards for the detention hearing. It must occur within a specified
time, and the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel. Id. at 3142(f). Though the rules
for the admissibility of evidence do not apply to the hearing, and the law makes no specific
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provisions for the Government to offer evidence, it does reserve to the defendant the rights to
testify, present witnesses, cross-examine witnesses who appear, “and to present information by
proffer or otherwise.” Id.
A judicial officer must order a defendant detained pending trial only if, “after a hearing
. . ., the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”
Id. at 3142(e)(1). The facts used to support a finding on dangerousness must “be supported by clear
and convincing evidence.” Id. at 3142(f). The statute is silent as to the evidentiary standard for
flight risk, and courts in this Circuit evaluate that element using a preponderance of the evidence
standard. See United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985)
In some cases, the law imposes a presumption that the defendant should be detained, and
requires the defendant to rebut that presumption. Id. at 3142(e)(2)–(3). Even in those cases,
however, there is no “burden of persuasion” on the defendant, who is required merely to produce
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption. United States v. Flores, 53 F.4th 313, 315 (5th Cir.
2022) (quoting United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1989)).
When deciding whether to release or detain a defendant, and whether to impose conditions
on that release, the law requires judicial officers to consider certain factors. These include:
the available information concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . or involves a
minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;
the weight of the evidence against the person; the history of and characteristics of
the person, . . . and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the person’s release.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1)–(4) (internal numbering and punctuation omitted). The “history and
characteristics of the” defendant are specified to include a wide range of details, including2
2 The statute does not limit the Court to considering the defendant’s history and characteristics in only the listed ways.
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character, physical and mental state, substance abuse history, employment, community ties, past
conduct, criminal history, and any pending criminal proceedings under federal, state, or local law.
Id. at 3142(g)(3)(A)–(B).
To summarize, in keeping with the presumption of innocence, the law imposes a strong
bias in favor of releasing defendants while their case proceeds. A defendant may be ordered
detained pending trial only if, after a hearing at which they were given legal counsel and were
permitted to produce their own evidence, the preponderance of evidence precludes a reasonable
assurance that they would appear in court when ordered to do so, and clear and convincing
evidence precludes a reasonable assurance that they would not pose a danger to other people or
the community.
III. 	ANALYSIS
In this case, the Government was permitted to move for a pretrial detention hearing because
the offense charged is one for which the Controlled Substances Act sets a maximum sentence
including ten years or more of imprisonment. (ECF 6 at 1); see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C). This is
a rebuttable presumption case for the same reason. See 18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(3)(A). The Government
originally moved for detention on both the grounds of flight risk and dangerousness. (ECF 6 at 2).
At the detention hearing, the Government withdrew the request for detention based on flight risk,
and now moves solely on dangerousness. (ECF 22 at 13).
There is not clear and convincing evidence in this case to show that Defendant will pose a
danger to the safety of other persons or the community if released. The Government’s argument
to the contrary focuses on the nature and circumstances of the offense charged. Defendant told an
undercover officer that he expected to receive a five-pound shipment of methamphetamine that he
would then distribute into the Amarillo community. (ECF 22 at 5). He then tried to continue selling
narcotics to an undercover officer while ostensibly cooperating with law enforcement, leading the
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Government to argue that he is not “truthful” and would not “be truthful to this Court about his
activities.” (Id. at 14). The Government argues that he would “engage in this conduct again while
out on conditions” because “even after law enforcement contacted him,” he continued to try to sell
drugs. (Id. at 14–15).
In other words, the Government’s evidence that Defendant will be dangerous to the
community if released consists of a statement he made to an undercover agent whom he thought
wanted to purchase large quantities of drugs, and of the fact that he continued dealing drugs while
working as a confidential informant for law enforcement. This is not clear and convincing evidence
that no combination of conditions could reasonably assure the Defendant will not sell drugs while
on pretrial release.
Defendant’s criminal history includes two other narcotics charges—from 1994 and 1996,
both for possession of small amounts of marijuana. At the detention hearing, Special Agent
Johnson testified that Defendant had no weapons on his person when encountered by law
enforcement (ECF 22 at 11), and nothing in Defendant’s history indicates a risk of violence.
Defendant has been unemployed since November of 2025, but has a lengthy employment history.
Defendant highlights that in the year between the drug transaction for which he has now
been arrested and the date of that arrest, the Government tried to enlist Defendant’s help in
arranging a drug deal that would result in the capture of his courier. (ECF 26 at 4). The call to
arrange a transaction with the undercover officer occurred during this time, when the Government
was already aware and making use of Defendant’s ongoing narcotics activity. Defendant argues
that, if the attempt to sell to the undercover agent in March of 2025 were clear and convincing
evidence that Defendant posed a danger to the community, the Government should have arrested
him immediately; instead, they continued to work with him for months. (Id. at 4). As stated in
Defendant’s brief, “It defies logic that the Government would leave an individual on the streets for
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14 months who presented a danger to the community.” (Id. at 3). The Court agrees that “[t]hese
facts undermine the credibility of the Government’s case for detention.” (Id.).
There is not clear and convincing evidence that no combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community while Defendant is on release.
Accordingly, the Court intends to impose conditions indicated in the unsigned Order Setting
Conditions of Release that is attached to this Order. At the hearing to set conditions of release, the
Court will permit either party to request additions or modifications to the terms indicated here.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and evidence, and the applicable law, it has not
been shown by the preponderance of the evidence that no combination of conditions could
reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant as required, nor by clear and convincing evidence
that no combination of conditions could reasonably assure and the safety of other persons and the
community if Defendant is released. Accordingly, the Government’s motion to detain Defendant
pending trial is DENIED. The Defendant will be ORDERED released at a hearing on Monday,
December 22, 2025 at 11:15 a.m., subject to the conditions established by the forthcoming Order
Setting Conditions of Release. An unsigned version of that forthcoming Order has been attached
to this Order to provide notice to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED on December 19, 2025.
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