Bermudez et al v. State of Texas et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION
RISHA BERMUDEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 1:25-CV-00239-H-BU
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Risha Bermudez brings this action against the State of Texas, Callahan
County, Callahan County Officials and Court Actors, the Department of Family and Pro-
tective Services (DFPS), named Child Protective Services (CPS) employees, and other un-
named agents acting under color of state law (collectively, “the Defendants”). Bermudez
alleges that the Defendants violated her constitutional rights through CPS proceedings oc-
curring in the 42nd Judicial District Court of Texas. Bermudez’s claims are subject to ju-
dicial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 because Bermudez has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 15. For the reasons below, the Court should dismiss
Bermudez’s claims against all Defendants.
I. JURISDICTION
Because Bermudez raises allegations of constitutional violations against state ac-
tors, her claims fall under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, granting this Court subject-matter jurisdiction
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. No. 1. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas,
Abilene Division, because Bermudez’s claims arise from court proceedings that occurred
in Callahan County, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The undersigned has the authority to
enter these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations after United States District Court
Judge James Wesley Hendrix referred Bermudez’s case to the undersigned for preliminary
screening under Special Order 3. Dkt. No. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Bermudez has not
consented to the undersigned exercising the full jurisdiction of this Court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of screening a plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
or 1915A, a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them
in a way that most favor the plaintiff. Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d
415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017).
The facts in this case arise from CPS proceedings that occurred in the 42nd Judicial
District Court, which is located in Callahan County. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 9, 4-1 at 1. Bermudez
alleges that, during the proceedings, the judge, the CPS employees, and the attorneys for
the father and children “aligned in a coordinated coercive effort” against her. Dkt. No. 1 at
9. During the proceeding, allegations were raised against Bermudez that she was using
drugs, an accusation she claims lacks verified evidence or probable cause. Id.
CPS also restricted her ability to communicate with her two minor children; she
alleges that her calls are monitored, that calls are terminated when comments critical of
CPS are made, and that she is limited to using written letters to communicate with her
children. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 9, 4 at 3. CPS conditioned in-person visitation with her children on
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Bermudez taking a drug test, regardless of the outcome of the test; Bermudez characterizes
this requirement as coercive, making “access to [her] own children conditioned on forced
submission.” Dkt. Nos. 1-2 at 2–4, 4 at 2–3. Bermudez also alleges that Meghan Davis,
one of the CPS workers, bragged that she had “never returned a child to the home” and
became a supervisor after “removal of the five youngest children.” Dkt. No. 4 at 3.
During these state proceedings, Bermudez sought to challenge the jurisdiction of
the 42nd Judicial District Court. On or around October 25, 2025, Bermudez submitted a
72-Hour Emergency Filing to the state court, demanding immediate restoration of direct
communication with her children, immediate proof of the court’s jurisdiction on the record,
and an emergency hearing. Dkt. No. 4 at 1. When Bermudez submitted her filing with the
state court clerk, she was told that it would not be placed in front of the judge because
“there was no order for the judge to sign.” Id. at 2. She was also told she could not speak
to the judge and that no emergency hearing would be scheduled. Id.
On October 28, 2025, Bermudez submitted a Notice of Expiring 72-Hour Emer-
gency Demand to the state court, reasserting her demands for uncensored communication
with her children, proof of jurisdiction, and an emergency hearing. Id. at 1, 3. If she did not
receive the relief demanded, she would instead seek immediate intervention from an “Ar-
ticle III § 2 tribunal” and an injunction against further court interference. Id. at 3. Bermudez
attached an intake acknowledgment form to her filing, on which the state court clerk indi-
cated again that the filing would not be routed to the judge on the same day and no emer-
gency hearing would be scheduled. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 2, 4 at 5.
Bermudez alleges that the state court’s failure to acknowledge the 72-Hour Notice
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or hold a hearing constitutes default in the court’s fiduciary duty. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. She
therefore filed her Complaint with this Court on November 5, 2025, seeking a declaration
that all orders and actions by Callahan County and DFPS are “null and void ab initio,” and
an order restoring all communication and custody privileges, imposing sanctions on the
defendants, and granting other equitable relief as the Court deems necessary. Dkt. No. 1.
III. THE PARTIES
In her filings, Plaintiff Risha Bermudez identifies the following defendants she
seeks to sue: (1) the State of Texas; (2) Callahan County; (3) Callahan County Officials
and Court Actors;1 (4) the DFPS; (5) named CPS workers;2 and (6) all other agents acting
under color of law. Dkt. No. 1 at 1.
Because Bermudez seeks to bring suit against state actors, including the State of
Texas and the DFPS, the Court must determine whether sovereign immunity precludes suit
against these defendants. The Eleventh Amendment bars private parties from bringing suit
against nonconsenting states in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1984); City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 2019) (“In
most cases, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars private suits against noncon-
senting states in federal court.”). The “DFPS is entitled to sovereign immunity as a state
agency” under the Eleventh Amendment.3 The State of Texas has not waived its sovereign
1 The only named Callahan County official that is named is Kaitlin Eubanks, the Callahan County District
Clerk. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 2–3, 4 at 5. Bermudez also identifies the judge and a second unnamed clerk in her
filings. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 9, 4 at 1–2.
2 Bermudez’s filings include the following CPS employees or contractors: Meghan Davis, Corey Jacobs,
and Meredith Locker. Dkt. Nos. 1-2 at 2–5, 4 at 3. Bermudez also identifies the CPS attorney and advocate
in her filings, although neither are named. Dkt. No. 1 at 9.
3 Palacios v. TX Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 2:24-CV-00223, 2025 WL 2346121, at *2 (S.D.
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immunity to § 1983 claims, and Congress has not abrogated this sovereign immunity. Jen-
nings v. Abbott, 538 F. Supp. 3d 682 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (citing NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v.
Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2015)). Thus, Bermudez’s claims against DFPS and
the State of Texas are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.4
However, the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity permits claims for
prospective relief to be brought against state officials in their official capacity to prevent
future constitutional or federal statutory violations. 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see Aguilar v. Tex.
Dep't of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir.1998). Here, the exception poten-
tially applies to Bermudez’s claims against the DFPS employees; Bermudez seeks only
prospective relief, such as injunctions against further court action and restoration of com-
munication with her children, and alleges violations of her due process and familial asso-
ciation rights. Dkt. No. 1 at 3–4, 9. In the analysis section below, the undersigned discusses
whether Bermudez has also plausibly alleged an ongoing constitutional violation: only in
the case of a plausibly alleged ongoing violation does the Ex parte Young exception apply
and permit her suit against the court officials and DFPS agents.
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the court determines the
complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
Tex. July 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24-CV-00223, 2025 WL 2337049 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 13, 2025)
4 Bermudez’s suit against Callahan County is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994) (“[C]ities and counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment
immunity.”).
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§§ 1915(e)(2)(B). A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable basis, either in fact or in law,
for the wrong alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks
an arguable basis in fact if it rests upon clearly baseless factual contentions, and similarly,
it lacks an arguable basis in law if it contains indisputably meritless legal theories. See id.
at 327; Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim—whether under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Sec-
tion 1915A(b)(1), or Rule 12(b)(6)—“turns on the sufficiency of the ‘factual allegations’
in the complaint.” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App’x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam)). Thus, if
a plaintiff “plead[s] facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle
them to relief, the claims should not be dismissed merely because the plaintiff fails to ar-
ticulate the proper legal theory that otherwise makes those facts actionable in court. John-
son, 574 U.S. at 11–12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3), (d)(1), (e)).
Courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). This means the factual allegations, while not
required to be detailed, must amount to more than mere labels, conclusions, or a statement
of the legal elements of a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469.
For claims to be substantively plausible, a plaintiff need not establish that the
pleaded facts probably occurred as alleged, but the facts must allow the court “to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc.,
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634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–679). Even pro se plain-
tiffs must plead facts that raise the right to relief above a speculative level. Chhim, 836 F.3d
at 469 (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)). And
when plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
When evaluating a complaint under these standards, courts liberally construe the
pleadings of pro se plaintiffs, holding their complaints to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). But
“liberal construction does not require that the Court . . . create causes of action where there
are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8
(N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013). “To demand otherwise would require the ‘courts to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff’” and would “‘transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.’” Jones v. Mangrum,
No. 3:16-cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Ultimately, “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experi-
ence and common sense.’” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d
890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
V. ANALYSIS
Through Bermudez’s various filings with the Court, she has asserted claims to the
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following forms of judicial relief: (1) an order nullifying all orders or actions taken by
Callahan County, DFPS, and any of their agents while jurisdiction was unproven; (2) an
order immediately restoring communication and custody privileges as they were prior to
the unlawful removals; (3) an order imposing appropriate sanctions against any officer,
clerk, or agent who refused to perform ministerial duties; (4) an order staying proceedings
in Callahan County until this Court has completed its full review; and (5) a demand for all
evidence and documentation related to the contested proceedings. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3–4, 6 at
1–2.
Bermudez presents her claim against the government Defendants as an original pe-
tition where she, as the plaintiff or petitioner, seeks injunctive and declarative relief against
the Defendants. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2. However, Bermudez has also filed what purports to
be a Notice of Removal with the court, accompanied by certificates of service to various
Defendants. Dkt. Nos. 6 at 2, 6-1 at 1–5. The undersigned will first construe Bermudez’s
claims as an attempt at removing the state CPS proceeding, and then discuss the alternative
construction of her claims as § 1983 allegations against the Defendants.
A. Construction as Removal
While not initially filed as a Removal, Bermudez submitted a Notice of Removal
two days after filing her Complaint. Dkt. No. 6 at 2. The undersigned notes that the removal
notice does not comply with the requirements of § 1446, which governs the procedure for
removing civil actions; for example, Bermudez’s filing did not include a copy of the pro-
cess, pleadings, and orders that were served on her, as required by § 1446(a). She also
failed to comply with Local Rule 81.1(a), which required that she provide a copy of the
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state docket and each document filed in state court.
However, even if Bermudez cured these procedural defects, removal would still be
impossible because this Court lacks original jurisdiction over CPS proceedings. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441, which defines a district court’s removal jurisdiction over civil actions, allows a
defendant to remove a civil action only when the district court has “original jurisdiction”
over said action. § 1441(a). The Supreme Court has held that federal district courts gener-
ally lack jurisdiction over “domestic relations” cases, including matters involving child
custody. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (“We conclude, therefore, that
the domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber, divests the fed-
eral courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”).
It appears from Bermudez’s Complaint that the civil action she seeks to remove
centers on a child custody dispute. She alleges that the CPS proceedings, which stemmed
from allegations of family conflict, turned to accusations of drug use; she also complains
that her ability to communicate with and visit her children have been obstructed by CPS
and the state court. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 9, 4-1 at 2–3. The relief she seeks include “immediate
restoration of communication and custody privileges” and a court Order staying “further
proceedings concerning the subject children” in state court. Dkt. No. 1 at 3–4. Based on
these facts, it appears that Bermudez seeks for this court to issue a “child custody decree,”
relief the Supreme Court has held this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant. Ankenbrandt, 504
U.S. at 703. Because federal district courts lack original jurisdiction over such civil actions,
Bermudez cannot remove her case to this Court.
Bermudez also asserts other grounds for relief, such as a lack of lawful jurisdiction
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and violation of her due process rights, that this Court would have original jurisdiction
over. Dkt. No. 1 at 3–4. While Bermudez may disagree with the state litigation on consti-
tutional grounds, these constitutional claims are not the subject of that litigation. Removal
is not the appropriate method to seek federal review of the validity of the state court pro-
ceedings; to the extent Bermudez seeks to do so, her filings are properly construed as as-
serting new complaints against the defendants rather than removing her civil action from
state court.
Turning from the discussion of Bermudez’s attempt at removal, the undersigned
now evaluates the validity of her constitutional claims against the defendants.
B. Construction as Constitutional Claim
Liberally construing Bermudez’s filings, the undersigned finds that she has alleged
the following claims against the Defendants: (1) that 42nd District Court officials have
obstructed her constitutional right to communicate with and have custody over her chil-
dren; (2) that these same defendants have deprived her of her rights without due process or
lawful jurisdiction; and (3) that the named CPS workers have deprived her of her constitu-
tional right to communicate with and have custody over her children. Each claim is dis-
cussed further below.
1. 	Domestic Relations Claim against the State Court Officials
First, Bermudez alleges that state court officials have obstructed her right of familial
association with her children. In particular, she alleges that the judge aligned with the CPS
workers and attorneys for the other parties, becoming a “unified party against the [plain-
tiff].” Dkt. No. 1 at 9. When Bermudez filed an emergency filing in state court demanding
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immediate restoration of “direct, uncensored communication” with her children, the state
court clerk told her that her filing would not be placed in front of the judge to sign. Dkt.
No. 4 at 1–2. A second filing demanding the same relief was denied by another state court
clerk, Kaitlin Eubanks. Dkt. No. 4 at 3–5. Bermudez now requests that the Court intervene
and restore immediate communication and custody rights with her children. Dkt. No. 1 at
3.
The undersigned concludes that, regardless of the merits of Bermudez’s claim, the
Court lacks jurisdiction to provide the requested relief. As discussed above, federal district
courts lack jurisdiction to issue child custody decrees in domestic relations cases. Anken-
brandt, 504 U.S. at 703. The Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court have cautioned against al-
lowing litigants to circumvent the state’s jurisdiction by reframing their domestic relations
dispute as a civil rights claim. Moore v. Whitman, 742 F. App'x 829, 832 (5th Cir. 2018)
(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). If review
of state court proceedings is desired, the appropriate remedy is to either appeal to a higher
state court or seek federal appellate review with the United States Supreme Court. Wkly. v.
Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000).
For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
overturn the state court’s judgment as to the appropriate form of custody and communica-
tion rights. However, Bermudez may still allege a plausible claim that the state procedure
deprived her of her due process rights; this claim is examined further below.
2. 	Due Process Claim against the State Court Officials
Next, Bermudez alleges that the officials in the 42nd District Court have deprived
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her of her rights without due process. She alleges that the state judge aligned with the CPS
workers and attorneys for the other parties, depriving her of her right to an unbiased tribu-
nal. Dkt. No. 1 at 9. She also alleges that her demand for a 72-hour emergency hearing was
summarily denied by two state court clerks, who each refused to place her filing before the
judge. Dkt. No. 4 at 1–5. Bermudez also alleges that the state court has failed to prove its
jurisdiction on the record, as demanded in the emergency filings. Dkt. No. 4 at 1–3.
The undersigned concludes that, on these facts, Bermudez has failed to plausibly
allege a violation of her due process rights. First, Bermudez fails to allege facts plausibly
showing that the judge aligned himself against her in the CPS proceeding. Even a judge
operating as a “neutral arbiter” will make judgments or issue orders that adversely affect
one of the parties; in order to allege more than a “mere possibility of misconduct,” Bermu-
dez must allege facts indicating that the judge’s actions against her went beyond neutral
dispute resolution. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc., 634 F.3d at 796.
The only fact alleged is that, despite the dispute centering on family conflict, accu-
sations of substance abuse were raised during the proceeding without “verified evidence or
probable cause.” Dkt. No. 1 at 9. Presumably, these accusations led to the requirement that
Bermudez take a drug test. Dkt. No. 4-1 at 2. While Texas courts can only order a drug test
when a party’s mental or physical condition is put into issue by adequate proof,5 Bermudez
has not alleged that the court ordered that she take a drug test; her pleadings claim only
5 T EX. R. CIV. P RO. 204.1(c) (formerly Rule 167a); Walsh v. Ferguson, 712 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. App.
1986) (“The ‘in controversy’ and ‘good cause’ requirements of Rule 167a(a) make it apparent that exami-
nations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition are not to
be automatically ordered, but instead are to be ordered only upon a showing of adequate proof.”)
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that CPS and DFPS required testing. Dkt. No. 4-1 at 2. Even assuming the drug test was
court-ordered, the good faith and controversy requirements can be satisfied by mere alle-
gations of drug use, even ones supported by hearsay. Monaghan v. Crawford, 763 S.W.2d
955, 957–58 (Tex. App. 1989) (accepting the father’s allegations that his children told him
they saw their mother use drugs). Thus, Bermudez’s insistence that “all claims [of drug
use] are hearsay” would not render the court-ordered drug test improper. Dkt. No. 1 at 9.
For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that Bermudez has not plausibly alleged that
the judge improperly sided against her and deprived her of due process.
Next, Bermudez fails to allege that her rights were violated by the court’s refusal to
grant her an emergency hearing. Bermudez does not present any law stating that a partici-
pant in a CPS proceeding has a right to demand a 72-hour emergency proceeding solely to
restore communication rights, and the undersigned is aware of none.6 The failure to set an
emergency hearing in the absence of an emergency is not a constitutional violation, espe-
cially when the desired communication rights were restricted only pending a drug test.
Lastly, Bermudez fails to plausibly allege that her rights were violated when the
state court failed to prove its jurisdiction on the record. At the outset, Bermudez does not
allege any basis for questioning the state court’s jurisdiction; instead, she claims that a court
that seeks to assert jurisdiction must prove jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 4 at 1. Insistence on “ever
more ‘authority and ‘authentication’” is a hallmark of the sovereign citizen movement.
6 Texas law does allow the court to issue temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the child. TEX. F AM.
CODE § 105.001(a). However, Bermudez sought an emergency order solely to gain “direct, uncensored
communication” with her children, without any allegation that her children faced any harm. Dkt. No. 4 at
1.
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Wirsche v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 7:13-CV-528, 2013 WL 6564657, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
13, 2013). “These teachings have never worked in a court of law—not a single time.” Id.
That her Complaint includes other indicators of sovereign citizen strategies, such as insist-
ence that she is a “sui juris” party rather than a pro se litigant,7 further suggests that her
demand for proof of jurisdiction is baseless. Dkt. No. 1.
While the above facts lead the undersigned to conclude Bermudez’s jurisdictional
claims are meritless, an independent assessment of the facts alleged indicate that the 42nd
District Court of Texas likely has lawful jurisdiction over her CPS claim. A brief review of
Texas law indicates that Texas district courts, such as the 42nd District Court of Texas,
have jurisdiction over family law and child custody cases in Texas. See Texas Government
Code § 24.008 (district courts have jurisdiction over “any cause that is cognizable by courts
of law or equity”); Id. § 24.601 (establishing family district courts with jurisdiction over
“child welfare [and] custody” cases, while not relieving “district courts . . . of responsibility
for handling cases involving family law matters”).
There are also no facts alleged indicating that the court in Callahan County is not
the proper district court to preside over Bermudez’s claim; the mailing address she provided
to the Court indicates that she resides in Baird Texas, which is within Callahan County.
Nowhere in her pleadings does she indicate that her children do not live in Callahan County,
a fact that would impact the court’s jurisdiction over her case. T EX. F AM . C ODE §
7 Jackson v. Massachusetts, No. 18-11609, 2018 WL 5017919, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 15, 2018) (“To the
degree [the Plaintiff] maintains that he is not a pro se litigant but a “sui juris” party, his position is facially
deficient. His legal position is erroneously based on a misguided reading of statutes and other authority that
are common to claims asserted by sovereign citizen groups.”).
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152.201(a).
For the above reasons, the undersigned concludes that Bermudez has not plausibly
alleged that the state court has violated her right to due process.
3. 	Domestic Relations Claim against CPS workers
Lastly, Bermudez claims that CPS and DFPS workers deprived her of her familial
association rights. Bermudez alleges that CPS worker Meghan Davis bragged about “never
returning a child to the home” and becoming a supervisor after effecting the removal of
five young children. Dkt. No. 4 at 3. Bermudez also attaches an email chain in which two
2ingage employees,8 Corey Jacobs and Meredith Locker, require that she take a drug test
before being allowed in-person visitation with her children. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2–4.
It is true that a parent possesses a substantive due process right to family integrity,
which includes custody and control over their children. Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211
F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 2000); D.A. v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 3d 715, 734–35 (W.D.
Tex. 2023). However, this liberty interest “must be balanced against the state's interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of children.” Wooley, 211 F.3d at 924. The right
to family integrity is violated when government action is “arbitrary, or conscience shock-
ing.” D.A., 663 F. Supp. 3d at 735.
Bermudez fails to plausibly allege a violation of her rights in either case. While the
8 2ingage is a Single Source Continuum Contractor (SSCC) with the DFPS. https://www.dfps.texas.gov/Do-
ing_Business/Purchased_Client_Services/Community-Based_Care_Contracts/default.asp. 	Thus, 	Jacobs
and Locker are most likely independent contractors rather than employees of the DFPS, and potentially
beyond the scope of a § 1983 claim. “§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how
discriminatory or wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143
L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). Regardless, Bermudez has failed to allege that these defendants violated her rights.
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undersigned accepts as true that Davis bragged about never returning a child to the home,
Bermudez has not alleged any action that Davis took against her; instead, she alleges that
Davis’s statement indicates a lack of impartiality. Dkt. No. 4 at 3. Bermudez cannot allege
that her familial integrity rights were violated merely by a CPS worker having a bias, es-
pecially if no conduct by said worker is alleged. Moreover, even accepting Bermudez’s
allegations about Davis’s bragging, Bermudez has not pleaded sufficient facts from which
this Court can reasonably infer that Davis’s “never returning a child to the home” or being
promoted for removing certain children was somehow improper. Without more, these alle-
gations could be perfectly consistent with the expected duties of a CPS worker.
Her claims against Jacobs and Locker fail because she has not alleged that they
deprived of her right to communicate with her children. She admits that she is able to com-
municate with her children through letters and calls, and that live visitation was conditioned
only upon taking a drug test, regardless of the outcome of the test. Dkt. No. 4-1 at 2–3. The
undersigned cannot conclude that, within the context of an ongoing child custody case,
these restrictions on custody are either arbitrary or conscience shocking.
For the reasons above, the undersigned concludes that Bermudez has failed to allege
that any CPS or DFPS workers have violated her rights.
4. 	Summary
For each Defendant, Bermudez has either failed to allege facts showing that this
court has jurisdiction to grant the relief demanded, or failed to allege a plausible violation
of her rights. The undersigned concludes that none of Bermudez’s claims survive judicial
screening, and therefore recommends that all claims be dismissed.
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VI. LEAVE TO AMEND
Still, there is the issue of whether the Court must give Bermudez leave to amend her
complaint. Generally, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his com-
plaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009).
Leave to amend is not required, however, where an amendment would be futile, in other
words, the amended complaint would still fail to state a claim, Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014), or where a plaintiff has already
received an opportunity to amend his or her claims, Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Inte-
grated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).
Here, the undersigned concludes that Bermudez has plead her best case. Bermudez’s
pleadings indicate that this Court lacks jurisdiction to preside over her CPS case or restore
communication with her children. Bermudez’s remaining claims center on the state court’s
alleged failure to provide an emergency hearing or prove its jurisdiction on the record;
Bermudez has failed to allege that she is entitled to either remedy under state law. Bermu-
dez’s reliance on sovereign citizen theories further indicates that her claims against the
state court are frivolous and that further leave to allege additional facts would be futile.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court:
(1) DISMISS Bermudez’s claims against the State of Texas and DFPS with preju-
dice as barred under the Eleventh Amendment; and
(2) DISMISS Bermudez’s claims against the remaining Defendants without preju-
dice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
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VIII. RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these Find-
ings, Conclusions, and Recommendations must file specific written objections within four-
teen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
the objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magis-
trate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations where the disputed determina-
tion is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will
bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of
plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
IX. TRANSFER OF CASE
Having completed the preliminary screening of Bermudez’s claims, the undersigned
ORDERS that this case be TRANSFERRED back to the docket of the United States Dis-
trict Judge and designated as Civil Action No. 1:25-CV-00239-H.
ORDERED this 5th day of December 2025.
JOHN R. PARKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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