Cusick v. TDCJ Parole Division

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION
CHRISTIAN CUSICK,
Institutional ID No. 119838
Plaintiff,
v.
TDCJ PAROLE DIVISION,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00232-BU
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Christian Cusick, a former TDCJ inmate, filed this pro se civil rights action
on November 03, 2025, complaining of events that occurred while he was incarcerated at
the El Paso County Jail Annex.1 Dkt. No. 1. Through this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Cusick
alleges that the TDCJ Parole Division violated his constitutional rights. See Dkt. Nos. 6,
11. He seeks monetary damages. Dkt. No. 6 at 4.
Cusick’s claims are subject to judicial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A
because Cusick has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 8, and he
sues a governmental entity, see Dkt. No. 1. United States District Court Judge James Wes-
ley Hendrix transferred Cusick’s case to the undersigned for preliminary screening. Dkt.
1 Cusick is currently in custody at the Taylor County Adult Detention Facility for an unrelated matter.
TCADF is managed by the Taylor County Sheriff’s Office and is not a part of the TDCJ. TCADF serves as
a county jail for individuals awaiting trial or sentencing.
Case 1:25-cv-00232-H Document 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 6 PageID <pageID>

2
No. 9; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Cusick has not consented to the undersigned exercising the full
jurisdiction of this Court.
For the reasons below, the Court should DISMISS Cusick’s claims.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Cusick alleges that in November 2023, he was arrested by the El Paso County Sher-
iff’s Office for allegedly violating a condition of his parole. Dkt. No. 6 at 4. Following a
hearing, parole authorities found Cusick not guilty of any parole violation. Id. Despite that
determination, he alleges that he was nevertheless “held by parole” and was not released
until February 29, 2024. Id. According to Cusick, this release occurred twenty-seven days
after the discharge date on his original sentence. Id.
Cusick contends that the TDCJ Parole Division is responsible for not releasing him
after the hearing and for holding him past his discharge date. Cusick alleges that his con-
stitutional rights were violated because “parole refused to communicate with El Paso
County Jail staff” and that his claims against the Parole Division are due to the Division’s
“general role in overseeing the parole program.” Dkt. No. 11 at 3–4. In the Magistrate
Judge’s Questionnaire, the undersigned asked Cusick the following:
Name any entities or individuals other than the TDCJ Parole Division that
you claim violated your civil rights in connection with this lawsuit. If none,
write none. If you wish to add additional defendants, list their name, position,
and specific facts regarding their involvement.
Dkt. No. 11 at 4. Cusick answered “None.” Id.
Case 1:25-cv-00232-H Document 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 6 PageID <pageID>

3
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
When screening a case under § 1915A, dismissal is appropriate when the plaintiff
“seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(2). Likewise, when screening a case under § 1915, dismissal is appropriate
when the plaintiff “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
III. ANALYSIS
Absent consent to suit, waiver of immunity by the state, or congressional abrogation
of sovereign immunity, the “Eleventh Amendment bars federal lawsuits by a U.S. citizen
against a state or against a state agency or department.” Fortenberry v. Bd. of Par-
dons and Parole, Civil Action No. 7:15-cv-167-O, 2018 WL 9739270, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Sep. 28, 2018). “As a division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the
[Texas] Board of Pardons and Paroles is a state agency.” Id. (citing Alberti v. Sheriff of
Harris County, Tex., 937 F.2d 984, 1003 (5th Cir. 1991); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§
493.002(a)(3), 493.005). This immunity applies equally to the TDCJ Parole Division.
Jackson v. TDCJ Pardon & Parole Div., No. CIV.A. 301CV2304L, 2002 WL 485696, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2002) (“the Pardons and Paroles Division is a state agency and, as
such, is cloaked with Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Texas has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to suits
against the Department of Criminal Justice. See id. (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §
492.010). Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted §
1983, the statute under which Cusick brings suit. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
Case 1:25-cv-00232-H Document 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 6 PageID <pageID>

4
491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Because there is no consent, waiver, or abrogation,
the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice are
not amenable to suit. Fortenberry, 2018 WL 9739270, at *1.
Here, Cusick seeks monetary relief from TDCJ Parole Division.2 The Texas Board
of Pardon and Paroles, a division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, is cloaked
with Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Duncan v. State of Texas, No. 3:15-CV-711-L-
BN, 2015 WL 7566270, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2015), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. Duncan v. The State of Texas, No. 3:15-CV-711-L, 2015 WL 7450497
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2015) (citing Waller v. Collier, 297 F. App’x 326, 327 (5th Cir.
2008) (per curiam)) (citing in turn McGrew v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158,
161 (5th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, Cusick’s § 1983 claim for damages against Defendant is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against this Defendant
should be dismissed under Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(2) because Cusick seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
2 The undersigned takes judicial notice of the relationship between the Parole Division (which Plaintiff
sues) and the Board of Pardons and Paroles. See https://tdcj.texas.gov/divisions/pd/index.html.
The Parole Division supervises offenders released from prison who are serving out their
sentences in Texas communities. The division also performs some pre-release functions by
investigating the parole plans proposed by inmates and by tracking parole eligible cases
and submitting them for timely consideration by the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
The division does not make release decisions, nor does it decide whose parole should be
revoked or what special conditions should be placed on releasees. Authority for those de-
cisions rests with the Board of Pardons and Paroles, but the division works closely with the
board and provides board members with the documentation needed to make informed de-
cisions.
Although Plaintiff sues the Parole Division, both state entities are cloaked with Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity.
Case 1:25-cv-00232-H Document 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 6 PageID <pageID>

5
Cusick’s claims fare no better if the Court construes them against unnamed officers
of the Parole Division in their personal capacities. “Parole officers are entitled to absolute
immunity from liability for their conduct in parole decisions and in the exercise of their
decision-making powers.” Littles v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th
Cir.1995) (per curiam) (citing Walter v. Torres, 917 F.2d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1990)); see
Woods v. Chapman, 239 F. App’x 35, 37 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (parole officials were
absolutely immune from suit for damages arising from proceedings to revoke or change
conditions of parole).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that all claims against
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE at the screening stage because the Defendant is immune from suit.3
V. RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these Find-
ings, Conclusions, and Recommendations must file specific written objections within four-
3 Although the Abilene Division is also unlikely a proper venue for Cusick’s claims, the question of venue
does not arise until a district court satisfies itself that it possesses subject matter jurisdiction. This is why
“[a] Court may not order a transfer under either section 1404(a) or section 1406(a) unless it has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of [the] lawsuit.” Andrade v. Chojnacki, 934 F. Supp. 817, 824 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(citing 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3827,
at 262, and § 3844, at 332 (2d ed. 1986)); see Syndicate 420 at Lloyd's London v. Early Am. Ins. Co., 796
F.2d 821, 827 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1986). This jurisdictional prerequisite for venue transfers is reflected in the
limitation of transfers under § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to only those districts or divisions where the case
might or could have been brought in the first place. Due to sovereign immunity, Cusick’s case could not be
brought in any district or division.
Case 1:25-cv-00232-H Document 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 6 PageID <pageID>

6
teen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
the objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magis-
trate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations where the disputed determina-
tion is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will
bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of
plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
VI. TRANSFER OF CASE
Having completed the preliminary screening of Cusick’s claims, the undersigned
ORDERS that this case be TRANSFERRED back to the docket of the United States Dis-
trict Judge and designated as Civil Action No. 1:25-CV-00232-H.
ORDERED this 25th day of February 2026.
JOHN R. PARKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00232-H Document 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 6 PageID <pageID>