Townsend v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue et al

9:24-cv-00217Txed26 nov. 2025

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BOBIE KENNETH TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:24-CV-00217
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules of Court for the Assignment of Duties
to United States Magistrate Judges, the district court referred this proceeding to the Honorable
Christine L. Stetson, United States Magistrate Judge, to conduct all pretrial proceedings, to enter
findings of fact and recommend disposition on case-dispositive matters, and to determine non-
dispositive matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); E.D. TEX. LOC. R. CV-72.
On September 9, 2025, this court adopted (#104) Judge Stetson’s Report and
Recommendation (#89) and denied pro se Plaintiff Bobie Kenneth Townsend’s motion for a
temporary restraining order (#3) as well as his first (#10) and second (#17) motions to release
his tax levies, and granted in part and denied in part the Government’s motion to dismiss (#27).
Only Plaintiff’s claim under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
remains (#104). On September 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider (#108) the order.
The Government responded (#113) on September 23, and Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to
file a reply (#116) and accompanying reply (#117) on September 30, 2025.
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I. Applicable Law
“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.”
Shepherd v. Int’l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326, 328 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). Under this district’s Local
Rule CV-7(a)(4), however, litigants may ask the court to “reconsider” its prior orders. Motions
for reconsideration of “any order or other decision that does not end the action” are analyzed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). McClendon v. United States, 892 F.3d 775, 781
(5th Cir. 2018) (referencing Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2017)).
This approach is “flexible” and allows the “district court to afford such relief from interlocutory
judgments as justice requires” without the “heightened standards for reconsideration governing
final orders.” Austin, 864 F.3d at 337. Further, “the trial court is free to reconsider and reverse
[or affirm] its decision for any reason it deems sufficient.” Id. at 336.
II. Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply (#116)
This district permits reply briefs. E.D. Tex. Loc. R. CV-7(f). Plaintiff does not need
leave to reply unless he seeks to file a reply past the deadline or a reply exceeding the page limit.
His reply here is five pages, and thus permissible. His motion for leave (#116) is therefore
DENIED as moot.
B. Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration
Plaintiff’s motion “asks for reconsideration [of the] Magistrate Judge’s R&R” on multiple
points (#108 at 2, ¶3). Many of the arguments he makes regarding what he perceives to be
errors in Judge Stetson’s Report and Recommendation simply rehash the arguments he made in
his first objections. Since re-raising the same arguments is “no better than a complete failure to
object,” Plaintiff offers no grounds to disturb the court’s previous adoption of Judge Stetson’s
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Report and Recommendation. SciCo Tec GmbH v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 599 F.Supp.2d 741, 743
(E.D. Tex. 2009). The court remains satisfied with its previous order.
This leaves Plaintiff’s request for the court to reconsider his “issue concerning 26 U.S.C.
[§] 6331(h) in the most favorable light of the mandates of the United States Supreme Court”
(#108 at 3). Both this court and Judge Stetson have treated Plaintiff’s claims most favorably
(#s104 at 6; 89 at 12). Plaintiff’s task was to identify a waiver of sovereign immunity for each
of his claims. He failed to do for his § 6331(h) claim (#s104 at 3–5; 89 at 34–36). He now cites
“mandates of the United States Supreme Court” which he says prove this court erred in denying
that claim, but the four cases he references involve statutory construction of imposts and taxes.
See Am. Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474 (1891); Benzinger v. United States,
192 U.S. 38, 54 (1904); Spreckels Sugar Refin. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 408 (1904);
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). Plaintiff also points to three other cases (which he
has continually cited throughout this litigation), but those cases do not involve waivers of
sovereign immunity for § 6331(h). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317–319 (1979)
(Waivers under Freedom of Information Act, Trade Secrets Act, and Administrative Procedure
Act); Comm’r v. Shapiro et ux., 424 U.S. 614, 623–29 (1976) (Waiver under 26 U.S.C. §
6861); Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024) (holding that courts must
not defer to executive-branch agencies “in deciding whether an agency has acted within its
statutory authority” under the APA and overruling Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). In short, this court got it right the first time.
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III. Order
Pursuant to the above, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (#108) is DENIED, and his
motion for leave to file a reply (#116) is DENIED as moot.
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 26th day of November, 2025.
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