IN RE: Cherie Faye Alexander

4:25-cv-01219Txed13 avr. 2026

Texte intégral

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
NURSERY DECALS AND MORE,
INC.
v.
TEGRITY CONTRACTORS, INC.,
ET AL.
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CIVIL NO. 4:25-CV-1219-SDJ
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Appellant Nursery Decals and More, Inc. (“NDAM”) filed its Notice of Appeal
and Statement of Election, seeking to appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Granting
Tegrity’s 	Motion 	for 	Further 	Orders, 	entered 	on 	October 	31, 	2025, 	(Dkt. 	#1)
(hereafter, the “interlocutory order”). Thereafter, the Court warned NDAM that, as
it stood, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal of an interlocutory order
issued by the Bankruptcy Court. (Dkt. #17). NDAM was directed to file a motion for
leave to appeal in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 158. (Dkt. #17).
The Court outlined the relevant legal standard for interlocutory bankruptcy
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)—emphasizing that such appeals are “exceptional”
and “disfavored”—and instructed NDAM on what to include in its motion for leave to
appeal. (Dkt. #17). NDAM then submitted its Motion for Leave to Appeal. (Dkt. #26).
Because NDAM has failed to demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction to consider
the interlocutory order, its motion for leave must be denied and its appeal dismissed.
I. B ACKGROUND
On July 12, 2024, Debtor Cherie Faye Alexander filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
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the Eastern District of Texas. See Bankruptcy Cause Number 24-41614. The principal
asset of the bankruptcy estate is the Debtor’s 96% ownership interest in NDAM.
NDAM and the Debtor have ownership interests in two unencumbered pieces of real
property: an office building located at 1005 S. McDonald Street, McKinney, Texas,
and a lot located at 480 McKinney Parkway, McKinney, Texas. At the time of the
bankruptcy filing, the lot was under contract to be sold to Tegrity Contractors, Inc.
(‘Tegrity”) for $700,000, and Tegrity had sued in state court for specific performance
of the contract.
The largest creditor of the bankruptcy estate is Brian Woodward, the Debtor’s
ex-husband, who filed a secured claim in the amount of $384,730.62. Woodward has
indicated he will seek to add approximately $227,000 in interest and reasonable
attorney’s fees under 11 U.S.C. §506(b) to his claim. Both the Debtor and NDAM
pursued objections to Woodward’s proof of claim.
While 	the 	objections to 	the 	Woodward 	claim 	were 	pending, 	the 	parties
negotiated a settlement agreement to resolve disputes regarding control of NDAM
and the sale of the lot to Tegrity. On May 16, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court entered its
Order Approving Settlement Agreement, which approved an agreement among the
Trustee, NDAM, and the Debtor. Under this agreement, NDAM and the Debtor
expressly agreed that if NDAM’s objection to the Woodward claim was unsuccessful,
the Trustee would assume control of NDAM and complete the sale of the lot to
Tegrity. The settlement agreement clearly provided that the Bankruptcy Court’s
entry of an order on the Woodward claim objection would trigger the obligation of
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both the Debtor and NDAM to assist the Trustee in completing the sale of the lot and
liquidating NDAM’s assets.
On October 9, 2025, Tegrity filed a Motion for Further Orders, Enforcement of
Settlement Agreement, Seeking Trustee’s Limited Control of NDAM for the Purposes
of Closing Real Estate Sale. Tegrity alleged that NDAM and the Debtor were
obstructing performance of the settlement agreement and sought to compel NDAM
to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. Following a contested hearing on
October 21, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court orally directed the Trustee to take complete
control of NDAM, close the sale of the lot to Tegrity as contemplated in the settlement
agreement, liquidate NDAM’s assets to the extent the Trustee believes appropriate
to pay claims against the estate, and retain all proceeds from the liquidation in the
Debtor’s bankruptcy estate pending further order of the Bankruptcy Court.
Thereafter, on October 31, 2025, the Bankruptcy Court entered its formal
Order Granting Tegrity’s Motion for Further Orders (referenced herein as the
“interlocutory order”), confirming the Trustee’s full control of NDAM and directing
the liquidation of its assets to pay creditors of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. The
interlocutory order also included multiple findings regarding the Debtor’s bad faith
in adhering to the previously approved settlement agreement. On the same date, the
Bankruptcy Court dismissed the objections of both the Debtor and NDAM to
Woodward’s claim. This dismissal conclusively resolved the validity of the Woodward
claim and triggered the Trustee’s obligation under the settlement agreement to take
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control of NDAM and liquidate its assets with the assistance of the Debtor and
NDAM.
Rather than comply with the settlement agreement and the interlocutory
order, on November 5, 2025, NDAM filed in this Court its Notice of Appeal of the
interlocutory order. NDAM did not seek leave for an interlocutory appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
NDAM’s motion seeks leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) or,
alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). For the following reasons, both grounds for an
appeal fail.
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 does not confer jurisdiction on district courts.
NDAM construes the interlocutory order as one “appointing a receiver in a
breach of contract claim for the sale of real property.” (Dkt. #26 ¶25). NDAM goes on
to assert that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) allows “immediate appeals of interlocutory orders
appointing receivers,” and further argues that a motion for leave to appeal is not
necessary for such an appeal. (Dkt. #26 ¶¶25–26).
This argument is a non-starter. Leaving aside the fact that the interlocutory
order, on its face, is not an order “appointing a receiver,” even assuming it were such
an order, Section 1292(a)(2) does not authorize this Court, or for that matter any
other district court, to review orders appointing receivers. Section 1292(a) provides
“the courts of appeals” with jurisdiction of appeals from various types of interlocutory
orders, including orders appointing receivers. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)–(3); see also
Connecticut 	National 	Bank 	v. 	Germain, 	503 	U.S. 	249, 	251, 	112 	S.Ct. 	1146,
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117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (explaining that “[c]ourts of appeals have jurisdiction over
[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292”) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	Put 	simply, 	contrary 	to 	NDAM’s
assertion, Section 1292(a)(2) provides jurisdiction only to federal courts of appeals,
not this Court.
B. NDAM fails to establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
i. 	Interlocutory appeals under Section 158(a) are limited to
“exceptional cases.”
A district court’s jurisdiction over appeals from bankruptcy courts is governed
by 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), which states that a district court has jurisdiction “to hear
appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees” and, “with leave of the court, from
other interlocutory orders and decrees of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and
proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title.”
28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (cleaned up).
However, Section 158(a) provides no standard for when a district court should
grant leave to appeal. To address this gap, district courts in this circuit have adopted
the standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for interlocutory appeals from district court
orders: “(1) a controlling issue of law must be involved; (2) the question must be one
where there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate
appeal must materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Matter of
Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1177 (5th Cir. 1991); see In re Searex Energy Servs., Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 09-5817, 2009 WL 2868243, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2009). Interlocutory
appeals under Section 1292(b) are reserved for “exceptional cases” where all three
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parts of the test are satisfied. United States v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.
1985). Courts have held that Section 1292(b) “must be strictly construed” and that
such interlocutory appeals “are generally disfavored.” Silverthorne Seismic, L.L.C. v.
Sterling Seismic Servs., Ltd., 125 F.4th 593, 598 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Allen v.
Okam Holdings, Inc., 116 F.3d 153, 154 (5th Cir. 1997)).
As with interlocutory appeals from district courts, bankruptcy interlocutory
appeals are disfavored due to their disruption to bankruptcy proceedings. See In re
Cross, 666 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Searex Energy Servs., Inc., 2009 WL
2868243, at *1. Otherwise, constant appeals would “interfere with the overriding goal
of the bankruptcy system, expeditious resolution of economic difficulties.” DuPree v.
Kaye, No. CIV A 307-CV-0768-B, 2008 WL 294532, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2008)
(quoting In re Hunt Int’l Res. Corp., 57 B.R. 371, 372 (N.D. Tex. 1985)); see In re
Durensky, 519 F.2d 1024, 1028–29 (5th Cir. 1975).
ii. 	This is not an “exceptional case.”
NDAM fails to show that the interlocutory order meets Section 158(a)’s high
bar for jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a bankruptcy court’s interlocutory order.
To begin with, NDAM has not shown that the appeal of the interlocutory order
turns on the resolution of a controlling, disputed question of law. The interlocutory
order is predicated on a settlement agreement that NDAM willingly entered but now
refuses to comply with, requiring the Bankruptcy Court to enforce it through the
interlocutory 	order 	and 	the 	Trustee’s 	well-established 	authority. 	Thus, 	the
interlocutory order arises from application of established law to undisputed facts, not
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from any novel or unsettled legal issue. NDAM simply disagrees with the outcome of
its contractual obligations and is now attempting to relitigate them through an
interlocutory appeal. Because no controlling and disputed question of law is
presented, the first prong of the Section 1292(b) test is not satisfied.
NDAM also has not shown that there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion on any controlling question of law. Indeed, NDAM apparently believes this
standard is met so long as a litigant has a “difference of opinion” with a court’s ruling.
NDAM suggests that its “difference of opinion” with the Bankruptcy Court about the
interlocutory order suffices. (Dkt. #26 ¶ 29). Not so. The “substantial ground for
difference of opinion” requires a difference of opinion between and among courts, not
the moving party and the court. See In re Cent. Louisiana Grain Co-op., Inc., 489 B.R.
403, 412 (W.D. La. 2013) (“[A] substantial ground for difference of opinion does not
exist because a party simply claims the bankruptcy court ruled incorrectly.”
(quotation omitted)); In re Genter, No. 3:19-CV-1951-E, 2020 WL 3129637, at *2
(N.D. Tex. June 12, 2020) (explaining that, where a bankruptcy court’s ruling did not
implicate a divide among courts, and instead reflected that “decisions of both district
courts and bankruptcy courts in this district and several other districts throughout
the United States have analyzed the issue and come to the same conclusion,” there
was no “substantial ground for difference of opinion” under Section 158).
Finally, NDAM has not shown that this interlocutory appeal will accelerate,
rather than delay, the underlying litigation. To the contrary, the record demonstrates
that NDAM has repeatedly delayed administration of the estate. NDAM’s strategy
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of delay includes its failures to comply with the settlement agreement and with the
Trustee after the Woodward claim objection failed, as well as the filing of a groundless
appeal in this Court.
As 	the 	Court 	has 	explained, 	interlocutory 	appeals 	are 	reserved 	for
“exceptional cases” where all three parts of the Section 1292(b) test are satisfied.
Garner, 749 F.2d at 286. This is not such an “exceptional” case.
III C ONCLUSION
For these reasons, Appellant Nursery Decals and More, Inc.’s Motion for Leave
to Appeal, (Dkt. #26), is DENIED and its appeal is DISMISSED.
The Clerk is directed to close this civil action.
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