Pitts v. Serrato Corporation

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
ANDREA K. PITTS
v.
SERRATO CORPORATION
d/b/a NORTH TEXAS JOBS CORPS
CENTER
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL NO. 4:25-CV-528-SDJ
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Serrato Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Count
Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Dkt. #9). Serrato Corporation (“Serrato”) did not move
to dismiss counts one or two. Plaintiff Andrea K. Pitts did not respond to the motion.
The Court, having considered the motion and the applicable legal authorities,
concludes that the motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. B ACKGROUND
Pitts was previously employed as a career technical training manager by
Serrato, in relation to Serrato’s contract with the U.S. Department of Labor to operate
the North Texas Job Corps Center (“NTJCC”). (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 2, 13–14). Pitts began
employment with the NTJCC in 1994, before Serrato took over operations, and
continued to work there for twenty-nine years, until 2023, when Serrato terminated
her employment. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 13–14).
Pitts claims that in 2022, another employee disclosed Pitts’s confidential
information to other Serrato employees in violation of company policy. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 17).
Pitts filed a complaint, but the other employee was never disciplined. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 17).
Case 4:25-cv-00528-SDJ Document 20 Filed 02/11/26 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Nearly a year after Pitts filed her complaint, she received a discipline notice
after two other Serrato employees alleged that she had used inappropriate language
during a meeting. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 18–19). Pitts denies using inappropriate language.
(Dkt. #1 ¶ 18). Pitts then filed a second internal complaint with Serrato alleging that
she was being discriminated against. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 20). Pitts alleges that Serrato failed
to investigate that complaint. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 20). Approximately one month later, Serrato
initiated a second discipline notice alleging that Pitts had disclosed confidential
information 	in 	violation 	of 	company 	policy. 	(Dkt. #1 	¶ 	20). 	Pitts 	denies 	that
accusation. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 24). Serrato subsequently terminated Pitts’s employment.
(Dkt. #1 ¶ 20).
Pitts alleges that Serrato engaged in racial discrimination when she was
“accused of disclosing confidential information,” disciplined, and discharged. (Dkt. #1
¶¶ 23–24). According to Pitts, this constituted racial discrimination because the other
employee 	who 	disclosed 	confidential 	information, 	a 	Hispanic 	female, 	was 	not
disciplined or discharged, but Pitts, a black female, was disciplined and discharged
when similarly accused. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 17, 23–24). Pitts also argues that she engaged in
protected activity when she filed an internal complaint of discrimination, and that
Serrato retaliated against her when it terminated her employment nineteen days
later. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 29–30). Pitts filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) based on racial discrimination and
retaliation. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 5). Her claims were investigated, and the EEOC issued a right
to sue letter. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 5–6). Subsequently, Pitts sued Serrato, alleging (1) race
Case 4:25-cv-00528-SDJ Document 20 Filed 02/11/26 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
discrimination, (2) retaliation, and (3) wrongful discharge, all in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 23–34).
Serrato moved to dismiss Pitts’s third count, wrongful discharge, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the ground that Pitts failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. #9). Pitts did not respond to the motion
to dismiss. Because Pitts did not respond, the Court presumes that she “does not
controvert the facts set out by [Serrato] and has no evidence to offer in opposition to
the motion.” L.R. CV-7(d). But the Court does not grant the motion to dismiss solely
based on Pitts’s failure to respond; rather, it will evaluate the merits of Serrato’s
arguments. See Webb v. Morella, 457 F.App’x 448, 452 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(holding that it is improper for a district court to grant a motion to dismiss solely
because a plaintiff fails to oppose the motion).
II. LEGAL S TANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint when the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. F ED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[t]he court’s review is limited
to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents
attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the
complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387
(5th Cir. 2010). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”
Case 4:25-cv-00528-SDJ Document 20 Filed 02/11/26 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007)). A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. Although a plaintiff is not required to establish a favorable probability
that the defendant is liable, the plausibility standard demands “more than a sheer
possibility.” Id.
In assessing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “accepts all
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). 	Legal 	conclusions 	“must 	be 	supported 	by 	factual 	allegations.” 	Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. To determine whether the plaintiff has pled enough to cross the line
“from conceivable to plausible,” a court draws on its own “judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679–80 (quotations omitted). This threshold is surpassed if the
court determines that the plaintiff pled “factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III. DISCUSSION
Count 	Three 	of 	Pitts’s 	complaint, 	alleging 	wrongful 	discharge, 	must 	be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Case 4:25-cv-00528-SDJ Document 20 Filed 02/11/26 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
In 	Count 	Three, 	Pitts 	alleges 	that 	Serrato 	“wrongfully 	discharged 	and
otherwise discriminated against [her] . . . which is an exception to the employment at
will doctrine in Texas.” (Dkt. #1 ¶ 34). There are very few exceptions to Texas’s
employment-at-will doctrine; usually, an employee may be terminated “at will, for
good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.” Montgomery Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown,
965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998). Wrongful discharge is such an exception, but it is
“very narrow,” applying only to “the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that
the employee refused to perform an illegal act.” Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985). When alleging wrongful discharge, “it is the plaintiff’s
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [her] discharge was for no
reason other than [her] refusal to perform an illegal act.” Id.
Pitts’s complaint does not include any allegation that Serrato asked her to
perform any illegal act, that she refused to do so, or that she was terminated based
on such refusal. Instead, Pitts simply realleges her first two counts in count three,
stating that she “was subjected to adverse employment actions due to race and
retaliation,” and that Serrato “wrongfully discharged and otherwise discriminated
against her.” (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 33, 34). Even if such facts were alleged, they would not be
the “sole reason” Pitts was discharged, as she claims that retaliation was also “a
factor in her termination of employment.” (Dkt. #1 ¶ 30). Thus, Pitts has failed to
plead sufficient facts to support a plausible claim of wrongful discharge. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570; Sabine Pilot Serv., 687 S.W.2d at 735.
Case 4:25-cv-00528-SDJ Document 20 Filed 02/11/26 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Pitts failed to respond to Serrato’s motion to dismiss. Nor has she amended her
complaint to allege facts that would support a freestanding wrongful discharge claim
separate from her claims of discrimination and retaliation. Accordingly, the Court
will grant the motion to dismiss this claim. However, the Court will give Pitts the
opportunity to replead her wrongful discharge claim.
IV. C ONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Serrato Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
Count Three of Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Dkt. #9), is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. Pitts’s claim for wrongful discharge is DISMISSED without prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Andrea K. Pitts may file an amended
complaint pleading sufficient facts to support a claim for wrongful discharge by no
later than February 27, 2026.
Case 4:25-cv-00528-SDJ Document 20 Filed 02/11/26 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>