Edge Communications Solutions LLC v. Werthamer et al

4:25-cv-00397Txed26 nov. 2025

Texte intégral

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
EDGE COMMUNICATIONS
SOLUTIONS LLC
v.
HEIDE WERTHAMER, ET AL.
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL NO. 4:25-CV-397-SDJ
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Edge Communications Solutions LLC (“Edge”) sued its former employees,
Heide Werthamer and Marina Willis, in Texas state court. Werthamer timely
removed the case to this Court based on an allegation of diversity jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Dkt. #1). Edge moves for remand to state court, maintaining
that Werthamer has failed to meet her burden to show that diversity exists. The
Court agrees with Edge and the case will be remanded.
I. B ACKGROUND
Werthamer and Willis are citizens of Florida. (Dkt. #1-1 ¶ 2). Werthamer
previously served as Chief Operating Officer for Edge and Willis is a former Vice
President of Strategic Accounts for Edge. (Dkt. #3 ¶ 4.01). In addition to being an
employee, Werthamer was also a member of Edge, a Delaware limited liability
company with its principal place of business in Collin County, Texas. See (Dkt. #1-2
at 7); (Dkt. #11-1 ¶ 2).
Werthamer and Willis both voluntarily resigned their employment at Edge in
2023. (Dkt. #3 ¶ 4.01). Edge asserts that Werthamer and Willis misappropriated
Edge’s confidential and proprietary information and improperly used the stolen
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information to solicit Edge’s employees and customers for their new employer. Edge
also contends that Werthamer violated a non-competition agreement. Based on these
assertions, Edge has brought various state law causes of action against Werthamer
and Willis, 	including 	claims 	for tortious 	interference 	with 	contract, 	breach 	of
fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy.
In regard to diversity of citizenship, neither Edge nor Werthamer have
provided a complete list of Edge’s members. Werthamer asserts that Michael Ford,
Richard A. Heise Jr., and Bill Hamel are members of Edge, but she does not allege
that 	they 	are 	the 	only 	members 	of 	Edge. 	(Dkt. #1-1 	¶ 6). 	Edge 	asserts 	that
Werthamer’s membership was never terminated and that she is still a member of
Edge. (Dkt. #9 at 2). Additionally, Edge and Heise assert that Old Willow Partners,
LLC (“OWP”), a single-member Delaware LLC, and Edge Series C, LLC (“Edge Series
C”), a Delaware LLC, are also members of Edge. (Dkt. #11 at 3–4); (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 5).
Heise claims that he is the sole member of OWP and that OWP is the sole member of
Edge Series C. (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 5).
Werthamer alleges that Ford is a resident and citizen of Texas, Heise is a
resident and citizen of Illinois, and Hamel is a resident and citizen of Pennsylvania.
(Dkt. #1-1 ¶ 6). To support her argument that Heise is a citizen of Illinois, Werthamer
notes that Heise’s Florida property tax bills were sent to his Illinois address, Heise
executed an affidavit in Illinois, and Heise has not provided certain documents that
would verify Florida as his domicile. (Dkt. #11 at 4–6); (Dkt. #14 at 5–6).
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Heise contends that he is a resident and citizen of Florida. (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 4). To
support Florida citizenship, Heise has provided copies of property tax records for a
residence in Palm Beach, Florida for the years 2021 to 2024, (Dkt. #9-2), utility bills
for that property for the months of January 2025 and May 2023, (Dkt. #9-3), and a
copy of his Florida driver’s license, (Dkt. #9-4). Heise also asserts that he is registered
to vote in Florida, (Dkt #9-1 ¶ 6), and that he and his wife have voted in statewide
and national elections in Florida for many years, (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 4). Heise acknowledges
that he maintains residences in Illinois, Indiana, Texas, and Mexico, in addition to
his Florida residence, and that he spends time at each residence throughout the year.
(Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 8). In further support of his claim that he is not an Illinois citizen, Heise
alleges that he has paid income tax to Illinois that only applies to non-Illinois
residents. (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 9).
The parties dispute whether Werthamer is currently a member of Edge.
(Dkt. #11-1 ¶ 3); (Dkt. #12 at 5). Werthamer asserts that her membership in Edge
terminated in 2023, when she ceased to be an employee at Edge, and that she has not
otherwise consented to reinstate her membership in Edge. (Dkt. #11-1 ¶¶ 3, 5). Heise
contends that Werthamer has provided no proof that her membership was terminated
and asserts that Werthamer is still a member of Edge because she continues to own
a 1.78% equity interest in Edge. (Dkt. #12-1 ¶¶ 12–13). In support of his assertion
that Werthamer’s membership is still active, Heise provided K-1 forms from 2020 to
2023, which evidence Werthamer’s equity interest. (Dkt. #12-2, #12-3, #12-4, #12-5).
In response, Werthamer states that because she has not received a K-1 form for 2024,
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she cannot be a current member of Edge. (Dkt. #11 at 2–3). According to Edge,
however, Werthamer should have received the form in September 2025, which is
consistent with when she received the form for the prior four years. (Dkt. #12 at 5);
see (Dkt. #12-2, #12-3, #12-4, #12-5) (The letters sent to Werthamer with the K-1s
attached were all dated in September the year following the K-1’s tax year.).
Werthamer has not advised the Court whether she received the form in September
2025.
In sum, and relevant here, Edge maintains that diversity does not exist
because Heise—an undisputed member of Edge—lives in Florida, as do Defendants
Werthamer and Willis, and Werthamer remains a member of Edge, further negating
any possibility of diversity jurisdiction. For her part, Werthamer maintains that
diversity exists because Heise is a citizen of Illinois, not Florida, and Werthamer is
no longer a member of Edge.
This case was originally filed in the 296th Judicial District Court of Collin
County, Texas prior to being removed by Werthamer. (Dkt. #1 at 1). The Court now
considers Edge’s Motion to Remand to State Court, which asks the Court to remand
the matter to the 296th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas on the basis
that complete diversity does not exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Dkt. #9 at 1).
II. LEGAL S TANDARD
A party may remove an action from state court to federal court if the action is
one over which the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). “The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction
exists and that removal was proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
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276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction,
the removing party must make “clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional
allegations” in her pleadings. MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc.,
929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988)).
To determine whether jurisdiction is present for removal, courts consider the
claims in the state court petition as they existed at the time of removal. Cavallini v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 1995). Any ambiguities are
construed against removal because the removal statute should be strictly construed
in favor of remand. Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
Remand is warranted because Werthamer has failed to identify each of Edge’s
members, has not made clear jurisdictional allegations of those members’ citizenship,
and has not rebutted the presumption against diversity jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds . . . $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of
different States.” To meet the burden of proof, the removing party must show that
there is “complete diversity” between the parties. MidCap, 929 F.3d at 314 (citing
McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)).
“Complete diversity” means that “all persons on one side of the controversy [must] be
citizens of different states than all persons on the other side.” MidCap, 929 F.3d
at 314 (quoting McLaughlin, 376 F.3d at 353). The parties do not dispute that the
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amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; only the citizenship of Edge is at issue.
(Dkt. #1 ¶ 14).
A. Edge’s Citizenship
The 	Court 	first 	addresses 	Werthamer’s 	allegations 	regarding 	Edge’s
citizenship. Edge argues that Werthamer’s list of Edge’s members is incomplete.
Werthamer has not clearly disputed that allegation. When one party to a suit is an
LLC, its citizenship is “determined by the citizenship of all of its members.” Harvey v.
Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008). Therefore, when trying
to establish diversity jurisdiction in a suit against an LLC, the removing party “must
specifically allege the citizenship of every member of every LLC.” SXSW, L.L.C. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 83 F.4th 405, 408 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Settlement Funding, LLC v.
Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 851 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 2017)). It is the removing party’s
duty to “trace entities’ citizenships down the various organizational layers where
necessary.” Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C., 618 F.App’x 765, 768 (5th Cir.
2015) (cleaned up).
The Fifth Circuit decision in Settlement Funding is instructive. Because the
removing plaintiff in that case, an LLC, failed to adequately allege “the citizenship of
each member of the many LLC- and partnership-litigants,” the court held that the
plaintiff did not meet its burden to establish complete diversity. 851 F.3d at 536–37.
The plaintiff asked the court to take “judicial notice” of public records, court filings,
and an affidavit from one of the LLC’s officers to establish complete diversity
jurisdiction. Id. But the plaintiff’s filings were deemed insufficient to cure the
jurisdictional defect, and the plaintiff even admitted that it did not know the
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citizenship of all its members at the time of removal. Id. at 537. The Settlement
Funding court emphasized that, as the party seeking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
bore the burden of establishing such jurisdiction. Id. When the plaintiff failed to meet
that burden, the court remanded the case to state court. Id. at 538.
Similarly here, Werthamer has failed to dispute or disprove Edge’s allegation
that the list of Edge’s members she provided was incomplete; thus, Werthamer has
not met the burden of proof required to establish diversity jurisdiction. Since Edge is
an LLC and party to this suit, Werthamer, as the removing party, must precisely and
affirmatively allege the citizenship of every member of Edge, including all the
members of all LLCs that are members of Edge. See MidCap, 929 F.3d at 314
(explaining 	the 	removing 	party’s 	burden 	of 	proof); 	Harvey, 	542 F.3d 	at 1080
(explaining how to determine an LLC’s citizenship); (Dkt. #1 ¶ 10) (Werthamer’s
incomplete list of Edge’s members). In addition to any individual members of Edge,
Werthamer must trace down OWP and Edge Series C’s structure and affirmatively
allege their citizenship or alternatively disprove that they are members of Edge. See
Alphonse, 618 F.App’x at 768 (requiring the removing party to trace down the various
organizational layers of an LLC in order to determine its citizenship); MidCap,
929 F.3d 	at 314 	(requiring 	the 	removing 	party 	to 	make 	precise 	affirmative
jurisdictional allegations); (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 5) (Heise alleging the structure of OWP and
Edge Series C). Werthamer disputes that OWP and Edge Series C’s are members of
Edge, but she has failed to seek jurisdictional discovery to supplement the record and
support her allegations.
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Like the removing party in Settlement Funding, Werthamer has failed to
properly establish the citizenship of the LLC in this suit, Edge. See 851 F.3d at 537
(highlighting that the plaintiff did not know the citizenship of all the members at the
time of removal); (Dkt. #1 ¶ 10) (Werthamer’s incomplete list of Edge’s members).
And, as in Settlement Funding, Werthamer has not met her burden to establish that
no member of Edge is a citizen of Florida—indeed Werthamer’s filings indicate that
she may not understand that it is her burden to allege and demonstrate complete
diversity. See (Dkt. #11 at 3) (arguing that Heise failed to identify Edge’s members or
their citizenship). Without alleging the full list of Edge’s members, and therefore
alleging the citizenship of every Edge member, Edge’s citizenship necessarily remains
ambiguous. For this reason alone, Werthamer has failed to meet her burden to
establish complete diversity.
B. Heise’s Citizenship
The Court next addresses the citizenship of Heise, who the parties agree is a
member of Edge. Edge asserts that Heise is a citizen of Florida, while Werthamer
contends that he is a citizen of Illinois. Considering the parties’ allegations regarding
Heise’s citizenship, the evidence presented by Heise, the lack of evidence presented
by Werthamer, and Werthamer’s burden as the removing party to prove that
complete diversity exists and to show a change in domicile, the Court finds that Heise
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is likely a citizen of Florida.1 At a minimum, there is sufficient ambiguity about
Heise’s citizenship to negate diversity jurisdiction.
For individuals, “citizenship has the same meaning as domicile,” and “the place
of residence is prima facie the domicile.” MidCap, 929 F.3d at 313 (quoting Stine v.
Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)). Citizenship requires both “[r]esidence in
fact” and “the purpose to make the place of residence one’s home.” MidCap, 929 F.3d
at 313 (quoting Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424, 59 S.Ct. 563, 83 L.Ed. 817
(1939)). While an individual’s statement of intent is relevant, to hold significant
weight it must agree with the objective facts. Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir.
1996).
Factors to consider when determining an individual’s domicile include where
the individual “exercises civil and political rights, pays taxes, owns real and personal
property, has driver’s and other licenses, maintains bank accounts, belongs to clubs
and churches, has places of business or employment, and maintains a home for his
family.” Id. “There is a presumption in favor of the continuing domicile which requires
the party seeking to show a change in domicile to come forward with enough evidence
to that effect to withstand a directed verdict.” Id. at 250. “[T]he party attempting to
show a change assumes the burden of going forward on that issue.” Id.
1 Heise asserts that two entities, OWP and Edge Series C, are members of Edge. Heise
further claims that he is the sole member of OWP and that OWP is the sole member of Edge
Series C. Werthamer disputes the existence of these entities and their Florida citizenship.
Because the Court finds that diversity jurisdiction is otherwise absent given Werthamer’s
failure to allege the citizenship of all Edge’s members, the ambiguity in Heise’s citizenship,
and the ambiguity as to whether Werthamer herself is still a member of Edge, the Court need
not further address the issue of the entities’ existence or their citizenship.
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In Dubier, our sister court held that the plaintiff was domiciled in California
even though she maintained several properties and utilized mailing addresses
outside of California. Dubier ex rel. Dubier 2011 Revocable Tr. v. Triangle Cap. Props.,
LLC, No. 1:21-CV-415, 2023 WL 3681503, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2023). There, the
defendant 	challenged the 	court’s 	subject 	matter jurisdiction, 	alleging 	that 	the
plaintiff was a U.S. citizen who resided and was domiciled in Greece. Id. at *1. The
plaintiff argued that she was a resident and citizen of California and diversity
jurisdiction was proper. Id. at *3. In support of her claim, she stated that she owned
residential property in San Francisco, voted in San Francisco elections, had a current
California real estate broker’s license, was a member of the San Francisco Association
of Realtors, and considered her domicile to be California. Id. at *4. The court also
noted that the record contained evidence that the plaintiff “pays property and income
taxes in California, carries insurance on her San Francisco residential property, and
maintains bank, retirement, and investment accounts in California.” Id.
To 	counter 	the 	plaintiff’s 	claim, 	the 	defendant 	pointed 	out 	that 	during
litigation the plaintiff used mailing addresses in both Michigan and Louisiana. Id.
The plaintiff explained that she used the Michigan address to avoid mail fraud, and
the Louisiana address was a home that she co-owned with her brother and was where
her mother resided. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff had a California driver’s license,
“albeit with a listed Louisiana address.” Id. Considering all the evidence, the court
found that the plaintiff established California as her domicile. Id.
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Here, Werthamer has failed to meet her burden to prove that Heise is not a
citizen of Florida. The parties do not dispute that Heise was a Florida citizen at some
point in time. See (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 8) (“In the past, we have also maintained our primary
residence in Juno Beach, FL., and Wellington, FL.”); (Dkt. #13-1 at 5) (emphasizing
that Heise maintained Florida primary residences in the past). While Heise’s
continuing Florida citizenship is supported by the fact he maintains a current
residence in Florida and his statement that he is a resident, citizen, and domiciliary
of Florida, this statement must be viewed in light of the objective facts. See MidCap,
929 F.3d at 313 (stating requirements to establish citizenship); Coury, 85 F.3d at 251
(emphasizing importance of concurrence between statements and facts); (Dkt. #12-1
¶ 4) (“I am a resident and citizen of Florida.”). In support of his assertion, Heise
attached copies of his Florida property taxes and driver’s license. Heise also alleges
that he and his wife “have voted in every statewide and national election in Florida
for many years,” own real property in Florida, and are part of a Florida HOA.
(Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 4); (Dkt. #9-2, #9-4). Since Werthamer is not only the party seeking to
show a change in domicile, but also the removing party, she must come forward with
enough evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of Florida continuing to be
Heise’s domicile. See Coury, 85 F.3d at 250 (explaining who has the burden of proof);
(Dkt. #14 at 4–6) (arguing Heise is not a Florida citizen).
The evidence relied upon to establish domicile in this case is similar to the
evidence used in Dubier. Like the plaintiff in Dubier, while Heise owns property in
multiple states and resides at those other properties from time to time, he asserts
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that Florida is his domicile. See Dubier, 2023 WL 3681503, at *4 (listing properties
the plaintiff owns); (Dkt. #12-1 ¶¶ 4, 8) (listing Heise’s residences). The individuals
in both cases pay property taxes in their alleged home state, are registered to vote in
that 	state, 	and 	have 	driver’s 	licenses 	issued 	by 	that 	state. 	See 	Dubier,
2023 WL 3681503, at *4 (listing evidence from the plaintiff); (Dkt. #9-2, #9-4) (Heise’s
property taxes, and driver’s license, and statement that he votes in Florida). Unlike
the plaintiff’s driver’s license in Dubier, Heise’s license lists his Florida address. See
Dubier, 2023 WL 3681503, at *4 (stating that plaintiff’s California driver’s license
had a Louisiana address); (Dkt. #9-4) (Heise’s driver’s license).
Werthamer, like the defendant in Dubier, relies on speculative evidence such
as Heise’s mailing address and where he signed his affidavit to try and negate Heise’s
assertion that he is a citizen of Florida. See Dubier, 2023 WL 3681503, at *4 (pointing
out that the plaintiff used a Michigan and Louisiana mailing address); (Dkt. #11 at 5)
(citing to Heise’s mailing address on his property tax documents and where he signed
his affidavit). Werthamer also points out that Heise does not claim to belong to any
clubs or churches in Florida, nor does he claim to maintain any bank accounts in
Florida. See (Dkt. #11 at 6) (pointing out gaps in Heise’s evidence).
An important distinction between Heise and the plaintiff in Dubier is that
unlike Heise, the plaintiff in Dubier was the party asserting diversity jurisdiction and
therefore bore the burden of proof. See Dubier, 2023 WL 3681503, at *3 (explaining
the burden of proof); (Dkt. #11 at 4–6) (arguing Heise does not live in Florida).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the current record does not satisfy the “clear,
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distinct, and precise” standard Werthamer, as the removing party, must meet, nor
does it overcome the presumption in favor of Heise’s continuing domicile in Florida.
See MidCap, 929 F.3d at 314 (explaining the removing party’s burden of proof);
Coury, 85 F.3d at 250 (explaining the burdens of proof for the party asserting a
change in domicile). Werthamer could have sought jurisdictional discovery to further
develop the record on Heise’s citizenship. She did not. Because Heise is likely a citizen
of Florida, or there is at last ambiguity on this issue, Werthamer has failed to meet
her burden to establish diversity.
C. Werthamer’s Membership in Edge
Finally, the Court turns to Edge’s assertion that Werthamer herself remains a
member 	of 	Edge 	and 	thereby 	destroys 	complete 	diversity 	due 	to 	her 	Florida
citizenship. Because Werthamer has removed the case to federal court, she bears the
burden to show that she is no longer a member of Edge. The Court finds that she has
failed to do so.
A member of a Delaware LLC may only resign “at the time or upon the
happening of events specified in a limited liability company agreement and in
accordance with the limited liability company agreement.” 6 Del. C. § 18-603.
“[U]nless a limited liability company agreement provides otherwise, a member may
not resign from a limited liability company prior to the dissolution and winding up of
the limited liability company.” Id. Other than resignation, an individual can cease to
be a member of an LLC upon assignment of all of the member’s limited liability
company interest. 6 Del. C. § 18-702(b)(3). A member of a Delaware LLC has the right
to obtain the “current list of the name and last known business, residence or mailing
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address 	of 	each 	member 	and 	manager” 	upon 	reasonable 	demand. 	6 Del. C.
§ 18-305(a)(3).
While Werthamer’s employment terminated with Edge in 2023, there is
nothing in the record other than her statements to support her argument that she is
no longer a member of Edge. See (Dkt. #1-1 ¶ 7) (“When I left my employment at Edge
in September 2023, I ceased being a member.”). As a Delaware LLC, Edge is governed
by the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, and therefore Werthamer could only
resign as a member upon the happening of certain events as outlined in Edge’s
company agreement or if Edge was dissolved. See 6 Del. C. § 18-603 (explaining how
a member can resign from an LLC). The company agreement is missing from the
record, creating ambiguity about the process for a member to resign from Edge. See
id.
Additionally, Werthamer has provided no evidence that she assigned all of her
interest in Edge. See 6 Del. C. § 18-702(b)(3) (explaining the effect of assignment of a
member’s interest). To the contrary, Heise alleges that Werthamer owns 1.78% of
Edge’s Common Shares and provided tax documents from 2020 to 2023 in support of
this claim. See (Dkt. #12-1 ¶ 13) (asserting that Werthamer continues to hold an
interest in Edge); (Dkt. #12-2, #12-3, #12-4, #12-5) (Werthamer’s past K-1 forms).
Werthamer does not refute this point but rather states that because she has not
received a tax document evidencing her membership from 2024, she can’t be a
member of Edge. See (Dkt. #11 at 2–3) (“If Werthamer was indeed still a member of
Edge following the cessation of her employment in 2023, Edge would have been
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required to issue a Schedule K-1 for tax year 2024 . . . Werthamer did not receive a
Schedule K-1 from Edge in 2024.”). Heise explains that Werthamer should have
received the tax document in September, which appears to be consistent with the
time the four prior tax documents were delivered to Werthamer. (Dkt. #12 at 5); see
(Dkt. #12-2, #12-3, #12-4, #12-5) (showing that the letters sent to the Werthamer with
the K-1s attached were all dated in September the year following the K-1’s tax year).
Werthamer has the right to demand a list of the current members of Edge,
which would clear up any confusion, but she has not provided any such evidence, has
not attempted to amend her pleading, and has not asked the Court for jurisdictional
discovery. See 6 Del. C. § 18-305 (explaining a Delaware LLC member’s rights).
Since there is no way to tell if Werthamer’s membership in Edge terminated
according to the company agreement, the LLC appears to be active, and Werthamer
has not provided any proof that she assigned her interest in Edge, Werthamer, as the
removing party, has failed to meet her burden of proof. The Court finds that
Werthamer is likely still a member of Edge. As a member of Edge, Werthamer’s
Florida 	citizenship 	destroys 	diversity 	jurisdiction. 	(Dkt. #1-1 	¶ 2); 	see 	Harvey,
542 F.3d at 1080 (“[T]he citizenship of a LLC is determined by the citizenship of all
of its members.”).
D. Attorney’s Fees
When a case is remanded, the court may order the removing party to pay “just
costs and any actual expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred as a result of the
removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Supreme Court has clarified that, absent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under Section 1447(c) “only where
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the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.”
Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141, 126 S.Ct. 704, 163 L.Ed.2d 547
(2005). This inquiry should take into consideration “the desire to deter removals
sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the opposing
party, while not undermining Congress’s basic decision to afford defendants a right
to remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria are satisfied.” Id. at 140.
While unsuccessful, there is nothing to suggest that Werthamer did not have
an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Therefore, the Court will not
award costs or expenses to Edge.
* 	* 	*
Werthamer has failed to demonstrate that no member of Edge is a citizen of
Florida because she has not provided a complete list of Edge’s members, has not
overcome the presumption in favor of Heise’s Florida citizenship, and has not
provided any proof that her membership in Edge was terminated. As the removing
party, Werthamer bears the burden to prove that complete diversity exists between
the parties, and her pleadings must contain clear, distinct, and precise affirmative
jurisdictional allegations. Werthamer has failed to meet that standard due to the lack
of certain documents in the record, creating ambiguity as to the structure of Edge,
Heise’s citizenship, and the status of Werthamer’s membership in Edge. Because
federal courts have limited jurisdiction, any doubts regarding whether removal
jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction. Thus, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s motion to remand should be granted.
Case 4:25-cv-00397-SDJ Document 18 Filed 11/26/25 Page 16 of 17 PageID #:
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III. C ONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court, (Dkt. #9), is
GRANTED.
It is therefore ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the 296th Judicial
District Court of Collin County, Texas.
Case 4:25-cv-00397-SDJ Document 18 Filed 11/26/25 Page 17 of 17 PageID #:
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