Timmer v. Triumph Roofing and Construction LLC

4:24-cv-00635Txed30 mars 2026

Texte intégral

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
REED TIMMER
v.
TRIUMPH ROOFING AND
CONSTRUCTION LLC, ET AL.
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CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-635-SDJ
MEMORANDUM ADOPTING IN PART AND
MODIFYING IN PART THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	the 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	of 	United 	States
Magistrate Judge (the “Report”), (Dkt. #41), this matter having been referred to the
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule CV-72. The Report
recommends that Plaintiff Reed Timmer’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment by
Default Against Defendant Roddy Doddy Agency, and Incorporated Memorandum of
Law, (Dkt. #34), be granted in part and that Defendant Roddy Doddy Agency pay
Plaintiff Reed Timmer $1,500.00 in statutory damages plus post-judgment interest.
No party filed objections to the Report.
The Court modifies the Report’s analysis of substantial prejudice. (Dkt. #41
at 5–6). To determine whether a default judgment is procedurally warranted, a court
must look at six factors from Lindsey v. Prive Corp.:
[W]hether material issues of fact are at issue, whether there has been
substantial prejudice, whether the grounds for default are clearly
established, whether the default was caused by a good faith mistake or
excusable neglect, the harshness of a default judgment, and whether the
court 	would 	think 	itself 	obliged 	to 	set 	aside 	the 	default 	on 	the
defendant’s motion.
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161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). The second factor, “whether there has been
substantial prejudice,” directs courts to analyze whether the plaintiff has been
substantially prejudiced. However, the Report analyzes whether the “entry of default
judgment would not be harsh or result in substantial prejudice to Defendant.”
(Dkt. #41 at 5) (emphasis added).1 Because “default judgments are disfavored,” a
court will not issue them unless a party’s default causes real prejudice to the moving
party. See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. In this regard, Lindsey refers to whether the
plaintiff has been prejudiced in its formulation of the second factor: “whether there
has been substantial prejudice.” Id. (emphasis added). Referring to “substantial
prejudice” that “has been,” Lindsey directs courts to analyze any prejudice that has
occurred, not whether there will be prejudice in the future due to a default judgment.
Id. Further, to analyze potential prejudice to the defendant would be duplicative of
the fifth factor, “the harshness of a default judgment.” Id. Therefore, when conducting
the analysis for the second of the six Lindsey factors, courts should analyze the
prejudice that has been experienced by the plaintiff.
1 In support of this analysis, the Report cites to this Court’s opinion in Wearable Shoe
Tree, LLC v. Does 1-601, No. 4:24-CV-334-SDJ, 2025 WL 872524, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 20,
2025). (Dkt. #41 at 5). The Court acknowledges that Wearable Shoe Tree mistakenly applied
the “substantial prejudice” inquiry to the defendants, rather than to the plaintiff, an
approach that departed from this Court’s previous rulings on motions for default judgment
in which it correctly analyzed prejudice as to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v.
Moss, No. 4:20-CV-972-SDJ, 2022 WL 757226, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2022); Back-Up Sys.
Maint., LLC v. Suarez, No. 4:21-CV-521-SDJ, 2022 WL 2119115, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 13,
2022); Viridity Energy Sols., Inc. v. Lone Star Demand Response, LLC, No. 4:21-CV-419-SDJ,
2022 WL 4004785, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2022); TenPearls, LLC v. Medulla Int’l, LLC,
No. 4:22-CV-550-SDJ, 2023 WL 3292883, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2023); BEPS Servs., LLC v.
Blue Escape Pools, LLC, No. 4:23-CV-975-SDJ, 2025 WL 2713722, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23,
2025). The Court notes that this minor error does not affect the ultimate resolution of the
motion at issue in Wearable Shoe Tree.
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Here, conducting the proper analysis as to the second Lindsey factor does not
alter the ultimate outcome of the Report. Defendant Roddy Doddy Agency’s failure to
appear has resulted in substantial prejudice to Timmer. When a defendant fails to
respond to a lawsuit, the adversarial process is brought to a halt, resulting in
prejudice to the plaintiff’s interest. Ins. Co. of the West v. H&G Contractor’s, Inc.,
No. CIV.A. C-10-390, 2011 WL 4738197, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2011). Here, Timmer
has been prejudiced by Defendant’s failure to answer the complaint and will be
further prejudiced absent a default judgment.
Besides the above-stated modification, the Court concludes that the findings
and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and adopts the Report as the
findings and conclusions of the Court.
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff Reed Timmer’s Motion for Entry of
Final 	Judgment 	by 	Default 	Against 	Defendant 	Roddy 	Doddy 	Agency, 	and
Incorporated Memorandum of Law, (Dkt. #34), is GRANTED in part.
It is further ORDERED that Defendant Roddy Doddy Agency shall pay
Plaintiff Reed Timmer $1,500.00 in statutory damages plus post-judgment interest
at a rate of 3.70% from the date of the entry of judgment.
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