Gay v. Mortgage Contracting Services, LLC

4:24-cv-00217Txed22 avr. 2026

Texte intégral

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
LANE GAY, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated
v.
MORTGAGE CONTRACTING
SERVICES, LLC
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-217-SDJ
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this class action arising from an alleged data security incident, the named
parties have agreed to settle the case. No objections to the proposed settlement or
valid requests for exclusion have been submitted. After full consideration, the Court
concludes that the proposed settlement should be approved and that the Lead
Plaintiff and class counsel should be awarded attorney’s fees and expenses.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Lead Plaintiff Lane Gay’s Amended and
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Dkt. #38). In doing
so, the Court certifies the proposed class and disposes of all claims in this class action
between Gay and the class members, on the one hand, and Defendant Mortgage
Contracting Services, LLC (“MCS”) on the other.
The Court also GRANTS Lead Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Attorney’s
Fees, Costs, and Service Award. (Dkt. #31).
I. B ACKGROUND
Gay and MCS have agreed to settle the claims in this class action. The
proposed settlement follows from nearly two years of litigation arising from an
alleged data breach that compromised MCS’s computer systems. After obtaining
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 1 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
2
preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement on July 3, 2025, Gay and class
counsel now seek final approval and an award of attorney’s fees and expenses.
A. The Data Incident
MCS is a nationwide property services provider headquartered in Lewisville,
Texas. (Dkt. #38 at 4). According to Gay, during the course of its business, MCS
“collected and maintained highly sensitive” personal identifiable information (“PII”)
belonging to its current and former employees and customers, including names and
Social Security numbers. (Dkt. #38 at 4).
In December 2023, cybercriminals gained unauthorized access to MCS’s
computer systems during a data security breach (the “Data Incident”). (Dkt. #38 at 4);
see also (Dkt. #4-1) (MCS’s notice of data security incident). Gay asserts that “the
unauthorized actor may have acquired files” containing the PII “of current and former
[MCS] employees and customers” including Gay. (Dkt. #38 at 4).
B. The Resulting Class Action Litigation
Gay filed this putative class action against MCS in March 2024. (Dkt. #1). The
Complaint asserted claims for (1) negligence, (2) negligence per se, (3) intrusion upon
seclusion / invasion of privacy, (4) breach of implied contract, (5) unjust enrichment,
(6) breach of fiduciary duty, and (7) breach of confidence. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 98–174). Gay
sought damages, injunctive relief, and other equitable relief. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 175).
Thereafter, Gay filed an Amended Complaint alleging the same causes of action.
(Dkt. #4). MCS filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, which was fully
briefed by the parties. (Dkt. #13, 18, 21). Then, in March 2025, the parties notified
the Court of a joint settlement. (Dkt. #24).
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 2 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
3
Class 	counsel 	diligently 	litigated 	the 	case, 	finalizing 	and 	executing 	the
settlement in June 2025. (Dkt. #38 at 5). Class counsel’s efforts to secure the proposed
settlement included months of negotiations with counsel for MCS. (Dkt. #38 at 5).
C. The Proposed Class Action Settlement
The proposed class settlement disposes of all claims in this class action and
provides relief available to all class members. The proposed class includes “all
individuals in the United States whose PII was impacted by the Data Incident[,]
including all those who were sent notice of the Data Incident.” (Dkt. #38-2 at 4).
The proposed class settlement provides several categories of relief to class
members. First, the proposed class settlement provides uncapped monetary relief for
documented losses attributable to the Data Incident. (Dkt. #38 at 5). Class members
may submit claims for reimbursement of “extraordinary out of pocket losses” of up to
$5,000 per claimant for identity fraud and theft-related losses “more likely than not
caused by the Data Incident” or “ordinary out-of-pocket losses” of up to $500 per
claimant for expenses incurred because of the Data Incident. (Dkt. #38 at 5–6). Class
members who spend time responding to the Data Incident may recover compensation
at $25 per hour for up to three hours. (Dkt. #38 at 6). Second, the proposed settlement
class members are entitled to receive two years of credit monitoring and identity theft
protection, and $1 million in identity theft insurance free of charge. (Dkt. #38 at 6).
Third, MCS will pay the costs of settlement administration and notice, and class
counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs and Plaintiff’s service award. (Dkt. #38 at 6).
Following the Court’s preliminary approval of the proposed class action
settlement on July 3, 2025, (Dkt. #30), Gay diligently notified the potential class
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 3 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
4
members of the proposed settlement. Potential class members were notified by
postcard notice, resulting in delivery of notices to 2,293 of the 2,319 potential class
members.1 (Dkt. #38 at 8). No class members objected to the proposed settlement or
requested exclusion from the proposed settlement. (Dkt. #38 at 8). Further, a CAFA
notice was issued to the attorneys general of every U.S. state and territory and to the
U.S. Attorney General; no objections or questions were received. (Dkt. #38 at 8).
Gay now moves for final approval of the proposed class settlement and for
attorney’s fees and expenses. (Dkt. #31, #38). MCS does not oppose these motions.
The Court held a settlement fairness hearing on February 20, 2026, to evaluate the
proposed settlement’s fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy to all class members.
(Dkt. #41). No class members appeared at the hearing. See (Dkt. #41). Also, the
October 3, 2025, deadline for objecting to the proposed class settlement or requesting
exclusion from it has passed. (Dkt. #38 at 8).
II. LEGAL S TANDARD
The Court’s responsibilities in evaluating a class action settlement run not only
to the named parties, but also to the unnamed class members. The Court must ensure
that the class members receive adequate notice of the settlement and an opportunity
to object or request exclusion from it. F ED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1); Pettway v. Am. Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1219 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court also must ensure that
that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to the class members under
1 These notices were delivered through a third-party administrator. The administrator
also maintained a webpage and toll-free number to inform class members of the settlement
and instruct them on submitting claims. (Dkt. #38 at 6–7).
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 4 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
5
the four factors enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2): (1) adequacy
of the representation, (2) fairness of the negotiations (i.e., whether the negotiations
were at arm’s length), (3) adequacy of the relief, and (4) equitability of treatment to
class members. The adequacy of relief factor turns on several considerations,
including the risks of proceeding to trial.2 F ED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C).
In addition to the nonexclusive Rule 23 factors, courts in this circuit often
consider the Reed factors in evaluating the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of
a proposed class settlement: “(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the
settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the
stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of
plaintiffs’ success on the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the
opinions of the class counsel, class representatives, and absent class members.”
Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted);
ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:16-CV-1414, 2019 WL 6219933, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
21, 2019) (observing that “courts in this circuit often combine [the Rule 23 and Reed
factors] in analyzing class settlements.”).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds that the motion for final approval of the proposed class
settlement should be granted. The proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and
2 The Rule 23 factors were added by amendment in 2018. According to the Advisory
Committee, these factors do not “displace any factor” sanctioned by the circuit courts. FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) Advisory Committee’s Note to 2018 Amendments. Instead, they were added
to “focus the court and the lawyers on the core concerns of procedure and substance that
should guide the decision whether to approve the proposal.” Id.
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 5 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
6
adequate to the class members. The class members each received adequate notice of
the settlement and the settlement will be effectively distributed through the plan of
allocation. The Court therefore certifies the proposed class, approves the class
settlement, and awards Gay and class counsel the requested attorney’s fees and
expenses.
A. The Proposed Class Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate.
The proposed class settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under both the
Rule 23 and Reed factors.
i. Adequacy of class representation.
The record establishes that Gay and class counsel adequately represented the
settlement class in litigating this complex data-breach case and in negotiating the
proposed settlement agreement. Gay has suffered the same alleged injuries as the
other class members. His motivations are therefore aligned with the other class
members, reducing the likelihood of a conflict of interest. In re Polaroid ERISA Litig.,
240 F.R.D. 65, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Where plaintiffs and class members share the
common goal of maximizing recovery, there is no conflict of interest between the class
representatives and other class members.”). Gay also actively participated in the case
by communicating with counsel and participating in settlement negotiations, further
demonstrating the adequacy of his representation. (Dkt. #32-2 ¶¶ 3–6).
Class counsel diligently prosecuted the case on behalf of the class. In addition
to 	drafting 	pleadings 	and 	negotiating 	the 	settlement 	agreement, 	counsel 	also
investigated the claims and engaged in initial discovery. (Dkt. #38 at 11–12). Counsel
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 6 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
7
was competent and informed, and ably represented not only Gay but also the
proposed class.
ii. Arm’s length negotiations, fraud, and collusion.
The proposed settlement agreement is not the product of fraud or collusion;
instead, it arises from extensive arm’s length negotiations between sophisticated
counsel. The parties entered the proposed settlement agreement after investigating
the class’s claims, engaging in informal discovery to ensure class counsel had
sufficient facts and information to make an informed decision regarding resolution of
the 	class’s 	claims, 	and conducting 	multiple 	rounds 	of 	settlement 	negotiations.
(Dkt. #38 at 11–12). There is no evidence that the proposed settlement has been
coerced through fraud or collusion. In any event, the Court may presume the absence
of any fraud or collusion when, as here, no evidence has been presented to the
contrary. See Welsh v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No. 5:16-CV-1062-DAE, 2018 WL
7283639, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2018) (“The Court may . . . presume that no fraud
or collusion occurred between opposing counsel in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary.”).
iii. Adequacy of relief; expected complexity, expense, and duration of
the litigation.
The proposed settlement agreement provides adequate relief to the class. It
achieves Gay’s aims in this litigation in that it provides compensation for the class’s
alleged losses and protection against future risk arising from the Data Incident.
Consequently, 	the 	relief 	provided 	in 	the 	proposed 	settlement 	is 	adequate 	to
compensate the class.
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 7 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
8
This is especially true when the case involves complex issues like those
presented in this data-breach class action. There is “an overriding public interest in
favor 	of 	settlement, 	particularly 	in 	class 	actions 	that 	have 	the 	well-deserved
reputation as being most complex.” Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.,
211 F.R.D. 457, 466 (S.D. Fla. 2002). “When the prospect of ongoing litigation
threatens to impose high costs of time and money on the parties, the reasonableness
of approving a mutually-agreeable settlement is strengthened.” Klein v. O’Neal, Inc.,
705 F.Supp.2d 632, 651 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Ayers v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356, 369
(5th Cir. 2004). Settlement “avoids the risks and burdens of potentially protracted
litigation” and consequently, courts favor settling complex data-breach cases such as
this. See Ayers, 358 F.3d at 369. Because any future recovery would be burdensome
and unpredictable, Gay opted for a settlement that is immediate and guaranteed.
That settlement will adequately and fairly compensate the class.
Further, the Court accords great weight to class counsel’s support for the
proposed settlement agreement. Klein, 705 F.Supp.2d at 649 (holding that “[t]he Fifth
Circuit has repeatedly stated that the opinion of class counsel should be accorded
great weight” when evaluating class settlement). Here, class counsel is highly
experienced in this type of litigation. (Dkt. #29 ¶¶ 9, 15–22). Consequently, they
understand data-breach class actions and the factors to consider when litigating
them. Therefore, the Court may rely upon the judgment of class counsel. See Stott v.
Capital Fin. Servs., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 316, 346 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (“As class counsel tends
to be the most familiar with the intricacies of a class action lawsuit and settlement,
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 8 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
9
‘the trial court is entitled to rely upon the judgment of experienced counsel for the
parties.’”).
iv. Equitable distribution.
The 	proposed 	settlement’s 	allocation 	plan 	equitably 	distributes 	proceeds
between the class members. When an allocation plan is “formulated by competent
and experienced counsel,” 	it will 	generally be upheld if it is 	supported by a
“reasonable, 	rational 	basis.” 	In 	re 	IMAX 	Sec. 	Litig., 	283 	F.R.D. 	178, 	192
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (cleaned up).
Here, the allocation plan is supported by a reasonable basis. The settlement
administrator notified all class members using the same methods, resulting in notice
being delivered to over 98% of class members whose valid mailing addresses could be
identified. (Dkt. #38 at 8, 14). Each class member who received notice was afforded
the same options. (Dkt. #38 at 14). While each class member may recover different
amounts, the relief afforded is no less equitable, as it compensates each class member
for their “relative” losses. See Spegele v. USAA Life Ins. Co., No. 5:17-CV-967-OLG,
2021 WL 4935978, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2021) (approving a settlement that
awarded differing recoveries based on a formula that considered class members’
“relative” losses).
v. Stage of proceedings and discovery efforts.
The stage of proceedings and discovery efforts factor also weighs in favor of
approving the proposed settlement. In evaluating this factor, the key issue is whether
the parties and court possess sufficient information to “evaluate the merits of the
competing positions.” Ayers, 358 F.3d at 369. Even when the parties “have not
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 9 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
10
conducted much formal discovery,” this factor can be satisfied when other information
demonstrates that the settlement should be approved. Klein, 705 F.Supp.2d at 653;
see also Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir.
2012) (“[F]ormal discovery is not a prerequisite to approving a [class] settlement as
reasonable.”). That conclusion flows naturally from the general principle that early
settlements should be encouraged, not hindered, so long as the parties have obtained
the “desired quantum of information necessary to achieve a settlement.” Jenkins v.
Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 300 F.R.D. 291, 304 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (cleaned up).
Here, the parties have obtained ample information to achieve an informed
settlement. While they have not engaged in extensive discovery, the parties have
conducted initial discovery, which included exchanging written discovery requests
and responses thereto. (Dkt. #38 at 11). This initial discovery allowed class counsel
to “understand the landscape affecting settlement.” (Dkt. #38 at 11).
vi. Probability of success on the merits.
The proposed settlement’s fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy is further
demonstrated by the uncertainty of success should the case proceed to trial. When
there has been no showing of fraud or collusion, the probability of success is the most
important factor in evaluating a proposed settlement. Smith v. Crystian, 91 F.App’x
952, 955 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204,
1209 (5th Cir. 1982)). This factor requires the court to “compare the terms of the
settlement with the rewards the class would have been likely to receive following a
successful trial.” DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., 240 F.R.D. 269, 287 (W.D. Tex. 2007). But
in comparing the settlement’s terms with the potential rewards at trial, the court
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 10 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
11
must avoid “try[ing] the case in the settlement hearings.” Reed, 703 F.2d at 172. That
would undermine the settlement’s “very purpose,” which is to “avoid the delay and
expense of such a trial.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the claims against MCS are hotly contested and difficult to prove.
Against Gay’s efforts to develop these claims, MCS has retained sophisticated counsel
to oppose these efforts and would likely continue opposing them through trial and
appeal. Moreover, even if Gay established MCS’s liability for the alleged Data
Incident, he would face additional challenges certifying a class and establishing
damages on a class-wide basis. For example, it is likely that MCS would vigorously
dispute the connection between the Data Incident and any alleged damages suffered
by class members. If Gay could prove the connection, MCS could still dispute what
portion of the breach was attributable to its actions as opposed to other causes.
The result would likely be a protracted battle of the experts that is avoided
through the proposed settlement. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201,
236, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (approving class action settlement in securities litigation in
which competing positions on damages issues would have devolved into a “battle of
the experts”); In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. CV-05-2165, 2009 WL
512081, at *14 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2009) (“Because the jury would have been faced with
competing expert opinions, the resulting damage award would have been highly
unpredictable.”).
vii. Range and certainty of recovery.
The range and certainty of recovery factor also weighs in favor of approving
the 	proposed 	settlement. 	In 	evaluating 	this 	factor, 	the 	Court 	must 	begin 	by
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 11 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
12
establishing a “range of possible damages that could be recovered at trial.” Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 460 (5th Cir. 1983) (cleaned up). After establishing the
range of possible damages that could be recovered at trial, the Court then determines
whether the settlement is “pegged at a [fair] point in the range” in light of the
“likelihood of prevailing at trial and other relevant factors.” Id. (cleaned up).
As explained in the discussion of the above factors, see supra Part III.A.i.–vi.,
Gay and the class faced considerable risks in proceeding to trial. Considering these
risks, it is far from guaranteed that the class would have recovered even a fraction of
the total amount in controversy. In contrast to the risk of trial, the proposed
settlement achieves everything Gay desired when he filed his complaint. Namely, the
proposed settlement provides uncapped monetary relief to compensate class members
for any alleged damages arising from the Data Incident and protection from any
future incidents free of charge. (Dkt. #38 at 5–6).
viii. Opinions of participants and absent class members.
The 	virtually 	unanimous 	support 	for 	the 	proposed 	settlement 	also
demonstrates its fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy. The named parties and
class counsel all believe that the proposed settlement is a favorable outcome for both
the active participants in the litigation and the absent class members. That the
parties and class counsel unanimously support the proposed settlement is an
important fact weighing in favor of its approval because, “absent fraud, collusion, or
the like,” the Court “should be hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of
counsel.” Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977). And here, the parties
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 12 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
13
and counsel, all of whom are sophisticated, have vigorously defended their respective
positions, lending further support for the settlement’s fairness.
In addition to the named parties and class counsel, the absent class members
also appear to support the proposed settlement. Out of nearly 2,300 potential class
members who received notice of the settlement, no potential class members objected
to the proposed settlement or validly requested to be excluded from it. (Dkt. #38 at 8).
This lack of objection from the class members supports the “adequacy of the
settlement.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M,
2018 WL 1942227, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2018) (cleaned up).
B. The 	Class 	Members 	Received 	Adequate 	Notice 	of 	the 	Proposed
Settlement.
The Court also finds that the class members received adequate notice of the
proposed settlement. The adequacy of a class settlement notice is not governed by
“rigid rules.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 114 (2d Cir.
2005), superseded on other grounds by Moses v. N.Y. Times Co., 79 F.4th 235, 243
(2d Cir. 2023); Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 2018 WL 1942227, at *3 n.1. Instead, the
notice must satisfy the “broad reasonableness standard[]” imposed by due process
and Rule 23(e). In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 197 (5th Cir. 2010)
(cleaned up). To satisfy that standard, the notice must provide class members with
“information reasonably necessary” to decide whether to object to the settlement or
not. Id. The standard does not require “actual notice to each party” to be bound by
the settlement. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 2018 WL 1942227, at *3 n.1 (citing
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 13 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
14
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14, 70 S.Ct. 652,
94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)).
Here, the class notices were adequate both in timing and content. In terms of
timing, 	class 	counsel 	published 	and 	distributed 	the 	class 	settlement 	notices
approximately two months before the deadline to object to the settlement. (Dkt. #38
at 8). These efforts resulted in delivery of notices to nearly 2,300 potential class
members before the objection deadline. (Dkt. #38 at 8). The Court finds, therefore,
that the notice procedures provided class members ample time to object to the
settlement if they wished to do so. See DeJulius v. New England Health Care Emps.
Pension Fund, 429 F.3d 935, 947 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the class members
received adequate notice of a class settlement when the notices were “sent out nearly
two weeks prior to the settlement hearing”).
In terms of content, the notices adequately informed the class members of the
nature of the settlement and the procedures for objecting or submitting a claim. The
notices were delivered via postcards to valid, up-to-date mailing addresses, (Dkt. #38
at 8), increasing the likelihood that class members would receive the notices and
understand them. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 2018 WL 1942227, at *3 (holding
that 	notices 	delivered 	through 	similar 	procedures 	satisfied 	the 	Rule 	23
requirements). These efforts satisfy due process and Rule 23.
C. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements for Class Certification.
The proposed class also meets the requirements for class certification and
should be certified. The Court first addresses the threshold requirements for class
certification under Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 14 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
15
representation. The Court then addresses the additional requirements for class
certification under Rule 23(b), concluding that class certification is justified under the
predominance 	and 	superiority 	prong. 	A 	proposed 	class 	must 	satisfy 	these
requirements even when it is certified for settlement purposes only.
Here, the proposed class includes all individuals in the United States whose
PII was impacted by the Data Incident, including all those who were sent notice of
the Data Incident, (Dkt. #38-1 at 11–12).
i. Numerosity.
The proposed class is sufficiently numerous that “joinder of all members is
impracticable.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). Gay’s evidence shows that the proposed class
contains almost three thousand members. (Dkt. # 38 at 15). Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has met his burden to show that the proposed class is so numerous
that joinder is impracticable as required by Rule 23(a)(1). See Seeligson v. Devon
Energy Prod. Co., No. 3:16-CV-82-K, 2017 WL 68013, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2017)
(finding numerosity requirement satisfied where proposed class contained “over
several thousand members” and defendants did not contest numerosity), overruled on
other 	grounds, 	753 	F.App’x 	225, 	231 	(5th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(per 	curiam); 	see 	also
McWilliams v. Advanced Recovery Sys., Inc., 310 F.R.D. 337, 339 (S.D. Miss. 2015)
(determining joinder of all members was impracticable where class consisted of
hundreds of members); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624–25
(5th Cir. 1999) (concluding numerosity requirement was met where it would be
difficult or inconvenient to join all “100 to 150” class members).
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 15 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
16
ii. Commonality.
The proposed class shares common questions of law or fact. All class members
share the same questions with their claims, such as whether MCS failed in its duties
to protect their PII and thus harmed them. These questions satisfy the commonality
factor. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. v. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
851 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (explaining that questions linking class
members must be “apt to drive the resolution of the litigation” by generating
“common” answers (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350, 131 S.Ct.
2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011))).
iii. Typicality.
Gay’s claims against MCS are typical of those belonging to the class. He alleges
that he suffered the same alleged injuries as the other class members arising from
the same alleged wrongdoing. See, e.g., Rooney v. EZCORP, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 439, 446
(W.D. Tex. 2019) (holding that plaintiff shareholder’s claims were typical of those
belonging to the class, where “[a]ll putative class members, including [p]laintiff,
allegedly purchased . . . stock during the class period at prices inflated” by the
defendants).
iv. Adequacy of representation.
Gay and class counsel fairly and adequately represented the class. See supra
Part III.A.i. As he alleges to have suffered the same injury as the other class
members, he has the same interests as the rest of the class. There is no conflict of
interest between Gay and the class, and Gay is entitled to the same benefits under
the settlement. Further, Gay’s request for a service award does not impact what the
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 16 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
17
class will receive. Additionally, class counsel was competent and experienced, ably
representing the class. Class counsel’s efforts to secure a favorable settlement
included investigating the claims and negotiating a favorable settlement.
v. Predominance and superiority.
In addition to meeting the threshold requirements for class certification under
Rule 23(a), the proposed class also satisfies the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) is designed to “achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable
results.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615, 117 S.Ct. 2231,
138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (cleaned up). The rule’s twin requirements of “predominance”
and “superiority” must each be satisfied. See, e.g., Sykes v. Mel. S. Harris & Assocs.
LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing Rule 23(b)(3)’s “disjunctive
inquiry,” 	which 	requires 	separate 	determinations 	as 	to 	“predominance” 	and
“superiority”); see also Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 615.
Here, the class issues predominate over individual issues. That is true because
the class members share identical claims against MCS. And each claim presents
virtually identical questions of law and fact, except that some class member may have
suffered different amounts of damages compared to others.
Class adjudication is also superior to individual adjudication of the issues in
these types of cases. Many class members would be unmotivated to prosecute their
claims because the “cost of bringing individual suits” would likely “outweigh the
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 17 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
18
recovery obtained.” Rooney, 330 F.R.D. at 451–52. Class adjudication resolves the
claims quickly and more efficiently than deciding each claim on an individual basis.
* 	* 	*
Because the proposed class meets both the threshold requirements for class
certification under Rule 23(a) as well as the additional requirements of predominance
and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court concludes that the proposed class
should be and is certified.
D. Class Counsel Is Entitled to Attorney’s Fees.
Class counsel has established not only the fairness of the proposed settlement
and grounds for certifying the class, but also a basis for recovering attorney’s fees.
Under the common fund doctrine, a lawyer can retain a reasonable portion of a fund
obtained on behalf of others. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478, 100 S.Ct.
745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980) (“[T]his Court has recognized consistently that a litigant
or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself
or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.”). The
common fund doctrine ensures that attorneys are fairly compensated for their efforts
and encourages them to undertake risky litigation for which no reward is guaranteed.
See id.; Barton v. Drummond Co., 636 F.2d 978, 982 (5th Cir. 1981).
To invoke the common fund doctrine in a class action case, a lawyer must
demonstrate 	his 	compliance 	with 	Rule 	23’s 	procedural 	requirements 	and 	the
reasonableness of the fees requested. Here, Gay’s counsel complied with Rule 23’s
procedural requirements by notifying the class members of the requested fees
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 18 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
19
through mail and a website—affording each class member an opportunity to object—
and by filing a motion requesting the fees. F ED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
Gay’s counsel also established the reasonableness of the fees requested. In
common fund cases, the Court may evaluate the reasonableness of the requested fees
using one of two methods: the percentage method or the lodestar method. See Union
Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G., 669 F.3d at 644 (“We join the majority of circuits in
allowing our district courts the flexibility to choose between the percentage and
lodestar methods in common fund cases, with their analyses under either approach
informed by the Johnson considerations.”).
Alternatively, the court may employ both methods, checking them against each
other, to confirm the reasonableness of the total award. See, e.g., Evans v. TIN, Inc.,
No. CV 11-2067, 2013 WL 4501061, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2013). No matter the
method employed, the Court must always apply the twelve Johnson factors to
determine whether the award should be adjusted, either upward or downward, based
on the facts and circumstances of the case. Torres v. SGE Mgmt., L.L.C., 945 F.3d
347, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714,
717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)). Although the Court must explain how each factor affects the
award, the explanation “need not be meticulously detailed.” In re High Sulfur Content
Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 220, 228 (5th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
As explained below, the Court finds that the requested attorney’s fees are
reasonable under the percentage method. The fees require no adjustment under the
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 19 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
20
Johnson factors. A lodestar cross-check also confirms the reasonableness of the
requested fees.
i. Percentage method.
The requested fees are reasonable under the percentage method. In keeping
with its name, this method awards counsel a fixed percentage of the recovery
obtained. Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G., 669 F.3d at 642–44. The percentage
method is often the preferred method for calculating reasonable attorney’s fees in
common fund cases because it “aligns the interests of class counsel [and] . . . the class
members,” encouraging successes and penalizing failure. Id. at 643; In re Rite Aid
Corp. 	Sec. 	Litig., 	396 	F.3d 	294, 	300 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005). 	It 	also 	“allows 	for 	easy
computation” in complex cases. Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G., 669 F.3d at 643.
Here, Gay’s counsel requests an attorney’s fee award of $137,500, which
amounts to less than one percent of the $14.385 million maximum value available to
the class.3 (Dkt. #32 at 10); (Dkt. #42 ¶ 11). This request is reasonable. Recognizing
that common fund litigation is risky for counsel, on the one hand, and beneficial to
the public, on the other, courts frequently award attorney’s fees up to thirty-three
percent of the settlement fund. See Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F.Supp.2d
942, 972 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the
percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average
3 Class counsel calculated the maximum value available to the class by multiplying
2,877 class members by $5,000, the maximum relief available to each member for
“extraordinary losses.” (Dkt. #32 at 10); (Dkt. #32-1 at 6). The Court notes, however, that
2,943 unique class members were identified, (Dkt. #38 at 7), so the maximum value available
to the class is actually slightly higher than class counsel’s number, at $14.715 million. This
discrepancy does not change the attorney’s fees analysis.
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 20 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
21
around 	one-third 	of 	the 	recovery.”). 	Some 	courts 	have 	awarded 	even 	higher
percentages. See In re Bayou Sorrel Class Action, No. 6:04CV1101, 2006 WL 3230771,
at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2006) (awarding class counsel 36% of the common fund); In
re Combustion, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1116, 1132, 1135–36, 1138, 1140 (W.D. La. 1997)
(awarding class counsel 36% of the common fund, amounting to approximately $46
million).
Here, the requested fees are well below the maximum accepted range. And the
reasonableness of the fee award is supported further by the lack of any objection to
the request and by counsel’s competence and diligence in prosecuting the case.
ii. Johnson factors.
The fee award requires no adjustment under the Johnson factors. See Johnson,
488 F.2d at 717–19.
Time and Labor Required. Class counsel spent considerable time and labor
achieving the proposed settlement. The time and labor factor turns on more than the
number of hours worked. In common fund class action cases, in particular, an early
settlement often signals counsel’s “efficiency” and “effectiveness” compared to similar
cases that “unnecessarily dragged on for years.” See Schwartz v. TXU Corp., No. 3:02-
CV-2243-K, 2005 WL 3148350, at *29 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2005); see also In re Harrah’s
Ent., Inc., No. CV. 95-3925, 1998 WL 832574, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 1998) (observing
that “overly emphasiz[ing]” the hours worked can “penalize counsel for obtaining an
early settlement” and “distort the value of the attorneys’ services.”).
Here, 	class 	counsel 	achieved 	a 	favorable 	settlement 	relatively 	early 	in
proceedings—before extensive discovery. And class counsel obtained the favorable
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 21 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
22
settlement through significant effort: investigating the Data Incident pre-litigation,
interviewing potential plaintiffs, drafting the complaint, preparing and defending
against MCS’s motion to dismiss, preparing the Rule 26(f) report and attending the
conference, engaging in extensive negotiations, negotiating the term sheet and
settlement agreement, drafting the motion for preliminary approval and supporting
exhibits, 	coordinating 	with 	the 	settlement 	administrator 	on 	settlement
administration, and preparing the fee motion. (Dkt. #32 at 11–12). The Court finds
that the requested fee award adequately compensates class counsel for these efforts,
requiring no adjustment.
Novelty and Difficulty of Issues; Undesirability of Case. Data breach
litigation is a rapidly developing area of the law that poses complex issues, including
unsettled standing issues. See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 767–69
(8th Cir. 2017) (discussing traceability and injury in fact in data breach litigation); In
re Sonic Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2807, 2019 WL
3773737, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2019) (“The realm of data breach litigation is
complex and largely undeveloped.”); Fulton-Green v. Accolade, Inc., No. 18-274,
2019 WL 4677954, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2019) (“This is a complex case in a risky
field 	of 	litigation 	because 	data 	breach 	class 	actions 	are 	uncertain 	and 	class
certification is rare.”); Cotter v. Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc., No. 8:19-CV-1386-
VMC-CPT, 2021 WL 3773414, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2021) (noting data breach
class actions present “serious risks” due, in part, to “the ever-developing law
surrounding data breach cases”). The requested fee award adequately compensates
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 22 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
23
counsel for undertaking a difficult and relatively undesirable case. No adjustment is
required under these factors.
Skill Required; Attorney Experience, Reputation, and Ability. Because
of the difficulty and complexity of the issues, this case required skilled attorneys.4
Here, the attorneys for both sides were adequately skilled to meet these demands:
they were reputable, competent, and accomplished.
As previously discussed, data breach class actions require substantial skill and
expertise. See, e.g., In re Sonic Corp., 	2019 WL 3773737, at *10 (noting the
“professional 	skill” 	of 	class 	counsel 	in 	the 	context 	of 	“unsettled 	data 	breach
litigation”); Fulton-Green, 2019 WL 4677954, at *13 (holding that class counsel’s
“substantial experience in class action litigation, including data breach class actions
. . . weighs in favor of determining that the fee is reasonable”). Further, class counsel
used informal discovery and engaged in extensive negotiations to secure substantial
and speedy benefits on behalf of the class. Lara v. Lubbock Heart Hosp., LLC, No.
5:23-CV-36 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2024), (Dkt. #50 at 26) (finding that the third factor
supported approval because class counsel used “informal discovery and mediation to
achieve a speedy and fair settlement”).
Because the requested fee award accounts for the skill required to litigate this
case and counsel’s experience, reputation, and ability, no adjustment is required
under these factors.
4 In evaluating the skill required for a particular case, the district court judge’s “past
experience as a lawyer” and his “observation[s] from the bench” are “highly important.” In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F.Supp.2d 732, 789 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718).
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 23 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
24
Preclusion from Other Employment. Class counsel spent nearly 200 hours
litigating this case, (Dkt. #42 ¶ 7), a substantial time commitment that likely
precluded counsel from working on other matters. See Schwartz, 2005 WL 3148350,
at *31 (“The time spent by [class] counsel on this case was at the expense of time that
counsel could have devoted to other matters.”); Burford v. Cargill, Inc., No. 05-0283,
2012 WL 5471985, at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 8, 2012) (holding that the preclusion-from-
employment factor weighed in favor of a “substantial fee award” because the class
attorneys “were often times precluded from working on other cases due to the
demands of the instant matter”). Because the requested fee award adequately
compensates counsel for investing considerable time into this matter, this factor does
not require any adjustment.
Fixed or Contingent Fee; Customary Fee in the Community; Awards in
Similar Cases. Class counsel litigated this case on a contingency basis. (Dkt. #32
at 15). 	That 	basis 	supports 	the 	requested 	fee 	award. 	In 	undertaking 	this
representation, counsel invested significant time and resources with no guaranteed
return. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Lawyers who are to
be compensated only in the event of victory expect and are entitled to be paid more
when successful than those who are assured of compensation regardless of result.”),
overruled on other grounds by Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp.,
790 F.2d 1174, 1175–76 (5th Cir. 1986).
When class actions are litigated on a contingency basis in the Eastern District
of Texas, counsel is customarily awarded fees ranging from twenty-five percent of the
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 24 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
25
settlement 	fund 	to 	over 	thirty-three 	percent 	of 	the 	settlement 	fund. 	Shaw,
91 F.Supp.2d at 972 (“[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the
recovery.”); see also Marcus v. J.C. Penney Co., No. 6:13-CV-736, 2017 WL 6590976,
at *6 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017) (“It is not unusual for attorneys’ fees awarded under
the percentage method to range between 25% to 30% of the [settlement] fund or
more.”), report and recommendation adopted by No. 6:13-CV-736, 2018 WL 307024
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2018); Ramirez v. J.C. Penney Corp., 2017 WL 6462355, at *5
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2017) (same), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL
6453012 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017).
Here, because the requested fee award adequately compensates counsel for
undertaking a class action on a contingency basis, and because the requested fee
award is customary in the community and matches those awarded in similar cases,
these factors do not require any adjustment.
Amount Involved and Results Obtained. The amount in controversy in this
case 	is 	significant. 	However, 	class 	counsel 	obtained 	a 	significant 	amount—a
maximum of $5,000 per class member and future protection for their PII free of
charge. When considering the results obtained, “both the Supreme Court and the
Fifth Circuit have explicitly rejected the notion that an award of attorneys’ fees must
be ‘proportional’ to the damages awarded to a successful plaintiff.” Pittman v.
Sw. Bell Tel. L.P., No. SA-20-CA-01262-XR, 2022 WL 20508220, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 16, 2022). Here, class counsel succeeded in obtaining substantial monetary relief
for all individuals in the class. Further, the proposed settlement requires MCS to
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 25 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
26
implement data security upgrades at its own cost, reducing future risk to class
members. Therefore, this factor supports the requested fee award without need for
any adjustment.
Time Limitations; Nature and Length of Relationship with Client. The
time limitations and client relationship factors also do not require any adjustment to
the requested fee award. For time limitations, the parties have not identified any
timing constraints imposed by the clients or circumstances. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
2018 WL 1942227, at *11 (“This factor does not apply in this case because there is no
indication that Lead Plaintiff imposed any time limits in the prosecution of this
case.”); see also In re Combustion, Inc., 968 F.Supp. at 1135 (“Even though it is
apparent that the Johnson factors must be addressed to ensure that the resulting fee
is reasonable, not every factor need be necessarily considered.”).
As for the nature and length of the client relationship, the Court finds that
class counsel ably represented the class beginning in 2024. Both class counsel and
Gay actively participated in the litigation for its full duration. Considering counsel’s
dedication to Gay and to the class stretching more than a year, the requested fee
award adequately compensates counsel. That conclusion is supported by the fact that
Gay and class counsel maintained “an effective and professional relationship”
throughout the litigation process. (Dkt. #32-1 ¶ 13); see also Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
2018 WL 1942227, at *12 (finding that this factor weighed in favor of a requested fee
award when “the professional relationship with Lead Plaintiff was positive”).
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 26 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
27
iii. Lodestar cross-check.
A lodestar cross-check confirms the reasonableness of the fees requested. The
lodestar method focuses on the work performed as opposed to the recovery obtained.
To calculate the lodestar, the court multiplies the attorney’s hourly rate by the hours
worked. See Hobbs v. EVO Inc., 7 F.4th 241, 259 (5th Cir. 2021).
Here, counsel submitted affidavits and declarations supporting a lodestar
amount of $126,782.50. (Dkt. #42-1 ¶ 3). The affidavits and declarations do not
include contemporaneous billing records, detailed time entries, or proof of the rate
typically charged in the community, as would typically be required to support a claim
for attorney’s fees. See McClain, 649 F.3d at 381–82. Nevertheless, the submitted
affidavits and declarations are sufficient under the circumstances. No party objected
to the fee request. And the Court is employing the lodestar method only as a rough
cross-check to confirm the reasonableness of the percentage award. Turner v. Murphy
Oil USA, Inc., 472 F.Supp.2d 830, 867 (E.D. La. 2007) (observing that, in performing
a lodestar cross-check, the court need not employ “mathematical precision” or
scrutinize each time entry, and “representations by class counsel as to total hours
[worked] may be sufficient” (cleaned up)).
When a lodestar cross-check is applied to a class-action fee award in a common
fund case, courts frequently use a multiplier ranging from one to four to evaluate the
reasonableness of the percentage method calculation. See, e.g., Burford, 2012 WL
5471985, at *6 n.1 (approving a 1.78 multiplier and remarking that courts frequently
approve multipliers ranging from 1 to 4); Di Giacomo v. Plains All Am. Pipeline,
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 27 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
28
No. Civ.A.H-99-4137, 2001 WL 34633373, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2001) (approving
a 5.3 multiplier in a securities class action).
Here, the Johnson factors, for the reasons explained above, see supra Part
III.D.ii., support a $137,500.00 attorney’s fee award—which is the lodestar amount
multiplied 1.07 times. That multiplier falls in the commonly accepted range. The
Court thus finds that the lodestar cross-check confirms the reasonableness of the
requested fee award.
E. Gay May Recover Reasonable Expenses.
Gay may recover reasonable expenses incurred during the litigation. Gay
requests $3,000.00 for the considerable time he invested in the case communicating
with counsel, reviewing documents, and participating in settlement negotiations.
(Dkt. #32-2 ¶¶ 3–7, 9–10).
The Court agrees that Gay invested considerable time and effort to this case
and awards Gay the requested recovery of $3,000.00. The award is below what courts
have awarded in other class action cases. See, e.g., Burford, 2012 WL 5471985, at *6
(awarding named plaintiffs up to $15,000.00 in compensation for efforts expended
representing 	the 	class); 	In 	re 	Catfish 	Antitrust 	Litig., 	939 	F.Supp. 	493, 	504
(N.D. Miss. 1996) (awarding $10,000.00).
IV. C ONCLUSION
The parties and counsel have diligently litigated this case and achieved a
favorable settlement not only for the named parties, but also for the absent class
members. The reasonableness of the settlement is reflected by the lack of any
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 28 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>
29
objection to it. The Court finds that the proposed settlement should be approved, the
class certified, and the requested fees and expenses awarded.
It is therefore ORDERED as follows:
1. 	The Court finally approves the proposed settlement agreement, (Dkt. #38), as
fair, reasonable, and adequate under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Its
terms shall bind all class members.
2. 	The Court finally certifies a class of all individuals in the United States whose
PII was impacted by the Data Incident, including all those who were sent
notice of the Data Incident.
3. 	The Court dismisses with prejudice all claims in this action between the class
and Defendants.
4. 	The Court approves the parties’ proposed allocation plan as a fair and
reasonable method of allocating the settlement fund among class members.
The Court directs the parties to distribute through the claims administer the
settlement fund in accordance with the settlement agreement and stipulation.
(Dkt. #38).
5. 	The Court awards class counsel $137,500.00 in attorney’s fees and expenses.
The Court awards lead Plaintiff Lane Gay $3,000.00 for expenses.
Case 4:24-cv-00217-SDJ Document 43 Filed 04/22/26 Page 29 of 29 PageID #:
<pageID>

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.